Moumoutzakis v Carpino - [2008] NSWDC 168

No judgment structure available for this case.

CITATION: Moumoutzakis v Carpino [2008] NSWDC 168

HEARING DATE(S): 28 – 31 July 2008

JUDGMENT DATE:
15 August 2008

JURISDICTION: Civil

JUDGMENT OF: Gibson DCJ

DECISION: 1. Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $50,000.
2. Costs and interest reserved.
3. Liberty to apply.
4. Exhibits retained for 28 days.

CATCHWORDS: TORT - defamation - limited publication - imputations - defence of qualified privilege at common law and pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act - defence of triviality (s 33) - defence of partial justification abandoned at the end of the evidence - damages - aggravated compensatory damages - award of $50,000

LEGISLATION CITED: Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)
Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 13
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), ss 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37
Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), ss 22, 47, 48, 52 and 65A

CASES CITED: Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183
Attrill v Christie [2007] NSWSC 1386
Bellino v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 135 ALR 368
Bennette v Cohen (2005) 64 NSWLR 81
Bik v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1971) [1979] 2 NSWLR 679 (n)
Calwell v Ipec Australia Pty Ltd (1975) 135 CLR 321
Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44
Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 693
Doelle v Bedey [2007] QCA 395
Frawley v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 248
Green v Schneller [2000] NSWSC 548
Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Tingle [2001] NSWCA 194
Holmes v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 570
Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135
Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614
Martin v Bruce [2007] NSWDC 264
McKenzie v Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 42
Morosi v Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 418
Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369
Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219
Peterson v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 152
Pinniger v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1979) 26 ALR 55
Shelmerdine v Mewett [1993] SASC 3932
Skalkos v Assaf (2002) Aust Torts Reports 81-644
Trantum v McDowell [2007] NSWCA 138
Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331
White v Betalli [2007] NSWCA 243

TEXTS CITED: Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed., vol 2
Folkard, Slander and Libel, 5th ed. (1891)
Minister for Housing, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard (no. 254), 13 November 1996

PARTIES: Plaintiff: Apostolos Moumoutzakis
Defendant: Vincent Carpino

FILE NUMBER(S): 4665 of 2006

COUNSEL: Plaintiff: Mr K Andronos/Ms J Chambers
Defendant: Mr M Rollinson

SOLICITORS: Plaintiff: Andresakis & Associates
Defendant: Ramrakha Jenkins Solicitors

Introduction

1. The plaintiff and defendant are owners of shops in Strata Plan 13595 (“the strata plan”) in Marrickville, a suburb of Sydney. The property in the strata plan consists of 11 small shops, mostly selling takeaway fast food, as well as 14 allocated parking spots and common property. The plaintiff owns five of these shops and the defendant owns one.

2. The plaintiff sues the defendant for defamation for a circular letter he posted on or about 14 July 2006 to four other strata plan property owners and for publication of the same circular letter on the front of an electricity cabinet, near the toilet block situated on the common property.

3. The plaintiff pleads that this publication, the text of which is set out below, conveys the following imputations:

(a) The plaintiff is a gangster;
(b) The plaintiff is a criminal;
(c) The plaintiff has engaged in a calculated plan to illegally dispossess the other strata owners of their rights under the strata plan.

4. The issues in these proceedings are determined in accordance with the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). These issues are:

(a) Publication : publication of the letters posted to the four co-owners is admitted but publication of the notice on the electricity circuit cabinet is denied;

(b) Imputations : whether the imputations pleaded are conveyed and defamatory;

(c) Defences : whether the publication on the electricity circuit cabinet was published on an occasion of qualified privilege either at common law or pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act 2005 (the other publications being conceded to be published on an occasion of qualified privilege) and whether the defendant was actuated by express malice, in relation to all of the publications; and whether a defence under s 33 (triviality) is made out;

Damages

5. A defence of partial justification (to imputation (c)) was formally abandoned at the beginning of the defendant’s address. I granted leave to the parties to provide me with additional submissions concerning the impact of the abandonment of this defence and also to enable the defendant to consider some additional issues on publication, malice and aggravated compensatory damages.

The background to the publications

6. The strata plan was registered in 1978 (Exhibit B and P2). It is clear from the plans (Exhibit B and J) that there was a storeroom behind lots 7 and 8 of the strata plan at this time. On 27 September 1983 the members of the meeting of the body corporate of the strata plan approved the construction of a toilet on the common property behind lot 9 (Exhibit Q). All of these events occurred prior to both the plaintiff and defendant becoming proprietors of lots in the strata plan.

7. The defendant became the proprietor of lot 4 of the strata plan in 1985 (T 118). Shortly after he became an owner, he and the other owners decided to erect the toilet block approved in 1983 for the common use of persons visiting the strata plan. This was accordingly built on the common property. The necessary approvals were obtained from the local council for the construction of the toilet block, but no by-law was passed, nor was there any registration of the by-law in accordance with the provisions of the precursor to the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW).

8. Examination of the minute books shows that J A Somerville Pty Ltd real estate agents were appointed following the annual general meeting of the proprietors on 29 September 1987. It was proposed that two proprietors volunteered to liaise with the managing agents and one of these was the defendant (Exhibit P1). However, according to the annual general meeting minutes of 1 October 1988, he was not a member of the council. Amongst the general business items was a note that one proprietor had built an extension to his shop without the consent of the body corporate and it was not known if the work was council approved. There were also concerns about the poor state of cleaning. The defendant’s role was minimal during this time. He attended meetings but was not elected to the council until 22 August 1998, the date when he was also appointed to carry out the cleaning of the common property, details of which are set out further below.

9. The plaintiff commenced leasing shop number 7 in 1990 where he sold yeeros (a takeaway food) and in 1995 began buying shops starting with shop 8 (T 8), with the result that at the time of publication he owned shops 6 to 10. At all relevant times the defendant leased his shop to tenants (currently a pizzeria with takeaway service to clients). He had very little contact with the defendant until 2005.

10. The following alterations referred to above are of relevance to these proceedings:

(a) prior to October 1988 (before the plaintiff purchased any shops) a portion of the property behind shop 8 was closed off. In 2005 the plaintiff rendered the wall of this area and moved the door;

(b) a large toilet, for use by customers, tenants and delivery staff, was also constructed on the common property in about 1988.

(c) in about 1995, a small toilet was constructed behind the shop that the plaintiff had bought during the year; and,

11. On 22 August 1998 the body corporate authorised the defendant to carry out cleaning for $2,600 per year. The plaintiff was at that time one of three people running the body corporate. In 2002, the plaintiff was elected to all three executive positions and in 2004 the cleaning fee was increased to $70 per weekly visit. However at about this time, the plaintiff and Mr Tranh, another shop owner, became dissatisfied with the state of cleanliness and general conduct of the body corporate.

12. On 15 July 2005 an extraordinary general meeting was held. The plaintiff and defendant attended, and the other owners gave each of them proxies. By special resolution the management contract with Somerville was terminated. However, there was no resolution passed as to the appointment of office bearers (although the plaintiff in his evidence said he thought he and Mr Tranh had been appointed, there is no record of this). Two weeks later, another managing agent, Vincent Montano Strata Management, was appointed, in a contract signed by the plaintiff and Mr Tranh, although at this stage only the defendant held any executive capacity, according to the minutes.

13. The defendant did not take any steps to appoint any other agent, or to call the annual general meeting for the year 2005. The body corporate is compelled by law to hold annual meetings. Only the defendant held any executive position, but he did nothing to ensure the company complied with its statutory obligations.

14. On 27 March 2006 Mr Montano wrote a letter to the defendant:

“Re: cleaning @ 125 – 135 Marrickville Rd., MARRICKVILLE

We have today been informed by the Executive Committee that your services are no longer required as of 31st March 2006.

15. The defendant said in his evidence that he did not receive this letter until 21 April 2006. He denied that he was upset about losing the cleaning contract and said that he did not need the money (T 164). The defendant wrote to the new strata manager, Mr Montano, on 21 April 2006 pointing out that he was the only person who was on the executive, adding:

“Seemingly the Body Corporate had no Annual General Meeting in 2005. You must be aware that AGMs are mandatory. This will be a very contentious issue not only for me but for the rest of the Owners Corporation… In the interim, legal advice will be sought and the Department of Fair Trading will be notified of the situation.”

16. On 9 May 2006 Mr Montano, acting apparently on the instructions of the plaintiff and Mr Tranh, called an annual general meeting for 29 May 2006. This business on the agenda included approval of the accounts and the budget for the forthcoming year and the appointment of office bearers. The plaintiff, the defendant and Mr Tranh attended the meeting. The financial accounts were approved. The plaintiff was elected as chairperson, with Mr Tranh as the secretary and the defendant as the Treasurer.

17. The problems with the cleaning were dealt with at this meeting. It was agreed that the plaintiff and Mr Tranh would provide one year of cleaning for free, and that the defendant would be paid for the cleaning he did in April 2006. Thus, although the letter of 27 March had been written without the authority of the executive, the situation had been regularised and the defendant was paid for the additional cleaning he had done during April.

18. On 7 July 2006, with the new strata executive in place, the strata manager, Mr Montano, issued a notice for an extraordinary general meeting to be held on 21 July 2006. The business of the meeting was to deal with the following 6 motions:

(a) Motion 1 – That the minutes of the last Annual General Meeting be approved.

(b) Motion 2 – That the structures NOT shown on the Strata Plan which include the toilet block and the small toilet outside shop 9 be approved.

(c) Motion 3 – That the change of door location at the back of shops 7 and 8 be approved.

