Mitchell and Nevis
[2014] FCCA 376
•3 March 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MITCHELL & NEVIS | [2014] FCCA 376 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Undefended de facto property proceedings – matters to be considered in respect of proceeding in absence of one party – relationship of approximately thirteen years in duration – relationship produced no children – small asset pool – assessment of contributions – weight to be given to disparity of capital at commencement of relationship – matters to be considered in respect of potential weighting for Kennon factors – considerations of justice and equity. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, ss.4(1); 90RD(1); 90SF; 90SM Federal Circuit Court Rules, rr.13.03(B)(2)(d); 13.1A |
| Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1 Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032 Pierce & Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 Ferraro & Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1 Kane & Kane [2013] FamCAFC 205 Steinbrenner & Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193 |
| Applicant: | MS MITCHELL |
| Respondent: | MR NEVIS |
| File Number: | ADC 2502 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Brown |
| Hearing date: | 21 February 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 February 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 3 March 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Kyrimis |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Kyrimis Lawyers Pty Ltd |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | No appearance |
ORDERS
In full and final settlement of all claims for the settlement of de facto property between the parties:-
It is ordered as follows:
It is declared pursuant to section 90SL of the Family Law Act 1975 that a de facto relationship existed between the parties and as a consequence the court has authority to make orders altering the property interests of the parties.
Within sixty days of the date of these orders the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00).
Contemporaneously with the payment referred to in order 2 hereof, the parties do all things necessary to discharge their joint liability to (omitted) Bank in respect of home loan accounts number (omitted) and number (omitted) being loans secured by way of mortgage registered in respect of the properties known as and situate at Property S (the Property S property) currently registered in the applicant’s sole name and Property M (the Property M property) currently registered in the respondent’s sole name respectively and keep the other indemnified in respect of any claims arising under each such mortgage.
The applicant be declared the sole owner of the Property S property to the exclusion of any claim by the respondent.
Subject to order 6 hereunder the respondent be declared the sole owner of the Property M property to the exclusion of any claim by the applicant.
In the event that the respondent fails to comply with order 2 hereof, the Property M property is to be placed on the market for sale by private treaty at a price to be agreed between the parties and failing agreement to be $189,000.00 with the selling agent to be agreed between the parties and failing agreement to be an agent nominated by the Secretary of the Real Institute of South Australia or his/her nominee.
Upon settlement of the sale of the property, the proceeds be divided as follows:
(a)To pay all necessary selling costs and agents fees;
(b)To discharge the mortgage secured against the property in favour of the (omitted) Bank;
(c)As to the remainder the sum of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) to the applicant or such lesser sum which remains to the applicant and any remainder to the respondent.
Including but without limiting the effect hereof, the applicant shall retain for her sole use and benefit absolutely free from any other claim or demand of the respondent:
(a)The Ford (model omitted) motor vehicle currently in her possession;
(b)Her personal affects and other furniture and furnishings in her possession power and control;
(c)Any other property and or financial resources in the applicant’s name and/or possession (including superannuation and bank accounts) standing in her name not otherwise specified herein.
Including but without limiting the effect hereof and subject to the provisions of order 10 hereunder, the respondent shall retain for his sole use and benefit absolutely free from any other claim or demand of the applicant:
(a)The Ford (model omitted) and Ford (model omitted) motor vehicles; the Honda (model omitted); Kawasaki; and Honda motorcycles currently in his possession together with any trailers and equipment relating to their use;
(b)The furniture and furnishings currently in his possession, power and control;
(c)Any superannuation standing in his name subject to the provisions of order 12 hereunder.
In the event that the applicant fails to comply with order 2 hereof and or the proceeds of sale of the Property M property are insufficient to satisfy such order in the event that orders 6 and 7 hereof are engaged, the applicant is authorised by this order to apply to the court for an enforcement warrant to direct and effect the sale of all or any of the motor vehicles referred to in order 9(a) hereof without further reference to the respondent.
