JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: MONTT CAPITAL PTY LTD -v- MBF CONSULTING PTY LTD [2004] WASC 146
CORAM: MASTER NEWNES
HEARD: 23 JUNE 2004
DELIVERED : 1 JULY 2004
FILE NO/S: COR 95 of 2004
BETWEEN: MONTT CAPITAL PTY LTD (ACN 100800646)
Applicant
AND
MBF CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 092423704)
Respondent
Catchwords:
Corporations - Application to set aside statutory demand - Served outside 21 days - Incorrect address for service on statutory demand - Whether document therefore not constitute statutory demand - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Corporations Act2001 (Cth), s 459E, s 459G, s 459J
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Ms L Horwood
Respondent: Mr C V Eastwood
Solicitors:
Applicant: Smyth & Thomas
Respondent: Cameron Eastwood
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Daewoo Australia Pty Ltd v Suncorp Metway Ltd [2000] NSWCA 35
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265
Kalamunda Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 4469
Quitstar Pty Ltd v Cooline Pacific Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 329
Quitstar Pty Ltd v Cooline Pacific Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 402
Re Ad‑A‑Cab Holdings Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt Qld (McKenzie J); 25 October 1996
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1977) 76 FCR 452
Topfelt Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 226
Case(s) also cited:
Centurion Constructions Pty Ltd v Beca Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 14 ACLC 312
N T Resorts Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 16 ACLC 957
MASTER NEWNES: This is an application by the plaintiff to set aside a statutory demand served on it by the defendant. The application is opposed by the defendant on the ground that the application and supporting affidavit were served outside the 21‑day period prescribed by s 459G of the Corporations Act2001 (Cth).
The statutory demand and the accompanying affidavit were served on the defendant on 25 March 2004. The defendant was therefore required to file and serve any application to set aside the statutory demand, and the affidavit in support of that application, by 15 April 2004. While those documents were filed on 14 April 2004, they were not served until 24 April 2004, when they were served on the managing director of the defendant.
The plaintiff says that the statutory demand contained an incorrect address for service of the defendant. The address for service on the demand was Unit 19, 61 Smith Street, Highgate. The plaintiff says there is no such address and the process server who was engaged to serve the application and affidavit was unable to find the address to serve the defendant. Accordingly, service was finally effected on the managing director of the plaintiff.
Affidavits have been filed on behalf of the defendant directed to demonstrating that the address for service in the statutory demand was correct. Equally, affidavits have been filed on behalf of…
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- Case
- [2004] WASC 146
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the statutory demand was invalid due to an incorrect address for service, and whether the Court had the power to extend the 21-day period within which an application to set aside the demand could be made. The court needed to determine if the demand was a statutory demand under section 459E of the Corporations Act, and whether the error in the address for service rendered the demand ineffective. Additionally, the court had to consider whether it had the discretion to set aside the demand despite the delay in making the application.
The court found that the statutory demand was valid despite the incorrect address for service. It held that the demand was still a statutory demand under section 459E of the Corporations Act, as the definition of "statutory demand" includes any document that purports to be a demand served under section 459E. The court also rejected the argument that the incorrect address for service rendered the demand ineffective. Furthermore, the court reiterated the principle from David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation that the Court has no power to extend the period within which an application may be made under section 459G. The court concluded that since the application to set aside the statutory demand was not made within the 21-day period, the powers of the Court to set aside the demand did not arise.
As a result of the court's decision, the application to set aside the statutory demand was dismissed. The court upheld the validity of the statutory demand and found that it was not rendered ineffective by the error in the address for service. The 21-day period for making an application to set aside the demand was not extended, and the demand remained in effect.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265, it was held that the Court had no power to extend the period within which an application may be made under s 459G. If an application for an order setting aside a statutory demand is not filed and served within 21 days after service of the demand, there is no application before the Court under s 459G. The powers of the Court to set aside the statutory demand do not arise. The Court acknowledged that, in some circumstances, the Act may operate harshly, but said that "that is a consequence of the legislative scheme which has been adopted to deal with perceived defects in the pre‑existing procedure in relation to notices of demand". It is not in issue that, in the present case, the application to set aside the statutory demand was not made within the 21‑day period. On the evidence, however, that was not because of any difficulties in connection with the address for service stated in the statutory demand. It appears from the affidavit of the process server charged with the responsibility of serving the application and supporting affidavit that he first attempted service on 17 April 2004. It was then he discovered the alleged problem with the address for service. That was, of course, two days after the 21‑day period expired. There is no evidence that any attempt was made to effect service within the 21‑day period. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the alleged error in the address for service had the consequence that the demand served was not a statutory demand within the meaning of s 459E. Such a demand must, pursuant to s 459E(2)(e), be in the prescribed form. The relevant form is Form 509H. That form requires the demand to include an address for service. I do not accept that, even if it were the case that the address for service was wrong, the demand that was served was not a statutory demand under s 459E. In the Corporations Act, "statutory demand" means "a document that is, or purports to be, a demand served under section 459E": s 9. In Topfelt Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 226, Lockhart J said, at 238:"There may, however, be cases where deficiencies in the form of demands are so fundamental that the demands are incapable of assuming the description of statutory demands within the meaning of the Corporations Law ... Assume, for example, a statutory demand that fails to follow critical parts of a prescribed form by not informing the company that the consequence of failing to comply with the demand is that the creditor may rely upon that failure as a ground for an application to wind up the company; or a demand may fail to inform the company that it may apply under section 459G to set the demand aside. The company may wish to lead evidence before the Court that it assumed the document was simply a demand for payment, but it had no idea of the consequences under the Corporations Law of failure to comply with it. It would be odd indeed if the court could not take this evidence into account in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to order the winding up of a company. That may be a case (I do not say that it is or is not) of a demand that is so deficient as to be incapable of answering the description of a statutory demand within the meaning of the Corporations Law."