(d) Motion 4 – That Vincent Montano Strata Management Services be confirmed as Managing Agents for Strata Plan 13595.

(e) Motion 5 – That the current Executive Committee be dissolved and that nominations for a new Committee be called and an election held for membership of the Committee and its Office Bearers.

19. At this time, Mr Tranh was the validly appointed secretary of the body corporate and it was part of his duty, pursuant to s 22 Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), to call such a meeting. However, it is conceded by the plaintiff that the motions to approve the existing structures were not put in the proper way. For the structures on the common property to be approved, a by-law had to be prepared for registration at the Registrar’s General’s office and appropriate compensation paid. In particular, these resolutions would need to be passed unanimously.

20. It was in response to these motions that the defendant wrote the matter complained of. However, he took some other steps first.

21. On 1 June 2006 he wrote to the plaintiff:

“ RE – RUBBISH DEPOSITED ON NO 4 2 CAR PARKS

Remove that rubbish forthwith and that means immediately, without delay, at once, it has been there for months and also since I talked to you last has duplicated.

Your inaction means lack of civility and respect.

22. Since the defendant had been responsible for the cleaning of the property until the beginning of May, these complaints show a degree of exaggeration. However, this was only the beginning of a series of several hundred letters and emails, as well as nine complaints to the CTTT.

23. On 26 June 2006 the defendant made the first of a series of nine complaints to the CTTT. This complaint was that Mr Montano should be removed “FOR INEFFICIENCY – FOR INCOMPETENCE – FOR: OMITED [sic] TO CALL AGM 2005 – NO FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 2005 – NO ANSWER TO MY CORRESPONDENCE – NO REPLY TO MY PHONE CALLS – NO KNOWLEDGE STRATA MANAGEMENT SCHEMES”. It was signed by the defendant as “Executive Committee Treasurer” (Exhibit 8).

24. The defendant wrote to the managing agents on 1 July demanding payment for not only April but also May 2006 (“I am here on a MISSION and I don’t accept NO for an answer” – Exhibit 9) as well as a copy of their licence and the management agreement. The body corporate had already paid the April account, and Mr Montano paid the $280 “ex gratia from my office account”, according to his handwritten note on Exhibit 9. He wrote again on 12 July asking for the names and addresses of shop owners for shops 1 – 3, 5 and 11 (he later sent the matter complained of to these addresses) as well as again requesting the agency agreement.

25. On 17 July 2006 the defendant filed a further application (Exhibit 11) seeking the order “Pull down the erection and bring the rest to the original state within 2 months.” However, this application postdates the matter complained of, which was published three days beforehand.

26. On 14 July 2006 the defendant sent the matter complained of to each of the four shop owners listed. The text, leaving in all grammatical and spelling errors, is as follows:

“ TO THE OWNERS OF SHOP 1,
SHOP 2, SHOP 3, SHOP 4,
SHOP 5, SHOP 11
LET US UNITED
FOR A GOOD CAUSE

RE – GENERAL MEETING OF STRATA PLAN 13595
21 TH JULY 2006

MY FRIENDS,

I am the owner of shop 4 for the last twenty years. I am not fully qualifed LAWYER but I have done a Law course. If you wish to fill a PROXY FORM send it to me or ring on 99581541 anytime. THIS MEETING IS OF A GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR STRATA PLAN 13595.

The GANGSTERS want our land, your land, my land and take possession of it in illegally form. The GANGSTER is the owner of shops 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the IGNORANT STRATA MANAGER works at unison with the gangster APOSTOLOS. Read very careful the MOTIONS OF THE AGENDA; if you can’t understand ask someone with knowledge regard STRATA MANAGEMENT. This MEETING is very important. Ask yourself a question – Why we want an other Meeting when we already had one on 29th May 2006????
Motion 2) of the Agenda: The land outside at the rear of SHOP 9 has been already taken and now be approved. THEY THING [sic] WE ARE VERY VERY STUPID.

Motion 3) That the change in shops 7 & 8 be approved. All of this has been done illegally, everything against the LAW. We are very lucky in this COUNTRY WE HAVE A LAW TO OBEY TO.

We want to preserve our RIGHTS, if not god knows what will happens next. UNITED WILL WIN. Please, please, come to the Meeting or fill the PROXY FORM and send to me. United will WIN. I am with you, I am part of the STRATA PLAN 13595. United will become a force. Say NO, NO, NO, to any of the motions presented to you. Marrickville Council is investigating this, but they are a bit slow. A Solicitor has been appointed, because we want the LAW to win.

I have put 2 Applications with the FAIR TRADING (Government Body), one against APOSTOLOS, and one against the strata manager, and will be a meeting in the CITY on 25th July (if you wish come along) and this is why they have call this URGENT MEETING, fear that the LAW will take over. I have spent a lot of my personal time to stop these LAW’S BREAKERS. I can’t stress more forceful than this. PLEASE, PLEASE, come to the meeting or fill up a PROXY FORM AND SEND TO ME. United will WIN.

It is your land, it is my land. We are lucky in the COUNTRY we have LAW and rights and let show them what we can do in UNITY. Let the law be the winner and punish the LAW’S BREAKERS.

BEST REGARDS TO ALL OF YOU & GOOD LUCK

Publication

27. It is not in dispute that each of the named recipients was sent this letter. The disputed issue concerning publication is whether a copy of the matter complained of was also affixed to the electricity cabinet outside the toilets near the car park.

28. The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff to establish publication is as follows:

(a) The plaintiff gave evidence he saw the matter complained of posted on the electricity cabinet opposite the common toilet block of the strata plan (T 33-34). In cross-examination the plaintiff agreed he could not read English well, but he was able to recognise his own name and some other key words. He took the notice down and threw it in the bin.

(b) Mr Mohammad Hai, the tenant of lot 6 of the strata plan, saw the defendant sticking something on a part of the wall that he had first called a noticeboard (T 78 line 11) but which he then said was “just the power point, big wooden piece” (T 78 line 18). In cross-examination he was asked whether it was a noticeboard or the surface of an electrical cabinet and he said “in front of the noticeboard” (T 79). When shown a picture of the noticeboard and asked if that was the noticeboard he was referring to he said “No, not, nothing else when here. It was from my door in the corridor, it was just opposite”. In fact the noticeboard was not erected until later in 2006. What Mr Hai appears to be endeavouring to say, in poor English, is that there was no noticeboard there at the time and that the notice in question was put “just opposite”.

(c) One of the complaint the defendant made to the CTTT and the managing agent was the absence of a noticeboard and in a number of emails (in particular an email sent which is number 43 in Exhibit Z) he sought the erection of a noticeboard on the common property for the purpose of displaying notices.

29. The defendant submits that I should accept the denial of Mr Carpino that he did not put a copy of the matter complained of on the door to the electricity cabinet.

30. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a copy of the matter complained of was affixed to the electricity cabinet. In addition to the evidence of the plaintiff and Mr Hai, the circumstances in which the defendant agitated for a noticeboard with a lock so that notices could be put up, and the circumstances in which the plaintiff was subsequently harassed by unknown persons calling out “gangster” to him, are corroborative. The defendant only sent his letter on 14 July, and with the weekend intervening he no doubt was anxious that all the other owners to whom he had written would have an opportunity to read his letter. In those circumstances, on the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that the defendant pasted a copy of the matter complained of on the electricity cabinet.

31. The defendant, in written submissions, disputes publication on the basis that if anything was seen on the door of the electricity cabinet by the plaintiff or by Mr Hai “it is not proved to have been put there by Carpino” (defendant’s outline, paragraph 1). As it happens, I am satisfied by Mr Hai’s evidence that it was the defendant who put the matter complained of on the electricity cabinet. However, to assert that it is necessary to prove that the defendant put it there is to misunderstand the very broad definition of conduct able to constitute publication, for the reasons explained by Isaacs J in Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331.

32. While it has not been precisely pleaded, liability for publication could still be made out on the principles set out in Webb v Bloch at 363-364 where Isaacs J citing with approval the meaning of “publication” in Folkard on Slander and Libel , 5th ed. (1891), at p. 439 that:

published

without reference to the precise degree

if he has intentionally lent his assistance to its existence for the purpose of being published

33. There is a helpful summary of cases concerning a defendant’s liability for a publication which is put on public view in Frawley v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 248. Strictly speaking, it is not a prerequisite for liability for publication to show that the defendant personally was responsible for the placing of a copy of his circular letter on the electricity cabinet, where it was in public view.

Are the imputations conveyed and defamatory?

34. Imputations are no longer the cause of action in New South Wales under the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). Where a judge-alone trial on all issues takes place, how should the judge approach this issue? I have adopted the approach taken by Simpson J in Holmes v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 570 at [22] – [28] and I have approached the question of whether each imputation was conveyed and defamatory in accordance with paragraphs [31] – [45] of her Honour’s judgment.

Imputation (a)

35. The word “gangster” occurs three times in the second paragraph of the matter complained of. The matter complained of sets out that “The GANGSTERS want our land, your land, my land and take possession of it in illegally form [sic]”. The plaintiff is then identified as the gangster and a statement is made that “the IGNORANT STRATA MANAGER works at unison [sic] with the gangster APOSTOLOS”.

36. The defendant submits in relation to both imputations (a) and (b) that the word “gangster” is an “abusive expression that would have been brushed off” (defendant’s submission, page 1) which Mr Rollinson, in oral submissions, put firstly on the basis of a claim of “vulgar abuse”.

