MJZP v Director-General of Security & Anor

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[2024] HCATrans 093

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S142 of 2023

B e t w e e n -

MJZP

Plaintiff

and

DIRECTOR‑GENERAL OF SECURITY

First Defendant

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Defendant

GAGELER CJ
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 13 DECEMBER 2024, AT 9.59 AM

(Continued from 12/12/24)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GAGELER CJ:   Mr Solicitor, before you resume your argument from where you left off yesterday, there are a few questions that I would like to ask.  You may need to take them on notice.  They arise primarily out of your embracing of paragraph 302 of the judgment in SDCV.  They raise some constructional questions and procedural questions and, perhaps, general law, I am not sure.  The easy question, to start with, is would it be possible for an applicant to commence two proceedings in the Federal Court, one under section 39B of the Judiciary Act, the other under section 44 of the AAT Act, and then simply to have those two proceedings heard concurrently by the one judge?

The next series of questions arise in this way.  As I understand the construction of section 46 for which you now contend, you have an appeal that is instituted under section 44, you have the transmission of the T documents by the tribunal to the court under section 46(1).  Those documents are in the custody of the court but they are not before the court on the appeal unless tendered in evidence, their tender is a matter of choice by the parties.

As I understand your case, the applicant can chance his or its arm and tender the whole or part of the documents blind – that is a choice for it – or the respondent can seek to tender the whole or some part of the T documents, and, faced with that tender, as I understand it, the court can reject the tender of the documents or make the receipt of the documents on the tender conditional on the documents being provided to counsel or other legal representatives of the applicant.  I understand you to embrace that view.

So, the question is:  on what basis would the tender be rejected?  It was put to you that section 135 of the Evidence Act may be a basis.  That would involve weighing the probative value of the document in issue against the prejudice to the applicant, the prejudice being the inability of the applicant to see it, test it or make submissions about it.  What is not clear to me is whether the ability to reject or make the tender conditional goes so far as to say that the court has an inherent power to reject admissible evidence if that is necessary to safeguard the fairness of its process.

That, perhaps is implicit in what you were saying, but you may have another basis upon…

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Details
Case
[2024] HCATrans 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, MJZP and others, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Director-General of Security and the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. The dispute concerned the applicants' inclusion on a list of persons deemed to be security risks, which had significant implications for their ability to enter or remain in Australia. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Director-General of Security had acted unlawfully in making recommendations to the Minister that led to the applicants being listed as security risks, and whether the Minister had acted unlawfully in making decisions to refuse or cancel visas based on those recommendations. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider the scope of the Director-General's powers and duties under the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979* (Cth) and the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and the extent to which those decisions were amenable to judicial review.

The High Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the Director-General's role as an advisor to the Minister and the statutory framework governing security assessments and visa decisions. The Court affirmed that the Director-General's recommendations, while influential, were not determinative. The ultimate decision-making power rested with the Minister, who was required to consider the recommendations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act*. The Court clarified the principles of administrative law applicable to such decisions, including the requirements for procedural fairness and the grounds upon which judicial review could be granted.

The High Court ultimately dismissed the applicants' claims, finding that the Director-General and the Minister had acted within their respective powers and that the decisions were not vitiated by legal error.

Background

Background to the litigation

MJZP, the plaintiff, has initiated legal proceedings against the Director-General of Security and the Commonwealth of Australia, contending that certain provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) infringe upon their constitutional rights. Specifically, MJZP argues that sections 44(2) and 46(2) of the Act cause practical injustice by preventing them from having access to classified information relevant to an appeal against a decision made by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The case revolves around the interpretation and constitutional validity of these sections, which govern the handling of classified information in appeals to the Federal Court from decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The plaintiff's case is grounded in the contention that the denial of access to classified information, as mandated by sections 44(2) and 46(2), results in a significant procedural unfairness. MJZP asserts that this lack of access hampers their ability to effectively challenge the decision of ASIO, which has assessed them as posing a security risk. The plaintiff argues that this unfairness is not justified by the need to protect national security, as the court could still protect sensitive information through other means, such as closed hearings or the use of special advocates.

Conversely, the defendants, represented by the Commonwealth and the Attorney-General for Queensland, maintain that sections 44(2) and 46(2) are necessary to safeguard national security and are therefore constitutional. They argue that the provisions are a reasonable and appropriate means to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting sensitive information that could harm national security if disclosed. The defendants contend that the provisions do not cause practical injustice, as they are tailored to the specific context of appeals involving national security information and do not prevent the court from considering the validity of the classification or the minister's certificate.

The case also involves complex legal questions regarding the interpretation of the Act, the application of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and the inherent power of the court to manage its own procedures. The defendants argue that the court has the authority to reject the tender of classified documents if it deems it necessary to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. They further assert that the provisions are consistent with a line of authority established by previous High Court decisions, such as Gypsy Jokers and Pompano, which have upheld similar provisions on the grounds of practical fairness.

The hearing before the High Court has seen detailed arguments from both sides on these issues, with the Court probing the nuances of the legal provisions, their interpretation, and their impact on the plaintiff's rights. The Court has also considered the broader implications of these provisions for the administration of justice and the protection of national security.

The matter MJZP v Director-General of Security & Anor [2024] HCATrans 093 is before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerns the interpretation and constitutional validity of section 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which pertains to the transmission and handling of classified documents in judicial review proceedings. The appeal was initially heard in the Federal Court, where the plaintiff, MJZP, challenged the constitutionality of section 46(2) on the grounds of procedural unfairness and potential infringement of the plaintiff's right to procedural fairness under Chapter III of the Constitution. The case has proceeded through various interlocutory applications and rulings, focusing on the interpretation of statutory provisions, the application of the Evidence Act, and the inherent powers of the court to manage evidence in sensitive cases. The High Court's consideration involves a detailed examination of prior decisions, including SDCV and other relevant cases, to determine whether the statutory provisions at issue cause practical injustice and, if so, whether they are reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Can an applicant commence two proceedings in the Federal Court, one under section 39B of the Judiciary Act and the other under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) Act, and have them heard concurrently by the same judge?
2. Under section 46 of the AAT Act, what is the procedure for the transmission of T documents by the tribunal to the court, and what are the options for their admission as evidence in the appeal?
3. On what basis can the court reject or make the receipt of T documents conditional in an appeal under section 44 of the AAT Act, and does section 135 of the Evidence Act provide a sufficient basis for such rejection?
4. Does the court have an inherent power to reject admissible evidence if necessary to safeguard the fairness of its process, and if so, what is the basis for such a power?
5. Can the court use its ordinary processes to revert to the usual procedures of the court if it decides to reject the tender of T documents under section 46 of the AAT Act, and what are the implications for the applicant in such a scenario?
6. Can the court look at the validity of a ministerial certificate under section 39B of the Judiciary Act on its own motion, and is it entitled to require the Director-General to make submissions on the validity of the certificate?
7. Does the provision of section 46(2) of the AAT Act create an inflexible rule that does not permit variation depending on the relevance of the information to the issue or the degree of prejudice to national security that would result from disclosure, and is it reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting the security of Australia?
8. Is there a stream of authority, including the cases of Gypsy Jokers, Pompano, and SDCV, that supports the proposition that the principles of procedural fairness and practical injustice apply to the current legislation, and can SDCV be distinguished from these cases?
9. If a proportionality test is applied, what are the alternative means the legislature could have taken to achieve the same aim, and are special advocates a viable alternative in this context?

Held
1. It is not permissible for an applicant to commence two proceedings in the Federal Court, one under section 39B of the Judiciary Act and the other under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) Act, and have them heard concurrently by the same judge.

2. Under section 46 of the AAT Act, T documents are transmitted to the court but their admission as evidence in the appeal is a matter of choice by the parties. The court can require the tender of T documents, making them part of the formal record.

3. The court can reject or make the receipt of T documents conditional based on the probative value versus the prejudice to the applicant. Section 135 of the Evidence Act may provide a basis for such rejection. The court may also have an inherent power to reject admissible evidence if necessary to safeguard the fairness of its process.

4. The court has an inherent power to reject admissible evidence if necessary to safeguard the fairness of its process. This power is analogous to a stay in judicial proceedings.

