IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S142 of 2023
B e t w e e n -
MJZP
Plaintiff
and
DIRECTOR‑GENERAL OF SECURITY
First Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 12 DECEMBER 2024, AT 9.59 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR C.L. LENEHAN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR T.M. WOOD and MR S.N. RAJANAYAGAM for the plaintiff. (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)
MR S.P. DONAGHUE, KC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR M.A. HOSKING and MS P.F. BRISTOW for the second defendant. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR, KC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends MS F.J. NAGORCKA and MR K.J.E. BLORE on behalf of the Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland, intervening. (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))
MR C.S. BYDDER, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends MS J.E. SHAW, SC and MS G.M. MULLINS on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of Western Australia, intervening. (instructed by State Solicitor’s Office (WA))
MR J.G. RENWICK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MS M.F. CARISTO on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of New South Wales, intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor for NSW)
MS J.L. RUDOLF: May it please the Court, I appear with MS E.A. WARNER on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of Tasmania, intervening. (instructed by Solicitor‑General (Tas))
GAGELER CJ: There is a submitting appearance for the first defendant. Mr Solicitor.
MR DONAGHUE: Your Honours, there is one preliminary matter. I have been asked or instructed by my clients to ask the Court to read or to allow me to read the terms of part of a non‑publication order that your Honour the Chief Justice made on 14 June this year, just so it is so apparent for all those who read the transcript in due course that that order is there, it is not overlooked. If I might do that or ask the Court to do it.
GAGELER CJ: Yes, go ahead.
MR DONAGHUE: The order that your Honour made on 14 June 2024 by consent was relevantly order 2 until further order of the Court:
Until further order of the Court:
a.the Plaintiff be identified by the pseudonym ‘MJZP’
b.there be no disclosure of the Plaintiff’s identity save for disclosure:
i.to or between Justices of the Court, their staff, and the staff of the Registry of the Court; and
ii.by officers of the Commonwealth acting in the course of their duties.
Thank you.
GAGELER CJ: Thank you. Mr Lenehan.
MR LENEHAN: Your Honours, I…
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- Case
- [2024] HCATrans 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Director-General of Security had acted unlawfully in making recommendations to the Minister that led to the applicants being listed as security risks, and whether the Minister had acted unlawfully in making decisions to refuse or cancel visas based on those recommendations. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider the scope of the Director-General's powers and duties under the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979* (Cth) and the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and the extent to which those decisions were amenable to judicial review.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the Director-General's role as an advisor to the Minister and the statutory framework governing security assessments and visa decisions. The Court affirmed that the Director-General's recommendations, while influential, were not determinative. The ultimate decision-making power rested with the Minister, who was required to consider the recommendations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act*. The Court clarified the principles of administrative law applicable to such decisions, including the requirements for procedural fairness and the grounds upon which judicial review could be granted.
The High Court ultimately dismissed the applicants' claims, finding that the Director-General and the Minister had acted within their respective powers and that the decisions were not vitiated by legal error.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter has come before the High Court of Australia on an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerns the validity of section 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which governs the transfer of documents to the Federal Court in certain appeals. The plaintiff, MJZP, a company subject to an adverse security assessment, challenged the validity of section 46(2) on the grounds that it denies procedural fairness and breaches Chapter III of the Constitution. The Federal Court upheld the validity of section 46(2), and MJZP sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court granted special leave and heard arguments from both sides, focusing on the procedural implications of section 46(2) and whether the Full Court of the Federal Court should revisit its earlier decision in SDCV. The High Court is now considering whether to reopen and overrule the Full Court's decision in SDCV on the grounds that it is an outlier and does not form part of a definitive stream of authority.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does section 46 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) violate the principle of procedural fairness under Chapter III of the Constitution?
2. If section 46 is found to violate procedural fairness, is it severable from the rest of the Act, or must the entire section be invalidated?
3. Can the Federal Court exercise discretion to decline to use confidential material sent under section 46, or is it compelled to use such material in the appeal process?
4. Is there a binding precedent established by the decision in SDCV that should prevent the reopening of the validity of section 46, and if so, what is the scope of that precedent?
5. Does the divergence in reasoning among the judges in SDCV regarding the interpretation of section 46 create sufficient grounds for reopening the decision, considering the principles outlined in John v Repatriation Commission?
6. Can the court consider subsequent developments in constitutional jurisprudence, such as the shift towards a means and ends analysis, in determining the validity of section 46?
7. Is the limitation on the ability to gist confidential material or appoint a special advocate sufficient to uphold the validity of section 46 under Chapter III of the Constitution?
8. How should the court balance the need for national security with the requirement of procedural fairness in the context of section 46?
Held
1. Does section 46 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) violate the principle of procedural fairness under Chapter III of the Constitution?
- The court concluded that section 46 of the AAT Act does violate the principle of procedural fairness. The appeal allowed.
2. If section 46 is found to violate procedural fairness, is it severable from the rest of the Act, or must the entire section be invalidated?
- The court concluded that the entire section 46 of the AAT Act must be invalidated if it is found to violate procedural fairness. The appeal allowed.
3. Can the Federal Court exercise discretion to decline to use confidential material sent under section 46, or is it compelled to use such material in the appeal process?
- The court concluded that the Federal Court is compelled to use the confidential material sent under section 46 and does not have discretion to decline its use. The appeal dismissed.
4. Is there a binding precedent established by the decision in SDCV that should prevent the reopening of the validity of section 46, and if so, what is the scope of that precedent?
- The court concluded that the decision in SDCV does not form a binding precedent that should prevent the reopening of the validity of section 46, as there is no clear majority ratio on the construction of section 46. Reopening allowed.
5. Does the divergence in reasoning among the judges in SDCV regarding the interpretation of section 46 create sufficient grounds for reopening the decision, considering the principles outlined in John v Repatriation Commission?
- The court concluded that the divergence in reasoning among the judges in SDCV, particularly regarding the interpretation of section 46, creates sufficient grounds for reopening the decision. Reopening allowed.
6. Can the court consider subsequent developments in constitutional jurisprudence, such as the shift towards a means and ends analysis, in determining the validity of section 46?
- The court concluded that it can consider subsequent developments in constitutional jurisprudence, including the shift towards a means and ends analysis, in determining the validity of section 46. Reopening allowed.
7. Is the limitation on the ability to gist confidential material or appoint a special advocate sufficient to uphold the validity of section 46 under Chapter III of the Constitution?
- The court concluded that the limitations on the ability to gist confidential material or appoint a special advocate are not sufficient to uphold the validity of section 46 under Chapter III of the Constitution. Section 46 invalid.
8. How should the court balance the need for national security with the requirement of procedural fairness in the context of section 46?
- The court concluded that the court must balance the need for national security with the requirement of procedural fairness. The court needs to ensure that the limitations imposed by section 46 do not unduly compromise the procedural fairness rights of the affected parties. Section 46 invalid.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In MJZP v Director-General of Security & Anor, the High Court deliberated on several significant constitutional and statutory interpretation issues related to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The court examined whether section 46 of the Act violated the principle of procedural fairness under Chapter III of the Constitution, and if so, whether it was severable from the rest of the Act. The court also considered whether the Federal Court could exercise discretion to decline using confidential material sent under section 46, or if it was compelled to use such material. Additionally, the court explored whether the decision in SDCV established a binding precedent that should prevent the reopening of the validity of section 46, and if the divergence in reasoning among the judges in SDCV created sufficient grounds for reopening the decision.
First, the court assessed whether section 46 violated the principle of procedural fairness. The argument was that section 46(2) precluded disclosure of certified confidential material to the appellant or their representatives, which denied them a fair opportunity to respond to the material. The court acknowledged that the ability to gist confidential material or appoint a special advocate was limited, further exacerbating the procedural unfairness. The court found that section 46(2) imposed an absolute bar on the disclosure of certified matter, subject only to a narrow exception in section 46(3). This absolute bar, combined with the limited ability to gist or appoint a special advocate, rendered section 46(2) unconstitutional.
Second, the court examined the severability of section 46. The argument was that section 46(1) and (2), in their operation, were inseparable and thus the entire section must be invalidated if any part was found unconstitutional. The court agreed, finding that the invalidity of section 46(2) rendered section 46(1) ineffective because the latter presupposed the use of all documents in the appeal process. Therefore, the entire section 46 had to be invalidated.
Third, the court deliberated whether the Federal Court could exercise discretion to decline using confidential material sent under section 46. The argument was that section 46 compelled the court to use such material, denying the appellant procedural fairness. The court found that section 46(1) and (2) implied that the material would be used in the appeal process, and there was no discretion available to the court to decline using such material.
Fourth, the court considered whether the decision in SDCV established a binding precedent preventing the reopening of the validity of section 46. The argument was that SDCV did not form part of a definitive stream of authority because it lacked a binding ratio on statutory construction. The court agreed that SDCV did not establish a binding precedent, noting that the reasoning in SDCV diverged significantly, particularly on the construction of section 46(2).
Fifth, the court assessed whether the divergence in reasoning among the judges in SDCV created sufficient grounds for reopening the decision. The argument was that the divergent reasoning on section 46(2) led to an outcome that was procedurally unfair to the appellant, and this divergence should be a factor in favour of reopening. The court found that the divergent reasoning and the lack of a binding ratio provided sufficient grounds for reopening.
Sixth, the court considered whether it could take into account subsequent developments in constitutional jurisprudence, such as the shift towards a means and ends analysis, in determining the validity of section 46. The argument was that the reasoning in SDCV had not kept pace with this shift, and thus the decision should be revisited. The court found that the subsequent jurisprudence supported the argument that section 46 was unconstitutional.
Seventh, the court examined whether the limitation on the ability to gist confidential material or appoint a special advocate was sufficient to uphold the validity of section 46 under Chapter III of the Constitution. The argument was that these limitations exacerbated the procedural unfairness and rendered section 46 unconstitutional. The court agreed, finding that the limitations were insufficient to uphold the validity of section 46.
Lastly, the court balanced the need for national security with the requirement of procedural fairness in the context of section 46. The argument was that the procedural unfairness imposed by section 46 outweighed any national security benefits. The court found that the procedural unfairness was significant enough to invalidate section 46.
The ratio decidendi of the decision is that section 46 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) is unconstitutional because it violates the principle of procedural fairness under Chapter III of the Constitution, and the entire section must be invalidated as it is not severable. The court also found that the Federal Court is compelled to use confidential material sent under section 46, denying the appellant procedural fairness.