Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (No 5)
[2022] VSC 335
•17 June 2022
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S CI 2015 04742
| CHRISTINE MOALA (and others according to the Schedule attached) | Plaintiffs |
| v | |
| FREE WESLEYAN CHURCH OF TONGA IN AUSTRALIA (VICTORIA) INC (Reg No. A0022699W) | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Ginnane J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 October 2021 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 17 June 2022 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (No 5) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2022] VSC 335 |
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CHURCHES – Incorporated association – Dispute and lengthy litigation about membership of the association – Mediation agreement – New committee – Challenge to committee’s rejection of membership applications – Whether dispute can be decided in existing proceeding – When committee can reject membership applications – Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 ss 67, 68.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | Mr T Sowden and Ms S Fernando | Reichman & Co |
| For the Defendant | Mr N Elias | Prolegis Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
This dispute arises from the rejection of applications for membership of the defendant, the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (the ‘Association’). The Association is incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (the ‘Act’). The Management Committee of the Association (the ‘Committee’) rejected the applications. The Association contends that it has a discretion to accept or reject applications, even when they satisfy the membership eligibility criteria in the Association’s rules, which include the Model Rules contained in the Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012. The three plaintiffs who bring this application, the fifth, fourteenth and twenty-sixth plaintiffs, dispute that contention. I will on most occasions refer to those three plaintiffs as the plaintiffs.
This is another round in disputes between groups in the Association which commenced in 2014 and which, at least in part, are about the Werribee Church property. I have already decided a number of issues that have arisen in the disputes. In the principal judgment, I decided the content of the membership rule of the Church Fellowship, which preceded the Association, thereby enabling the founding members of the Association to be identified.[1] Section 51(1) of the Act provides that upon the registration of an incorporated association the members will be the persons who are members immediately before its incorporation. Section 51(2) enables other persons to be admitted as members in accordance with the association’s rules.
[1]Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc [2019] VSC 205.
Following the principal judgment, the parties conducted a mediation and agreed on a process to identify founding members, for the election of a new committee and for membership applications to be made and determined.
On 18 April 2019, I made orders varying the provisions of the mediation agreement requiring the Committee to meet to receive applications for membership of the Association. The Committee called for applications for membership in December 2019 and rejected 116 applicants associated with the Werribee and Dandenong congregations.[2] There are also Sunshine and Keysborough congregations. The Association’s evidence is that it has no association with the Dandenong property which is owned by the Uniting Church and that its ministers do not conduct services at it.[3]
[2]Affidavit of Christine Moala dated 2 June 2021, [2].
[3]Affidavit of Nameeta Chandra dated 22 June 2021, [4]-[5].
The three plaintiffs who ultimately pursued the applications now before me are Ana’uta Grima, Tevita Kafoika and Sione Militoni Halahala, the fifth, fourteenth and twenty-sixth plaintiffs. They seek a declaration under s 67(2) that the Committee’s power to reject applications for membership is limited to a consideration of the rules of the Association.[4] Section 67(2) empowers the Magistrates’ Court to give directions for the performance and observance of the Association’s rules. The plaintiffs also claim that the Committee’s rejection of the membership applications was oppressive conduct within s 68(1) of the Act.
[4]Further outline of plaintiffs’ submissions dated 2 August 2021 in response to defendant’s submissions, [12] and Transcript of Proceedings, Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (No 5) (Supreme Court of Victoria, S CI 2015 04742, Ginnane J, 25 October 2021) 2 (‘T’).
Section 85 of the Act requires that office holders, who include committee members, must exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the association, and for a proper purpose.
The case was commenced in the Magistrates’ Court under ss 67 and 68 of the Act and then transferred to this Court.
The Association’s Rules
The Association’s Constitution or Rules (the ‘Rules’) state:
SECTION 2: OBJECT
The object of the FREE WESLEYAN CHURCH OF TONGA IN AUSTRALIA IS to promote religion and to uphold christianity and christian teachings and the principles of the bible as observed and practised by the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga.
FUNCTIONS
The functions of the Management Committee shall be:-
(a)To administer the affairs of the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia.
(b)To determine and to act for the Church in all matters both Legal, administrative or otherwise pertaining to the growth welfare or advancement of the Church in Melbourne or in any part of Victoria.
SECTION 3: MEMBERSHIP
As a religious body, a person who accept the doctrines of the said Church through baptism within the Church, truly acceptance of Christ and willing to become an active member of the Church, will be eligible to be a member of the Church.
There is no entrance fee or annual subscription to be paid to become a member of the Church.
SECTION 4: REGISTER OF MEMBERS
The secretary shall keep and maintain a register of members in which shall be entered the full name, address and date of entry of the name of each member and the register shall be available for inspection by members at the address of the Public Officer.
The Model Rules
The Association’s Rules are supplemented by the Model Rules made under the Act and regulations.[5] The Model Rules relevant to membership applications are:
[5]Sections 47-49 of the Act.
9 Application for membership
(1)To apply to become a member of the Association, a person must submit a written application to a committee member stating that the person—
(a) wishes to become a member of the Association; and
(b) supports the purposes of the Association; and
(c) agrees to comply with these Rules.
(2) The application—
(a) must be signed by the applicant; and
(b) may be accompanied by the joining fee.
Note
The joining fee is the fee (if any) determined by the Association under rule 12(3).
10 Consideration of application
(1)As soon as practicable after an application for membership is received, the Committee must decide by resolution whether to accept or reject the application.
(2)The Committee must notify the applicant in writing of its decision as soon as practicable after the decision is made.
(3)If the Committee rejects the application, it must return any money accompanying the application to the applicant.
(4) No reason need be given for the rejection of an application.
11 New membership
(1)If an application for membership is approved by the Committee—
(a)the resolution to accept the membership must be recorded in the minutes of the committee meeting; and
(b)the Secretary must, as soon as practicable, enter the name and address of the new member, and the date of becoming a member, in the register of members.
(2)A person becomes a member of the Association and, subject to rule 13(2), is entitled to exercise his or her rights of membership from the date, whichever is the later, on which—
(a) the Committee approves the person's membership; or
(b) the person pays the joining fee.
