Moore-McQuillan v WorkCover Corporation (No 2) No. Scgrg-98-1343

[2000] SASC 157

MOORE-McQUILLAN v WORKCOVER CORPORATION (NO 2)
[2000] SASC 157

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Duggan and Lander JJ
Leave to appeal in private

1. DOYLE CJ: The applicant, Mr Moore-McQuillan, has applied by application dated 18 May 2000 for leave to appeal against a decision made by Debelle J on 24 March 2000. By that decision Debelle J dismissed an appeal against an order for costs made by a District Court Judge. The order was made under s 40(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1991.

2. The application for leave to appeal has been considered by the Full Court in private pursuant to r 94.03 of the Supreme Court Rules.  The application was considered by the Full Court comprising me, Duggan and Lander JJ.  We have considered the written material submitted by Mr Moore-McQuillan. 

3. Application for leave to appeal was originally made to Debelle J.  He refused leave to appeal.  The further application for leave to appeal should have been made within 14 days of Debelle J's decision.  However, as the application was made only two days outside that time, it is appropriate to extend the time within which the application for leave to appeal may be made.

4. The documents lodged by Mr Moore-McQuillan do not fully comply with the requirements of r 94.03.  Nevertheless, the Court makes an order dispensing with the requirements of that rule to the extent that they have not been met. 

5. The order made by the District Court Judge required Mr Moore-McQuillan, who was not a party to the proceedings in the District Court, to meet the costs of those proceedings.  Mr Moore-McQuillan challenges that order on the merits, and on the basis there was no power to make the order. 

6. We are unanimously of the view there is no reason to doubt that the generally expressed power of the District Court to award costs includes the making of an order for costs against a non party.  We refer to the decision of the Full Court in Vestris v Cashman (1999) 72 SASR 449, and in particular to the reasons of Olsson J at 456 and Lander J at 464.

7. Apart from that point, the application does not raise any issue of principle.  It is an attempt to re-argue the merits of the application.  We are unanimously of the view that the matters referred to by Debelle J in his reasons provided ample grounds for the making of the order made by the District Court Judge.  We are of the view that the applicant's own physical and mental health, to the extent that they are raised by his submissions, are not a sufficient basis for attacking the original order for costs, or the decision of Debelle J on appeal.

8. Our view is that the application for leave to appeal does no more than seek to re-argue the merits of the original appeal, and of the original grounds for opposing the making of the order.  Our view is that there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant establishing that the order made by the District Court Judge was wrong, or that Debelle J erred in his approach to the appeal. 

9. For those reasons, while we would extend the time for the making of the application to 18 May 2000, and dispense to the extent required with the requirements of the r 94.03, we are unanimously of the view leave to appeal against the decision of Debelle J should be refused and the court orders accordingly.