Moore-McQuillan v WorkCover No. Scciv-03-1113

[2003] SASC 325

MOORE-McQUILLAN v WORKCOVER
[2003] SASC 325

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Prior and Vanstone JJ

1. DOYLE CJ, PRIOR & VANSTONE JJ This an application for leave to appeal against a decision given by the Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal on 22 July 2003.

2. Mr Moore-McQuillan made his application initially to a judge of this court.  On 22 August 2003 the judge refused leave to appeal.

3. Mr Moore-McQuillan now renews that application for leave to appeal, in this case making it to the Full Court.

4. By Supreme Court Rule 94.03 the application for leave to appeal is to be considered privately by the Full Court.

5. The court has considered the written material submitted by Mr Moore McQuillan.

6. As the Workers’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 now stands, the Supreme Court has no power to hear an appeal against a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal, which is now the name of the former Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal.  If the present provisions are applicable, the application for leave must be refused on the grounds that the court has no power to hear an appeal.

7. The decisions that Mr Moore-McQuillan wishes to challenge were made by Review Officers in 1991 and 1995 respectively.  They relate to the amount of payments to which Mr Moore-McQuillan was entitled under the legislation.

8. When those decisions were made the legislation was in a different form.  The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal was still in existence.  The decision about which Mr Moore-McQuillan complains is described as a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal.  It may be that the situation is governed by the legislation as it was in its earlier form.

9. Previously, s 100 of the legislation provided for an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against a decision of the Tribunal.  However, by s 100(3) the appeal was limited to a question of law.

10. The decision by the Tribunal in July of this year was to refuse to extend the time within which to appeal against the decisions of the Review Officers made in 1991 and 1995.  The time for appealing had well and truly expired.  As we have noted, the ultimate point is whether the amount of payments under the Act, to which Mr Moore-McQuillan is entitled, have been correctly computed.

11. The decision by the Tribunal indicates that it was satisfied that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success; that Mr Moore-McQuillan had had earlier opportunities to raise the complaints that he was now making, and that to allow these complaints to be raised so late in the piece would be manifestly unfair to the respondent.

12. This court has power to grant leave to appeal only if the proposed appeal raises a question of law, and would not grant leave to appeal if the appeal appears to have no reasonable prospect of success.  It is important to bear in mind that the decision under appeal is a decision to refuse to grant an extension of time.

13. We can find no indication of an error of law in the Tribunal’s refusal to grant an extension of time.  The Tribunal has clearly considered the appropriate issues and principles.  We can find no indication of an error by the Tribunal in its approach to the question of whether the time within which to appeal should be extended.

14. That was the view of the judge of this court who refused leave to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal.

15. Because we are of the opinion that an appeal against the decision of the Tribunal to refuse to extend time within which to appeal has no reasonable prospects of success, our view is that leave to appeal should be refused.