The mediation agreement
The mediation agreement dated 10 March 2017 provided that, if complications arose in any of the steps to be taken, the Committee could make an application to the Court for directions. By order of 18 April 2019, I varied provisions of that mediation agreement and recorded as ‘Other Matters’ that:
Pursuant to an agreement entered into following mediation on 23 February 2017 (“mediation agreement”), the parties agreed that upon the Court resolving who the current members are, steps including the following should occur…
The steps contained in the mediation agreement included returning custody and control of the Werribee property to the Association, the convening of a meeting of members, at the meeting electing a committee and Chairperson from among the members and considering whether to retain or adopt new rules. The ‘Other Matters’ recorded included that:
1(f) Following the determination of what rules are to apply to the Association in accordance with paragraph 1(d)(ii)(3) above, the committee will hold a meeting at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules.
1(g) In the event that any complication arises with any of the steps in 1(b)-(f), including the requirements of Corporate Affairs Victoria in relation to adherence to the 2012 Act, the committee may make application to the Court for directions.
The variations I ordered to the mediation agreement included alterations to the provisions for the identification of Founding Members, the holding of the first meeting and the election of a committee. In respect of the Committee’s consideration of membership applications, I ordered that:
12.Clause 1(f) of the mediation agreement be varied to require that the committee hold a meeting at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules by no later than 14 December 2019.
The Committee rejects membership applications
As mentioned, the Committee called for membership applications in December 2019. The plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s evidence differs slightly on the number of applications. The first plaintiff, Ms Christine Moala’s, affidavit states that 142 applications were submitted by members of the Werribee and Dandenong Churches,[6] with the Committee accepting 26 and rejecting 116.[7] The affidavit by the Association’s solicitor stated that Ms Moala delivered by hand to the Committee 135 applications for membership.[8] This difference in the number of applications is not critical to the determination of this proceeding.
[6]Affidavit of Christine Moala dated 2 June 2021, [2].
[7]Ibid.
[8]Affidavit of Nameeta Chandra dated 22 June 2021, [11].
On 21 December 2019, the Committee met to consider the applications and decided that they did not comply with the application form required by the Model Rules.[9] It wrote to the applicants notifying them of its decision and enclosing a copy of the application form to be used. It was in the following terms:[10]
[9]Ibid [12].
[10]Ibid [12]-[13].
On 10 January 2020, Ms Moala delivered 139 membership applications to the Association’s mailbox.[11] Ten were new applications, the remaining 129 were from previous applicants who were among the initial 135 membership applicants.[12]
[11]Ibid [14].
[12]Ibid.
On 11 January 2020, the Committee met to consider the 139 membership applications. Twenty eight applications were accepted and 111 were not.[13] Of the applicants not accepted, six are plaintiffs in this proceeding, but do not include the three plaintiffs who bring this application.[14] Two applicants have since died, reducing the number of rejected applications to 109.[15]
[13]Ibid [15].
[14]Ibid.
[15]Ibid [16].
The Committee’s letter informing applicants that their applications had not been approved stated:[16]
Thank you for your application requesting membership of the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Incorporated (Association). The Committee met today 11 January 2020 to consider your application.
We regret to inform you that the committee has not approved your application for membership of the Association at this time.
It should be noted that as the 1991 Rules are silent on the consideration of the applications for membership the Model Rules apply.
Therefore before contacting us in regard to your application, reference should be made to the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 – Model Rules for an Incorporated Association Part 3, Division 1, Point 10(4).
[16]Exhibit CJM-3 to the Affidavit of Christine Moala dated 2 June 2021.
On 19 February 2020, I gave judgment about the custody and control of the Werribee Church property,[17] and made orders enforcing the obligations contained in the mediation agreement. At that time, the plaintiffs were seeking remedies about the rejected membership applications and in that regard, I said:
In summary, the plaintiffs do not recognize the Committee and say that applications for membership of the Association from the Werribee and Dandenong congregations have been rejected to bolster the numbers of Committee members who support the defendant. They seek orders compelling the Committee, as it was constituted prior to February 2020, to comply with the rules and seek leave to cross examine its members to ascertain what, if any, criteria was used in rejecting the 116 applications.
As discussed in submissions, I do not propose to deal as part of this judgment with the issue of rejected membership applications or the election of the four additional members to the Committee. These issues were only raised shortly before the hearing and the defendant mentioned the possibility of discussions occurring in respect of the rejected applicants. In order for the Court to decide these issues, lengthy hearings might be required. The issues do not affect the eight members of the Committee who were elected last year. In those circumstances, the parties should discuss the position of the 116 applicants and further information may need to be provided to support their applications. Before hearing any claims by the plaintiffs about the rejection of the 116 applications, I would also need to be satisfied that the applicants agreed to that course and were aware of any possible costs consequences that they may incur. I would also need to be satisfied that the existing plaintiffs were aware that this new dispute was being argued in this proceeding and were aware of any possible cost consequences to them that may follow. If the Court is required to determine the 116 membership claims, appropriate directions for that to occur will have to be given.[18]
[17]Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (No 4) [2020] VSC 50.
[18]Ibid [24]-[25].
On 16 March 2020, the Association’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiffs’ solicitors informing them that the Committee proposed to contact each of the persons who had applied unsuccessfully for membership, inviting them to meet individually with members of the Committee to discuss their applications and to enable the Committee to seek information about them or clarification of their applications.[19] However, on 16 March 2020, the COVID-19 state of emergency was declared in Victoria and the meetings had to be postponed.[20]
[19]Affidavit of Nameeta Chandra dated 22 June 2021, [22].
[20]Ibid [23].
The meetings were rescheduled for February and March 2021,[21] and the Committee wrote to each applicant inviting them to attend, stating:
The Management committee of the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Vic) Inc. would like to invite you to meet with a panel of committee members to discuss and seek further information from you in regards to your rejected Membership application.
…
Should you not attend this meeting and not reschedule, the committee will take this to mean that you do not wish to pursue any application for membership of the Association at this time.[22]
[21]Ibid [30].
[22]Ibid [31].
