Mossop Group Pty Ltd v 1KW Adelaide Pty Ltd

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Appeal from a Master: Civil)

MOSSOP GROUP PTY LTD v 1KW ADELAIDE PTY LTD

[2018] SASC 186

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle (ex tempore)

11 December 2018

PROCEDURE - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT - IN GENERAL

Appeal from a decision of a Master refusing the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment in respect of the amount claimed under a progress certificate.

The Superintendent issued a progress certificate under the Contract in response to a progress claim made by the plaintiff construction company.  A subsequent replacement progress certificate was issued for a lesser amount.  There was evidence that the replacement progress certificate was issued as a result of the Superintendent identifying an error in the initial progress certificate.  While the Contract provided for the issuing of a replacement progress certificate in such circumstances, the Contract required that this be done by the Supervisor.  The replacement progress certificate in this case was not issued in the name of the Superintendent, but rather a colleague of his.  While the Contract provided for the Superintendent to delegate his functions, it required that there be written notification of any such delegation.  There was no such written notification in this case.

The plaintiff claimed that in circumstances where there had not been compliance with the contractual mechanism for issuing a replacement progress certificate, the replacement progress certificate issued in this case was of no contractual force.  Accordingly, it was entitled to the sum in the initial progress certificate, and sought summary judgment to give effect to this.

The defendant contended that in circumstances where the plaintiff had acquiesced in the Superintendent’s colleague exercising various of the functions of the Superintendent under the Contract, it had a reasonable basis for defending the proceedings on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to insist upon strict compliance with the contractual requirement that there be written notification of any delegation of these functions.

The Master upheld the defendant’s contention and dismissed the application for summary judgment.

Held, per Doyle (dismissing the appeal):

1.       The evidence established a reasonable basis for a contention that by reason of the colleague’s conduct in carrying out various of the Superintendent’s functions, and the plaintiff’s acquiescence in this occurring without any written notice of a delegation of those functions, the plaintiff was estopped from insisting upon, or waived its entitlement to insist upon, compliance with the contractual obligation to give notification of the delegation of that function in respect of the replacement certificate.

2.       Appeal dismissed.

Supreme Court (Civil) Rules 2006  (SA) r 232, referred to.
Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1; Ke Qin Ren v Hong Jiang; Jiang v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 104 ACSR 149, considered.

MOSSOP GROUP PTY LTD v 1KW ADELAIDE PTY LTD
[2018] SASC 186

DOYLE J (ex tempore):    

  1. This is an appeal from a…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 186
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mossop Group Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of a Master who had refused the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment in respect of a progress payment claim under a building contract. The plaintiff, a construction company, had entered into a contract with the defendant, the registered proprietor of multi-storey premises, to carry out building works. The Contract included the AS4902-2000 general conditions of contract and required the plaintiff to make progress payment claims to the Superintendent. Moto Projects Pty Ltd, engaged as the Superintendent, had assigned shared responsibilities to Ms Rachael Oliver-Dearman, a project manager, without notifying the plaintiff. This raised a dispute over the validity of the Superintendent’s delegation and the plaintiff’s entitlement to the disputed progress payment claim number 10 for $595,069.56. The plaintiff sought summary judgment under rule 232, which requires the court to be satisfied that there is no reasonable basis for defending the claim. The Master had refused the application, considering the amended defence and counterclaim, including an estoppel plea based on the plaintiff’s conduct regarding Ms Oliver-Dearman’s role.

The court had to decide whether the Master correctly refused the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. The key issue was whether there was a reasonable basis for defending the claim, considering the estoppel plea and the subsequent events, such as the Superintendent issuing a final payment certificate and the plaintiff issuing a tax invoice. The court had to assess whether the estoppel plea was valid and if the subsequent events affected the basis for summary judgment. The court also needed to consider whether the Master had correctly applied the principles governing an application for summary judgment, particularly whether the outcome was likely to turn on contested issues of fact.

The court found that the Master had correctly refused the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. The estoppel plea was valid, as the plaintiff had accepted, or acquiesced in, Ms Oliver-Dearman exercising the Superintendent’s powers without objection. This conduct estopped the plaintiff from challenging Ms Oliver-Dearman’s authority and insisting on strict compliance with the contractual requirement for written notification of delegation. The subsequent events, such as the Superintendent issuing a final payment certificate and the plaintiff issuing a tax invoice, did not affect the basis for summary judgment. The court concluded that the Master had properly considered the amended defence, the estoppel plea, and the principles governing an application for summary judgment. The court found that the outcome was likely to turn on contested issues of fact, making it inappropriate to determine the matter summarily.