37. The law relating to vulgar abuse has been comprehensively explained by the Court of Appeal in Bennette v Cohen (2005) 64 NSWLR 81. The facts in this case were as follows. A s 7A jury found that an imputation that the plaintiff had done illegal work which severely damaged the environment was conveyed but was not defamatory. The Court of Appeal noted at [46] – [47] that Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 establishes the law of New South Wales on vulgar abuse in defamation. There is no dichotomy between vulgar abuse on the one hand and defamatory matter on the other (at [51]). An imputation which is conveyed may, in certain circumstances, lose its defamatory meaning by reason of the context, particularly in the case of spoken words (in both Bennette and Mundey , the words in question were spoken). The Court of Appeal concluded (at [57]) that ordinary reasonable people could take the view that references to working illegally and work which severely damaged the environment was so indefinite and imparticular that they could not injure the plaintiff’s reputation.

38. However, the comments of the Court of Appeal relate to defamatory meaning, not to capacity to convey. How can it be said that the word “gangster” constitute a word that the ordinary reasonable reader would have “brushed off”? Counsel for the defendant submitted that this is because this is a “bane and antidote” case: Morosi v Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 418. The facts in Morosi were as follows. A radio broadcast dwelled at some length upon rumours concerning Ms Morosi (describing her as “the most notorious women’s name in the country”), but then went on to say that there was no truth in any of these claims, was held to be defamatory. Samuels JA noted at [6]:

Bik v Mirror Newspaper Ltd

39. While each publication must turn on its own facts, as Samuels JA noted at [8], it is necessary in a bane and antidote case to point to at least some antidote. In the present publication, there is none at all. Counsel for the defendant appears instead to be suggesting that the publication was so grossly defamatory that nobody would take it seriously. That is not an argument which has ever enjoyed any degree of acceptance by the courts. Nor is it an argument to say that the subject matter (an extraordinary general meeting of a body corporate) is so anodyne that no imputation can be conveyed.

40. Accordingly I am satisfied that imputation (a) is conveyed.

Imputation (b)

41. In addition to the same argument as was put in relation to imputation (a) (which I reject for the same reasons) the defendant submitted that imputations (a) and (b) do not differ in substance.

42. A criminal is a person who breaks the law. A gangster is a person who, usually as a member of a gang (hence the name), takes things by intimidation and force. There are many persons who may be described as criminals but who are not “gangsters”. To call a person a gangster is to accuse a person of engaging in the kinds of conduct (criminal or not) which gangsters use. This is a different meaning to “criminal”.

43. The reference to the plaintiff as a “law’s-breaker” [sic] in the last two paragraphs of the matter complained of, in the context of the need for the plaintiff to be punished for breaking the law (line 33) in circumstances where he has already acted illegally, is capable of conveying the imputation that the plaintiff is a criminal. The ordinary reasonable reader is not alive to the niceties of differentiation between civil and criminal law, but any allegation that a person who has “already” done the wrong thing and should be punished as a law-breaker runs the risk of conveying an imputation that the person about whom it is published is a criminal.

44. Imputation (b) is conveyed.

Imputation (c)

45. Objection is raised to imputation (c) on the basis that the imputation is pitched too highly. It is asserted that all that the matter complained of is capable of conveying is that the plaintiff, amongst others, plans to obtain approval for what was an illegal structure, if motions were passed at the next body corporate meeting.

46. The matter complained of says that the land outside of the rear of shop 9 “has already been taken” in circumstances where the plaintiff is asking for approval afterwards. It is asserted that the plaintiff and the strata manager think that the other owners “are very very stupid”.

47. The ordinary reasonable reader would not read the matter complained of as an assertion that the plaintiff amongst others was planning to obtain approval for an illegal structure. The matter complained of clearly says the plaintiff wants to take land belonging to others, having already taken possession of it illegally, and is now asking for approval in circumstances where he is counting on the other owners being “very very stupid”.

48. Accordingly imputation (c) is also conveyed.

Defamatory meaning

49. The defendant made assertions that imputations (a) and (b) (if conveyed) are incapable of conveying a defamatory meaning by reason of being vulgar abuse. I reject this for the reasons set out above.

50. The defendant’s submission that the ordinary reasonable reader would brush these imputations off and pay no regard to them is completely unmeritorious. These are imputations of great seriousness and ordinary right thinking members of the community would think less of a person about whom each is conveyed.

51. Having determined these issues, I now turn to a question of the defences.

Defences

52. The defendant has pleaded defences of qualified privilege at common law and pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act 2005 and a defence of unlikelihood of harm pursuant to s 33. I shall first consider the defence of qualified privilege.

Qualified privilege

53. A defence of qualified privilege both at common law and pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act 2005 is pleaded.

54. A publication is taken to have been made on an occasion protected by qualified privilege at common law where the person who makes the communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it.

55. The plaintiff has conceded that the four publications which were sent by the defendant to the identified fellow members of the body corporate were publications made on an occasion of qualified privilege at common law. In relation to these publications, the sole issue to be determined is whether the defence of qualified privilege both at common law and pursuant to s 30 of the Act is defeated by malice. Consequently, my findings about whether the publication was made on an occasion of qualified privilege are only directed to the publication placed on the electricity cabinet.

56. Both the common law and statutory defences are pleaded, and the statutory defence is of particular relevance to the publication placed in the public arena because of the extent of publication. I will deal with the statutory defence first.

Section 30 – qualified privilege

57. Section 30(1) of the Defamation Act 2005 provides as follows:

“ 30 Defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information

(a) the recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some subject, and

(b) the matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject, and

58. The matters which a court may take into account in determining whether the conduct of the defendant is reasonable in the circumstances are set out at s 30(2) of the Act. Section 30(2) provides:

“(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a recipient has an apparent interest in having information on some subject if, and only if, at the time of the publication in question, the defendant believes on reasonable grounds that the recipient has that interest.”

59. The defendant has provided the following particulars (under cover of a letter dated 27 February 2007) to establish qualified privilege both at common law and pursuant to the statutory defence. These particulars are as follows:

(a) the recipients were fellow owners of units in the Strata Plan and members of the Owners Corporation and had a common interest with the defendant in the fair and effective management of the affairs of the Corporation;

(b) that common interest extended to the extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of which the owners of lots in the Strata Plan had received notice on 7 July 2006;

(c) each recipient had an actual interest or, alternatively, an apparent interest in receiving information on the above subject;

60. It will be readily apparent that none of these particulars deal specifically with the publication on the electricity cabinet. Those particulars are of course relevant to the four publications sent by the defendant to his fellow owners (which the plaintiff concedes was published on a protected occasion), but the notice pinned to the electricity cabinet was able to be read by any persons using the public toilet, including persons making delivery to the shops, tenants, customers and the like. The defendant has denied publication on the electricity cabinet ever took place, which is a significant barrier to the defence being made out but submits that the defence would still apply. In order to determine whether the criteria for a s 30 defence has been made out, I set out each of the provisions in s 30(3).

Section 30(3)(a) – The extent to which the matter published is of public interest

61. Matters that are the private affairs of an individual or relatively small group of people have generally not been considered matters of public interest. It is not sufficient if the opinion has a relationship to matters of public interest only in the most peripheral way. In Green v Schneller [2000] NSWSC 548 Simpson J at [24] set out the test as follows:

Bellino

62. In Green v Schneller the subject matter of the dispute was an argument about problems caused by a rupture in the sewer line between their properties. The remarks of Simpson J are very apposite to a case such as the present. At best, any public interest would be of a borderline nature.

Section 30(3)(b) - performance of the public functions or activities of the person

63. The plaintiff was an ordinary member of the public. He was not performing any public function or activity.

Section 30(3)(c) – the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published

64. Each of the defamatory imputations carried is serious.

Section 30(3)(d) – the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts

65. I have set out in more detail below the degree to which the statements in the matter complained of are not in fact capable of being proven facts. A number of the statements are statements which must have been known by the defendant to have been false. In addition, the matter complained of contains allegations and suspicions, details of which are set out below.

Section 30(3)(e) – whether expeditious publications was warranted

66. This is a particular designed to be relied upon by media publications. Counsel for the defendant submitted that there was great urgency because of the forthcoming meeting. I have found, however, for reasons set out more fully below, that there is very little connection between the CTTT hearings and the contents of the matter complained of. However, there was to have been a body corporate meeting of some importance, and that would in my view warrant expeditious publication of such information. The difficulty is, however, that the defendant did this as well as provides that information to the four recipients. How can it be said that it was necessary in addition to place a copy on the cover of the electricity cabinet? It was submitted that there was a concern that one or more of the recipients of the letter might not receive the letter in time. However, the defendant denied placing the publication there, and cannot have it both ways. It was certainly in their interest to be told, but it was not necessary for it to be drawn to the attention of the general public.

Section 30(3)(f) – the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates

67. Again, this is a particular designed to be relied upon by media defendants. There is nothing in the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates to have any relevance here.

Section 30(3)(g) – the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources

68. If the source of the information was the CTTT, that would be a source with integrity. However, since most of the information contained in the matter complained of was false to the knowledge of the defendant, the fact that some of that information came from a source of integrity is largely irrelevant.

Section 30(3)(h) – attempts to get the other side of the story

69. Again, this is a particular designed to be relied upon by media defendants. No attempts at all had been made by the defendant to obtain the plaintiff’s side of the story.