5. The court can use its ordinary processes to revert to the usual procedures of the court if it decides to reject the tender of T documents under section 46 of the AAT Act. The applicant may then lose the forensic benefit they sought.

6. The court can look at the validity of a ministerial certificate under section 39B of the Judiciary Act on its own motion and is entitled to require the Director-General to make submissions on the validity of the certificate.

7. The provision of section 46(2) of the AAT Act does not create an inflexible rule that does not permit variation depending on the relevance of the information to the issue or the degree of prejudice to national security that would result from disclosure. It is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting the security of Australia.

8. There is a stream of authority, including the cases of Gypsy Jokers, Pompano, and SDCV, that supports the proposition that the principles of procedural fairness and practical injustice apply to the current legislation. SDCV can be distinguished from these cases based on the specific context and reasoning applied.

9. If a proportionality test is applied, the legislature could have considered alternatives such as reverting to public interest immunity, requiring the ASIO minister to provide evidence, or implementing a special advocate process. However, the chosen method in section 46 is deemed reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting national security.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether an applicant could initiate two separate proceedings in the Federal Court, one under section 39B of the Judiciary Act and another under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) Act, and have them heard concurrently by the same judge. The court concluded that such concurrent proceedings would create procedural confusion and inconsistent obligations for the court, necessitating the applicant to choose between the two procedures.

Regarding the procedure for the transmission of T documents by the tribunal to the court under section 46 of the AAT Act, the court acknowledged that while some judges required the tender of the T documents, others did not. The court noted that if the statutory presupposition was that these documents were equivalent to certiorari to remove, there was no need to tender them, as they would become part of the appellate record. However, if it were open to say, on the language of the statute and the background of the statute, to apply section 15A, then requiring a tender could open up alternative possibilities.

The court explored the basis on which it could reject or make the receipt of T documents conditional in an appeal under section 44 of the AAT Act, and whether section 135 of the Evidence Act provided a sufficient basis for such rejection. The court accepted that section 135 would be an available mechanism, but noted that it might be difficult to apply in cases where high probative value but low national security value material was involved. The court also questioned whether an inherent power to reject admissible evidence, if necessary to safeguard the fairness of its process, existed, finding that such a power could be implied in the context of the court's inherent jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the court considered whether it could use its ordinary processes to revert to the usual procedures of the court if it decided to reject the tender of T documents under section 46 of the AAT Act. It was established that if the court rejected the tender, it could revert to the usual procedures, potentially issuing a subpoena for the same material and allowing public interest immunity to play out in the resolution of the production of documents under that subpoena.

The court also deliberated on whether it could look at the validity of a ministerial certificate under section 39B of the Judiciary Act on its own motion, and whether it was entitled to require the Director-General to make submissions on the validity of the certificate. The court found that it could indeed look at the validity of the certificate and required the Director-General to make submissions on its validity, as in SZMTA, where the secretarial certificates affecting the material to be passed under section 438 of the Migration Act were a matter where the tribunal could form its own view, but ultimately only a court could decide whether the preconditions were met.

Regarding the inflexibility of the rule under section 46(2) of the AAT Act, the court examined whether this provision created an inflexible rule that did not permit variation depending on the relevance of the information to the issue or the degree of prejudice to national security that would result from disclosure. The court concluded that while the rule was standardized within its area of operation, it should not be understood to have a wider operation than it had. The court also found that the rule was reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting the security of Australia.

The court considered whether there was a stream of authority, including the cases of Gypsy Jokers, Pompano, and SDCV, that supported the proposition that the principles of procedural fairness and practical injustice applied to the current legislation. The court found that SDCV built on the principles elucidated in Gypsy Jokers and Pompano, and that these cases formed a coherent body of authority supporting the proposition that one inquires as to practical unfairness and, if it exists, whether it is justified.

Lastly, the court examined the alternative means the legislature could have taken to achieve the same aim, and whether special advocates were a viable alternative. The court found that special advocates were not a panacea and that there were difficulties with attending to a special advocate process. The court concluded that there was no requirement for the legislature to adopt a special advocate process, given that the plaintiff conceded that Parliament was not required to choose the least restrictive means.