IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M134 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
VERA MOMCILOVIC
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA
Second Respondent
VICTORIAN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 2011, AT 10.17 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR M.J. CROUCHER: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS K.L. WALKER and MS C.A. BOSTON, on behalf of the appellant. (instructed by Melasecca, Kelly & Zayler)
MR G.J.C. SILBERT, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR B.L. SONNET and MR C.W. BEALE, on behalf of the Crown for the first respondent. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Vic))
MR S.G.E. McLEISH, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS J.M. DAVIDSON and MR A.M. DINELLI, for the second respondent. (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
MR S.P. DONAGHUE: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR E.M. NEKVAPIL, on behalf of the third respondent. (instructed by Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission)
MR S.J. GAGELER, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with MS R.M. DOYLE, SC and MR A.D. POUND for the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth intervening under section 78A of the Judiciary Act. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor (ACT))
MR R.J. MEADOWS, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR R.M. MITCHELL, SC and MS C.L. CONLEY, on behalf of the Attorney‑General for Western Australia under section 78A of the Judiciary Act. (instructed by State Solicitor (WA))
MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South
Wales: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.M. RICHARDSON, for the Attorney‑General for New South Wales who intervenes in the proceedings. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C. JACOBI, on instructions of the Attorney‑General for South Australia intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))
MS M.A. PERRY, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, the Chief Solicitor for the Australian Capital Territory, MR P.J.F. GARRISSON, and MS K.A. STERN for the Australian Capital Territory intervening under section 78A of the Judiciary Act. (instructed by ACT Government Solicitor)
MR M.K. MOSHINSKY, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.P. YOUNG, for the Human Rights Law Resource Centre which seeks leave to appear as amicus curiae. (instructed by the Allens Arthur Robinson)
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Victorian *Charter* could operate to invalidate or limit the operation of Victorian legislation that was inconsistent with a human right, and whether the impugned provisions of the *Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981* (Vic) and the *Crimes Act 1958* (Vic) were invalid by reason of their inconsistency with the *Charter*. The Court was also required to consider the relationship between state legislation and a state human rights charter, and the extent to which a state parliament could legislate in a manner that conflicted with its own human rights instrument.
The High Court, by majority, held that the Victorian *Charter* did not empower courts to invalidate or disapply Victorian legislation that was inconsistent with a human right. Instead, the *Charter* imposed a duty on public authorities to act compatibly with human rights and required courts to interpret legislation, so far as is possible, in a way that is compatible with human rights. The majority found that the impugned provisions of the Victorian *Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981* and *Crimes Act 1958* were not invalid, as the *Charter* did not provide a mechanism for their disapplication or invalidation due to inconsistency with human rights. The Court also considered the principle of legality, which presumes that Parliament does not intend to abrogate fundamental rights unless it does so clearly and unequivocally.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of Victoria. The appellant, Vera Momcilovic, was convicted in the County Court of Victoria for offences under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) relating to trafficking in a drug of dependence, specifically methylamphetamine. The key issue in the appeal was whether there was a direct inconsistency between Commonwealth and State laws, in particular, the inconsistency between sections 13.1, 13.2 and 302.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and sections 5 and 71AC of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria. The appeal was heard over two days, with the arguments presented by the appellant's counsel, the Crown, and the other respondents. The Court reserved its decision and adjourned the matter for the pronouncement of orders.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether there is a direct inconsistency between sections 13.1, 13.2 and 302.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and sections 5 and 71AC of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria.
2. Whether section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria imposes a legal onus or an evidential onus on an accused person in respect of possession of drugs found on their property.
3. Whether the construction of section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria, which imposes a legal onus or an evidential onus on an accused person in respect of possession of drugs found on their property, is consistent with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and is a justifiable limitation on the right to be presumed innocent.
4. Whether the error in the directions irrespective of the Charter argument still leaves the section 109 argument open.
Held
1. The court concluded that there is a direct inconsistency between sections 13.1, 13.2 and 302.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and sections 5 and 71AC of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria. The direct inconsistency arises because the Victorian provisions alter, impair or detract from the operation of the Commonwealth provisions by imposing a legal onus or an evidential onus on an accused person in respect of possession of drugs found on their property, which is not required under the Commonwealth provisions.
2. The court concluded that section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria imposes a legal onus on an accused person in respect of possession of drugs found on their property, meaning the accused must prove on the balance of probabilities that they were not in possession of the drugs.
3. The court concluded that the construction of section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria, which imposes a legal onus on an accused person in respect of possession of drugs found on their property, is not consistent with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and is not a justifiable limitation on the right to be presumed innocent. Instead, the court found that the provision should be construed as imposing an evidential onus, which is a justifiable limitation.
4. The court concluded that the error in the directions irrespective of the Charter argument still leaves the section 109 argument open. The inconsistency between the Commonwealth and Victorian provisions remains, even if the evidential onus construction is adopted, because the Commonwealth provisions require the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt every element of the offence, while the Victorian provisions impose an onus of disproof on the accused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Momcilovic v The Queen & Ors [2011] HCATrans 15 examined several significant legal issues, primarily focusing on the interplay between Commonwealth and state criminal laws, and the implications of these laws on the presumption of innocence as guaranteed under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
Firstly, the court assessed whether there was a direct inconsistency between sections 13.1, 13.2, and 302.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and sections 5 and 71AC of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria. The court found that there was indeed a direct inconsistency. Section 5 of the Victorian Act imposes a legal onus on the accused to disprove possession of drugs found on their property on the balance of probabilities, whereas the Commonwealth provisions require the Crown to prove possession beyond reasonable doubt. This inconsistency arises because the Victorian provision alters, impairs, or detracts from the Commonwealth's operation by imposing a stricter standard on the accused.
Secondly, the court deliberated on whether section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria imposes a legal onus or an evidential onus on an accused person. The court concluded that section 5, as interpreted by the respondents, imposes a legal onus on the accused to disprove possession. However, the appellants argued that a more appropriate interpretation under the Charter would impose only an evidential onus, which would require the accused to raise sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt about their possession.
Thirdly, the court examined whether the imposition of a legal or evidential onus under section 5 of the Victorian Act is consistent with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and whether it constitutes a justifiable limitation on the right to be presumed innocent. The court determined that while an evidential onus does infringe upon the presumption of innocence, it is a justifiable limitation under section 32 of the Charter, as it aligns with the purposes of the legislation and does not unjustly limit the right to a fair trial.
Lastly, the court addressed whether the error in the jury directions, irrespective of the Charter argument, still left the section 109 argument open. The court found that despite the error, the section 109 argument remained valid. The difference in the burden of proof between the Commonwealth and Victorian provisions still constituted an inconsistency under section 109 of the Constitution, even if the error in the jury directions did not directly affect the outcome of the case. This inconsistency, the court held, would undermine and negate the criteria for the existence and adjudication of criminal liability adopted by the federal law.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act of Victoria imposes a legal onus on the accused, a construction imposing only an evidential onus is possible and consistent with the Charter. However, this construction still leaves a section 109 inconsistency with the Commonwealth provisions, which require the Crown to prove possession beyond reasonable doubt. The court's decision highlights the delicate balance between state and federal criminal laws and the protection of individual rights under the Charter.