Section 30(3)(i) – other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published

70. I repeat the matters I referred to in relation to s 30(3)(g) above.

Section 30(3)(j) – any other relevant circumstances

71. No other relevant circumstances were identified by the defendant in submissions. However, it is important to look at the factual background to this case in the context of the very long history of informal dealings of this body corporate. This was not a case where a sudden and potentially unwelcome change to the structure, perhaps impacting on tenants and customers, was likely to be made. This was a meeting about regularising a state of affairs that has existed for many years. The publications of such a notice may well have alarmed persons reading it who knew nothing about the circumstances of this long history.

72. This is a clear case of a publication which is in excess of that which is required both in language and extent of publication, which is not reasonable, and therefore cannot be protected by s 30.

The defence of qualified privilege at common law

73. In Holmes v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 570 Simpson J considered the elements of the defence of qualified privilege at common law under the new statutory regime, and I gratefully borrow her Honour’s explanation of the elements at [84] – [91].

74. The plaintiff concedes that the publications to the owners were published on an occasion protected by qualified privilege at common law as well as pursuant to s 30, submitting that the defence is defeated at common law, as is the statutory defence, by malice. My findings about whether the defence of qualified privilege at common law is made out is accordingly restricted to the publication which I have found the defendant put on the electricity cabinet. The plaintiff submits that the defence cannot extend to this publication as the requisite duty and interest cannot be made out.

75. As a matter of logic it is hard to see how the defendant can assert duty and interest for a publication he denies making at all. The defendant’s denials (T 135, 184) appear to concede there was no duty or interest. He said (at T 184) “there is no reason to put the letter on the meter there… I want not the neighbourhood, I want the owners be there…I just wanted the members of the strata, on the strata role, to be there, not anybody else… [It was] nothing to do with the tenants. What I wanted, the owner [sic] to attend the meetings. No one else.”

76. The particulars of duty and interest given by the defendant relate only to the publications to the other owners. In circumstances where there is a flat denial of publication, the question must arise, both under the statutory and common law defence, as to whether these defences can be available at all.

77. The defendant appears to have conceded he had no interest in telling persons other than the other owners of his concerns; he certainly had no duty to communicate these matters to passers-by on their way to the toilets who would have been able to read this document nearby.

78. The defence of qualified privilege at common law, like the statutory defence, is accordingly not available for the publication placed on the electricity cabinet.

79. I now turn to a consideration of the issue of malice. In the event that I have erred in holding that the publication which was placed on the electricity cabinet was not published on an occasion of qualified privilege, I have addressed my findings as to malice in relation to this publication as well as to the other publications.

Malice

80. The defence of qualified privilege, both at common law and under the Act (s 30(4)) is defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication is actuated by malice.

81. The plaintiff relies on the following to establish malice:

(a) the defendant was motivated to cause harm to the plaintiff because of the termination of the agreement for cleaning the common property. The defendant agreed in cross-examination that he blamed the plaintiff, Mr Tranh and Mr Montano for this (T 164) although he denied it had upset him. He agreed he was offended and angry about the lateness of the letter and its contents, which he considered disrespectful to him (T 164, 206 – 7);

(b) the defendant resented his loss of status as the owner who was “king of the show” and his conduct towards the plaintiff from mid-2006 was motivated by a desire for revenge rather than a legitimate assertion of his own rights and interests;

(c) the defendant’s failure to consider the matter complained of was capable of conveying any or all of the imputations (interrogatory 1), which is evidence of recklessness;

(d) failure to inquire (interrogatory 5) and the selective view he took of the information he did possess (T 176). For example, he did not take into account that similar use of the common property by other owners, including himself;

(e) the absence of any belief in the truth of the imputations (interrogatory 7);

(f) the use of violent, sensational and extreme language in the matter complained of. The plaintiff admitted that words such as “gangster” were used to “entice” owners to attend the forthcoming meeting;

82. Malice may be shown if it is proven the defendant used the occasion upon which the immunity is founded for some wrong or improper purpose or motive, other than the interest which gave rise to the privileged occasion, or that he or she spoke dishonestly or in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. It may be proved that inferences can be drawn from the language of the matter complained of or by extrinsic evidence on matters such as the relationship between the parties, the mode and extent of publication and the conduct of the defendant in publishing it: Brown The Law of Defamation in Canada , 2nd ed., vol 2, [16.1]. Malice is essentially a state of mind and it is the defendant’s primary or predominant motive in publishing that is determinative: Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149. Proof of malice involves, in almost every case, the drawing of inferences from proved facts ( McKenzie v Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 42 at 51 per Clarke JA). Its proof is not confined to the four corners of the publication (Brown, at [16.4(1]).

83. The defendant asserts that no malice has been proved “as at 14 July” and that this is the “only issue” (defendant’s submissions, page 2). The purpose of the publication, according to the defendant, was twofold. Firstly, he wished to encourage the other owners to attend the meeting, and secondly, he wanted to draw to their attention the application he had lodged with the CTTT, for which there was, he said, a meeting at the CTTT on 25 July. His concern was that if these motions were passed, then the matters he had raised with the CTTT would be bypassed.

84. The defendant put in a series of nine complaints, many of which overlap. The first of these was filed on June 21 and sought the removal of Mr Montano for inefficiency, citing his failure to hold an AGM, prepare financial records or answer inquiries from the defendant. All these claims were pointless, because there had in fact been an AGM the month before, where all these things had been done, and Mr Montano not only did respond to the defendant’s request for documentation but also reimbursed the defendant personally from his own pocket after there was a delay in sending the letter terminating the defendant’s cleaning contract.

85. The CTTT did remove Mr Montano, but not for any of the reasons put forward by the defendant. It is necessary to look carefully at the decision of the Strata Schemes adjudicator, Mr D Forbes, which was handed down on 22 September 2006, because this reveals what the meeting at the CTTT was about. I set out the text of this document in full.

“SUBMISSIONS

Submission on behalf of the Applicant:

The Applicant is the owner of lot 4 in SP 13595.

There was no Annual General Meeting of the Owners Corporation between October 2004 and May 2006.
The management agreement between Strata Plan 13595 and Vince Montano Strata Management Services is dated 1 August 2005 for an unspecified period.
There was no general meeting of Owners Corporation 13595 to approve the appointment of Vince Montano Strata Management Services.
The owners of Lots 6 to 9, Apostolos Moumoutzakis, and the owner of Lot 10, Milton Moumoutzakis, dominate the management decisions of the strata scheme.
Illegal structures have been erected on common property.
On 18 August 2006, the Executive Committee purported to amend the Minutes of the Extraordinary General Meeting held on 21 July 2006.

The Applicant provided a written consent to appointment as Strata Managing Agent from J A Somerville Pty Ltd together with a proposed Strata Management Agency Agreement.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:

The Respondent is Apostolos Moumoutzakis.

On 21 August 2006, the Respondent made a written submission in response to the application.

The Respondent alleges that the application is part of a personal and nasty campaign against him, initiated by the Applicant, Vincent Carpino. The Respondent believes that Mr Carpino is causing trouble because his cleaning services contract for the parcel has been terminated by the Owners Corporation.

The Respondent states that he blocked an existing door to Shop 6, to prevent water overflowing from the drain in the corridor into the shop. He relocated an existing door 300mm further South on the external wall to facilitate a fire & emergency exit.

An external toilet was erected some 7-8 years ago at the rear of Lot 10, because the existing toilet was filthy and unsuable.

It is obvious that over the years the owners have made and implemented decisions that have not been recorded.

The owners should be allowed to make their own decisions and resolutions based on their needs and legal requirements.

The Respondent would like to seek an order approving all existing alterations at their present location and the registration of an Exclusive-Use By-law, to eliminate future arguments.

On 13 August 2006, the Respondent’s lot was vandalised. His external toilet was smashed and doors and walls were painted.

The Respondent requested a common sense resolution of the dispute.

The Respondent submitted a number of e-mails and letters from the Applicant with his submission. I find the content of these e-mails and letters quite disturbing.

Submissions on behalf of Other Interested Persons:

On 22 August 2006, the owners of Lots 1, 2 and 3 in SP 13595 made a written submission in response to the application.

The owners of Lots 1, 2 and 3 support the application and object to the Owners Corporation allowing privately held buildings to be built on common property, namely the small toilet and the brick building enclosure.

FINDINGS

1. The Applicant is the owner of Lot 4 in SP 13595.
2. The Respondent is the owner of Lots 6, 7, 8 & 9 in SP 13595.
3. The Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (“the Act”) applies.
4. The application for an order by an Adjudicator was made by an interested person, namely the owner of a lot in the strata scheme.
5. The application is incorrectly brought against the Respondent.
6. The application should have been brought against the Owners – Strata Plan No. 13595.
7. On 25 July 2006 the Registrar joined Owners Corporation SP 13595 as another interested party to the application.

THE DECISION

The Applicant bears the onus of proving the grounds required to make the order sought on the balance of probabilities.

It is submitted that I should make an order under Section 162 of the Act, to appoint a person as Strata Managing Agent of SP 13595, to exercise all the functions of the Owners Corporation.

An Adjudicator may make an order under Section 162 if the Adjudicator is satisfied that the management structure of the strata scheme is not functioning, or is not functioning satisfactorily.

I have considered all the evidence filed and submissions made in response to the application.

There are 11 lots in Strata Plan 13595, which is a commercial scheme comprised of shops and restaurants.

The Applicant is the owner of Lot 4. Mr & Mrs H Moumoutzakis are the owners of Lots 6, 7, 8 and 9. Milton Moumoutzakis is the owner of Lot 10.

Mr Moumoutzakis controls 423 out of 1000 unit entitlements.

