IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M17 of 2023
B e t w e e n -
MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 007 870 395)
First Appellant
NORTHPARK BERWICK INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 075 238 121)
Second Appellant
and
ZELKO BEGOVIC
Respondent
GAGELER J
GORDON J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
JAGOT JTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 2 AUGUST 2023, AT 10.03 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.M. GIBSON, for the appellants. (instructed by Thomson Geer Lawyers)
MR C.A. MOORE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.T. GOTTSCHALL, for the respondent. (instructed by Shine Lawyers)
GAGELER J: Thank you, Mr Moore. Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: May it please the Court. Your Honours, this case raises the application of the consumer protection standard, proscribing misleading and deceptive conduct in trade and commerce, relevantly, section 18 of the ACL. As it ought be deployed, or should be understood to have a limited application concerning conduct which is in compliance with, indeed mandated by, another law, in this case, under the Motor Vehicle Standards Act 1989.
As your Honours can see from proposition 1, we place to the forefront that in the proper understanding of the relation between the general proscribing of the unfair trade practice of misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce, the significance of a specific requirement in relation to the particular arm of trade in question, which in this case happens to compel certain conduct for anybody who wishes to engage in trade.
At the heart of it, therefore, is the same kind of approach which, of course, on its own facts and with somewhat different statutory regimes, lay behind the reasoning of Sir Anthony Mason in the GMAC Case and in particular his Honour’s reference to the unexpressed assumption concerning the application of the general unfair practice proscription with respect to a specific compelled form of conduct at 137 CLR 561.
Now, the fuel consumption label, to move to our proposition 2, is one which can be seen to be the outcome of what I regret to tell your Honours is a rather complex interlocking set of provisions by which the label, with which your Honours might be familiar from ordinary life, comes to be affixed to the windscreen of vehicles. Could I ask your Honours please, in the bundle of authorities, to turn to page 115.
GORDON J: Could you just say what that is, Mr Walker? Because we have hard copy legislation, it might be that we will be using that, if you would not mind.
MR WALKER: Yes, understandably, it is the Motor Vehicles Standards Act 1989.
GORDON J: Thank you.
MR WALKER: In its section 5, the definition section, could I draw to attention the definition of a “national standard”,…
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- Case
- [2023] HCATrans 97
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the High Court was whether the respondent, Mr. Begovic, had established that the appellants had taken adverse action against him for a prohibited reason, specifically for exercising a workplace right. This required the Court to consider the evidentiary burden and the proper application of the statutory presumptions contained within the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) when an employer's motive is in question.
The High Court analysed the evidence presented, focusing on the timing of the adverse action relative to the respondent's exercise of his workplace rights. The Court reiterated the principles governing the determination of an employer's state of mind, noting that the onus shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the adverse action was not taken for a prohibited reason once the employee establishes a prima facie case. The Court considered whether the employer had discharged this onus by providing a valid, non-prohibited reason for its conduct.
The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the primary judge had erred in their assessment of the evidence and the application of the statutory provisions. The Court concluded that the respondent had not discharged the onus of proof required to establish that the adverse action was taken for a prohibited reason. Consequently, the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside, and judgment was entered for the appellants.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi