Morton and Morton (No. 2)

Case [2008] FamCA 855


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MORTON & MORTON (NO. 2) [2008] FamCA 855
FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Application for extension of time to seek costs
Family Law Rules 2004 r 1.14
Clivery & Conway [2007] FamCA 1435
APPLICANT: Ms Morton
RESPONDENT: Mr Morton
FILE NUMBER: MLC 9844 of 2007
DATE DELIVERED: 1 September 2008
PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne
PLACE HEARD: Melbourne
JUDGMENT OF: Watt J
HEARING DATE: By written submission

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: David Stagg Tonkin & Co
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Aitken Partners Pty Ltd

Orders

  1. I dismiss the wife’s application filed 6 May 2008.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Morton & Morton is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 9844  of 2007

MS MORTON

Applicant

And

MR MORTON

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Application for extension of time to file costs submissions

  1. In this matter, the husband instituted proceedings for property settlement in this court after the wife had, to his knowledge, already instituted proceedings in an English court seeking property settlement, spousal maintenance, and divorce.

  2. The wife sought a stay of the husband’s proceedings in this court and in response, the husband sought an order restraining the wife from continuing with her proceedings in the English court. The case turned on whether the Family Court of Australia was a clearly inappropriate forum and I found that it was so.

  3. On 10 January 2008 I granted the order sought by the wife staying the husband’s proceedings in this court, being satisfied that this court was a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of the parties’ property proceedings. I gave reasons orally, indicating that they would be published when revised.

  4. A major factor in my decision was that the English court in which the wife had instituted her proceedings had jurisdiction to make a pension sharing order in respect of the superannuation entitlements of the husband accumulated while he was a serving member of the UK armed forces during the marriage, but the Family Court of Australia could not, as I found, make a splitting order that would bind the UK trustee of that fund: see my reasons for judgment published on 7 March 2008 in this matter. There has been no appeal against that judgment.

  5. On 18 March 2008 the wife’s solicitors wrote to my associate advising that the wife wished to make application for her costs of the proceedings before me. The letter sought direction as to whether the application should be made at an oral hearing, or based on written submissions. If the latter, the wife proposed the following timetable:

    1.That the applicant wife provide written submissions as to costs within 21 days;

    2.That the respondent husband respond within 14 days;

    3.That any reply of the applicant wife be delivered within a further 7 days.

  6. In response to this letter, a telephone mention was listed for 9.30am on 27 March 2008, and the parties’ solicitors…

Continue reading Morton and Morton (No. 2)

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Morton and Morton (No. 2) [2008] FamCA 855
Case
[2008] FamCA 855
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Morton and Morton (No. 2)*, the wife sought to vary a property settlement order made by consent in 2005. The application was heard by Watt J in the Family Court of Australia. The core of the dispute concerned the wife's assertion that she had been induced to enter into the original consent orders by misleading and deceptive conduct on the part of the husband, specifically in relation to the valuation of certain assets.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the wife had established a sufficient basis to set aside the original consent orders on the grounds of misleading and deceptive conduct. This required the court to consider the nature of consent orders in family law proceedings and the threshold for their variation or setting aside, particularly when allegations of fraud or misrepresentation are raised. The court also had to assess whether the wife's evidence sufficiently demonstrated that she relied on the alleged misleading conduct to her detriment when agreeing to the original settlement.

Watt J dismissed the wife's application. The reasoning focused on the high bar required to displace consent orders, which are generally treated as final and binding. The court found that the wife had not adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the husband had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, nor that she had relied upon such conduct to her detriment when entering into the consent orders. The wife's application was therefore unsuccessful.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

I dismiss the wife’s application filed 6 May 2008.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.