The present strata managing agent, Vincent Montano Strata Management Services, was appointed pursuant to a Management Agency Agreement dated 1 August 2005. It appears that there was no meeting of the Owners Corporation to approve Mr Montano’s appointment.

The minutes of meetings of the Owners Corporation have not been accurately recorded.

Over the past twenty years, a number of structures have been erected on common property, without formal approval of the Owners Corporation. Some of these structures are being exclusively used by owners or occupiers of particular lots, in contravention of the Act.

The relationship between the Applicant and the Respondent has completely broken down. The Applicant has made veiled threats against the Respondent that cause me a great deal of concern. Both the Applicant and the Respondent are on the Executive Committee of the Owners Corporation SP 13595. It is obvious to me that they cannot work together in the best interests of all lot owners.

The Respondent’s shop has been vandalised.

It is in the interests of both parties, and the other lot owners, that an independent Strata Managing Agent be lawfully appointed to manage the strata scheme effectively, and to solve the problem of the structures erected on common property.

Taking into account all the evidence provided, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the management structure of Owners Corporation SP 13595 is not functioning satisfactorily.

It is appropriate in all the circumstances to appoint a compulsory Strata Managing Agent to exercise all the functions of Owners Corporation SP 13595.

It is appropriate in all the circumstances to give the compulsory Strata Managing Agent all the functions of Owners Corporation SP 13595, including all the functions of Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and Executive Committee.

Once appointed, the compulsory Strata Managing Agent will have sole responsibility to ensure that the management structure of Owners Corporation SP 13595 begins to function satisfactorily.

The Applicant has provided a written consent to appoint J A Somerville Pty Ltd, the holder of Strata Managing Agent’s licence issued under the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 . The requirements of Section 162(4)(b) have been met.

86. The removal of Mr Montano and his replacement by the previous strata management company had little or nothing to do with the matters to be raised at the EGM in July. These problems had to be regularised, whoever the strata manager was.

87. The defendant did make a second application to the CTTT against the plaintiff, seeking orders for the unit 10 toilet and the walls of the store room demolished (exhibit 11). However, this was filed on 17 July 2006, after the motion was sent around, and was in response to its contents.

88. The other reason given, namely the defendant’s wish that persons attend the meeting to vote against the motion, is germane to the occasion of qualified privilege both under common law and pursuant to s 30.

89. The motions on the agenda should have been framed as a special resolution to amend the by-laws (ss 47 and 52 Strata Schemes Management Act ) and, after a unanimous vote, should be sent to the Registrar-General’s office in proper form (s 48). A by-law can, but does not have to, contain conditions. Section 53 provides that a by-law “may confer rights or special privileges subject to such conditions as may be specified in the by-law (for example, a condition requiring the payment of money by the owner or owners of the lots concerned, at specified times or as determined by the owner’s corporation”).

90. Most importantly, where a new structure is erected on the common property, this must be done by a special resolution: s 65A.

91. The purpose of the Strata Schemes Management Act is to create an alternative mode with distinctive requirements to requirements under legislation such as the Conveyancing Act 1919 ( White v Betalli [2007] NSWCA 243 at [30] – [32]). The purpose of the Act was to introduce “more flexibility” into strata title schemes concerning “day-to-day issues” (Minister for Housing, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard (no. 254), 13 November 1996 p. 5921).

92. This information, if contained in the defendant’s letter, together with information about the entitlement of the body corporate to seek publication, would have been entirely proper.

93. However, there is nothing in the matter complained of capable of conveying this kind of information. It is a series of statements which must have been known by the defendant to be false. In particular:

(a) “I am not fully qualified lawyer but I have done a Law course” . This was false. The defendant conceded in cross-examination that he had not completed a Law course of the kind required to become a fully qualified lawyer. He had not studied any relevant course subject containing information concerning strata title law, although he had completed a continuing education course on family law at the University of Sydney.

(b) “ Why we want another meeting when we already had one on 29th May 2006???? ” This was false, because the defendant well knew that the position had to be regularised, and also because the meeting on 29 May had been the annual general meeting and this issue had not been under consideration.

(c) The plaintiff had taken possession “ illegally ” and “ against the law ”; the plaintiff and the strata manager were “ law’s breakers ” and the owners were asked to “ punish the LAW’ BREAKERS ”. This was false to the knowledge of the defendant. He knew there had been approvals given many years ago, that the problem was that this was not properly done, and that the situation needed to be regularised.

(d) “ Marrickville Council is investigating this, but they are a bit slow. A Solicitor has been appointed, because we want the LAW to win ”. There was no evidence of any investigation by the council or appointment of a solicitor.

(e) “ I have put two Applications with the FAIR TRADING …and will be a meeting in the CITY on 25th July (if you wish to come along) and that is why they have called this URGENT MEETING ”. However, the notice was sent around on 7 July and reached the defendant some time before 17 July, which is the date of the second of his applications. It was the defendant’s complaint to the CTTT that was in response to the notice of meeting, not the other way around. There was only one application to the CTTT, calling for Mr Montano to be removed. This was not an impediment to these resolutions.

(f) The whole premise of the publication was false. If a unanimous resolution was required, then only the defendant needed to vote against the motion. However, it is not clear to me that the defendant actually understood this, so I have not treated this as being knowingly false. It was, however, a reckless statement to make, when the terms of the Strata Schemes Management Act are quite clear, and he had received this advice from the CTTT which he was able to impart more rationally in his letter of 9 December 2007 (Exhibit R).

gangster

94. The matter complained of contained a series of statements known by the defendant to be false. It was, in addition, couched in language of the most extreme kind. The plaintiff is called a “gangster” (three times), a ‘LAW’S BREAKERS” (twice) and it is because of “fears that the LAW will take over” that the plaintiff is acting “illegally” (twice) and “against the law”. “[G]od knows what will happen next”. Finally, the defendant calls on the other owners to “punish” the “LAW’S BREAKERS”.

95. The few truthful statements are that this is a meeting of great importance and that all the owners need to vote.

96. In Calwell v Ipec Australia Pty Ltd (1975) 135 CLR 321 at 322 – 3, Mason J cautioned against a close textual analysis of the words and that whether the language was extravagant would depend on the facts of the case (cited with approval in Pinniger v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1979) 26 ALR 55 at 61 – 2; Shelmerdine v Mewett [1993] SASC 3932 at [15]). Greater violence of language may be expected where someone makes an unexpected discovery, or is party to a hot dispute, and such words should not be weighed in “nice scales” ( Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219 at 243). Severe language and wrongheaded criticism is not necessarily evidence of malice: Peterson v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 152.

97. However, in the present case, the insults are so extreme that they actually get in the way of any coherent understanding of the publication, very much in the same way as the publication in Skalkos v Assaf (2002) Aust Torts Reports 81-644.

Publication of other defamatory material

98. Both before and after publication of the matter complained of, the defendant wrote approximately one hundred letters and emails to the strata manager and to the plaintiff in which he made serious allegations about the plaintiff.

99. Counsel for the plaintiff only tendered part of this correspondence. What was tendered was sufficient to show the sarcastic and insulting tenor of this avalanche of correspondence. On some occasions, the defendant sent up to four emails a day, as well as letters.

100. I have set out extracts I consider relevant. Some of them (as particularised in the Statement of Claim) refer to or repeat the allegations in the matter complained of; this is relevant to the issue of aggravated damages. Others are relevant to the issue of malice because they refer to the letter terminating the defendant’s cleaning contract (which the plaintiff submits is the true motive for publication of the matter complained of), or because the defendant boasts about his ability to harass the plaintiff and Mr Montano, this being evidence of hostility and ill will. I have set all of these extracts out together because it is important to read this correspondence in chronological order in order to arrive at accurate findings of fact on all these issues:

(a) “… APOSTOPOULOS MOUMOUTZAKIS has built a shed, ILLEGALLY, as a permanent fixture on the COMMON PROPERTY… [letter to Mr Montano, 5 June 2006];

(b) “… you give them false expectations and illegally [sic] opinions… Do you get FREE kebabs or financial remuneration from him??? … How can you say to the poor ignorant man that an illegally [sic] structure from every corner be adopted!!! [letter to Mr Montano, 17 July 2006];

(c) “The storm pipe was blocked while an illegal CONSTRACTION [sic] was going on and by the negligence of your workmen and not taking care and attention of the environment… I was not consulted by you nor by your cohort the STRATA MANAGER, and that contravene [sic] all the rules and LAWS of the ACT OF THE STRATA SCHEME [letter to plaintiff, 6 August 2006];

(d) “During the months of March, April and part of May I could not park my car in the car park because of his building materials and debris while his ILLEGAL construction in a [sic] COMMON PROPERTY WAS GOING ON. He has usurp my land by 750 cm.” [letter to plaintiff’s solicitor, 7 August 2006];

(e) “This maybe is Montano and gang style or could be vietnamese or greek [sic] from the mountains of Peleponnesus [sic] but not the CARPINO style… September will be the big decision of the Adjudicator, the ones inefficient and the culpable ones will pay the price.” [email to Mr Montano, 15 August 2006];

(f) “When will be Armageddon day??? Very soon.” [email to Mr Montano, 16 August 2006, sent at 2.16 am];

(g) “ARMAGEDDON day is coming very soon” [email to Mr Montano, 16 August 2006, sent at 6.58 am];

(h) “The acting committee was ALBATROSS and his cohort Vincent Montano. Give a break! Put your head in a bag.” [email to Mr Montano, 16 August 2006, sent at 10.43 pm];