On 8 February 2021, Ms Moala sent an email to Ms M Fonua, the Association’s secretary, informing her that the 29 applicants, who Ms Moala described as ‘various individuals from the plaintiffs’ side in the current outstanding continuation of legal proceedings’, would not be attending the meeting with the Committee.[23] The Committee’s lawyers replied to Ms Moala stating that the Association:
…considers this unfortunate and reiterates its invitation to applicants to contact any of the members of the Association’s committee to speak to them about their individual application. In the event that some applicants do not wish to pursue membership of the Association at this time, the Association encourages them to apply again for membership at any time and the applications will be considered in the future.[24]
[23]Ibid [33] and Exhibit NC4-13 to the Affidavit of Nameeta Chandra dated 22 June 2021. She later notified the Association of the names of another 11 applicants who would not be attending a meeting.
[24]Ibid [38].
In this reply email, the Association’s lawyers also stated that the Committee could not comment on the application of an individual applicant, but that the proposed discussions with the applicants were to enable the Committee to satisfy itself that they met the requirements for membership.[25]
[25]Ibid [39].
On 22 February 2021, the plaintiffs’ solicitor wrote to the Association’s solicitor a letter including:[26]
[t]here is nothing in your request to indicate reasons why an interview is required in relation to membership applications.
If your clients have any questions in relation to members those questions can be put to the applicants for membership and they will reply to any reasonable questions. If replies are required in the form of a statutory declaration our clients are willing to do that.
[26]Ibid [42].
On 25 February 2021, the Association’s solicitor wrote to the plaintiffs’ solicitor a letter stating:[27]
7.Since 16 March 2020 in each of the correspondence listed at paragraphs 1(d) to 1(g) of this letter, we have notified you of the Association’s approach to the membership applications. In particular we have notified you that applicants would be invited to meet with the management committee to discuss their membership applications. We have also notified you of the purpose of these discussions.
8.The Association considers that meetings with the applicants is an informal, flexible, and efficient way of gathering information that would be more sensitive to the context in which the individual applications are being considered.
9.It is not clear from your letter why there remains a reluctance on the part of your clients (or some of them) to meet with the Association’s committee. It seems strange that your clients (or some of them) who profess a desire to become members of the Association and to abide by its rules and support its purposes are at the same time unwilling to discuss their application for membership with the Association’s committee, who are required by the Association’s rules to consider it.
[27]Ibid [43].
On 5 March 2021, Ms Moala emailed Ms Fonua listing the names of at least 74 applicants for membership and requesting that the Committee put in writing its questions for them so that they might respond in writing.[28]
[28]Ibid [46]. The affidavit lists 74 names and in two instances refers to family members who are not directly named. The thirty-seventh entry is ‘Sena Fotofili and Children’ and the seventy-fourth entry is ‘Siosaia Tonga & Sons’.
Ms Moala’s evidence was that few applicants saw any utility in attending a meeting with the Committee, given the animosity which existed between the Committee members and the members of the Werribee and Dandenong congregations.[29]
[29]Affidavit of Christine Moala dated 2 June 2021, [7].
On 13 March 2021, Ms Moala, who was one of the applicants for membership, attended a meeting with the Committee. Her account, which was not challenged by evidence from the Association, was that the Chairman, Mr Vaotangi, read a prepared statement in English to the effect that:
[Y]ou have been invited here to discuss your membership application so we can get further information. However, given your behaviour towards the Association’s members has been aggressive and that you yell, if you show any of these behaviours your interview will be terminated and you will be requested to leave and if not police will be called to escort you off the association’s property and that given that there is an intervention order against you brought by Mr Wall who will be here at 5.45pm for a committee meeting you will have to leave at that time.[30]
[30]Ibid [8].
Ms Moala said that the Chairman read questions in English asking her:[31] (a) why she wanted to be a member of the Association ‘The Church’; (b) how she would participate in the life of the Association if made a member; (c) whether she knew that in the Wesleyan Church the ritual of sacrament is carried out by the Minister and not a steward, and whether she agreed with that; and (d) whether she knew that the Minister has oversight of all religious activities in the Church.
[31]Ibid [9].
In response to the Chairman’s statement and questions, Ms Moala reiterated her desire to be a member of the Association and that she was prepared to abide by s 3 of the Rules. She asked what relevance the Chairman’s questions had to her eligibility to apply for membership. A Committee member replied that it was important that she understood that the membership requirements were contained in the Model Rules. Ms Moala said that during the meeting she was accused of stealing a security camera installed at the Werribee Church and was asked why she should be a member if that was true. She was also accused of bullying members and asked why, in those circumstances, she should be accepted as a member. She denied that she was a bully and objected to the allegation that she had stolen Church property and said that ‘Christ came down to earth to forgive our sins and who amongst us is without sin’.[32] She felt that she was appearing before something like a parole board. The Committee rejected her membership application, but gave her no reasons, although the questions that she was asked gave an indication of the Committee’s thinking.
[32]Ibid.
Mr Uilkinson Haunga also met with the Committee and was asked whether he accepted the Minister and whether he had contributed to misinale at the Werribee Church.[33] Following the meeting, the Committee wrote to Mr Haunga stating that his membership application was rejected because he did not accept a Minister of the Church.[34]
[33]Ibid [11].
[34]Ibid.
On 24 March 2021, the Committee wrote to each other applicant who did not attend a meeting stating that the Committee took their non-attendance at the scheduled meetings as meaning that they did not wish to pursue their membership applications at that time.[35] It also stated that they did not need to be a member to attend, or participate in, Church services and that they were welcomed and encouraged to do so.
[35]Affidavit of Nameeta Chandra dated 22 June 2021, [54].
Standing
The Association conceded that the fifth, fourteenth and twenty-sixth plaintiffs, Ana’uta Grima, Tevita Kafoika and Sione Militoni Halahala (the ‘three plaintiffs’), who are members of the Association, would have standing to bring applications in the Magistrates’ Court under ss 67 and 68 of the Act.[36] But the Association contended that, the other plaintiffs did not have such standing, as they were neither members nor former members of the Association.[37] Counsel for the plaintiffs clarified that the three plaintiffs were making the applications under ss 67 and 68.
[36]T 23.
[37]Ibid.
