Mofeed Louis Tanious v Australian Medical Council Limited (AMC)

[2015] HCASL 171

MOFEED LOUIS TANIOUS

v

AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL LIMITED (AMC) & ANOR

[2015] HCASL 171
S142/2015

1. The first respondent is appointed pursuant to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) ("the National Law") as an external accreditation entity for the medical profession to conduct examinations for persons trained as medical practitioners overseas who seek registration to practice in Australia. The second respondent is established under the National Law; its functions include establishing procedures for the development of accreditation standards and dealing with applications for registration as a health practitioner. The applicant, seeking registration as a medical practitioner in Australia, undertook examinations conducted by the first respondent on a number of occasions, and failed the clinical assessment component each time. The applicant commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking, in effect, orders that the result of his clinical assessment examination be set aside, that he be awarded a pass, and that the first respondent change the clinical examination system.

2. On 22 April 2015, the Supreme Court (Bellew J) summarily dismissed the proceedings, holding that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed against either respondent.  Bellew J held that the applicant's claims against the first respondent asked the Court to substitute its own views for those of the appropriately qualified representatives of the first respondent who had assessed the applicant, and that there was no legal foundation for doing so.  His Honour held that the applicant's case against the second respondent had more fundamental shortcomings, as the second respondent had played no part in the clinical assessment about which the applicant was aggrieved.

3. On 8 July 2015, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Beazley ACJ and Ward JA) refused an application for leave to appeal, holding that any appeal would be doomed to fail and that the primary judge was clearly mindful of the exceptional nature of the power to summarily dismiss proceedings for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

4. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to this Court.  The applicant's draft notice of appeal substantially repeats the claims considered and dismissed below and does not raise any question of law that would justify a grant of special leave.  There is no reason to doubt the decisions of the Courts below.  Special leave is refused.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
15 October 2015 P.A. Keane