(i) “Until you persist to run my STRATA PLAN ILLEGALLY I will bombard you with these messages until the end of the earth” [email to Mr Montano, 17 August 2006];

(j) “… as long as you persist with force and illegality, to control MY strata plan…” [email to Mr Montano, 18 August 2006];

(k) “… at next meeting do not bring the VIDEO man, because I’ll summon you or I’ll scream at you very loudly as I have done in the past. MY BEST WISHES TO ALL OF YOU. Vincent Carpino, your best friend” [email to Mr Montano, 19 August 2006];

(l) “Yesterday the ‘TRIUMVIRATE’ met once again. The only difference was that this time, ONE was ignorant, one spastic and the powerful one can NOT read or write.” [email to Mr Montano, 19 August 2006];

(m) “Do you remember the famous and excellent first letter addressed to me??? Dated 27th March 2006. Quote: I VINCENT MONTANO and the executive committee have come to the conclusions that your services are no longer required as [sic] 31 March 2006”. Once again the ‘TRIUMVIRATE’. Who are they????? One ignorant, one spastic, the other one can not read or write.” [email to Mr Montano, 20 August 2006];

(n) “You treat us as pigs. When you are the BIG FAT PIG. When are you going to realise you run MY STRATA PLAN ILLEGALLY?” [email to Mr Montano, 20 August 2006];

(o) “YOU CAN’T ESCAPE THE LAW. Yes, Mr Montano you can call 100 meetings but you are not escaping the LAW, you and your two cohorts and best friends. Money is not the problem, time is the problem. Better go for a confession on Sunday day [sic]. Good luck.” [email to Mr Montano, 20 August 2006];

(p) “Mr Moumoutzakis not only is capable to [sic] rob LAND from the OWNERS CORPORATION, also he can see trough [sic] the wall because he has a magic secret power or clairvoyant. A person with many talents.” [letter to Mr Montano, 20 August 2006];

(q) “that illegal new construction put up by APOSTOLOS MOUMOUTZAKIS [letter to Mr Montano, 21 August 2006];

(r) “the two stooge’s meeting’ [referring to the minutes of the Executive Committee] [letter to Mr Montano, 22 August 2006];

(s) “Do you keep my emails??? They are a bit of fresh air. You must have a big collection by now??” [email to Mr Montano, 24 August, 2006];

(t) “If you think I have initiated a personal and nasty campaign against you – IT IS NOT TRUE. The eternal LAW is: if you do something wrong you should be penalized. You have done wrong in relation to the LAW, and in relation to the STRATA PLAN 13595… Telling blatant lies without evidence means nothing, what it means [sic] stupidity and ignorance. STOP telling LIES and baseless stories, does not advance your excuses.” [letter to plaintiff, 25 August 2006];

(u) “The illegal MONTANO AND the illegal ALBATROSS. Do you remember your fatal date 27-03-06?????” [email to Mr Montano, 25 August 2006; the reference to 27 March is to the date on the letter terminating the defendant’s cleaning contract for the body corporate];

(v) “Have you been for confession this morning???? Do you remember the international (two lines) famous, excellent, fantastic letter (and maybe stupid) of the 27-3-2006? The first and last letter. If is part of one LAW of physical science: “Every action create reaction.” Please, do not write any more reports because they will be more nails in your coffin” [email to Mr Montano, 27 August 2006];

(w) “To the illegal manager of STRATA PLAN 13595, and the secretary of illegal construction, aia [sic] would like to inform you that all the boys and girls are getting ready for and when will be your departure. The big party will go on for weeks, with balloons and stremars [sic]. Please, do not forget to purchase ONE WAY ticket only. Goodby [sic] and bon voyage.” [email to Mr Montano, 27 August 2006];

(x) “VOODOO MAGIC OF MONTANO. SIR, I have been shouting at you, I have been outcrying at you – TO GO – Any sane person would have done so, by now. For you, grasping and understanding things is a bit of a problem. The only way is to use the whip, that is the only solution. You and your stuff too inefficient. Your luggage ready yet??? [email to Mr Montano, 28 August 2006];

(y) “I ordered a Notice Board can not [sic] get the most suitable one, orders from Montano LAW and a stooge. You must go, yes you must go. Yes, you will go, yes, you will go.” [email to Mr Montano, 28 August 2006];

(z) “when and where montano and albatross (hoping very soon) are gone…” [email to Mr Montano, 29 August 2006; the defendant agreed in cross-examination that references to “albatross” were to the plaintiff];

(aa) “We have plenty of tangible evidence from you, actions of taking possession of COMMON LAND not once but in 3 different times, as you have stated in a document under my possession… You think you are the KING OF THE SHOW… You don’t know the LAW, or you don’t understand the LAW, or you ignore the LAW. It is impossible to understand the LAW when you don’t understand the ENGLISH language.” [letter to plaintiff, 14 September 2006];

(bb) “This is my last warning to you, no more mercy… No more warnings, this is final. It took 20 years to move your big rubbish container from my car spot. It took 10 years to move your two 44 gallon drums from my car park… I COULD NOT park in my car park because was [sic] full of timbers and an old sink and plus blue metal, while the illegal construction was going on plus renovations.” [letter to plaintiff, 24 October 2006];

(cc) “The respondent has treated us as morons for too long. The illegality of illegal construction has been done in four different times so he is well aware of his actions. NO MERCY FROM ME. Owners of lots 1, 2 and 3 made a submission also. The respondent was well aware of taking possession of portion of LAND that was part of the common property. If there are any other issues or contradictions wild and witless, outside the illegality of the Structures must be solved by an expert in the field or by a COURT.” [letter to Mr Sarroff, 19 March 2007];

(dd) “Why the Owner’s Corporation has to give an other opportunity for proposal when the TRIBUNAL has already spoken? THE SENTENCE has already been given” [letter to Mr Sarroff, 22 March 2007];

Conclusions concerning malice

101. I make the following findings in relation to malice concerning the defence of qualified privilege at common law and pursuant to s 30:

(a) I accept the plaintiff’s submission that the defendant’s sudden concern about these long-standing encroachments on the common property was largely as a result of his anger at the circumstances of the termination of the cleaning contract. The references to this letter in his subsequent correspondence make this quite clear. He admitted in cross-examination he considered the letter terminating his services disrespectful (T 164, 206-7). Whether or not this letter was disrespectful, it was not an excuse for an unwarranted attack on the plaintiff for taking steps to regularise the situation concerning structures on the common property;

(b) I accept the plaintiff’s submission that the defendant resented the plaintiff because he thought the plaintiff had become, to use his own words, “king of the show” and that his motivation in opposing the regularisation of the situation was not a legitimate concern as to the plaintiff’s activities but a desire for revenge. The defendant’s abusive and insulting conduct towards not only the plaintiff but all three managing agents is of significance. After Mr Montano was replaced by Mr Sarroff, the defendant began to attack Mr Sarroff, eventually writing “I thought Montano was bad enough, here history repeats itself” and Mr Sarroff was removed. The current managing agent, Mr Conides, was called by the plaintiff, and gave evidence of continuing complaints by the defendant;

(c) the defendant’s failure to consider the matter complained of was capable of conveying serious imputations was reckless;

(d) the defendant admitted in cross-examination that what inquiries he made were selectively used (T 176) and he never made inquiries of the plaintiff;

(e) the defendant did not have any belief in the truth of the imputations and abandoned a plea of truth to (c);

102. Individually each of these is capable of amounting to evidence of malice. When viewed collectively, these matters paint a very clear picture of a defendant motivated by malice to publish serious allegations which he knew to be false, out of anger and a desire for revenge. Accordingly the defences of qualified privilege both must fail.

Section 33 triviality

103. Section 33 of the Defamation Act provides:

“ 33 Defence of triviality

104. The particulars provided under cover of a letter dated 27 February 2007 were to the effect that the matter complained of was delivered to not more than eight persons excluding the plaintiff, that each of those persons had a special interest in the matter and was in a position to verify the facts therein.

105. The defence of triviality under the new Act is explained by Simpson J in Holmes v Fraser at [77].

106. The extent of circulation of the matter complained of in Holmes v Fraser was 629, a far greater number than the handful of people who read these publications. However, the potential for damage was high. Each of the members of the body corporate could vote against the plaintiff ( Holmes at [80]) and apart from Mr Tranh did in fact do so. The use of the very strong word “gangster” had potential for harm and the defendant admitted as much in the witness box.

107. Limited extent of publication, by itself, is insufficient for the defence to succeed. The defence of triviality has failed even where the publication is only to one person: Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614.

108. The defence of triviality may be made out where there is publication to a small number of persons well acquainted with the plaintiff and able, themselves, to make a judgment of their own knowledge as to the likelihood of any substance in the imputation conveyed: Doelle v Bedey [2007] QCA 395 at [10]. The circumstances in which the publication was placed on the electricity cabinet for any passers-by going to use the toilet could not hope to satisfy such a test. Nor could it be said that the plaintiff was “unlikely to suffer any harm” following publication of a letter containing legal advice from a person purporting to have legal training which accused the plaintiff of conduct of a very serious nature.

109. Section 13 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) required only that the plaintiff was “not likely to suffer harm”. Section 33 Defamation Act 2005 requires that the plaintiff be “unlikely to suffer any harm”. Whether this is a mere restatement of the same provision, or places the bar higher, may be a matter for debate, but on any test the likelihood of harm flowing from such a publication, given the extreme gravity of the imputations and the circumstances in which it was made, is very high. Accordingly the defence under s 33 fails.

110. All defences having failed, I now consider the issue of damages.

Damages

111. The matter complained of was addressed to four persons, who were fellow shop owners in the strata plan. However, the additional copy of the matter complained of which was pasted on the electricity cabinet for several days was read by other persons, such as Mr Hai, the tenant of shop 6, and also, I find, by one or more of the persons who called out “a gangster” at the plaintiff over a period of time commencing shortly after the notice was placed on the front of the electricity cabinet.

112. A plea of “grapevine effect” is made in reliance upon this evidence. The relatively small number of readers is comparable to the extent of publication in Trantum v McDowell [2007] NSWCA 138. The facts in that matter was very similar, in that a defamatory publication was circulated to approximately one dozen owners in a strata title complex. However, that case was decided in accordance with the principles relevant to the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW). It is necessary for me to examine the provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW).

Provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) relating to the award of damages

113. These provisions are as follows:

“ 34 Damages to bear rational relationship to harm
In determining the amount of damages to be awarded in any defamation proceedings, the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded.

35 Damages for non-economic loss limited
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise under subsection (2), the maximum amount of damages for non-economic loss that may be awarded in defamation proceedings is $250,000 or any other amount adjusted in accordance with this section from time to time (the "maximum damages amount") that is applicable at the time damages are awarded.

(2) A court may order a defendant in defamation proceedings to pay damages for non-economic loss that exceed the maximum damages amount applicable at the time the order is made if, and only if, the court is satisfied that the circumstances of the publication of the defamatory matter to which the proceedings relate are such as to warrant an award of aggravated damages.

(3) The Minister is, on or before 1 July 2006 and on or before 1 July in each succeeding year, to declare, by order published in the Gazette, the amount that is to apply, as from the date specified in the order, for the purposes of subsection (1).

For orders under this subsection, see Gazettes No 84 of 30.6.2006, p 5043 (amount declared: $259,500); No 80 of 15.6.2007, p 3793 (amount declared: $267,500) and No 72 of 20.6.2008, p 5482 (amount declared $280,500).

(4) The amount declared is to be the amount applicable under subsection (1) (or that amount as last adjusted under this section) adjusted by the percentage change in the amount estimated by the Australian Statistician of the average weekly total earnings of full-time adults in Australia over the 4 quarters preceding the date of the declaration for which those estimates are, at that date, available.

(5) An amount declared for the time being under this section applies to the exclusion of the amount of $250,000 or an amount previously adjusted under this section.

(6) If the Australian Statistician fails or ceases to estimate the amount referred to in subsection (4), the amount declared is to be determined in accordance with the regulations.

(7) In adjusting an amount to be declared for the purposes of subsection (1), the amount determined in accordance with subsection (4) is to be rounded to the nearest $500.

(8) A declaration made or published in the Gazette after 1 July in a year and specifying a date that is before the date it is made or published as the date from which the amount declared by the order is to apply has effect as from that specified date.

36 State of mind of defendant generally not relevant to awarding damages
In awarding damages for defamation, the court is to disregard the malice or other state of mind of the defendant at the time of the publication of the defamatory matter to which the proceedings relate or at any other time except to the extent that the malice or other state of mind affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff.

37 Exemplary or punitive damages cannot be awarded
A plaintiff cannot be awarded exemplary or punitive damages for defamation.”

114. The statutory cap under s 35(1) has been adjusted to $280,500.

115. The manner in which these sections should be applied to defamation proceedings had only been considered in a handful of cases. In Attrill v Christie [2007] NSWSC 1386 Bell J awarded damages of $110,000. In Martin v Bruce [2007] NSWDC 264 I awarded damages of $25,000 for a limited publication to members of a club, where the extent of publication was four persons. Neither of these proceedings was defended as to liability.

116. There have been two recent awards of damages under the new Act in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in proceedings which were contested as to liability. In Holmes v Fraser damages were awarded for publication of a letter to 629 recipients. However, Simpson J noted at [110] that there was “little material on which to base an award of damages”, and that “doing the best I can” her Honour assessed the damages at $70,000.

117. In Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 693 McClellan CJ at CL explained the working of s 35, rejecting a submission that there should be two “caps” on damages, one in respect of the Daily Telegraph publication and the other in respect of the Sunday Mail publication, for a total aggregate cap of $561,000 prior to any consideration of aggravation.

118. The nature of defamation means that each letter posted by the defendant, as well as the copy placed on the electricity cabinet, is capable of constituting a separate publication.

119. The plaintiff submits, and I accept, that I should assess the damages in the same fashion as that explained by McClellan CJ at CL at [8] of Davis .

120. Section 35(2) provides that damages for non-economic loss may exceed the maximum damages amount applicable if and only if an award of aggravated compensatory damages is warranted.

121. The operation of s 35(2) has been the subject of debate. In a seminar paper provided to the New South Wales Bar Association on 24 June 2008, Mr T K Tobin QC, who was the Queens Counsel for the plaintiff in Davis , made the following points concerning s 35(2):

“23. The section produces a very strange result unless interpreted to apply to separate defamatory publications and not to proceedings generally. That is, in the Davis case there would be two caps, one in respect of the Daily Telegraph and another in respect of the Sunday Mail for a total aggregate cap of $535,000 prior to any consideration of aggravation.

24. While section 35(1) refers to ‘proceedings’, section 35(2) refers to ‘defamatory matter to which the proceedings relate’, in the singular.

25. By section 4 ‘matter’ is defined to include ‘(a) an article, report, advertisement or other thing communicated by means of a newspaper, magazine or other periodical’. It is significant that it is defined in the singular not plural. This is consistent with the effect of section 8.

26. By section 8, there is a single cause of action for defamation in relation to the publication of defamatory matter about the person even if more than one defamatory imputation about the person is carried by the matter. Thus, the cause of action relates to the particular defamatory matter not to all defamatory matter that may be included in the proceedings or to which the proceedings relate. Thus, in this case there is a separate cause of action in respect of two separate matters. To say that there is a global cap relating to all causes of action, even if they are separate and distinct publications, seems inconsistent with the effect of sections 4 and 8. Moreover, if that is the case then the cap could be circumvented by the procedural device of starting separate proceedings for each publication.

27. Alternatively, by operation of the discretion in section 35(2), damages in excess of the cap may be awarded if the circumstances of the publication warrant such an award of aggravated damages. If the two defamatory publications are regarded as being governed by the one cap on damages, in that relief is sought in the same proceedings, then by operation of section 35(2), the Court may exercise the discretion in favour of increasing damages because of effectively the doubling of the extent of publication, which is a matter in aggravation of damages. This approach ensures that section 35 is not interpreted so as to permit a defendant to avoid pay damages for more than one defamatory publication.

122. Mr Tobin QC noted there was as if no authority on the point and that in the absence of any express provision to aggregate or limit existing common law right as to aggregated damages of the kind provided for relating to punitive damages (in s 39) this interpretation should be accepted.

123. McClellan CJ at CL has, however, rejected this approach at [18]-[20] in Davis .

124. Having made these preliminary comments, I now turn to a consideration of the evidence on damages.

125. The plaintiff has lived in Marrickville since 1973 or 1974. He regularly attends the Greek Orthodox Church there and his customers include customers from other shops in Marrickville. He has worked in the take-away food business for all of his professional life.

126. Prior to publication of the matter complained of, nobody had ever called him a gangster or a criminal (T 38). However, after the matter complained of was left on the electricity cabinet, the plaintiff said that:

“There are drivers that drive outside my place, my shop, and they keep on shouting at me, ‘Gangster. You are a gangster’ et cetera, and I have reported the case to the police, but they have not been caught as yet.”

127. He was asked how many times this had happened and he said:

“Many times. Even last night, they passed through three times.” (T 38)

128. He had seen the vehicles but he was unable to write down the registration number as the word “gangster” was shouted when the car was moving. The plaintiff went on to say:

“…even people from the units, nearby units, they have complained to the police because of this.”

129. This evidence was not the subject of challenge.

130. The plaintiff said that he suffered upset when he saw the notice on the noticeboard. He later torn it down and threw it in the rubbish bin (T 34). He said (T 35):

“I see the letter again. I'm shy and I think about it. I was scared to take it off or leave it there. And because maybe I think no good to take it off, not take, to leave there. But not - and then we - me take it off and threw it the rubbish. The time we seen them.”

131. In addition, since these events, the other tenants have stopped talking to him. This made him feel “very awful” (T 37). He said that at the meeting which occurred after the publication:

“Everybody was looking at me as a kind of criminal. We did not reach any agreement in this meeting. That's the reason I found a lawyer, Alex, to continue my case, to take care of my case.”

132. This was identified as the lawyer who looked after the “strata corporation issues” (T 37).

133. The plaintiff was somewhat inarticulate, and did not give very extensive evidence about hurt to feelings. Nevertheless, it is clear that his hurt to feelings was considerable.

134. A number of the factual statements made by the defendant were wrong. These included not only the wrong statement that the meeting had been called illegally, but also the false statements made by the defendant about his having studied law to the extent that, while not being a qualified lawyer, he was not far short of this standing. This was a serious misrepresentation. In fact the plaintiff had completed some kind of continuing education course on family law at The University of Sydney. While the defendant was entitled to point out that there needed to be a unanimous resolution and a by-law if parts of the common property were to be appropriated in the manner proposed, and some form of compensation could be sought, this did not entitle him to misstate the situation in the way he did, particularly since the defendant well knew that prior to these changes had all been made a considerable number of years beforehand and that what was being sought to be done was to regularise the situation.