I accept that the three plaintiffs have the necessary standing to make the applications. Any member of an incorporated associations may apply for orders under s 67 of the Act for the enforcement of its rules and the rights of members and under s 68 may seek orders in respect of oppressive conduct by the Association. When this proceeding was commenced in the Magistrates’ Court, the plaintiffs’ allegations of oppressive conduct included that the Association had failed to compile a proper list of member and the question of who are its members has always been a live issue. Another matter that gives the three plaintiffs standing is that each of the plaintiffs is a party to the mediation agreement made on 10 March 2017. That agreement included provision for the election of a Committee, which was to hold a meeting ‘at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules’ (cl 1 (f))’.
I will next consider the two issues argued on this occasion.
Issue 1: Should the plaintiffs’ applications be decided in this proceeding?
The Association’s submissions
The Association argued that the Court could not, and should not, determine the plaintiffs’ claims concerning the rejected membership applications and that, in order to pursue such claims, they must commence a new proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court which could exercise the jurisdiction conferred by ss 67 and 68 of the Act. Section 10 of the Associations Incorporation (Amendment) Act 1997 amended the Act to require applications under those provisions be commenced in the Magistrates’ Court in order to ‘[provide] a less costly means by which members may seek an order for the enforcement of rights and obligations under the rules of an incorporated association.’[38] There would be no substantial time and cost savings by the applications proceeding in this Court, and the issues now raised were unrelated to any matter previously determined by the Court in this proceeding.
[38]The Explanatory Memorandum to the Associations Incorporation (Amendment) Bill 1997, 2.
The three plaintiffs’ submissions
In addition to their application under s 67(2) of the Act, the three plaintiffs also sought remedies under s 68(4) about the rejection of the membership applications. Members can bring proceedings under those provisions of the Act to challenge the rejection of membership applications made by persons who are not members of the Association. They argued that the rejection of bundles of applications without considering them individually was contrary to the interests of an association and was oppressive conduct within s 68 of the Act.
The plaintiffs also submitted that they were seeking to enforce the orders establishing the Committee, and specifically the order varying the mediation agreement ‘to require that the committee hold a meeting at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules by no later than 14 December 2019’.
Analysis
As mentioned, three plaintiffs have standing to bring applications under ss 67 and 68 of the Act: Ms Grima, Mr Kafoika and Mr Halahala.
In my opinion, the Court has jurisdiction to determine this dispute about whether the Committee has validly rejected membership applications and should so determine. The Court determined the membership rule of the Church Fellowship, which enabled the founding members of the Association to be identified. The Court is now asked to decide what matters the Committee can take into account in deciding membership applications. All the plaintiffs and the Association were parties to the mediation agreement and bound by the order of 18 April 2019. The present plaintiffs are seeking to enforce the mediation agreement provisions concerning applications for membership. As previously mentioned, the mediation agreement provided in clause 1 that:
(f)Following the determination of what Rules are to apply to the Association in accordance with paragraph 1(d)(ii)(3) above, the committee will hold a meeting at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules.
The order of 18 April 2019 recited the terms of the mediation agreement and varied and added to them. Paragraph 12 of the order stated:
Clause 1(f) of the mediation agreement be varied to require that the committee hold a meeting at which each and every application for membership will be considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules by no later than 14 December 2019.
The plaintiffs’ applications seek determination of whether the Committee has a discretion, or power, to reject applications for membership when the applicants satisfy the three eligibility criteria contained in s 3. They are also seeking to have the applications for membership by the 116 applicants considered and determined in accordance with the applicable rules. As such, the plaintiffs are seeking to enforce the order of 18 April 2019 and clause 1(f) of the mediation agreement as varied by that order. An application to enforce an order can be made in the proceeding in which the order was made and an application to enforce a mediation agreement can be made in the proceeding in which that agreement was made. Parties can enforce terms of a settlement in the same proceeding in it was reached, which is plainly a more convenient course than bringing a separate proceeding.[39] The pleadings do not have to be amended for such orders to be sought.[40]
[39]See the cases collected in LexisNexis Butterworths, Civil Procedure: Victoria, vol 1 (at Service 327) [I 23.01.145] and Australian Xinyangfeng Fertilizer Pty Ltd v Andrew Freshwater [2020] VSC 450.
[40]The plaintiffs indicated that they would seek to amend the pleadings if that was necessary: T 38.
The determination of the plaintiffs’ applications in this proceeding would achieve the overarching purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 in relation to civil proceedings: to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute.[41] It is likely to be time consuming and incur additional costs for the Magistrates’ Court to deal with the current issues and for a Magistrate to learn the background to the issues in this dispute. There are a number of decisions of Supreme Courts, and at least one of the Federal Court, deciding similar legal issues about membership applications in associations. It is just and appropriate that the plaintiffs’ applications be heard in this Court.
[41]Section 7(1).
Issue 2: Whether the Committee had power or a discretion to refuse membership applications
The plaintiffs’ submissions
The three plaintiffs described the questions raised by issue 2 as:
(a) whether the Committee was bound by the applicants’ pledge in their membership application form to abide by the purposes of the Association;
(b) whether the Committee has a residual discretion to reject applications for membership that otherwise comply with s 51(2) of the Act and s 3 of the Rules;
(c) if such a discretion exists, its extent and in what circumstances it ought to be exercised.
The plaintiffs sought a declaration under s 67(2) of the Act that the Committee’s power or discretion to reject membership applications is limited to a consideration of the Association’s rules, namely whether the applicant in each case meets the criteria for membership contained in s 3 of the Rules.
The plaintiffs submitted that s 46 of the Act creates a contract between the association and its members comprising the association rules and that the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply to the contract. However, they noted that caution should be exercised in implying terms into the Rules, given their nature as public documents registered or lodged under the Act.[42]
[42]Relying on United Muslims New South Wales Incorporated v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils & Ors [2021] NSWSC 382, [42].
