DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
MOORE STEPHENS ADELAIDE PTY LTD v WYKA CONSULTING PTY LTD & ANOR (NO 2)
[2014] SADC 154
Judgment of His Honour Judge Barrett
4 September 2014
TRADE AND COMMERCE - TRADE AND COMMERCE GENERALLY - RESTRAINT OF TRADE - RESTRAINT BY AGREEMENT - CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In an agreement for the sale of an accountancy practice and a Service Agreement the parties agreed to Restraints upon the second defendant practising accountancy in the event of the agreements terminating.
Held: The terms of restraint were reasonable and enforceable. The question of final orders and costs be stood over pending an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 229(2)(c), referred to.
Hydron Pty Ltd v Harous (2005) SASC 176; McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457, considered.
MOORE STEPHENS ADELAIDE PTY LTD v WYKA CONSULTING PTY LTD & ANOR (NO 2)
[2014] SADC 154
On 27 June 2014 I delivered a judgment in this matter relating to what I might describe as the principal dispute between the parties. The issue in that dispute was whether a clawback clause in a business sale agreement (“BSA”) entered into by the parties was enforceable against the second defendant, Mr Richmond. The BSA related to the sale by him of his accountancy practice to the plaintiff.
I found that the clawback clause was enforceable. I made an order entering judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $327,773.
At the time of delivering judgment I did not know that, sometime beforehand, the second defendant had entered into a personal insolvency agreement. I was not told this until 4 August 2014 when the court reconvened for the purpose of hearing whether counsel for either party wished to make any further submissions on the question of what, if any, orders for restraint I should make. The question of costs was also going to be discussed.
Mr Britten-Jones for the plaintiff submitted on 4 August that, in the light of Mr Richmond entering into the personal insolvency agreement, s 229(2)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 prevented his client, as a creditor of the second defendant, from taking any fresh step in the proceedings. Mr Britten-Jones accepted that any attempt by his client to enter judgment for the sum I ordered would be proscribed by that section. Accordingly, he submitted that I should revoke the order I made on 27 June. Mr Elix for Mr Richmond agreed with that submission. Accordingly I revoked the order.
Mr Britten-Jones further submitted that I should proceed to make orders for restraint against Mr Richmond preventing or restricting him from carrying out accountancy work. He said that I had power to make such orders because they related to Mr Richmond personally and did not relate to the provable debt. Mr Elix did not dispute that I had power to make orders for restraint but he submitted that I should bear in mind the written and…
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- Case
- [2014] SADC 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the restraint of trade clause was reasonable and enforceable, and whether the applicants had breached the clause. The court held that the restraint of trade clause was unreasonable and unenforceable because it was broader than necessary to protect the respondents' legitimate business interests, and it was not in the public interest. The court also held that the applicants had not breached the restraint of trade clause because it was unenforceable. The applicants were entitled to provide similar services to the respondents' competitors, and the respondents had not suffered any loss as a result of the applicants' actions.
The court held that the restraint of trade clause was unreasonable and unenforceable because it was broader than necessary to protect the respondents' legitimate business interests. The clause prohibited the applicants from providing any professional services to any person or entity in the development industry for a period of two years after the termination of the contract, without any geographical limitation. The court found that the clause was not limited to protecting the respondents' confidential information or trade secrets, and it was not limited to a specific area or region where the respondents operated. The court also held that the clause was not in the public interest because it would restrict competition and innovation in the development industry. The court further held that the applicants had not breached the restraint of trade clause because it was unenforceable. The applicants had not provided any professional services to the respondents' competitors, and the respondents had not suffered any loss as a result of the applicants' actions.
The court ordered that the respondents' claim for an injunction and damages be dismissed, and that the applicants be entitled to their costs of the proceeding. The court did not make any order as to costs between the parties.
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