Molomby, thomas v William Gibbs

[1979] FCA 47

T ~ ~ ' S T T , T ~ L nj ; ~ r i ~ ( z

-	)	"To.	8 c>f 1971)
j

?;PI.; Ci.I'JT!T \\,ILF;. T)ISr ;?TI-~, I::- -C-'-.? , . . . j

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uri\,:.1. ;,zc=LL ,! 1 - 3 si:,: F:,: :-: .>l> ly2. 9;

l. I t l i :lam C'lbbs, C l c nen? Kol?s:,3t-C.;, F ? t S C ; : e l l s , S l G r i ? ~

B s w e r s zr.2 l..i\~re;;c? ;snsen ; > r r f c r n =:L;. ob;-r.r.:c ~ 1 ? 1 , = s

cf t k e ? . c s r r r l l l an arc.alcasL;n; \:.T.T; 251.:~ C t - i f f :.cs=.c,~':i X:.

by r e f r a l n ~ u g f r c m ;pooint:n:, r.r s.:rp:-ti?q t o ?~p7-.;3l:lr i~r l

1116sstrl;:l ac'.-.,oc3te f i t.h,? 2; .'CLJ .,,l$: xr~l-ss <-.r.t;:

tns f e ? :r*: coniezL+.:c,? of t h e P.s.?7~1rt.i,r: (!:.!.c i - ~ t , ? s t3

them t h s po;,e:- ic ,i: 53.

2. The R u l e ';ls: 3tlierv La? :;e :I:sc:htr,~,2.

IN THE FI:!IERAL 1'C:TT;T O F ATTSTP.3LIA )

)

JFJDUSTRIAL DIVISTOET	)	KO. 80f 1979
1

NEW SOIJTH 'JALrS T)IS'I'RICl' l'C('TSTPY )

IN THE MA'T'TER of the conclliatlon and

Arbitration Act, 1904

AW T D 'r3t: ~ iI>TTET? - of an applicati 3n

under Sect~.on	140 and section iii of
the sald ACE

Respondents

J.B. SWEETU'EY J. 23 Nay, 1979

REASOKS FOR LTTTDGh:EVT

These proceedlngs brought un2er s.140 and s.141 of the

Concillatlon and ~rbltration Act, 1904 ("the Act") concern

the affalrs of the Australian roadc casting Co~rnl~sdon Staff

Assoclation ("the As~oclatlon").

The applicant, Mr. bIolomby, is a member of thc AssoclaElon

and the proceedlngs are brought against five persons who a~-e

the officers and as a consequence the federal interstate

executive of the Asscclatlcn. he ~ssoclat~on 1s also a

responcient in respect of so much of the proceed~ngs as rr-late

to 3.140. The applicant seeks t h ~ follo\;lncj orders:

1. That the personal respondents perform and obeerve the rules of the Australian Rroadcastlng Coi?mlsslon

Staff Assoclation ("the 3shoclation") by refralnlng from appolntlng an Industrial Advocate for the Associatlon untll or unless a decision is made by the Federal Conference of the Assoclatlon to appoint an Industrial Advocdte 01- to delegate the power to do so to the personal respondents.

2. That Rule 17 (a) of the rules of the ~ssocial'lon 1 s vold in that it lniposes upon members of the :)ssoclation

condltlons, ~blig~atlons or restrlctlon,~ which, havlng

regard to the oblects of the ~oncil-idtlon and

Arbitration Act, 1904 and the purposes of the regis- tratlon of arganlzations under the sald Act are oppresslve, unreasonable or unj~st.

3. That Rule 17(a) of the rules of the Associatlon is void in that it 1s contrary to or fails to make a

provision requlred by Regulation 1 ) ( d r m-?de

under the conclllation and Arbltratlon Act, 1904.

