Morse v Riley

Case [2014] NSWSC 212


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Morse v Riley [2014] NSWSC 212
Hearing dates:11 March 2014
Decision date: 11 March 2014
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Schmidt J
Decision:

First Plaintiff not to be excused from cross-examination at the hearing of the motion.

Catchwords: PROCEDURE - order that first plaintiff be excused from cross examination sought - order refused
Legislation Cited: Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW)
Category:Interlocutory applications
Parties: Joanna Louise Morse (First Plaintiff)
Joanna Chapman Investments Pty Ltd (Second Plaintiff)
Michael Thomas Riley (First Defendant/Cross-Claimant)
Julie Anne Riley (Second Defendant)
LawCover Insurance Pty Limited (Cross-Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr T Molomby SC with Ms M Fraser (Plaintiffs)
Mr J Downing (Cross-Defendant)
Solicitors:
Castagnet Lawyers (Plaintiffs)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Cross-Defendant)
File Number(s):2011/177707
Publication restriction:None

EX TEMPORE Judgment

  1. HER HONOUR: Having heard the parties, it must be concluded that the first plaintiff cannot be excused from cross-examination at the hearing of the motion. It does seem to me that, having regard to what is in issue between the parties on the motion which arises from the provisions of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW) and, in particular, the provisions of s 6(4), which includes a proviso in terms that:

"No action shall be commenced in any Court, except with the leave of that Court, leave shall not be granted in any case where the Court is satisfied that the insurer is entitled, under the terms of the contract of insurance, to disclaim liability and that any proceedings, including arbitration proceedings, necessary to establish that the insurer is so entitled to disclaim, have been taken."

the requirement that the first plaintiff be available for cross-examination at the hearing of the motion is a reasonable one. Steps can be taken by the parties to arrange for that cross-examination to be undertaken by way of telephone, given the first plaintiff's physical difficulties, so that hurdle can be overcome in a practical sense.

  1. It seems to me, given what appears to be common ground between the parties, that the first plaintiff's statement, on which reliance will be placed in order to support the joinder sought by way of the motion, does fairly leave open the possibility that her evidence will also be relevant to the question of whether or not the circumstances are such that the claim falls within the proviso in s 6(4), to which I have earlier referred. That is what LawCover seeks to establish.

  1. It seems to be common ground between the parties that the circumstances are such that the first defendant, who has filed a submitting appearance, has clearly admitted negligence. That there is a possibility that the conduct involved is more serious, namely dishonest conduct which, under the relevant policy, would entitle the insurer to disclaim liability is a possibility which LawCover is entitled to explore in cross-examination.

  1. In those circumstances, the issue in relation to which cross-examination of the first plaintiff would assist the Court, the question posed in the plaintiff's submissions at paragraph 2, is clearly answered. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's physical difficulties, it seems to me that justice does demand in this case that the plaintiff not be excused from cross-examination at the hearing of the motion.

  1. The parties have liberty to approach.

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Details
AGLC
Morse v Riley [2014] NSWSC 212
Case
[2014] NSWSC 212
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Morse v Riley was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The first plaintiff, Morse, sought an order to be excused from cross-examination during the proceedings, while the defendant, Riley, opposed this application. The dispute centred around the admissibility and weight of Morse's evidence, with Riley contending that Morse's testimony was critical to the resolution of the case. The court was tasked with determining whether Morse's application should be granted and, if so, under what circumstances.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Morse's application to be excused from cross-examination should be granted, considering the potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings and the quality of evidence presented. The court needed to balance Morse's right to avoid unnecessary harassment and the potential for prejudice against Riley's right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to test the evidence given by Morse through cross-examination. The court also had to consider whether Morse's evidence was so unreliable or prejudicial that it warranted an exemption from cross-examination.

The court found that Morse's application to be excused from cross-examination was not justified. The judge held that the evidence given by Morse was not so unreliable or prejudicial as to warrant an exemption from cross-examination. The judge emphasised the importance of cross-examination as a fundamental right in the adversarial system, allowing for the testing of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, the court refused the application, ruling that Morse must face cross-examination. The court's decision underscored the principle that the right to a fair trial, including the right to cross-examine witnesses, outweighs the potential discomfort or inconvenience to a witness in most circumstances.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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