Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Mohareb v Palmer [2020] NSWCA 323 Hearing dates: 5 March 2020 Date of orders: 5 March 2020 Decision date: 11 December 2020 Before: Basten JA Decision: Dismiss the applicant’s recusal application.
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – recusal application – reasonable apprehension of bias – appeal from vexatious proceedings order – presiding judge having sat on prior appeal and leave application characterised as vexatious – reliance on transcript – other member of the earlier court dismissive of applicant’s case
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 338
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), ss 6, 8
Cases Cited: Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; [1983] HCA 17
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Nader Mohareb (Applicant)
Matthew Palmer (First Respondent)
Attorney General of NSW (Second Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
In person (Applicant)
J Emmett/R McEwen (Second Respondent)
In person (Applicant)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Second Respondent)
File Number(s): 2019/267950 Decision under appeal
- Court or tribunal:
- Supreme Court of NSW
- Jurisdiction:
- Common Law Division
- Citation:
- Date of Decision:
- 7 August 2019
- Before:
- Fagan J
- File Number(s):
- 2018/217228
Judgment
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BASTEN JA: The applicant, Nader Mohareb, sought leave to appeal from a judgment of Fagan J in the Common Law Division making orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), prohibiting the applicant from initiating fresh proceedings, without leave of the court.
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At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant sought my recusal. I declined the application, indicating that I would give reasons for that decision when judgment was delivered on the substance of the application. [1]
1. CA tcpt, 5 March 2020, p 7(15).
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The application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act was brought on the motion of the respondent, Matthew Palmer, who had been the subject of a number of proceedings brought against him by the applicant. The basis of the application was that the applicant had “frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings” as provided in s 8(1)(a) of the Act. “Vexatious proceedings” include proceedings “instituted or pursued without reasonable ground”, as noted in the definition in s 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
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In support of that application, a number of proceedings were identified as having been commenced without reasonable grounds. They were characterised numerically by the trial judge as the first-tenth proceedings. The application was based on two applications for leave to appeal which had come before this Court, when I was sitting. One, heard on 2 November 2017, was identified as the “sixth proceeding” in the judgment of the trial judge. [2] That matter involved an application for leave to appeal from the refusal of Mr Mohareb’s application for leave to bring a prosecution for perjury, pursuant to s 338(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The application for leave to appeal was brought from a decision of Gibson DCJ in the District…
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- AGLC
- Mohareb v Palmer [2020] NSWCA 323
- Case
- [2020] NSWCA 323
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Basten JA, necessitating his recusal. This required the court to consider the impact of the judge's previous participation in a leave application and an earlier appeal, both of which had been characterised as vexatious, and the reliance on a transcript from those proceedings.
Basten JA dismissed the recusal application, finding that the applicant had not established a reasonable apprehension of bias. His Honour reasoned that the prior decisions were made on the merits of the applications before the court, and that the characterisation of proceedings as vexatious was a necessary part of the judicial function in such circumstances. The mere fact of having previously considered applications that were ultimately found to be vexatious did not, in itself, give rise to an apprehension of bias in the current appeal. The court noted that the applicant's reliance on a transcript and the conduct of another member of the earlier court did not alter this conclusion.
The Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant's recusal application be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Dismiss the applicant’s recusal application.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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