| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL | [1995] QCA 157 |
| SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND | Appeal No. 242 of 1994 |
| Brisbane | |
| Before | Fitzgerald P. Davies J.A. Pincus J.A. |
[Morris v. F.A.I. General Insurance]
BETWEEN:
KATRINA MARY MORRIS
(Plaintiff) Respondent
AND:
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD
(Defendant) Appellant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FITZGERALD P.
Judgment delivered 05/05/1995
I agree with Davies and Pincus JJ.A. that this appeal should be dismissed, with costs.
There were potential difficulties with the form of the action, in which the respondent, who was injured by the appellant's insured, sued the appellant not the tortfeasor: cf. Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Limited v. New World Fabrications Pty Ltd (1987) 4 A.N.Z.I.C. 60-775.
The primary judge found that there was an assumption adopted by the respondent and induced by the appellant's letter of 11 September 1987 that the appellant admitted liability and would not rely on the limitation period. The appellant's principal argument was that such an assumption was not justified by the terms of its letter; the sole foundation for this argument was the proposition that the appellant's statement that it was "prepared to accept [the respondent's] claim for personal injuries" in conjunction with a request for "copies of the relevant medical reports, to enable us to give consideration to an offer for quantum" does not convey that liability is accepted but merely that there is a present intention to do so, with, presumably, an implicit reservation that that intention might alter and liability might be denied.
In my opinion, that was not the effect of the appellant's letter, and courts should not encourage such pedantry, or the injustice which it would produce.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 242 of 1994.
Brisbane
[Morris v. FAI Insurance]
BETWEEN:
KATRINA MARY MORRIS
(Plaintiff) Respondent
AND:
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD
(Defendant) Appellant
__________________________________________________________________
___
Fitzgerald P.
Pincus J.A.Davies J.A.
__________________________________________________________________
___
Judgment delivered 05/05/1995
Joint Reasons for Judgment of Pincus and Davies JJ.A. Separate concurring reasons
of Fitzgerald P.
__________________________________________________________________
___
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS
__________________________________________________________________
___
CATCHWORDS: | CONTRACT - estoppel - assumption - detriment - personal injuries - whether letter from insurer advising "we are prepared to accept your client's claim for personal injuries" estopped it from relying on Limitation of Actions Act when proceedings commenced out of time. |
| S. 11 Limitation of Actions Act 1974. Giblin v. Duggan (Full Court 8/3/81) Q.S.C.P. case 7522 Newton, Bellamy & Wolfe v. SGIO (Qld) [1986] 1 Qd.R. 431 Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394 | |
| Counsel: | Mr S C Williams Q.C. for the appellant. Mr B O'Donnell Q.C. for the respondent. |
Solicitors: | McInnes Wilson and Jensen for the appellant. Quinlan Miller and Treston for the respondent. |
Hearing date:30 March 1995.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 242 of 1994.
Brisbane
| Before | Fitzgerald P. Pincus J.A. Davies J.A. |
[Morris v. FAI Insurance]
BETWEEN:
KATRINA MARY MORRIS
(Plaintiff) Respondent
AND:
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD
(Defendant) Appellant
JOINT…
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- Case
- [1995] QCA 157
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the insurer's letter, which stated "we are prepared to accept your client's claim for personal injuries," constituted an estoppel that prevented the insurer from relying on the Limitation of Actions Act. The court had to examine the circumstances under which promissory estoppel might apply, particularly considering the detriment suffered by the insured due to the insurer's communication. The court also needed to determine if the insured had acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on the insurer's letter.
The court held that promissory estoppel could apply in this context, finding that the insurer's letter created an assumption that it would accept the claim, which led the insured to forgo timely legal action. The detriment suffered by the insured, due to the delay in commencing proceedings, was sufficient to warrant the application of estoppel. The court emphasised that the insured had acted reasonably in relying on the clear and unequivocal assurance provided by the insurer. Consequently, the insurer was estopped from relying on the Limitation of Actions Act, and the claim was permitted to proceed.
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