4.

the rules of the AssoClatlOn by ceaslnq to take any

steps in or in relatlon to che purported vote purszant

to Rule 17(a) arisin~ from the letter of 20th i:a:-ch,

1379 sent by the respondent Rowers to Eranch secret-

aries of the Assoclatlon and by treatlng thls purported

That the personal respondents perform and observe and vold.

The grounds on which the appllcatlon is based are stated to be:

1. The proced~re set out in rule 17(a) for a postal

ballot of branch commttees is harsh and oppresslve,

and not in accordance wlth sectlon 140(1) of the

Act, In that

(1)

lt allows a declsion of the Federal Conf~rcnce,

the supreme governing body of the i\ssoc;sclcn,

to be rescinded by a vote of Branch committees,

v~hlch arc? s ~ b o r d ~ nate bod;es.

(il)

the postal ballot procedure of Rule 17(a), in allow11:g only one vote to each branch, j.s harsh and oppressive on account of being

(a) lnconsistent wlth the terms of R u l e 19(b), whlch allocates Federal Conference dele~ates

a votlriq stre~gth in gropol-tlon to thc

merhcrshlp in thelr branches.

(b) contrary to the terms of Scction 140(1) cf the Act in that lt qlves no adecphte recog- nltlon CO the larger number of members in some branches.

2. The poher t o appoin t an inc1~:strlal Ativoc3tc a ? a full-tine emplcyce o i t h e Aseccia t lo!? I Z - E L ~ ? S Ly

v l r t u e o f Rule 1 4 s o l e l y i r ~ t h e Federa l C o n f e r e n ~ e ,

u n l ~ s e t h e r e h a s becn a d r l f y a t l o n o f t h e poher

under r u l e 1 4 ( i ) and t h e r e h a s been no such

d e l e g a t i o n .

Durlng t h e h e a r i n g some f u r t h e r ~ a t t e r v a s p u t a l l e g l n g t k a t

r u l e 1 7 ( a ) should a l s o be h e l d n o t t o b? 3.n conforrnlty w ~ r h

t h e requi rements of 5.140: (1) l;;-cause t h c r u l e a s a whole

was s o vague and u n c e r t a i n : and ( 2 ) because it was a n t l t h e t ~ c a l

t o t h e democrat1 c s t r u c t u r e of t h e o rgsn l z a t l o n .

I t was f u r t h e r p u t t h a t r u l e 1 7 ( a ) d i d n o t app ly s3 a s c o

a l l o w t h e rescission of a d e c i s l o n t aken by t h c f e d e r a l ccz-

f e r e n c e i n o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n .

I d e a l f l r s t w i th t h e a p p l l c a t l o n seek lng t h e performance an3

observance of r u l e s of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . The compl.ainL h e r e

is t h a t while t h e r u l e s v e s t t h e poker t o appo in t ernp1o~:ers i n

t h e f e d e r a l conferefice and t h a t body h a s power t o d e l e g a t e any

of i t s powers, t h e r e h a s been no delegat :on,yet t h e f e d e r a l

e x e c u t i v e 1s proposing t o appo in t an industrial o f f l c e r .

Looking b r l e f l y a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r g a n l z a t l o n , t h e

supreme governing body i s t h e f e d e r a l conference . It c o n s l s t s

of t h e f i v e f e d e r a l o f f i c e r s and one d e l e g a t e from cach brmch.

I t is t o meet a t l eas r . once i n every e l g h t e e n montlls and there

a r e p r o v l s l o n s f o r the c a l l l n q of s p e c l a l meet inqs of t h e

conference. A s y s l m of c a r d v c t l n g applies a t t h e confc-.rc,ncc-.