The court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Master’s decision. The defendant was not liable to pay the amount claimed in the disputed progress payment claim number 10.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of a Master refusing the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment in respect of a progress payment claim under a building contract.Background The plaintiff is a construction company, and the defendant is the registered proprietor of multi-storey premises at 1 King William Street, Adelaide. In February 2015 they entered into a contract (the Contract) to carry out building works on those premises. The Contract comprised a number of documents, but relevantly included the AS4902-2000 general conditions of contract. A dispute arose between the parties in respect of a particular claim for a progress payment. As at the date of argument before the Master, there had been 12 progress payment claims made by the plaintiff. All of them had been paid other than the disputed one, being progress payment claim number 10 for an amount of $595,069.56. Before coming to the circumstances of the dispute in relation to progress payment claim number 10, it is appropriate to mention the provisions of the Contract in relation to progress claims, and the superintendent’s role. The Contract, under clause 37.1, provided for progress claims to be made by the plaintiff (as the Contractor) to the Superintendent. Clause 37.2 governed the process by which the Superintendent certified those claims. Relevantly for the purposes of this appeal, clause 37.2.1 provided that the Superintendent shall, within 10 business days after receiving a progress claim issue a progress certificate evidencing the Superintendent’s opinion of the moneys due from the Principal to the Contractor pursuant to the progress claim and the reasons for any difference. Clause 37.2.5 provided that the Principal shall pay to the Contractor the amount shown in the progress certificate within 10 business days of the later of the date the progress certificate is issued, and the date the payment preconditions[1] are satisfied. Under clause 37.2.7 neither a progress certificate nor payment of moneys shall be evidence that the subject building work has been carried out satisfactorily; rather, payment other than final payment shall be payment on account only. Finally, clause 37.2.8 provided that “the Superintendent may (by issuing a further certificate) correct any error which has been discovered in any previous Progress Certificate”.[1] Which includes the issuing of a tax invoice. Moto Projects Pty Ltd was engaged to provide superintendent services in relation to the building works under the Contract. The Contract defined the Superintendent as “Lorne McClurg for and on behalf of Moto Projects Pty Ltd”. There is no dispute that Mr McClurg was the Superintendent under the Contract. However, the evidence of Mr McClurg was to the effect that he and Ms Rachael Oliver-Dearman (a project manager employed by Moto Projects) had shared the responsibility for undertaking the tasks of the Superintendent in relation to the building works on the premises at 1 King William Street. Clause 21 of the Contract provided for the Superintendent to appoint a delegate to exercise his functions. But it required that the Contractor be provided with notice of the appointment in writing, and an opportunity to object.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE J
Mr McClurg gave evidence to similar effect. He said that since commencing with Moto Projects in January 2016, Ms Oliver-Dearman had shared with him the responsibility for undertaking the Superintendent’s tasks for the project, including coordination of the building activities, assessing payment claims and variations, issuing payment certificates, issuing site instructions and directions to the plaintiff, and sending and receiving correspondence. He said that no representative from the plaintiff had raised any issue regarding Ms Oliver-Dearman’s authority to carry out any aspect of the Superintendent’s role on the project. The application for summary judgment The principles governing an application for summary judgment are not in dispute. The application was brought under r 232, which provides the Court with power to give summary judgment for a party; but in the case of an application by the plaintiff, only if the Court is satisfied that “there is no reasonable basis for defending the applicant’s claim”. There is no dispute about the applicable test and principles. They are those articulated by the Court in Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin.[3] A court will not lightly grant summary judgment. The nature of the test is such that it will not ordinarily be appropriate to determine a matter summarily where the outcome is likely to turn upon contested issues of fact. [3] Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1 at [80]-[82]. The application for summary judgment was initially heard by the Master in December 2016. However, a significant period of time elapsed before judgment was delivered on account of the parties attending two mediations. Those mediations were apparently successful in resolving some of the other broader commercial issues between the parties, but not the issues the subject of these proceedings. Further, when the parties informed the Master that the mediations had not resolved all of the issues between them, and that it would still be necessary to determine the application for summary judgment, the Master’s reasons record that the parties agreed that the application should be determined “on the basis of the pleadings as at the date of the argument and the material before the Court at that time.” In reality the defence had been amended twice before the matter came to be decided, and indeed the defendant had included a counterclaim. Those subsequent documents had raised various issues, including a plea of estoppel. The essence of the plea of an estoppel was that by reason of the plaintiff’s conduct in accepting, or acquiescing in, Ms Oliver-Dearman exercising the powers of the Superintendent it was now estopped from relying upon its strict contractual entitlement to insist upon any delegation of the Superintendent’s functions being subject to notification in writing, or from otherwise challenging Ms Oliver-Dearman’s authority in connection with the replacement progress certificate. Finally, I mention also that when the matter came to be argued before me, the defendant sought to adduce fresh evidence of the fact that the Superintendent had since issued a final payment certificate, and indeed that the plaintiff had recently issued a tax invoice seeking payment of the amount in that certificate. Subject potentially to one minor qualification in respect of a particular variation, the defendant’s evidence was that the final payment certificate included, or took account of, the amounts in progress payment claim number 10, and that the defendant acknowledged an obligation to, and intended to, pay the amount in that invoice. In the absence of opposition, I received evidence of the above as fresh evidence on the appeal, and gave the defendant permission to rely upon a notice of contention to the effect that these subsequent events superseded the 1 July 2016 progress certificate, and hence removed the basis for summary judgment in the amount claimed in that certificate.The Master’s reasons

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE J

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