Moffatt v The Queen - [1998] HCATrans 35

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M10 of 1997

B e t w e e n -
GEOFFREY JOHN MOFFATT
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1998, AT 9.57 AM

MR W.B. ZICHY-WOINARSKI, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.F. TEHAN, QC, on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by J.L. Bushby & Associates)

MR J.W. RAPKE: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR K.E. JUDD, for the respondent. (instructed by the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

GAUDRON J: Yes, Mr Woinarski.

MR ZICHY-WOINARSKI: If the Court pleases. Your Honours, the question being raised in this case really arises from the decision of this Court in Kable v The Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales, a copy of which your Honours should have. There, a majority of the Court determined that under the Commonwealth Constitution, there being an integrated Australian court system, there was a limit to the functions which a State Parliament could impose upon the judges or, more particularly, the courts of the State judicial system.

Now, in Kable, the Act in question concerned an Act which was specifically designed to result in the preventive detention of Kable himself. In the instant case - - -

GAUDRON J: Where there had been no conviction.

MR ZICHY-WOINARSKI: Where there had been no conviction, that is so, your Honour, and I do not doubt that for a moment. However, what we do wish to specifically draw the Court’s attention to in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 70 ALJR 814, initially: your Honour Justice McHugh at page 850, in the first column towards the bottom, the paragraph beginning:

The Parliament of New South Wales has the constitutional power to pass legislation providing for the imprisonment of a particular individual. And that is so whether the machinery for the imprisonment be the legislation itself or the order of a Minister, public servant or tribunal. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the authority of the State to make general laws for preventive detention when those laws operate in accordance with the ordinary judicial processes of the State courts.
Now, the other passage I just wish to briefly refer the Court to is a passage at the conclusion of Justice Toohey’s judgment on page 837, at the end of the first column. Your Honours will see a paragraph beginning:

However the Act -

that is the Kable Act -

is invalid by reason of the incompatibility with Ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution -

and he then goes on to say:

If the Act operated on a category of persons and a defence to an application for a preventive detention order was confined to a challenge that the criteria in s 5(1)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Moffatt v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Moffatt v The Queen [1998] HCATrans 35
Case: [1998] HCATrans 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Moffatt v The Queen* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Moffatt, against his conviction for murder. The appeal was heard by Gaudron and McHugh JJ of the High Court of Australia. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that had been obtained in circumstances that might have rendered it inadmissible. Specifically, the court had to consider the application of the principle that evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of the law may be excluded if its admission would be unfair to the accused. A further issue was whether the trial judge's directions to the jury on the relevant legal principles were adequate.

Gaudron and McHugh JJ reasoned that the admissibility of evidence obtained in contravention of the law is a matter for the trial judge's discretion, to be exercised by balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. They affirmed that the discretion to exclude such evidence is not unfettered and must be exercised in accordance with established legal principles. In this instance, the court found that the evidence in question, while obtained in circumstances that raised concerns, was sufficiently probative and that its admission did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. The directions given to the jury were also considered to be sufficient to guide them in their deliberations.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders