Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 723

File number(s): ADG 53 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD
Date of judgment: 23 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Regional Employer Nomination visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal –application of the waiver provision in PIC 4020 – whether applicant purposely provided false and misleading information in contravention of PIC 4020(1) – compassionate or compelling circumstances – whether requirement to disclose UK spent convictions – where Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence - jurisdictional error established – writs issued
Legislation:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 85ZL, 85ZM(2)(b), 85ZR, 85ZR(2), 85ZS, 85ZS(1), 85ZV, 85ZV(2), 85ZZH(d)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 187.213 in Schedule 2 and PIC 4020 in Schedule 4

Cases cited:

Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019) 266 CLR 250

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 334 FLR 281

Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 417 ALR 210

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton (2023) 276 CLR 136

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169

Wu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1091

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 86
Date of last submission/s: 12 March 2025
Date of hearing: 13 February 2025 and 27 March 2025
Place: Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicants: Peter Barnes
Solicitor for the Applicants: Ujvari Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Oliver Morris
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

ADG53 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DEAN STUART MARTIN MOORE

First Applicant

LUCY HELEN FITZPATRICK

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GERRARD

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 31 January 2022.

3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s review application according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 723
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicants, British citizens, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding their application for Regional Employer Nomination visas. The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in its consideration of the Public Interest Criterion 4020 (PIC 4020) and the application of the waiver provision within it. The applicants argued that they had not purposely provided false and misleading information in contravention of PIC 4020(1) and that there were compassionate or compelling circumstances warranting a waiver under PIC 4020(4). The court examined whether the AAT had failed to consider relevant evidence, specifically a letter from a UK solicitor that explained the legal position regarding the applicant's convictions as spent convictions.

The court found that the AAT had indeed failed to consider this crucial piece of evidence. The Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the applicant's explanation were internally cogent, but the omission of the solicitor's letter, which directly addressed the critical issue of whether the applicant could have genuinely believed he did not have to disclose his convictions, constituted a jurisdictional error. The court held that the AAT's failure to consider this evidence led to an unreasonable decision-making process. Consequently, the court set aside the AAT's decision and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration. The court emphasised that the AAT must properly consider all relevant evidence when making its determinations under PIC 4020.

In summary, the court concluded that the AAT had made a jurisdictional error by not considering relevant evidence provided by the applicant. This error was significant enough to warrant the setting aside of the AAT's decision and the matter being remitted for reconsideration. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly examining all relevant evidence in migration cases, particularly when it pertains to the credibility of the applicant's explanations and the applicability of the waiver provisions under PIC 4020.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the Court has found jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. On that basis, the application has succeeded. BACKGROUND The first applicant (the applicant) is a British citizen (CB 24). The second applicant is the de facto partner of the applicant and is also a British citizen (CB 26). The applicants first arrived in Australia in 2015. On 1 March 2018, the applicants applied for the visas (CB 23-46). In that application, the applicant indicated that he had been nominated for the position of Building Associate (CB 30) and disclosed that he had previously been convicted of driving under the influence in Australia in 2017 (CB 43). The applicants provided various documents in support of their application (CB 47-151, 166-180). The applicants appointed a registered migration agent as their authorised recipient in their visa application (CB 29). The applicant provided a National Police Certificate dated 28 May 2019 which discloses his 2017 conviction (CB 204), along with a statutory declaration dated 12 May 2018 which explains this conviction in more detail (CB 197). The applicant also provided a copy of a police certificate from the Association of Chief Police Officers Criminal Records Office (the UK police certificate) dated 17 May 2019, which details a number of historical offences (CB 200-202). On 19 June 2019, a delegate of the Minister issued a natural justice letter to the applicant inviting him to comment on adverse information received, namely, that Public Interest Criterion 4020 (PIC 4020) of Schedule 4 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) may not be satisfied on the basis of his failure to provide details of his convictions in the United Kingdom in his visa application (CB 208-211). At the time of the Tribunal’s decision, PIC 4020 relevantly provided:(1)There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5‑reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:(a) the application for the visa; or(b)a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.…(4)The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or(b)compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;justify the granting of the visa.(5) In this clause:information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and(b)relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.Note: For the definition of bogus document, see subsection 5(1) of the Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, it is clear that the applicant was required to disclose his spent convictions in his visa application. Failure to consider relevant evidence As observed, the applicant has consistently maintained that he believed that his earlier records of offences and convictions had ceased to exist. This was a claim which was rejected by the Tribunal as “challenging to believe as accurate”. It is useful to set out the Tribunal’s understanding of the applicant’s evidence and its findings in respect of this in full (at [19]-[20] of its reasons):[19] When asked why he did not disclose the convictions on his visa applications or his incoming passenger card on his arrival into Australia, the visa applicant stated that he thought, based on his earlier experiences in the UK legal system that these records of offences and convictions ceased to exist after certain time periods had occurred, which varied depending on the type of offence. Had he known then that they didn’t cease to be on his record but remained permanently, he would have done differently and declared them.[20] The Tribunal finds the explanation proffered that he didn’t understand that his convictions would be relevant as they had ceased to be convictions prior to arriving in Australia as they had expired, is challenging to believe as accurate. It also notes the wording on the visa applications and passenger entry card which are quite clear, including the issue of previous convictions and charges. The Tribunal has concluded that the visa applicant knowingly provided false information in relation to convictions on his visa applications and his incoming passenger card on his arrival into Australia. It was, of course, a matter for the Tribunal to make an assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s explanation in respect of his failure to disclose his convictions, provided that assessment was within the boundaries of legal reasonableness. The Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting the applicant’s explanation are internally cogent. That is, the Tribunal had regard to what it believed were clear statements on the visa application and passenger entry cards and reasoned that the applicant could not have believed he was not required to disclose those convictions. Absent any evidence to the contrary, that was an acceptable rationale for the Tribunal’s finding. However, the issue was not, in fact, absent any evidence to the contrary. The applicant had provided a letter from a UK solicitor which supported the applicant’s explanation. That letter expressly states that the “area of law is unnecessarily complex and typically many defendants tend to assume that a lapse of time necessarily means that it can never be cited or disclosed”. There is no reference to the letter from the UK solicitor anywhere in the Tribunal’s decision. Given the letter is direct evidence as to the legal position in respect of the applicant’s convictions, explains that they are spent convictions, and importantly, goes directly to the critical issue of whether the applicant could have genuinely believed that he did not have to disclose the conviction, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was not required to consider this.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Jurisdictional error is made out in respect of this ground, albeit for slightly different reasons than advanced in the application.CONCLUSION The applicants have succeeded on ground two of the amended application. Accordingly, the decision will be set aside and the matter will be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains two particularised grounds. Both grounds allege jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s reasons for determining that PIC 4020(1) was breached and that the conditions for waiver under PIC 4020(4) were not met.Ground one – the Tribunal’s consideration of compassionate or compelling circumstances Ground one contends that the Tribunal erred in its construction and application of PIC 4020(4)(a) and (4)(b) in finding that there were not compelling circumstances affecting the interests of Australia, or compelling or compassionate circumstances affecting the interests of an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand, to justify waiving PIC 4020(1) for the grant of the visas. The requirements of PIC 4020 may be waived if there are compassionate or compelling circumstances that justify the granting of the visa (PIC 4020(4)). In Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173 (Plaintiff M64/2015), the plurality of French CJ, and Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ, defined “compelling” circumstances as those which “‘force or drive the decision-maker’ ‘irresistibly’ to be satisfied that ‘special consideration’ should be given to granting the particular application” (at [31]). Gageler J (as his Honour then was), in separate reasons, considered the statutory requirement to be that “the decision-maker be persuaded that there are reasons in favour of taking that action which, when weighed within the context of the particular statutory scheme, are irresistible” (at [64]). The Full Court of the Federal Court in Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235 (Kaur 2017) at [26] per Dowsett, Pagone and Burley JJ discussed the inquiry under PIC 4020(4) as follows:Fourthly, PIC4020(4) sets up a two-staged inquiry. It obliges the decision maker first to be satisfied that there are “compelling circumstances”. Only then may the decision maker go on to consider those circumstances in the application of his or her discretion. The appellants’ argument conflates these inquiries. They submit that upon the involvement of any child in a visa application to which PIC4020 applies, the existence of the Convention comes into consideration as a compelling circumstance warranting the balancing exercise of the considerations involved. In our view, that does not represent a correct interpretation of the regulation. PIC4020(4)(a) imposes a filter, whereby the decision maker must consider that there exist “compelling” (that is, “forceful”; Paduano v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 211; (2005) 143 FCR 204 at [32]–[37] per Crennan J) circumstances. In the present case, the Tribunal applied that filter at [82] to reject the appellants’ submissions. We see no error in that approach. This approach was applied by Judge Lucev in Wu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1091, who went on to say:The appropriate inquiry under PIC 4020(4) (a) or (b) of Sch 4 to the Migration Regulations is a two-stage inquiry. The first stage of the inquiry through PIC 4020(4)(b) of Sch 4 to the Migration Regulations is to consider whether there are compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen. The word “or” is ordinarily treated as being disjunctive: Uddin v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, Ltd [1965] 2 QB 582; R v Surrey Quarter Sessions, ex parte Cmr of Metropolitan Police [1963] 1 QB 99. In this case that means that the circumstances identified by a decision-maker are not required to be both compassionate “and” compelling: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1614; (2018) 334 FLR 281. The second stage is discretionary. It requires a decision-maker to consider whether the compassionate or compelling circumstances identified in the first step justify the grant of the Partner Visa.