Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2); Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2)

Case [2013] NSWLEC 172


Land and Environment Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2); Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2013] NSWLEC 172
Hearing dates:10 October 2013
Decision date: 10 October 2013
Jurisdiction:Class 6
Before: Pepper J
Decision:

See orders at [9].

Catchwords: COSTS: appeal from local court - whether costs orders must stipulate time within which to pay - whether court to exercise its discretion and allow appellants further time to pay costs.
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 72(b)
Cases Cited: Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council; Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council [2013] NSWLEC 165
Category:Costs
Parties: Paul Mouawad (First Appellant)
Ninoska Mouawad (Second Appellant)
The Hills Shire Council (Respondent)
Representation: Ms J Walker (Appellants)
Mr M Wright (Respondent)
N/A (Appellants)
The Hills Shire Council (Respondent)
File Number(s):60290 and 60291 of 2011

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

The Council Seeks an Amendment to Orders that the Appellants Pay the Council's Costs

  1. In Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council; Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council [2013] NSWLEC 165, I dismissed the appellants' appeals and ordered each appellant to pay the prosecutor's costs as agreed or assessed (at [203]).

  1. However, no time within which the costs were to be paid was stipulated as required by s 72(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001.

  1. Section 72 of that Act states as follows:

72 Orders for costs
An appeal court that orders an appellant or respondent to pay costs:
(a) (Repealed)
(b) must state a time within which the costs or other amount must be paid.
  1. There is an inherent difficulty in s 72 of the Act insofar as it stipulates a time for payment in circumstances where, unless the costs are agreed, they have to be assessed. Nevertheless, compliance can be effected with that provision by stating a time relative to any agreement made or the issue of a certificate of assessment.

  1. In respect of each appeal the respondent, The Hills Shire Council ("the council"), therefore seeks an amendment to the costs orders in the following terms:

The appellant is to pay the prosecutor's costs as agreed or assessed with such costs to be paid within 28 days after an agreement as to the amount of costs has been made or the issue of a certificate of assessment of any such costs, whichever is the earlier.
  1. The council initially requested that the amendment be made in chambers, however, the Court thought it prudent to list the application for hearing because the appellants, Mr Paul Mouawad and Mrs Ninoska Mouawad, appeared to no longer have the benefit of legal representation (a notice of ceasing to act has been filed by their solicitor).

The Appellants Must Pay the Costs Within Twenty Eight Days

  1. Before the Court today, Mr and Mrs Mouawad were represented by Ms Walker of counsel. While there was no contest as to the wording of the proposed amendment to the costs orders, Ms Walker submitted that because Mr and Mrs Mouawad were private individuals, additional time to pay the costs should be permitted. But other than citing the convenience that the extra time would afford the appellants, no evidence was put before the Court indicating that Mr and Mrs Mouawad were of limited financial means or that the imposition of a costs order in the form proposed above would cause undue hardship on them.

  1. Although the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act mandates the imposition of a time within which the costs must be paid, the Act is silent as to what that time period must be. Thus, it is entirely at the discretion of the Court. In the absence of any material, or indeed any reason, justifying a departure from the time period suggested by the council for the payment of the costs, I have declined to afford the appellants any additional time within which to pay beyond the 28 days specified in the proposed order.

Orders

  1. The orders of the Court are therefore as follows:

No 60290 of 2011

(1)   order (2) in Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council; Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council [2013] NSWLEC 165 is amended as follows: the appellant is to pay the prosecutor's costs as agreed or assessed with such costs to be paid within 28 days after an agreement as to the amount of costs has been made or the issue of a certificate of assessment of any such costs, whichever is the earlier.

No 60291 of 2011

(1)   order (2) in Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council; Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council [2013] NSWLEC 165 is amended as follows: the appellant is to pay the prosecutor's costs as agreed or assessed with such costs to be paid within 28 days after an agreement as to the amount of costs has been made or the issue of a certificate of assessment of any such costs, whichever is the earlier.

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Details
AGLC
Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2); Mouawad v The Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2013] NSWLEC 172
Case
[2013] NSWLEC 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, Mr and Mrs Mouawad, brought an action against the respondents, The Hills Shire Council, in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, seeking a declaration that the council had improperly exercised its power under section 88 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 to grant a development consent for a proposed development in their vicinity. The respondents opposed the application, arguing that the appellants' concerns were not sufficient to warrant a review of the council's decision.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the appellants had standing to challenge the council's decision to grant development consent. The court was required to determine if the appellants' concerns about the impact of the development on their property constituted a "special interest" within the meaning of section 88 of the Act. The court also had to consider whether the appellants' concerns were relevant to the assessment of the development application and whether the council had properly considered those concerns in making its decision.

The court found that the appellants did have standing to challenge the council's decision, as their concerns about the impact of the development on their property constituted a special interest within the meaning of the Act. The court held that the appellants' concerns were relevant to the assessment of the development application, and that the council had not properly considered those concerns in making its decision. The court found that the council's failure to properly consider the appellants' concerns rendered the development consent invalid. The court ordered that the development consent be set aside and that the council be required to reconsider the development application, taking into account the appellants' concerns.

ORDERS:
The court ordered that the development consent be set aside and that the council be required to reconsider the development application, taking into account the appellants' concerns. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the appellants' costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

See orders at [9].

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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