Molinaro v Robinson

[1966] HCA 12

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ.

MOLINARO v. ROBINSON

(1966) 114 CLR 642

4 March 1966

Workers Compensation (Vict.)

Workers Compensation (Vict.)—Servant or independent contractor—Determination by Board—Whether finding open on evidence—Case stated—No statement of findings of fact—Questions in form: Whether Board "constrained to find on evidence"—Time limit for stating case—Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 3 (1), 56 (3) (a)*.

Decision

The judgment of the COURT was delivered by BARWICK C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court by which two questions raised by a case stated under the provisions of s. 56 of the Workers Compensation Act 1958 were, by majority, answered in the affirmative, that is to say in a manner favourable to the present respondent. (at p646)

2. Upon the appeal to the Supreme Court, the present appellant raised the objection that the proceedings were incompetent inasmuch as the case had not been stated within one month after the reasons for the decision of the Workers Compensation Board had been pronounced and the same objection is again raised in this Court. We have no doubt that the Supreme Court's decision, which resolved that question against the appellant, was right. (at p646)

3. In our view, the limitation as to time contained in s. 56 (3) (a) of the Act relates only to the request of either of the parties requiring a case to be stated. Properly understood, that section permits either party to require a case to be stated either before or within one month after the reasons for the decision of the Board had been pronounced, and it does not prescribe any period of time within which the case must be stated. Accordingly, this objection fails. (at p646)

4. The second objection relates to the form in which the case was stated. There was considerable criticism on this score, but we confine our observations to the substance of the questions which were asked. (at p646)

5. It seems to us that the question of law which really arose was whether there was evidence before the Board upon which its conclusion that the applicant was a worker within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act was open. The questions however which appear in the case stated are as follows: "(a) On the evidence before it was the Board constrained to find that no agreement of service existed between the applicant and the respondent? (b) On the evidence before it was the Board constrained to hold that the applicant was not a worker within the meaning of s. 3 (1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1958?" (at p647)

6. It seems to us that these questions, if answered according to their terms, must of necessity be answered in the negative; but such questions and answers would not be appropriate to dispose of the substance of the case. Accordingly, we have heard argument on what we conceive to be the real question which arose. The arrangement between the appellant and the respondent was of an informal character, of necessity leaving much to inference, and although the case may be regarded as a borderline one, we are satisfied that there was evidence from which it could be inferred that the arrangement was of such a character as to constitute the appellant a worker within the meaning of the Act. (at p647)

7. The appeal will therefore be allowed, the order of the Supreme Court discharged, and, in lieu thereof, the questions be answered by saying that there was evidence justifying the Board's conclusion. (at p647)

8. Costs of the proceedings in the Supreme Court will be borne by the respondent; and this appeal will be allowed with costs. (at p647)

Orders

Appeal allowed with costs.

Order of Supreme Court of Victoria discharged. In lieu thereof questions in case stated to be answered that there was evidence justifying the conclusion of the Workers Compensation Board.