Relying on Megarry J’s judgment in Woodford v Smith,[43] the plaintiffs submitted that the Committee could not reject an application for membership unless the applicant was unwilling or unable to agree with the association’s objects. Therefore, provided an applicant satisfied the requirements of s 3, the Committee was obliged to accept them as a member and had no discretion or power to reject their application. As mentioned, s 85 of the Act requires Committee members to act in good faith, for a proper purpose and in the best interests of the Association. The Committee could only reject an application for membership if it formed the view, on reasonable grounds, that the applicant lacked bona fides. The Association had presented no evidence that the applications were not made in accordance with the Rules and, it is improbable that it could do so given the number of disputed applicants and the fact that they were all members of the Dandenong and Werribee congregations of the Church.
[43][1970] 1 WLR 806.
In Woodford v Smith, Megarry J added the qualification that:
In my judgment, subject to one qualification, the rules do not confer on the committee any power to reject or suspend any application for membership, and the committee cannot confer any power on the secretary or anyone else to postpone an application until the committee can consider it. The qualification is that if there are sufficient grounds for believing that an application is not in accordance with the rules, as where it does not appear to have been in fact made by the proposed applicant, or he cannot fairly be said to be in agreement with the objects of the association, then the Committee may refuse to treat the applicant as a member, at all events until the doubts are resolved.[44]
[44]Ibid 816.
While Model Rule 10(4) did not make it mandatory for the Committee to provide reasons for rejecting applications, the Committee could, and should, have done so.
The plaintiffs submitted that the Association was attempting to rely on a broad unfettered discretion, which was not found within the Rules. Any discretion to reject applications had to be exercised within the scope, purpose and objects of the Rules.
No meeting or interview between the Committee and the applicants was warranted because the applicants’ pledge contained in the signed application forms sufficed. The statements of the applicants in their signed application forms satisfied the eligibility criteria and entitled them to membership, in the absence of other evidence. Applications may be rejected, but only on the basis that the applicants do not meet the criteria in the Rules, for instance if an applicant was not baptised, or his or her beliefs and attitudes were at odds with the Association’s object. The interviews held with Ms Moala and Mr Haunga went beyond the scope, purposes and objects of s 3 of the Rules, by asking questions about the theft of a security camera and bullying and whether they accepted the minister. In any event, once applicants are accepted as members, if they act in a manner contrary to the Association’s objects they can be dealt with under the disciplinary code contained in the Model Rules.
The authorities relied on by the Association dealt with circumstances where associations had grounds for questioning the bona fides of applicants. No evidence for any such suspicions had been presented by the Association. An interview process could not be used to fish for reasons to justify rejecting membership applications, when there was no evidence that the applicants did not satisfy the eligibility criteria.
The large number of membership applications was not ground for suspicion as they followed the Association’s call for applications.
The plaintiffs also sought a direction that, in the event the Committee has grounds for believing that an application was not in accordance with the Rules, those grounds should be reduced to writing and forwarded to the applicant within 21 days of the Committee meeting to consider the application and the applicant given the chance to respond. Thereafter, the Committee must decide to accept or reject the application as soon as practicable.
The Association’s submissions
The Association submitted that, absent approval by the Committee, no person had a legal entitlement to membership. Neither Model Rule 10, nor any other rule, required the Committee to accept or approve an application for membership. Under Model Rule 11, a person becomes a member only after the Committee approves the person’s membership.
The Association submitted that the Committee retained some discretion to reject applicants, even when they appeared otherwise to satisfy the eligibility requirements contained in s 3 of the Rules. It could make enquiries about the bona fides of applicants for membership prior to accepting them in order to satisfy itself that the applicant met the eligibility criteria.
While the Committee’s discretion or power in respect of membership applications must be exercised in good faith and with regard to the Association’s objects, the plaintiffs bore the onus of establishing that any decision was invalid. It was for the Committee, and not the Court, to decide if the applicants were bona fide. Courts are reluctant to intervene in the affairs of voluntary associations, especially in decisions about admission of members. It was not appropriate for the Court to intervene in a voluntary association by determining the bona fides of individual applicants.
Many of the applicants had been part of a breakaway group, worshipping at another Church without a minister and that conduct might reflect a different core belief about the way in which religious activities should be conducted. The Committee was entitled to meet with applicants to see if they would be happy as members and to discuss their intentions if admitted to membership, particularly those who had been members of a breakaway group. Therefore, the Committee’s questions to Ms Moala were appropriate. If her answers revealed that she disagreed with how the Church was run, or that she would not attend Church services conducted by the minister, the Committee was entitled to wonder if would be in its interests that she be admitted to membership. The Committee could defer making a final decision on these kind of questions until an applicant showed that they would participate in Church activities.
The Committee would be justified in refusing membership applications in at least the following circumstances. Where the applicant had not attended services and Association activities, but had worshipped at another church or under a different minister. Where a genuine concern existed that an applicant sought membership to further their own interests, or those of another member, or for other ulterior motives, rather than from a genuine interest in becoming a member of the Association and furthering its interests. Another reason for rejecting an application would be if it appeared to the Committee that the applicant’s aims and interests were not consistent with the Association’s objects. Membership applications could also be rejected where the Committee considered that the Association could not cater for the influx of new members, or where it was not in its interests to have such an influx at a particular time.
The Committee remained willing to discuss the applications of the rejected applicants or any new application they may submit.
The Church and the Association are distinct, and it is not necessary to be a member of the Association to participate in worship and Church social activities. The Association is principally concerned with administrative matters such as the management of the Church property and membership gives voting rights in it. Admission to membership of the Association does not confer participation rights in the religious and cultural aspects of the Church’s worship.
Legal principles
The authorities establish that the power of incorporated associations to accept or reject membership applications must be exercised in good faith and having regard to the objects of the association. The power must be exercised for a proper purpose. The association may reject an application because the aims and aspirations of the applicant are not consistent with its objects. An association is entitled to make enquiries to satisfy itself that the applicants are bona fide. There may be relevant practical considerations preventing an application being accepted, such as a lack of space or other facilities for a greatly increased membership.[45] But adopting a blanket rule that any application for membership made by a person who was not a member of the church in recent years may be invalid.[46]
[45]Pettit v South Australian Harness Racing Club Inc [2006] SASC 306, [26]; Kaur v Sikh Gurdwara (Perth) Inc [2017] WASC 270, [45]; Millar v Houghton Table Tennis & Sports Club Inc (2003) 225 LSJS 241; [2003] SASC 1, [114]-[116].
