Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 924

File number(s): SYG 1711 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
Date of judgment: 16 June 2025
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – cancellation of a Spouse (subclass 820) visa and Bridging A (subclass 010) visa – where the applicant had previous criminal conviction charges – suppression order made in regard to a s 359A letter – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements of s 359A –  whether the Tribunal denied the applicant an opportunity for a physical hearing –  no jurisdictional error made out – application dismissed with costs.
Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 230, 231, 232

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 116(1)(e), 359A, 360, 376

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Gong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 561

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Dhillon)(2014) 227 FCR 525; [2014] FCAFC 157

SZJTK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1712

SZNNE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 194

Tien v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 80

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 93
Date of hearing: 27 May 2025
Place: Parramatta
Solicitor for the Applicant: Self-represented  litigant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 1711 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AHMED MOHAMED ZAKI ABDELRADY MOHAMED

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for judicial review of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (“the Tribunal”) decision dated 22 June 2020 affirming two decisions of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (“the delegate”) to cancel the applicant’s Spouse (subclass 820) visa (“the spouse visa”) and the applicants Bridging A (subclass 010) visa (“the bridging visa’).

  2. For the reasons outlined below, the application should be dismissed.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The applicant is…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 924
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an Egyptian citizen who had applied for and was granted a Spouse (subclass 820) visa and a Bridging A (subclass 010) visa in May 2018. The Department of Home Affairs later decided to cancel both visas based on information indicating the applicant had previous criminal conviction charges, which led to a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation (NOICC) being issued under section 116(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirmed the delegate's decision to cancel the visas, leading to the applicant lodging an appeal to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the AAT failed to comply with the requirements of section 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Tribunal denied the applicant an opportunity for a physical hearing. Section 359A requires the AAT to invite the visa holder to comment on adverse information before making a decision, while section 360 concerns the fairness and procedural requirements of the hearing process.

The court found that the AAT had properly followed the statutory requirements under section 359A by providing the applicant with clear particulars of the adverse information and an opportunity to comment. The Tribunal had also correctly applied section 360 by conducting a telephone hearing that provided the applicant with a fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments. The court was satisfied that the AAT's decision to conduct the hearing by telephone during the COVID-19 pandemic was justified, and the applicant's representative had ample opportunity to present extensive evidence on the applicant's behalf. The court concluded that no jurisdictional error was made by the AAT, and therefore dismissed the application with costs.

This decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory requirements when handling visa cancellations and ensuring that visa holders are given a fair opportunity to present their case, even in exceptional circumstances such as a global pandemic. The court's ruling reinforces the AAT's authority to adapt its processes to ensure hearings can proceed while maintaining fairness and due process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons outlined below, the application should be dismissed. BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Egypt. On 18 May 2018, the applicant applied for the spouse visa on the basis of his Australian marriage to Ms N. On 28 May 2018, the applicant was granted the bridging visa. On 7 December 2018, the applicant was granted the spouse visa. On 8 January 2019, the Department of Home Affairs (“the Department”) sent the applicant a letter inviting him to comment on adverse information the Department had received, that his relationship with Ms N had ended. On 28 March 2019, the applicant sent an email to the Department that did not respond to the Department’s invitation to comment. On 14 May 2019, the Department sent the applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of his visa (“NOICC”) under s 116(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). In the NOICC the Department advised the applicant that it had received information that he had been charged with several offences pursuant to the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The NOICC advised the applicant that he may be a risk to the safety of an individual or individuals, and that it appeared that grounds existed to cancel the spouse visa. On 28 May 2019, the applicant responded to the NOICC. On 10 June 2019, the delegate decided to cancel the applicant’s spouse visa. On 18 June 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision to cancel the spouse visa. On 12 June 2019. a separate NOICC was sent to the applicant in relation to the prospective cancellation of his bridging visa. On 26 June 2019, the applicant, through his representative, responded to the NOICC in relation to the bridging visa. On 10 July 2019, a delegate cancelled the applicant’s bridging visa under s 116(1)(e) of the Act. On 19 July 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s bridging visa. On 24 April 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant under s 359A of the Act to comment on information, which was provided to it in a file from the Department, that the Tribunal considered would, subject to his comments or response, be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The Tribunal informed the applicant that the particulars of the information from the Departmental file form was as follows:·That applicant was still married to his claimed previous wife, Mrs Mohamed in Egypt and his relationship with her was continuous.·That applicant entered into a relationship with his former sponsor so he could secure a permanent visa and bring his previous wife Mrs Mohamed and his daughter to Australia.·That the applicant’s relationship with the sponsor had ceased.·That the applicant had an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) taken out against him by his former sponsor in December 2018 at Liverpool Police Station.·That the applicant had made inquiries into the submission of a fraudulent protection visa based on fabricated information and/or documentation to remain in Australia if his Partner visa was cancelled.·That the applicant had physically assaulted both his former sponsor and her daughter on multiple occasions.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 June 2020, the Tribunal made the decision to affirm the respective delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s spouse visa and the applicant’s bridging visa.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION At [27], the Tribunal set out the grounds for cancellation of a visa under s 116 of the Act and the applicable case law. Relevantly, at [28], the Tribunal outlined that a visa may be cancelled under s 116(1)(e) of the Act if the Minister is satisfied that the presence of the visa holder in Australia is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to: the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or the health or safety of an individual or individuals. The Tribunal placed reliance on the case of Gong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 561, at [41], stating that there does not have to be any direct, solid or certain foundation before the power to cancel a visa can arise, it can arise on the possibility that some event occurred in the past. In construing the meaning of the phrase ‘good order of the Australian community’, the Tribunal placed reliance on the case of Tien v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 80 at [94], stating that it contains a public order element and concerns activities which have an impact on public activities, or which manifest themselves in a public way. It requires that there be an element of risk that the person’s presence in Australia might be disruptive to the proper administration or observance of the law or might create difficulties or public disruption in relation to the values, balance and equilibrium of Australian society. At [30], The Tribunal noted that the applicant had been charged with nine separate offences, all of which it considered serious and involved alleged violent behaviour towards individuals in a domestic violence sense. The alleged behaviour pertained to the applicant’s spouse visa sponsor and her children during 2018. At [36], the Tribunal noted that on 24 September 2019 the applicant had been convicted in the Liverpool Local Court of four of the nine charges. These convictions were for:· common assault (DV) charge 2: between 1 August and 30 September 2018 the applicant dragged the sponsor’s child by holding her arms and hair towards the garage of the house. The applicant told the sponsor’s child he would lock her in the garage without food for the day.· common assault (DV) charge 4: in November 2018 the applicant pulled the hair of the sponsor’s child and subsequently made verbal threats to the sponsor when she confronted him over the matter.· common assault (DV) charge 7: in December 2018 the applicant struck the sponsor’s child three or four times about the head and back with a cushion after an argument about her presence in the garage.· common assault (DV) charge 8: on 26 December 2018 the applicant and the sponsor’s child began arguing at the dining table where the applicant seized the pole of a vacuum cleaner and struck the sponsor’s child’s head twice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As such, it was open to the Tribunal to conduct a hearing by telephone, there was an evident and intelligible justification for it proceeding in that way. The applicant has not articulated how he was denied a real and meaningful hearing, and therefore no error is made out. CONSIDERATIONGround One Ground one is a complaint that the Tribunal breached s 359A of the Act by failing to provide clear particulars of the material contained in the departmental file or explain why it was relevant to the review due to the misapplication of s 376 of the Act. No particulars are provided as to the basis upon which the Tribunal failed to provide clear particulars of the adverse information. If grounds of judicial review are not supported by particulars, for that reason alone, they are liable for dismissal: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35]. At [6] - [7] the Tribunal records that on 24 April 2020 it wrote to the applicant setting out the information which was adverse to him. The applicant was invited to give comments by 8 May 2020. The Tribunal also advised the applicant of the existence of a s376 certificate. At [16] the Tribunal records that it agreed to a request from the applicant’s representative for an extension of time to respond to the material contained in the s 359A and S 376 notifications to the applicant. Further, the applicant did not seek a favourable exercise of the Tribunal discretion to disclose the material. I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s letter to the applicant, pursuant to s 359A, complied with all statutory requirements and in particular, disclosed the information that was relevant to the review. I have perused the confidential exhibit that was provided to me for which the adverse material was taken, and I am satisfied that the Tribunal completely complied with s 359A(1). Ground one has no merit.Ground Two Ground two is a complaint that the Tribunal breached s 360 by holding a telephone hearing that denied the applicant the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments face-to-face. It is suggested this was an ad hoc procedure that denied the applicant an opportunity to gain a favourable credit finding by way of demeanour. Firstly, the Tribunal sets out at [21] that the hearing was held during the COVID- 19 pandemic, and in these circumstances purpose satisfy the up applicant was given a fair opportunity to give evidence and present arguments. At the hearing, he was represented by a Migration Agent. A perusal of the Tribunal’s reasons indicates that he had heard extensive evidence from the applicant which is set out in the Tribunal’s reasons. For example, The Tribunal noted at [45] that the applicant went into great, and at times, baffling detail over a significant time at the Tribunal hearing explaining the background detail of his claims of a conspiracy against him by the sponsor, the sponsors mother, the sponsor’s former husband and his own former wife. At [63] the Tribunal noted the hearing before it went for almost five hours.