135. In determining issues relating to award of damages I must have regard to:

(a) The quantum of damages, which must be proportionate sustained by the plaintiff (s 34);
(b) The maximum amount of damages for non-economic loss, namely $280,500 (s 35(1)); and
(c) I must disregard the state of mind of the defendant, including any malice of the defendant, except to the extent that it affected the harm suffered by the plaintiff (s 36).

136. I am satisfied that the plaintiff should be awarded general damages. I now turn to a consideration of the award of aggravated compensatory damages.

Aggravated compensatory damages

137. The plaintiff submits that I should have regard to the following aggravating factors:

(a) The publication was actuated by malice and a desire to harm the plaintiff, and malice may remain an aggravating factor in the assessment of general damages and in particular hurt to feelings, notwithstanding s 36 of the Act.

(b) The defendant repeated the defamatory allegations in subsequent material published to others, including the strata manager.

(c) The falsity of the imputations to the knowledge of the plaintiff increased his hurt.

(d) The conduct of the defence, including the reliance on a defence of justification to the third imputation pleaded, which was dropped at the end of evidence.

138. There is substantial evidence of malice, and a feature of the matter complained of and for that matter subsequent publications was an intent to “mock and ridicule” (to borrow the expression used in Davis at [37]) the plaintiff. As it was the case in Davis , although the matter complained of purported to be about a body corporate meeting, the letter was framed in such a personal manner as to amount to malice.

139. In Davis McClellan CJ at CL rejected a submission that the defendant was running a campaign against the plaintiff. However, the evidence here which I have set out in detail above, indicates to the contrary.

140. The defendant’s affirmation of the defamatory imputation in subsequent material published by the defendant can be seen from correspondence he sent to Mr Montano.

141. The conduct of the defence, including the late abandonment of the defence of justification, is conduct which may aggravate the plaintiff’s damages: Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Tingle [2001] NSWCA 194. Such conduct was held to justify an award of aggravated compensatory damages in Davis at [32]-[33]. Finally, the defendant’s refusal to apologise, when an apology was sought at an early stage of the proceedings, may be relevant not only to ordinary compensatory damages but also aggravated compensatory damages, for the reasons explained by McClellan CJ at CL at [36]. The defendant asserted that he did in fact apologised. The text of his apology is as follows:

“ DEAR SIR,

RE – APOSTOLOS MOUMOUTZAKIS – YOUR REF. AA: AN: MISC.
LETTER 26-07-2006

The continues SAGA OF APOSTOLOS.

Please, give me the opportunity to describe the incivility and the bad manners of the odd times I have met APOSTOLOS MOUMOUTZAKIS by the following events:

“I can park wherever I like”.

4) Last year a big mixing machinery was left in my car park no 4 for at least 3 months. NO THANK YOU – NOR APOLOGIES YET!! STILL WAITING.
4) Forget years ago.
5) Up to this moment he has 2 (two) 44 gallons drums sitting still in my car park – photos have been taken – after numerous requests not only from me but also from the STRATA MANAGER his cohort, and even was mentioned at the AGM May 2006.
6) During the months of March, April, and part of May I could not park my car in my car park because of his building materials and debris while his ILLEGAL construction in a COMMON PROPERTY WAS GOING ON. He has usurp part of my land by 750cm.

If he is able and capable in his Own writing to apologize six times to me I will apologize for my alleged comments, if he can prove it. I shall wait until the pigs will start flying – maybe – APOSTOLOS is the worst offender in the car park of STRATA PLAN 13595, for uncleanness and disorderly parking. Every tenants every owners can testify his bad manners.”

142. The terms of this letter are such that the plaintiff relies on it in seeking aggravated compensatory damages.

The defendant’s submissions on damages

143. Counsel for the defendant (written submissions, p 2) submitted that damages, if reached, would be “minimal”, on the basis that the only harm since publication was that the owners of shops 1, 2 and 3 (in other words, all other owners except the defendant and Mr Tranh) were not so friendly towards him. It is asserted that the minutes of nearly all the meetings since do not evince opposition to the plaintiff’s proposals as these other owners either support the plaintiff’s proposals or are indifferent to them.

144. In oral submissions, counsel for the defendant submitted that there was no basis for the award of aggravated damages, particularly since the number of persons who had read the publication was so small. Counsel for the defendant did not address the issue of the impact of the abandoned plea of truth on aggravated compensatory damages.

145. The purpose of damages for defamation is consolation for the distress caused by the publication, reparation for the harm done to reputation and vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation: Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44. As the Court of Appeal has emphasised in Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183, a solatium for injured feelings forms a large element in the damages awarded for defamation. The award must show that the plaintiff has been vindicated in his reputation and should reflect the high value the law places upon reputation, so the plaintiff can point to the sum awarded to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge.

146. The defendant’s submissions fail to address the evidence of the plaintiff concerning the ongoing problems he has had not only with his fellow owners but also with members of the public. Nor do they address his hurt to feelings not only resulting from the original publication but from repetition of the imputations in subsequent correspondence to the strata manager.

Conclusions concerning damages

147. The plaintiff should be awarded damages which take into account all of the matters referred to by the Court of Appeal in Ali, but in the context of the cap on damages imposed for the 2005 legislation, and paying particular regard to the limited extent of publication.

148. As a matter of general observation, publications to a handful of persons rarely if ever attract substantial damages. The impact of the cap on damages must mean that awards of damages at the lower end of the scale is appropriate for such publications.

149. In awarding damages, I should include an amount for aggravated compensatory damages. The bringing of a hopeless defence of partial justification, which was abandoned after the defendant had to make concessions in the witness box is but one of a series of matters which individually and collectively constitute grounds for such an award.

150. I have had regard to the manner of assessment of damages under the new Act by Simpson J in Holmes v Fraser at [103] – [110]. In particular I note that s 36 provides that I am to disregard the malice of the defendant at the time of publication or at any other time except to the extent that the malice affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff. In Holmes there was no evidence that the malice affected the harm but in the present proceedings the saga of correspondence following the publication and the defendant’s conduct of the litigation has affected the harm sustained by the plaintiff. In Holmes there was only the matter complained of but in these proceedings the plaintiff has had to live with these allegations on a daily basis because they have been repeated.

151. I have also taken into account that pursuant to s 38 evidence of an apology or other mitigation is admissible. The defendant in cross-examination claimed that he would apologise to the plaintiff and said he had already done so (see the text of the letter set out above). The tenor of his offer to apologise in the witness box was much the same as his letter, and far from amounting to apology was a further cause of distress to the plaintiff.

152. Taking all of the above factors into account, I assess the plaintiff’s damages at $50,000.

153. The parties have asked me to reserve on questions of interest and costs.

Orders

1. Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $50,000.
2. Costs and interest reserved.
3. Liberty to apply.
4. Exhibits retained for 28 days.

******

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Citations

Moumoutzakis v Carpino [2008] NSWDC 168

Most Recent Citation

Cush v Dillon and Boland v Dillon [2009] NSWDC 21

Cases Citing This Decision

1

Cush v Dillon and Boland v Dillon [2009] NSWDC 21

Cases Cited

23

Statutory Material Cited

4

Webb v Bloch [1928] HCA 50

Frawley v New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 248

CITATION:	Moumoutzakis v Carpino [2008] NSWDC 168
HEARING DATE(S):	28 – 31 July 2008
JUDGMENT DATE:	15 August 2008
JURISDICTION:	Civil
JUDGMENT OF:	Gibson DCJ
DECISION:	1. Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $50,000. 2. Costs and interest reserved. 3. Liberty to apply. 4. Exhibits retained for 28 days.
CATCHWORDS:	TORT - defamation - limited publication - imputations - defence of qualified privilege at common law and pursuant to s 30 Defamation Act - defence of triviality (s 33) - defence of partial justification abandoned at the end of the evidence - damages - aggravated compensatory damages - award of $50,000
LEGISLATION CITED:	Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 13 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), ss 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37 Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), ss 22, 47, 48, 52 and 65A
CASES CITED:	Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183 Attrill v Christie [2007] NSWSC 1386 Bellino v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 135 ALR 368 Bennette v Cohen (2005) 64 NSWLR 81 Bik v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1971) [1979] 2 NSWLR 679 (n) Calwell v Ipec Australia Pty Ltd (1975) 135 CLR 321 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 693 Doelle v Bedey [2007] QCA 395 Frawley v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 248 Green v Schneller [2000] NSWSC 548 Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Tingle [2001] NSWCA 194 Holmes v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 570 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614 Martin v Bruce [2007] NSWDC 264 McKenzie v Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 42 Morosi v Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 418 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219 Peterson v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 152 Pinniger v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1979) 26 ALR 55 Shelmerdine v Mewett [1993] SASC 3932 Skalkos v Assaf (2002) Aust Torts Reports 81-644 Trantum v McDowell [2007] NSWCA 138 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 White v Betalli [2007] NSWCA 243
TEXTS CITED:	Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed., vol 2 Folkard, Slander and Libel, 5th ed. (1891) Minister for Housing, NSW Legislative Assembly, Hansard (no. 254), 13 November 1996
PARTIES:	Plaintiff: Apostolos Moumoutzakis Defendant: Vincent Carpino
FILE NUMBER(S):	4665 of 2006
COUNSEL:	Plaintiff: Mr K Andronos/Ms J Chambers Defendant: Mr M Rollinson
SOLICITORS:	Plaintiff: Andresakis & Associates Defendant: Ramrakha Jenkins Solicitors