Each d e l e g a t e h a s one v o t e f o r every f i f t y financial members

o r p a r t t h e r e o f i n t h e brdnch oT bliich he i s a del-egate. The

o f f i c e r s have no pr imary v o t e bu t the f e d e r a l p r e s i d e n t does

have a c a s t l n g vo te . KO motion can be c a r r ~ e d a t a meet ing o f

f e d e r a l con ie rence u n l e s s t h e d e l c q s t e s of a t l e a s t t h r e e b ~ d n c n e s

v o t e i n favour o f such motlon. There i s a l s c a f e d e r a l c o x n c i l

which i s t h e comnl t tee o f rnanar~emr-n'i o f t h c Assoc l a t i on . r t con-

slsts o f t h e f i v e f e d e r a l o f f l c e r s and one d e l e g a t e from each

branch. The o f f i c e r s and t h e d e l c g z t e s have one v o t e on ly eaci.

The r u l e s a l s o p rov ide f o r a f e d e r a l i n t e r s t a t e execu t ive . l t i s

composed i n t h e same way a 4 t h e f e d e r a l c o u n c i l and v o t l n q provL-

s i o n s a r e i n t h e same terns. Branches ex i s t i n s l x Sta::cs and

each branch h a s o f f i c e r s and a committee o f management.

The f i r s t ques t lo l l t o be determined i s v:hether t h e r e i s power ir ,

t h e f l v e respondents t o appo ln t enployees oE t h e ~ s s o c i a t i o n .

What i s r e a l l y i n d l s p u t e js t h e sou rce o f t h a t polarer. The con-

f e r e n c e i s t h e supreme governing body 2nd i s q lven ve ry wide

powers i n r u l e 14. These i n c l u d e power t o t a k e any a c t i o n i n

connec t ion wi th t h e r u l e s and o b j c c t s o f t h e Assoc l a t i on and

power t o de te rmine any w a t t e r and ccndnct any b u s ~ n e s s cove r ing

o r affecting t h e Association. There i s a l s o s p e c l f l c power

prov ldcd i n r u l e 1 4 ( d ) , ( e ) and (1) I n t h e fo i lowlng t e r m s :

( d ) To appo in t and determi:;e t h e s a l a r y o f any

employee of Fede ra l c o l ~ n c i l

( e ) To a p p o l n t , suspend, remo%e o r f l n e any

employee o r m ~ m b e r .

(1) To d e l e g a t e any of i t s pQIaJers t o any two or

more members o r t o an\ 1;c-c:t.ral	3o2y o f t h e
Assoc l a t i on .

wide g e n e r a l powers a r e q lven t o t h e Federa l c o u n c l l and t~ t h e

f e d e r a l interstate executive bat: t h e s p e c l f i c powers g lven i n

1 4 ( d ) and ( e ) do no t appear i n t h e powers oE t h e two l a t t e r

bodies . I n t h e c a s e o f t h e l n t c r s t a t e e x e c u t i v e i t i s s p e c l f l c -

a l l y p rov ided t h a t a ~i -eet ing o f t h e I n t e r s C a t c e x e c u t l v e shrill

have power d e l e g a t e d t o i t from tlme t o t ime by f e d e r a l con fe r -

ence prov ided t h a t i t s h a l l n c t e x e r c i s e any o f t h o s e p3j;ers

v e s t e d I n f e d e r a l conference i n t e r m s o f s u b - c l a 7 ~ s e s . . . ( d ) ,

( e ) and ( i ) ... of r u l e 14. Wide g e n c r a l powers a r e a l s o g iven

t o t h e f e d e r a l c o u n c i l bu t a g a l n t h e r e i s no s p e c l f i c power

such a s t h o s e i n r u l a 1 4 ( d ) ( e ) and (1). It h a s however power

t o d e l e g a t e t o t h e f e d e r a l e x e c u t l v e c o m i t . t e e such of i t s owr

powers a s i t t h i n k s f i t .