[46]Singh v Brisbane Sikh Temple (Gurdwara) Inc [2022] QSC 17, [58].
In Woodford v Smith,[47] on which the plaintiffs relied, a practice existed whereby membership was obtained by completing a form and paying the subscription fee, with the ‘filling of the application form [being] virtually sufficient to secure membership’.[48] In the present case, no such practice was proved. Here, the applicants paid no subscription fee. However, s 46 provides that the rules do constitute the terms of a contract between the association and its members. The Committee has been recently established by Court order and charged with determining membership applications. The rules considered in Woodford v Smith did not include a provision similar to Model Rule 10, which gives, or assumes, the committee’s right to reject a membership application. Such a provision has been accepted as indicating that a committee has power to accept or reject a membership application.[49]
[47][1970] 1 WLR 806.
[48]Ibid 812.
[49]Lukaszewicz v Polish Club Limited [2019] NSWSC 446, [146]; Millar v Houghton Table Tennis & Sports Club Inc (2003) 225 LSJS 241; [2003] SASC 1, [187].
The rules of an association may indicate that it has no power or discretion to reject an applicant who satisfies the eligibility requirements. Thus in Lawton v Bidgerdii Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islanders Corporation Community Health Service Central Queensland Region (the ‘Bidgerdii Case’),[50] Kiefel J considered whether the committee of a community health service could reject membership applications made by persons who satisfied the membership criteria. The rules provided:
8.(1)Membership of the Association shall be open to adult Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons normally and permanently resident in: Rockhampton and the Central Queensland Region.
8.(2)The members of the Association shall be those Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons who qualify for membership and who apply to the Committee and who pay an annual membership fee as prescribed by the Governing Committee of the Association. A register of members shall be kept by the Public Officer.
[50][2004] FCA 1474.
Kiefel J decided that the committee had no discretion to refuse applicants who were otherwise eligible for membership and explained:
The respondent relied upon the decision in Baker v The Liberal Party of Australia (SA Division) where the plaintiff’s application for membership was rejected. It was submitted for the plaintiff in that case that, on applying for membership and paying the necessary fee, a contract came into existence between her and the party, a contention which was rejected by Bollen J. His Honour found that the defendant acted in accordance with its Constitution in rejecting the application. The Constitution provided that membership commenced one month after receipt of an application unless the State Executive, acting upon the recommendation of a branch or of its own motion, declined to admit a person, which it could do without giving any reason. The State Executive did reject the plaintiff’s application and that rejection was upheld. A similar power was provided to the Committee of a Club in Millar v Houghton Table Tennis and Sports Club Inc. There the process was one of seeking ‘acceptance by the Committee’ which could refuse or reject membership.
The Bidgerdii rules contain no such provisions. That is no doubt the reason why the amendments which became effective in April 2003 were sought. In particular the mere fact of a person having to apply to the Committee of Bidgerdii does not provide the Committee with wider powers of refusal or rejection than are marked out by rule 8.(1) and (2). The method of application is simply the procedure to be followed.
…
The present rules are closer to the type considered in Woodford v Smith. There seems no reason to doubt that rules may constitute an offer to all persons who qualify under the eligibility rule to become members: Nurses Memorial Centre of South Australia Incorporated v Beaumont. In my view that is the effect of rule 8. It is not possible to read into it a discretion in the Committee to reject a person’s application.[51]
[51]Ibid [17]-[18], [20] (authorities omitted).
Analysis
The issue before the Court is whether, as a matter of law, the Committee was obliged to accept applicants as members if they met the requirements of s 3 of the Rules. That section states:
As a religious body, a person who accept the doctrines of the said Church through baptism within the Church, truly acceptance of Christ and willing to become an active member of the Church, will be eligible to be a member of the Church.
There is no entrance fee or annual subscription to be paid to become a member of the Church.
The Rules do not provide that an eligible person who applies for membership must be accepted as a member. They differ from the rules in the Bidgerdii Case, which considered the membership admission rules of a community health centre.
The Committee, in making a decision ‘whether to accept or reject the application’, being the words of Model Rule 10, is not bound by an applicant’s assertion that he or she satisfies s 3, if the Committee is aware of matters which suggest that the assertion is not correct. The words of the Model Rule indicate that the Committee must decide whether to accept or reject membership applications which are made by an applicant submitting a signed application form. If it rejects an application, it need not give reasons for doing so.
The context in which the 116 applicants applied to become members is significant in determining whether the Committee validly applied the membership admission rule. This proceeding was originally commenced because of uncertainty about who were the members of the Association and, therefore, who were eligible to be members of the Committee. The plaintiffs in the proceeding include persons with long standing ties to the Church and the Werribee congregation. Following the previous judgments, the founding members of the Association were identified, but they did not include many people with those long standing ties. A committee was elected and charged with considering membership applications. Although many applications were received, they were not received unexpectedly, or without apparent reason, and therefore the number of applications could not by itself give rise to suspicions about the applicants’ motives.
However, there is considerable conflict between the plaintiffs and people who support them and at least some of the Committee and people who support it. I summarised this unfortunate situation in a passage which I will repeat:
In summary, the plaintiffs do not recognise the Committee and say that the applications for membership of the Association from the Werribee and Dandenong congregations have been rejected to bolster the numbers of Committee members who support the defendant. They seek orders compelling the Committee, as it was constituted prior to February 2020, to comply with the rules and seek leave to cross examine its members to ascertain what, if any, criteria was used in rejecting the 116 applications.[52]
[52]Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc (No 4) [2020] VSC 50, [24].
The Committee’s task
When deciding whether applicants should be admitted as members, the Committee must consider the three eligibility criteria contained in s 3 of the Rules. The Committee may also consider whether the admission of an applicant to membership would be consistent with the Association’s object, which is:
SECTION 2: OBJECT
The object of the FREE WESLEYAN CHURCH OF TONGA IN AUSTRALIA IS to promote religion and to uphold christianity and christian teachings and the principles of the bible as observed and practised by the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga.
When an applicant satisfies the three eligibility criteria, it would usually be case that their admission to membership would be in accord with the object of the Association.
