[2015] QCA 221
COURT OF APPEAL
MARGARET McMURDO P
GOTTERSON JA
APPLEGARTH J
Appeal No 1984 of 2015
SC No 62 of 2015
BEVAN ALAN MOWEN Appellant
v
ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF QUEENSLAND Respondent
BRISBANE
MONDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 2015
JUDGMENT
APPLEGARTH J: On 23 January 2015 the appellant filed what was styled an “Ex Parte” originating application which sought
“An Ex Parte Injunction to the Queensland State Election of 2015, any Act passed by a Parliament, either State or Federal, that is contrary to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia as void ab initio”.
His application and supporting material were served on the Queensland Electoral Commission. The Commission was not named as a respondent. It had an obvious interest in the relief being sought.
The matter came before a judge of the trial division on Friday, 30 January 2015. Counsel for the Commission initially appeared as a friend of the court. After some discussion, the Commission was made a respondent to the application, without objection by the appellant. After hearing the matter, the primary judge gave reasons as to why the case advanced by the appellant was simply unarguable. It is unnecessary for present purposes to set out the reasons of the primary judge for dismissing the application. They appear in Mowen v Electoral Commission of Queensland [2015] QSC 16.
In accordance with standard practice, the primary judge inquired whether counsel for the successful party had any application whereupon counsel applied for costs. After hearing the applicant on the question of costs, the primary judge made a further order that he pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
On 25 February 2015 the applicant filed a notice of appeal which contains six grounds. Two of them relate to the conduct of the hearing on 30 January 2015.
First, the appellant alleges that the primary judge failed to allow natural justice. There is no substance to this allegation. The primary judge heard the appellant’s arguments and invited the appellant to respond to the respondent’s written outline of submissions. The primary judge told the appellant that “now is your opportunity to say anything you’d like to say in response to Mr Scott’s submissions”. The appellant concluded his oral submissions. He was not cut short. At the end of his oral submissions, he said “thank you” to the judge. The appellant was given a fair hearing.
The fact that the primary judge was able to give ex tempore reasons for dismissing a misconceived case does not mean that the application was predetermined or that the primary judge was prejudiced. It means that a judge, assisted by written submissions of the respondent’s counsel about the legal flaws in the appellant’s case, was able to determine the matter promptly, as he should have in the circumstances. The appellant provided no reasonable argument to the primary judge as to why the respondent’s submissions on the points of law raised by the appellant were wrong. He still has not done so. The ground…
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- Case
- [2015] QCA 221
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge allowed natural justice as he heard the appellant's arguments and invited him to respond to the respondent's submissions. The primary judge's ability to provide ex tempore reasons for dismissing the case did not indicate a predetermined outcome or prejudice on the part of the judge. Furthermore, there was no coercion involved in the primary judge's decision to name the Electoral Commission of Queensland as a respondent, as it was necessary for the application to proceed. The Court of Appeal also rejected the appellant's claim that the primary judge failed to point to any enumerated power in the Constitution that gave the Judiciary of Queensland plenary power. The primary judge was not required to address the source of the court's power to issue an injunction, as the appellant's originating application already relied upon the court having that power.
The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the primary judge's conclusion that the appellant's arguments were misconceived, and the appeal did not provide any basis in law to set aside the orders made on 30 January 2015.
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