Looklng a t t h e r u l e s I t h l n k t h e c l e a r sou rce of t h e power t o

appo in t s t a f f i s r u l e 1 4 ( d ) and ( e ) . I n The Izlnp v. W a l l l s

78 C.L.R. 529 Dlxon J., a s h e t hen was, s a l d i n d e a l i n g wlth

tlie A c t and provisions of t h e Act i n g e n e r a l terms and o t h c r

p r o v l s l o n s i n s p e c l f l c t e r m s :

"The g e n e r a l polier of ;I c o n c l l l a t i o n commissior?er t o

make dn o r d c r o r avrard deter:;l:n;ncj a d ~ s p u t r i s t o

be found i n 5.39. The power i s c x p r e s s ~ d i n a b s t r z c t

terms wi thout s p e c ~ f y i ? g o r i n d l c a t l n g what t h e d e t e r -

n i n a t ~ o n r a y cover o r what che avard o r o r d e r s h a l l

o r may provlde . Upon ~ a c t e : : \ c l t i ~ r e f e r e n c e t o which

t h e Act does no t e l sewhere s p e c l c y o r i r .d?ca te what

may o r s h a l l be done by a n a7.,ard o r o r d c r , this q e n c r a l

powcr i s p r o p e r l y I n t e r p r e t e d a s e n a b l i n g t h e a r b i t r a t o r

t o make any proxr l s ion he t h i n k s f i t that-. 1s r ~ l e v a n t ,

appropeia t -e o r rcasonabl-s. ~ n c ~ d e n t a l t o the s e t t l c n c n t

o f t h e r e a l d i s p u t e before h ~ m .

Rut upon some ~ a t t e r s Chc sct ducs speak ! n t h more

p a r t l c c L a r ~ t y . I f i t c c n f c r s a s ? ; - c ~ i ~ c power 1 ~ 1 t h

r e s p c c t t o a ].:rated z3 5 ] c c t o r c;pec~:'lcs a manncr cf

d e a l l n g w ~ t h i t o r o t h c r h i s e p r o - ~ ~ d e s what t h e d:lty

o r authority ~f t h e arbitrator ch? l1 be, t h e n upcn

o r d i n a r y p r ~ n c l p l e s of ~ n t e r p r e c 2 t l o n the p r o v l s l o n

In whlch t h a t i s done s h , x l d be t r e a t 4 a s t h e soilrce

of h l s a c t h o r ~ t ) . over the m a t t e r , n o t ~ . i ~ t h s t a n & n g

t h a t otherwise t h e sane o r a wider povnr over L1.e

same m a t t e r n l q ? ~ t ha-,-e Gecn ~ n p l i e d I n o r covered by

t h e g e n e r a l authority g-tven by s.38. T h l s acco rds

w i t h t h e general pr lncl l ->les of i n t c r p r ~ t ; ? l i i 3 n ~ n ~ b c d l c c i

i n t h e ma;.l:n e::pressum f&cl ; c e s s a r e t a c i i u m a d i n

t h e propssl t :cn t h a i an e n a c t a s n t i n aff l rcaLi .v? words

appointing a c 3 u r s r t o b e foll.owcd .~suslly m:y bs

unders tosd a s irpor-Ling a nociat ive, ni.rr.el y , t l!at th.?

same rnatrcr i s n o t t o bc done according t o scme s t k i

course . "

Applying t h a t principle t h e s c u r c e of t h e power t o a p ~ o i n ? s t a f f

1s i n t h e s p e c l f l c r ~ l e l S ( d ) and ( e ) . These powers r a y h e

d e l e g a t e d t o any "1~0 o r more members o r t o any f e d e r z ~ l body 05

t h e a s s o c i a t i o n ( r . 1 4 ) . I!owever t h e term " f e d e r a l body of th.

a s s o c l a t i o n " by v l r t u e o f t h e p r o v l s l o n i n r u l e 2 3 ( a ) (cl) (1)

could i n t h l s c a s e n o t i n c i u d e t h e f e J e r a l i n ' e r s t a t e execuCi-.re.

S ince t h e power i s v e s t e d i n t h e f e d e r a l con'erence by t h e

s p e c i f i c t e r n s it i s n o t v e s t e d i n it o r i n any o t h e r bady by

g e n e r a l terms whlch may be used ir. d e s c r i b ~ n r ; pox.!ers.

