Monfort (No 2)

The matter of Monfort (No 2) involved an application by Ms Monfort for leave to appeal against a series of orders made between herself, her former spouse, and a trustee appointed to sell some of their property. The application was heard by the Full Court, which dismissed it. The court had to decide whether the proposed appeal was vexatious within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Ms Monfort had to demonstrate that her proposed appeal was not vexatious under s 102Q(1) of the Act, which includes proceedings without reasonable grounds or those pursued for wrongful purposes. Ms Monfort submitted ten grounds of appeal, none of which were meritorious. The court found that the proposed appeal evinced no reasonable grounds and was vexatious within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the amended application in an appeal and refused leave to appeal. The Full Court determined that Ms Monfort’s application for leave to appeal was vexatious because it did not demonstrate reasonable grounds and was likely to cause delay or detriment. The Full Court considered the definition of “vexatious proceedings” and the requirements for leave under the Act. The court found that Ms Monfort had not satisfied the necessary standard to show that the proposed appeal was not vexatious, leading to the dismissal of her application and refusal of leave to appeal.