While each membership application requires individual consideration, at least the following guidance can be given about what the Committee must do. The Committee does not possess an overriding discretion to reject membership applicants who satisfy the eligibility criteria contained in s 3 and whose admission to membership would be consistent with the Association’s object. The Committee’s power to accept or reject membership applications allows it to make reasonable enquiries about whether an applicant meets the eligibility requirements, at least where the Committee is aware of facts that suggest that the applicant may not. Such enquiries may include requesting that the applicant meet with the Committee. But any such enquiry must relate to one of the eligibility criteria, or to whether the acceptance of the applicant as a member would be consistent with the Association’s object. Requiring all applicants to attend a meeting may well be invalid where it appears to be an additional restriction on applicants who are opposed to the existing Committee.
The Committee’s right to meet with membership applicants is best discussed by considering the three eligibility requirements. The first is that the applicant is ‘a person who accepts the doctrine of the said Church through baptism within the Church’ and would normally be satisfied by proof of baptism within the Church, unless there was evidence that the applicant had since rejected the Church’s doctrines. Baptism is often taken as a sign that the person has become a member of a Christian Church. Mere occasional non-attendance at Church services, or failing to always live in accordance with Church doctrine, would not by itself establish that the applicant had rejected Church doctrine.
Satisfaction of the second criterion, that the applicant has ‘truly acceptance of Christ’ would mainly depend on the applicant’s statement about that matter in the application form, unless there was strong evidence to the contrary.
The third criterion that the applicant is ‘willing to become an active member of the Church’ speaks as to the future. Satisfaction of this third criterion would depend on the person’s assertion and, perhaps, other matters such as how often they had attended the Church in the past, where they live and any obstacles that may prevent them being an active member of the Church. The third criterion may raises issues which may justify the Committee in making reasonable enquiries about an applicant.
When applicants who pledge by signing the application form that they support the Association’s purposes and will comply with its Rules, are known to the Committee as baptised persons who have recently worshipped in an Association church, there should ordinarily be no need to meet with them before granting them membership. This is an important point to make in this case as Ms Moala’s evidence suggests that many applicants see no point in attending a meeting because of the hostility that exists. The Committee should take that impression of some applicants into account and only require a meeting where there are credible reasons to believe that an applicant does not meet the eligibility criteria. After all, when a person has been admitted to membership, the Model Rules permit the Association to take disciplinary action against them if they have failed to comply with the Rules, refused to support the Association’s purposes or have engaged in conduct prejudicial to the Association.[53]
[53]Model Rule 19.
I do not accept the plaintiffs’ submissions that no meeting or interview with applicants who have signed application forms could ever be warranted. But I doubt that all 116 applicants needed to be interviewed, or should have had their applications rejected, because they declined to be interviewed. Some, if not many, must have been readily known to members of Committee as good Christian people who have attended Church services and who satisfied the s 3 criteria. There is no reason why the Committee should require such persons to attend a meeting and be interviewed before being granted membership. A general demand that all applicants attend a meeting may be evidence that the Committee is not acting bona fide, but acting oppressively.[54]
[54]Kaur v Sikh Gurdwara Perth (Inc) [2017] WASC 270, [23]-[26]; Middeldorp v Avondale Jockey Club Incorporated [2019] NZHC 901, [157]-[158].
It is important to state what the Committee cannot do in considering membership applications. It cannot make enquiries of applicants, or impose requirements, that have no rational connection to a decision whether they satisfy the eligibility criteria. It cannot make the process of becoming a member harder for those who are seen as opponents in the conduct of the Church. Nor can it impose additional hurdles on some groups of applicants, or reject persons it does not like, or who were unsuccessful candidates for office in the Association, or who were supporters of such candidates, or who have been involved in this unfortunate litigation. Applicants for membership should not be rejected because they have different views about Church procedures and operations provided that they are willing to accept the Committee’s decisions unless overturned by a special general meeting of the Association.[55] The consideration of membership applications is not an occasion to rake over the embers of past disputes. Black J’s statement about a company are equally applicable to this Association:[56]
In any event, the Plaintiffs also rely on statutory principles of oppression which are plainly applicable to the conduct of the Club’s affairs. The exclusion of applicants for membership because they might pursue policies with which the directors do not agree, or where the power is exercised for the purpose of stifling debate or to stifle views which differ from that of the directors would not be a proper exercise of the directors’ power to admit members, and may be contrary to the interests of members as a whole and constitute oppression.
[55]Section 8 and Model Rule 32.
[56]Lukaszewicz v Polish Club Limited [2019] NSWSC 446, [149].
An association, not least one that conducts a Christian church, should not be the preserve of any one faction. The Committee must seek to uphold religion and Christianity and Christian principles of the Bible as observed and practised by the Church. The Committee should admit persons who share those objects, even though they may seek to achieve them in a different way than the Committee members might. Over the last 2,000 years, Christian churches have frequently had to, and been able to, accommodate groups who disagree about matters of administration, membership or implementation of doctrine, but who wish to worship the same God in the same congregation.
Matters that applicants for membership must accept
Applicants for membership must accept that the Association’s affairs are administered by the elected Management Committee. Members must be prepared to accept its decisions. If they do not, they can challenge those decisions in a General Meeting. In turn, the Committee must act reasonably and bona fide. If it does not, members may challenge its decision under ss 67 and 68 of the Act.
The Association pointed out that persons whose membership applications were rejected could still worship in one of the churches and take part in church activities. But as I noted in the principal judgment, the witnesses in this proceeding in using the term ‘Church’ were mostly intending to refer to the religious group to which they considered they belonged, whatever its formal title.[57] They are unlikely to be content if told that they could not be a member of the Association that replaced the Church Fellowship, but could worship at church. Rather, as the first eligibility criterion reflects, they would regard their baptism as conferring on them membership of the Church, whether it is called an Association or a Fellowship.
[57]Moala v Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga in Australia (Victoria) Inc [2019] VSC 205, [17].