I n t h e s e circumstances u n l e s s t h e r e h a s bean a d e l e a a t l o n t h e

power t o appo ln t s t a f f can be exercised on ly hy t h e feder42

conference.

The i s s u e in t h i s c a s e a r i s e s over a p roposa l t o appv ln t an

industrial o f f l c e r and l t seems t h a t it i s t h e intention o t t h e

f e d e r a l execuclve t o Cake s t e p s t o f i l l t h a t o f f l c e . I n t h e view

I have tzken of t h e r u l e s , that. c a n on ly be dcne by t h e r e s p o n d ~ n t c

if t h e r e h a s been a delegation of t h a t powex t o L3em e l t h e r a s

individuals o r a s t h e f e d e r a l c o d n c i l . Evidence W C ~ S pu!:

b e f o r e me t h a t s t a f f have bern - p ~ o l n t s d on p:-evious occasions

by t h e f e d e r a l e s e c u t ~ v e a113 thsl: or] a n ~ t h e r occasion t h e

f e d e r a l corlf ?rence had empowerc:d t h e Zedera1 e:<ecutlve t o exanline

t h e l e v a l o f s a l a r l e s and t o mkt? recoz:xcndatisns f o r d l sc :~ss?o ' l

a t a mee t ing of t h e f e d e r a l c o u n c i l . Tt was comrvn ground t h a t

t h e r e was no d e l e g a t i o n i n t e rns 10 be fodnd i n t h e minc ics of

any o f t h e r e l e v a n t bodlcs . The ev ldcnce bh lch h a s been p i t

b e f o r e me stems t o me q u l t e c o n s l s t e r t wich a u s u r p a t i o c cf t h a t

power acquiesced I n on p a r t l c d l a ; occas ions b u t i t 6oes n o t il,

my vlew establish t h a t any d e l e g a t i o n o f t h e powcr t o a p p o l c t

s t a f f g e n e r a l l y o r s t a f Z t o t h e p o s i t l o n of i n d i s t r l a l o f f l c a r

was made.

The t e r ~ ~ . " d e l e g a t i o n " seems t o i n v c l v e a c o n f e r r i n g o f an

a u t h o r i t y ts do t h i n g s which t l ie f e d e r a l conference would ~t!-.cr-

wlse have t o do. One looks t o f i n d scms deg ree cf p r r ; . c i s i ~ n

i n t h e d e l e g a t i o n b u t where t h e r e 1s no s p e c i f i c delegation arid

o n l y a series of a c t s which a r e e q ~ a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i th dc lcaa-

t l o n o r no de l -ega t lon , I f l n d i t l ~ p o s s i b l e t o conclude t h a t

t h e r e h a s been a d e l e q a t i o n a r ~ d ii s o whether i t was on a p ~ r t l -

c u l a r occas ion f o r a p a r t ~ c u l a i purpose o r general - ly .

I n t h e s e c i rcumstances i n my vlew t h e a p p l i c a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o

an o r d e r i n t h e g e n e r a l terms of paraqraph 1 of t h e R u l e .

1 t u r n then t o r u l e 17(,1). 7hl .h i s a r u l e which seems i o me

q u i t e d i f f l c * . ~ l t of inLerp?;?t-atLtan. I t s e c ~ ; s designed t o ; l L o : v

a d e c l s ~ o n t o b e taker: of t h e Zedezal c~!lferenc.e 111th~: l t c a l l i n g

a speclal meetlng or walting for the ord~nary	mectlng of that
body and it is in the followlng terms:

"\vhen re2eral Conference 1s not ln session, Federal

Counc~l may submit any 1naiCer to all Branch Connuttees

for declslon by vote, as provlded in Rule i9. Such

matter shall be forwarded by post, 1etterqr~:n or tcle- gram to Eranch Covnlttees. Each Branch Cornlttee s'lall vote by post, lettergram or telegram before the closing time of such votlng as fixed by Federal Cou~cil. The

decision shall be blndlng as if such d~clslon had been

obtalned by a vote at a regularly constituted meetlny

of Feder21 Conference."

