District Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Moore v Lawrie [2025] NSWDC 97 Hearing dates: 13 March 2025 Date of orders: 13 March 2025 Decision date: 13 March 2025 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Newlinds SC DCJ Decision: Orders at para [24]; Appeal allowed in part
Catchwords: APPEALS – Appeal from Local Court decision under Dividing Fences Act – Appeal to criminal jurisdiction of District Court
DIVIDING FENCES ACT – Proper construction of s 4 “sufficient dividing fence” in light of defined term “fence” in s 3
COSTS – Interrelationship between ss 7(1) and 14(c) of the Dividing Fences Act as to orders as to cost of building a fence
Legislation Cited: Dividing Fences Act 1991 (NSW) s 3, s 4, s 7, s 13, s 14
Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW) s 18, Pt 3
Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 70, Pt 4
Cases Cited: Category: Principal judgment Parties: Michael Moore (Appellant 1)
Carmen Lawrie (Respondent 1)
Jeffrey Lees (Appellant 2)
Dale Thompson (Respondent 2)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
B Haines ( Appellants)
D Yakenian (Solicitor) (Respondents)
McAuley Lawyers ( Appellants)
Juris League Consultancy (Respondents)
File Number(s): 2023/346694 Publication restriction: Nil Decision under appeal
- Court or tribunal:
- Local Court of New South Wales
- Jurisdiction:
- Special Jurisdiction
- Date of Decision:
- 09 February 2024
- Before:
- Khoo LCJ
- File Number(s):
- 2023/346694
JUDGMENT; ex-tempore
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This is an appeal from a decision of the Local Court sitting in its special jurisdiction arising out of an application under the Dividing Fences Act 1991 (NSW) (“the Act”).
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The parties are neighbours. The Appellants live at Number 4 and the Respondents at Number 6. The Respondents have recently demolished their house to build a new one, which has only recently been completed, although it seems that the landscaping and other leveling work is not yet either started or completed.
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The reason the matter came to Court is because the parties do not like each other at all. They do not get on in the way that ordinarily society expects neighbours to coexist. Indeed, I have evidence before me of significantly serious conduct by the Respondents, including evidence of assaults and there are applications for Apprehended Violence Orders and the like floating around. No doubt these allegations are contested, and I do not need to decide whose fault the situation is. Suffice to say, they do not like each other.
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The matter has an unfortunate procedural history. It commenced in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“NCAT”) where it seems it almost settled by way of an agreement, substantially in the terms of the orders the Appellant presses for, which agreement was resiled from by the Respondent and abandoned by the Appellant. The matter was then transferred to the Local Court and determined by Magistrate Khoo of that Court on 8 February 2024.
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Essentially, what the Appellants sought were orders for a new Colourbond fence to be erected between the…
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- AGLC
- Moore v Lawrie [2025] NSWDC 97
- Case
- [2025] NSWDC 97
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to interpret the statutory language in the Dividing Fences Act, particularly the definitions of "fence" and "sufficient dividing fence" as outlined in sections 3 and 4 respectively. The appellant contended that the hedgerow fulfilled the statutory requirements and argued that the Local Court had erred in its interpretation of the Act. Furthermore, the court had to determine the interplay between sections 7(1) and 14(c) of the Act regarding the allocation of costs for building a fence. The primary focus was on whether the hedgerow was a valid "sufficient dividing fence" and whether Lawrie was indeed liable for the cost of constructing a new fence.
The District Court found that the hedgerow did not meet the statutory definition of a "sufficient dividing fence" as set out in the Act. The court emphasised that a "fence" must be a solid barrier and that a hedgerow, while potentially providing some level of separation, did not satisfy the statutory requirement for a "sufficient dividing fence". The court noted that the hedgerow was not a solid barrier and lacked the necessary characteristics to be considered a fence under the Act. Consequently, the court upheld the Local Court's decision that Lawrie was liable for the cost of building a new fence. However, the court allowed the appeal in part by finding that the hedgerow did not constitute a "sufficient dividing fence" and that Lawrie was responsible for the costs of erecting a new fence as per section 7(1) of the Act.
The final orders included a ruling that the hedgerow did not meet the statutory requirements of a "sufficient dividing fence" and that Lawrie was liable for the costs of building a new fence. The District Court allowed the appeal in part, affirming the Local Court's decision on the liability for costs but correcting the interpretation of the statutory definition of a "sufficient dividing fence". The court's detailed analysis clarified the statutory language and provided guidance on the application of the Dividing Fences Act in similar future disputes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Orders at para [24]; Appeal allowed in part
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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