Summary and conclusions
In summary, the Committee was not bound by an applicant’s pledge given by signing the application form, but had to make their own decision on whether he or she met the eligibility criteria and whether his or her admission as a member was consistent with the Association’s object. The Committee’s overriding obligation in making a decision on a membership application is to act reasonably and bona fide, without recrimination or rancour. Although, the Committee is not required to give reasons for its decision rejecting a membership application, an applicant seeking to challenge the rejection of their application under ss 67 and 68 of the Act may attempt to rely on surrounding circumstances to establish that the decision was not made validly. In that event, members can challenge the Committee’s decisions. However, the plaintiffs did not argue that applicants for membership had the right to natural justice and such an argument would be contrary to authority.[58]
[58]Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 58-59; Millar v Houghton Table Tennis & Sports Club Inc (2003) 225 LSJS 241; [2003] SASC 1, [187].
So far as the 116 rejected applicants who sought membership are concerned, I have insufficient information to decide whether the Committee acted validly in requiring most of them to attend a meeting and rejecting their applications when they did not do so. I cannot rule that each demand that an applicant attend a meeting with the Committee was invalid, it would depend on why the meetings were required. Some of the demands may have been invalid, but others may have been valid. But, a uniform demand of that nature may well be invalid as suggesting that the Committee has not given the applications, and the demand that applicants attend a meeting, the individual consideration that is required.
I am not persuaded that the plaintiffs have established that the Committee’s demand that Ms Moala and Mr Haunga attend meetings with the Committee, or its rejection of their membership applications, were invalid. Speaking in the abstract and without making any finding that such events have occurred, if the Committee was satisfied on a credible foundation that an applicant had stolen Church property, or had frequently bullied members, it could take those matters into account in deciding whether to accept them as members, provided that the Committee was acting bona fide. Similarly, if an applicant did not accept the minister as the appropriate person to preside at church services, that fact might be relevant in deciding whether to accept them as members. The minister’s role is described in the Rules, as being ‘the head representative and the chairperson of every meeting’.[59] The Committee is entitled to seek to matters of this character in a meeting with any such applicant. However, any such matters would need to be based on credible evidence and not hearsay or gossip.
[59]Part 11, Section 2.
The fifth, fourteenth and twenty-sixth plaintiffs sought declarations under ss 67(2) and 68(1) of the Act that the powers of the Managing Committee to reject applications for membership were limited to a consideration of the Association’s Rules, namely, whether the applicant in each case met the criteria for membership under s 3. During the hearing different forms of orders were discussed. I am not prepared to make the declarations sought because they would not resolve the issues argued before me, particularly the issue of when the Committee could require applicants to attend a meeting, or whether particular applicants satisfy the membership eligibility requirements. Any declaration made would have to include, at least, an acknowledgement that the Committee can require applicants to attend a meeting, if it bona fide considers it necessary in order to decide whether they meet the eligibility criteria, or whether their admission to membership would be in accordance with the Association’s object. But even with the inclusion of such an acknowledgement, I do not consider that a declaration should be made, as it would not assist in the resolution of individual membership applications for which the individual circumstances of applicants would need to be established and considered.
The plaintiffs also sought a direction requiring the Committee to give applicants for membership notice of grounds that may cause it to believe that an applicant does not satisfy the Rules. It is not appropriate to make such a direction, for it would clash with Model Rule 10(4), which states that reasons need not be given for rejecting an application. While, as the plaintiffs submitted, Model Rule 10(4) does not prevent the Committee giving reasons for rejecting a membership application, it removes any obligation to do so. As mentioned, the plaintiffs did not contend that applicants for membership were entitled to natural justice or a hearing. Rather, the plaintiffs contended that the Committee lacked power to oblige them to attend an interview.
While I am not prepared to make a declaration, I have endeavoured in this judgment to state how the Committee must approach its decisions on membership applications.
Concluding statement
Compromise, good will and a big hearted approach to resolving disputes that may arise are required to enable the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga to continue and flourish in Victoria. At the end of any long dispute there needs to be a period in which the parties can attempt to reconcile, in this case at least, to the extent necessary to enable the Church to operate for the good of all existing and new members and applicants for membership.
Conclusion
I dismiss the fifth, fourteenth and twenty-sixth plaintiffs’ applications for orders under ss 67 and 68 of the Act. The parties may make submissions about any further orders they seek as a result of this judgment.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
| CHRISTINE MOALA | First Plaintiff |
|
|
|
| TUIA VEA | Third Plaintiff |
| TOAKASE KALU | Fourth Plaintiff |
| ANA’UTA GRIMA | Fifth Plaintiff |
| LATUSILATOLU TAUNISILA | Sixth Plaintiff |
| PITA OFAMO'ONI | Seventh Plaintiff |
| VIKA TAUTALANOA | Eighth Plaintiff |
| SITIVENI FA | Ninth Plaintiff |
| APIKALE FA | Tenth Plaintiff |
| MELE LOISI LATU | Eleventh Plaintiff |
| VAI PAUA | Twelfth Plaintiff |
| SEMISI PAUA | Thirteenth Plaintiff |
| TEVITA KAFOIKA | Fourteenth Plaintiff |
| ANA FINAU | Fifteenth Plaintiff |
| FISI’IAHI TU’ULAKITAU | Sixteenth Plaintiff |
| SITANI FALEPAINI | Seventeenth Plaintiff |
| EMELI FALEPAINI | Eighteenth Plaintiff |
| FALEPUNA KAFOIKA | Nineteenth Plaintiff |
| MELE LINO | Twentieth Plaintiff |
| MOHELATA WALLS | Twenty-first Plaintiff |
| SENETI TAUFA | Twenty-second Plaintiff |
| POUSIMA TAUFA | Twenty-third Plaintiff |
| MAKA TU’ULAKITAU | Twenty-fourth Plaintiff |
| FOHE TAUTALANOA | Twenty-fifth Plaintiff |
| SIONE MILITONI HALAHALA | Twenty-sixth Plaintiff |
| MARYANNE FORD | Twenty-seventh Plaintiff |
| TUIPULOTU OFAHENGAUE | Twenty-eighth Plaintiff |
| VILI OFAHENGAUE | Twenty-ninth Plaintiff |
| KOLINI TAUFA | Thirtieth Plaintiff |
| AND | |
| FREE WESLEYAN CHURCH OF TONGA IN AUSTRALIA (VICTORIA) INC | Defendant |
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