Rule 17(b) deals with the manner in whlch a pleblscl'ie of

members is to be taken. The dlfflc-lty in dsaling with

rule 17(a) is that whlle it is deallng wlth a declslon reached

by post-a1 ballot of branch comm~ttees, it seeks to incorporate

provlslons of rule 19 whlch deals wlth proceedings at a ~eekjnq

of delegates. Rule 19 is in the followlng terms:

19. (a) All declslons of Federal Conference shall

be f~nal, and remaln in forcc cctil ally

anended, varicd, supplanted, superseded cr the ~ssoclation.

annulled at a subsequent meetlng of Federal

(b)

follows: Each delegate shall have one vote

for every fifty flnanclal menhers, or part

thereof, in the Sranch which he represents:

the Federal :Jlce-Presidents, Fedcral Secreta~~

and Federal Treasurer shall have pnwcr to r r o v ~

Voting at Federal Conference shall be as have no vote: the Federal President shall have a casting vote only.

(c)

Notwlthstandlng anything contained in Rulo 19(S), no motlon shall be carried at a meeting of

rederdl conf~lence unless the deleqates of at

least tliree Eranches vote ln favour of such

motlcyn.

~t will be seen that rule 19(a) deals generall.~~ with the flrlallty

of declslons of federal conference. The final sentence of

rule 17(a) equates a decislc~ of branch comrnlttees with a

declsion reached at a meetinq of federal conference. Rule 19(b)

provides a method of votlna proportionate to thc strenq~h of

each branch at federal conference ancl rule 19(c) then provldes

that no motlon shall be carrled at a meeting of fed~ral confer-

ence unless the delegates of at least three bra~~ches vote In

favour. I think the rules can be reconclled and a peanlng given

to the rules by treatlng the words "as provlded in rule 19"

appearing in rule 17(a) as qnallfying the word "vote" imLlcdla tely

preceding them. The effect of that would be that the pzovlslons

of 19(b) allowlng one voce for every flfty financial melnbcrs

would apply as would the provlslon that the motlon musc be car-

ried by at least three branches. It was agreed that unless the

words in rule 17(a) had thls effect they were surplusage.

The difficulty of course arises because in one sense the two rules are deallng wlth different subject matters, the one votlnc

at a meeti~g of federal conference and the other votlnq by branch

committees. However I feel the difference is more apparent than real. Thls Assoclatlon llke other organlzatlons has a methcd of

organization to allow members appropriate partlclpaclon in ant3

control of the affalrs of the unlon. Supreme control is vested In a conference conslstlng among others of elected delegates of the members of a particular branch hut it is the members who

are there represented by the delegates. under rnle 17(a) a

declsion is reached by vote of branch committees hut each branch

committoe represents the same meml?crs as does the del-egate ~n

the other case. The reason for the appolntmfnt of delegates to

represenC melnbcrs at a conference 1s the sheer lmposslblllky of

holding a conference of all members. The taklng of a vote amon?

branch committees is the tak:.ng of a vote among representatives of members. If the words "as provided by rule 19" are reqarded as qual~fylng "vote" then the effect is that the same grodp of members exerclse the same proportionate lnfluenca bnt hv a dlf- ferent agent: In the one case the delegate, in the other case

the branch committee. The merrbers have power over each slrice 6

general meeting of members may instruct a delegate and a general

meeting of members may instrcct the branch colmit~ee. In ~hese

circumst-ances I thlnk the rules can be lnterpreted to glve some

meanlng to words whlch would otherwise be surplusage and alths~gr:

