FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MOL Bulk Carriers Pte Ltd v Sin-Tang Development Pte Ltd [2016] FCA 619
File number: WAD 517 of 2015 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 31 May 2016 Catchwords: ADMIRALTY - Practice and Procedure – application to set aside order for service out of the jurisdiction to Singapore – whether order for service out of the jurisdiction tainted by material non-disclosure or misrepresentation of key facts – whether there is a prima facie case – strength of case at service stage – dealings leading to contracts of affreightment – FOB, CFR and CIF contracts – consequences of such contracts
ARBITRATION – International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), s 7 - whether proceedings should be stayed on the basis of an arbitration clause in the relevant agreement – whether party that contends it is not a party to the agreement is entitled to rely on the arbitration clause in the agreement – whether proceedings should be stayed in the absence of a formal application for a stay under r 28.43 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Legislation: Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(1), 4(3)(f) , 9(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 10.43, 28.43
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 7
Cases cited: CMA CGM SA v Ship 'Chou Shan' (2014) 224 FCR 384
Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45
Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd v Trina Solar Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1453
Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies AB (2011) 250 FLR 63
Perdaman Chemicals & Fertilisers v ICICI Bank Ltd [2013] FCA 175
Date of hearing: 1 March 2016 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Admiralty and Maritime Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 70 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Jones SC with Ms H Mann Solicitor for the Applicant: Jarman McKenna Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Young SC with Mr Oldfield Solicitor for the First Respondent: K & L Gates Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms A Richmond-Scott Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Minter Ellison Lawyers ORDERS
WAD 517 of 2015 BETWEEN: MOL BULK CARRIERS PTE LTD
Applicant
AND: SIN-TANG DEVELOPMENT PTE LTD
First Respondent
KIMBERLEY METALS GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 114 123 572)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent’s interlocutory application filed 20 October 2015 be dismissed.
2.The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
SIN-TANG’S APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE OR STAY PROCEEDINGS
Sin-Tang Development Pte Ltd applies for service of an originating application upon it in Singapore to be set aside, the order granting leave for service to be discharged and the proceeding against it stayed. Sin-Tang contends that the relevant orders granted in favour of MOL Bulk Carriers Pte Ltd for service out of the jurisdiction…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 619
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the order for service out of jurisdiction to Singapore was tainted by material non-disclosure or misrepresentation, whether there was a prima facie case, and whether the proceedings should be stayed based on an arbitration clause in the agreement. Mol argued that Sin-Tang's attempt to challenge its liability under the contract while simultaneously relying on the arbitration clause was inconsistent, and that Sin-Tang had not filed a formal application for a stay under the Federal Court Rules.
The court held that Mol had established a prima facie case, and therefore the service orders would not be set aside. The court also found that without a formal application, the proceedings would not be stayed at that stage. Consequently, Sin-Tang's application was dismissed with costs to be paid by Sin-Tang to Mol.
In summary, the court denied Sin-Tang's application to set aside the service orders and to stay the proceedings. Mol's claims would proceed in the Federal Court, and Sin-Tang was ordered to pay Mol's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent’s interlocutory application filed 20 October 2015 be dismissed.
2. The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
MOL contends that Sin-Tang, in doing so, is maintaining a ‘schizophrenic approach’ to the case. In other words, Sin-Tang cannot argue on the one hand that it is not a party to the Third Contract of Affreightment, and on the other hand say that, if it is, it is entitled to rely upon the arbitration clause. More specifically, on this topic, MOL’s argument is that the application for a stay is made under r 28.43 FCR which provides as follows:28.43 Application for stay of arbitration(1)A party to an arbitration agreement who wants an order under section 7 of the International Arbitration Act to stay the whole or part of a proceeding must file an originating application, in accordance with Form 51.(2)The originating application must be accompanied by:(a)a copy of the arbitration agreement; and(b)an affidavit stating the material facts on which the claim for relief is based. That Rule requires any person seeking an order under s 7 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) to stay proceedings to file an originating application in accordance with Form 51. That application must be accompanied by the arbitration agreement and an affidavit stating the material facts on which the claim is based. There is no such application before the Court. MOL argues that without filing an application, any party seeking the exercise of the Court’s power to stay must accept that it is a party to the arbitration agreement before it can enforce its terms by seeking the stay. This is said to be entirely consistent with recognition that the relevant onus to establish the existence of the arbitration agreement rests on the party seeking the stay. Sin-Tang cannot, MOL argues, take advantage of the so-called doctrine of separability (the arbitration agreement is to be treated as a ‘distinct agreement’ from the balance of the contract) because the basis of its challenge to its liability under the balance of the Third Contract of Affreightment (that the agent who purported to buy as principal has no authority to conclude any agreement on its behalf), necessarily also applies to the arbitration agreement. MOL says that these are two quite inconsistent positions. I am not yet persuaded this is necessarily so. Sin-Tang also appear to rely upon an ‘inherent power; in the Court to stay the proceeding. It says ‘having regard to all the material before the Court as a whole’ the proceeding ought to be stayed, relying upon Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies AB (2011) 250 FLR 63 (at [197]). However, this is an authority directed towards stay of proceedings to prevent an abuse of process. It is difficult to see that if the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case against Sin-Tang, that there could be an abuse of process given the following matters:(a)the proceedings are plainly pursued for a monetary remedy, a regular outcome sought in the institution of proceedings;(b)the proceedings bear a relevant relationship with the forum, the contract having been, arguably, made and breached in Perth;(c)Sin-Tang does not (at least at this stage) seek to engage the statutory jurisdiction to enforce and thereby embrace the arbitration clause in the contract;(d)there are no other proceedings on foot in which the issues before the Court are being litigated;(e)the state of the record is that there are two parties that have potential liability under the Second Contract of Affreightment;(f)Sin-Tang and KMG have had a sequential series of dealing with MOL up to and including, in the case of KMG, the Second Contract of Affreightment and potentially in the case of Sin-Tang, the Second Contract of Affreightment. It is certainly difficult to see that neither party could have any relationship with the contract;(g)it would be preferable for matters to be litigated between the parties in the one proceeding to avoid the risk of inconsistent findings on similar subject matters;(h)the forum is plainly appropriate for KMG, a Western Australian company; and (i)Sin-Tang has not put forward any factual case to support a finding that this Court is a ‘clearly inappropriate’ forum (see CMA CGM SA v Ship 'Chou Shan' (2014) 224 FCR 384).