Mpunzwana v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MPUNZWANA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2009] FMCA 901
MIGRATION – Review of Migration Review Tribunal decision – subclass 485 visa – refusal – extension of time to bring proceedings – Wednesbury unreasonableness relevant only to discretionary decisions.
Migration Act 1958, ss.5, 65, 362B, 417, 477
Migration Regulations 1994, reg.1.15C, cl.485.215, cl.485.222 of sch.2
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, r.44.12
General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Kamal [2009] FCAFC 98
NAVX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287
Applicant: ABEL GARIKAI MPUNZWANA
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: PEG 108 of 2009
Judgment of: Cameron FM
Hearing date: 7 September 2009
Date of Last Submission: 7 September 2009
Delivered at: Perth
Delivered on: 7 September 2009

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The time within which to bring these proceedings be extended to 2 July 2009.

  2. Pursuant to r.44.12 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, the application be dismissed.

  3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $2,935.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
PERTH

PEG 108 of 2009

ABEL GARIKAI MPUNZWANA

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Zimbabwe. On 24 December 2007 he applied for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) subclass 485 visa. A delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the application on 12 December 2008 on the basis that the applicant failed to satisfy cl.485.215 of sch.2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (“Regulations”). The applicant subsequently applied to the Migration Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) for a review of that departmental decision. He was unsuccessful before the Tribunal and has applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

  2. The matter is before the Court today for consideration of the applicant’s application that the respondents show cause why relief should not be granted to him.

  3. At a hearing to determine whether an order to show cause should be made, the order will not be made and instead the proceedings will be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12 of the Rules of Court, if the applicant does not have an arguable case against the respondents.

  4. The authorities show that such a dismissal will not be ordered except where the lack of a cause of action is clearly demonstrated (General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 per Barwick CJ at 129), the claim is groundless (Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62

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Details
Case
[2009] FMCA 901
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Mpunzwana v Minister for Immigration & Anor involves an application for an extension of time in filing an application to the Federal Magistrates Court regarding a migration decision. The application was not filed within the statutory 35-day period stipulated by Section 477 of the Migration Act. The court must now determine if an extension of time can be granted under the specific conditions outlined in Section 477(2) of the Act. The applicant, Mpunzwana, contends that various factors such as personal hardship, insufficient funds, and a misdelivered letter contributed to the delay in filing his application. The court is required to consider whether these circumstances justify an extension of time, thereby addressing the legal issues concerning the interpretation and application of Section 477(2) in this context.

The court's task is to assess whether the applicant's written application and oral submissions adequately satisfy the prerequisites of Section 477(2)(a) and (b). Specifically, the court must determine if the application was made in writing and specifies why an extension is necessary in the interests of justice. Additionally, the court must consider whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension. The applicant has provided written reasons for the extension in his initiating application and further elaborated on these grounds in his oral submissions. The applicant's reasons include personal hardship, miscalculated time period, minimal delay, and the absence of prejudice to the respondent. The court must evaluate these grounds to decide whether they meet the statutory requirements for an extension of time.

Upon reviewing the applicant's written application and oral submissions, the court concluded that the applicant had satisfied the requirements of Section 477(2)(a). The applicant provided a written application with reasons for the extension, which the court found sufficient. The court then considered whether it was necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension. The court accepted that the applicant's circumstances, including the personal hardship and minimal delay, justified the extension. Consequently, the court found it necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension. The court ordered that the time within which to bring the proceedings be extended to 2 July 2009.

The final orders of the court include an extension of the time within which to bring the proceedings to 2 July 2009. The court also mandated that the application be heard under the relevant rules of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. This decision underscores the court's consideration of the specific circumstances presented by the applicant and its discretion in granting extensions under Section 477(2) of the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The time within which to bring these proceedings be extended to 2 July 2009.

2.

Pursuant to r.44.12 of the

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 477 of the Act relevantly provides:(1) An application to the Federal Magistrates Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.(2) The Federal Magistrates Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Magistrates Court considers appropriate if:(a)an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Magistrates Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and(b) the Federal Magistrates Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.(3) In this section:date of the migration decision means:(a) …(b) in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal – the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1); … In this case the Tribunal’s decision was signed on 13 May 2009. However, the application was not filed until 2 July 2009; this means that it was brought one day out of time. The consequence of this is that the Court must now consider the two questions posed by s.477(2). The first of these is whether an application for an extension of time to bring the proceedings has been made to the Court in writing and specifies, whether in the document itself or in its supporting affidavit or other document, why the applicant considers it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time to bring the proceedings. In this case, the applicant made an application in writing for an extension of time by including such a request in his application commencing these proceedings. In his oral submissions today he relied on the grounds which appear in his initiating application and specifically relate to the application for an extension of time. There, the applicant says that:a)he received the decision of the Tribunal by mail;b)he suffered severe hardship;c)he did not have sufficient funds;d)he was depressed and was unable to file the review application;e)the application is late by only one day;f)he miscalculated the period of time within which he had to lodge the application for review; g)severe hardship would be caused to him if the application for an extension of time were not granted; andh)no prejudice would be caused to the respondent by the court granting the extension of time sought. In his oral submissions today, the applicant also made reference to other circumstances, which were to the effect that his mail had been misdelivered and that he did not receive the letter from the Tribunal inviting him to its hearing until after the date for the hearing had passed. In the circumstances, I conclude that the applicant has satisfied the requirements of s.477(2)(a). Therefore, the next issue to be addressed is whether the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order sought.