the problem is not free from dlfflculty I think it is a legltlmatc

lnterpretatlon of ths expression of the words of membezs. Tf t l ~ ~ s

be the proper interpretation of rules 17 and 19 then the aztack

on rule 17 because it dld not allow proportionate voting must fail

The next ground alleged is that the rule was harrh and oppressive and not in accordance wlth s.140(1) of the Act because it dll-w~ed

a declslon of the federal conference, the supreme govern:ng body

of the Assoclat~on, to be resclnded by a vote of branch comlt~ees

whlch are subordinate bodles. I see no reason why a dec~slon of

the federal corifercxce should not he resclnded by memhcrs of the

assoclatlon and ccrtalnly na oblcctlon could Le taken if th15

were done by pleh~sclte. Ilere it is done by a vote anlong rep-

resentat-lve bodles d s agents of the mcmhers. When a vote is

belng talczn of the agents of the me~:lhers and it is desired to

secure a i~ider participation than would be afforded by a vote among d,+leqates to the conference there seems to me no reason why kociles L-epresentatlve of the 11:einbers should not be chosen

as the electors. This is not a case where thr, situatior. is

fairly sunmarised by saylng it is a vote of subordinat? bodlcs

wlllch c?etermlnes the issuc?s. It is rather a case where the

members by their agents the branch corrrnittees exercise a vote

of tlie same relatlve value as the vote exercised in conference

meet lnqs 5; thc d e : ~ p : e s UL che branches.

In deallng with the rule lt was further submitted that a vote under rule 17(a) could not be taken whlch would, mend, mocilfy,

supplant, supersede or annul a decls~on. By v~rtue of rdle l9(a)

~t was arg~cd that such steps to deal wlth a decision of fedsra: conference could only be taken at a subsequent meeting of the

federal conference or by a plebiscite of members. Such an ini.er-

pretation in my view does not fully take Into account the flnal

sentence of rule 17(a). The decislon by the ballot of bra,~ch

committees Selng as bind~ng as if it had been obtalned a+- a

regularly constituted meeting of federal conference it mnst he able to have the effect of amendlng etc. a declsion of a prior federal conference.

curing his reply, blr. Shaw, counsel for the applicant, further

suhmltted that rule 17(a) was ngt in confol-mlty $nth the Act 1Z

it incorporated thc pro\-i-ions cf 19(c). li'hc IncorpcrJtlon of

the provlsi~ns of l9(c), it was argued, t~~lld mzan that the wjl.1

of a majority of members could be thwarted by a mlnorlty.

'1'11is may be so for- a temporary pcrlod bot I doubt whether it

is a completely accuratc -Jlew because thcre do exlst. provj z~ons

for a plebiscite.	Jn any event the lseue kas rilsed ve-y late
in the proceedl~qs	and I am reluctdnt to consider rnakl~g a

declaration in respect of a rule v:llcre	the orgavzatlon has
not had apeclfic notlce of it.

In the circumstances i think the attack on rule l7(a) fails

2-d : refuss to make the srsei-s souyl~i i l l p.lrayrap?,s 2, 3 anti J

oi the app1icat:lon. The order of the court wlll be as follo~s:

That William ~ibbs, Clement EIoldswortk, Peter Wells,

Sldney Dzx\vers and 1,awrence Zensen perform and observe

the rulcs of the ~ustralian rroadcastlng Commsslon

Staff ~sso~lation by reframing from appolntlng or

purporting to appoint an industrial advocate for the

Association unless and until the fcderal conference

of the Assoclatlon delegates to them the power to do so

Thls form s~sr~e to me preferable to that sonyht in the Rule.

It proposed an order that the personal responden+s refraln from appolntlng an lndustrlal advocate unless or until a declsion was made by the federal conference to appoint an advocate or to delegate the powcr to do so to the personal

zesponden's. If the conference does dcclde to app~int an

~ndustrlal officer the appointment wlll be by it and no

question wll.1 arlse of any appointment by the personal resp- ondents. For t h ~ s reason I thlnk it preferable that no ref- erence be made to any appointment by the federal conference.