Pending the satisfaction of order 2 hereof, an injunction issues and the respondent is restrained from dealing with encumbering, charging or otherwise dealing with the Property M property and any motor vehicle currently in his ownership or possession.
A base amount of seven thousand nine hundred and sixty two dollars and ten cents ($7,962.10) be allocated as required by section 90MT(4) of the Family Law Act 1975, to the applicant Ms Mitchell out of the interest of the respondent Mr Nevis in (omitted) Super Fund (membership number (omitted)).
With respect to superannuation:
(a)Pursuant to paragraph 90MT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act, whenever a splittable payment becomes payable in respect of the interest of the respondent in the Fund, the applicant is entitled to be paid the amount calculated in accordance to Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, using the base amount allocated above and there shall be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of the person to whom the splittable payment would have been made but for this Order;
(b)Paragraph 13(a) of this Order has effect from the operative time and the operative time is the beginning of the fourth business day after the day on which an original certified copy of the final sealed Order is served on the Trustee of the Fund;
(c)Paragraph 13(a) of this Order binds the Trustee of the Fund;
(d)The Trustee of the Fund and the parties, in accordance with the obligations set out in the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to calculate the entitlement of the applicant and make payments in accordance with paragraph 13(a) of this Order;
(e)The respondent is restrained from giving the Trustee of the Fund a binding Death Nomination in favour of a reversionary beneficiary on behalf of a child or a reversionary beneficiary who is a child which would have the effect of in any way reducing the value to the applicant of the splitting Order made in paragraph 13(a) herein;
(f)The respondent shall indemnify the applicant with respect of any loss the applicant suffers as a result of the respondent failing to comply with paragraph 13(a) of this Order;
(g)After service of the payment split notice pursuant to Regulation 7A.03 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994, the applicant shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary including but not limited to exercising her request pursuant to Regulation 7A.05 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 for the creation of a new interest in her name in the fund or exercising her request pursuant to Regulation 7A.06 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 for the trustee to roll over or transfer the transferable benefits to another regulated superannuation fund or approved deposit fund or to an EPSSS or RSA specified in the request to be held for the applicant’s benefit;
(h)The value of the transferable benefits to be transferred from the respondent’s interest to the applicant’s interest will be calculated by the Trustee of the Fund in accordance with Regulation 7A.11 or 7A.12 (as the case requires) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994;
(i)Pursuant to Regulation 14F of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, any payments made from the respondent’s interest in the Fund after the Trustee of the Fund has created a new interest in the applicant’s name in the Fund or transferred or rolled over the transferable benefits to another regulated superannuation fund or approved deposit fund or to an EPSSS or RSA as contemplated by paragraph 13(h) of this Order, are not splittable payments.
In the event that either party refuses or neglects to execute any deed or instrument having been directed to do so by these orders than the Registrar of this court at Adelaide shall have the power as prescribed by section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 to execute such deed or instrument on his or her behalf and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to such deed or instrument.
The husband deliver to the wife at her expense within sixty (60) days of the date of these orders the oven, stove top and range hood purchased by her for installation in the Property M property.
A copy of the orders made this day and these reasons for judgement be personally served on the respondent.
All applications be otherwise dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Mitchell & Nevis is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADC 2502 of 2013
| MS MITCHELL |
Applicant
And
| MR NEVIS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These reasons for judgment relate to undefended de facto property proceedings. Ms Mitchell “the applicant” and Mr Nevis “the respondent” lived in a de facto relationship from mid-1999 until August of 2012. Their relationship produced no children.
Ms Mitchell commenced these proceedings on 15 July 2013. From her perspective, the relationship between the parties has been an unmitigated financial disaster leaving her in debt and with an uncertain future.
At this juncture, Ms Mitchell’s most significant asset is the home in which she currently lives located at Property S, “the Property S property”. It is registered in her sole name and was purchased by her shortly prior to the commencement of the de facto relationship between the parties.
The Property S property is currently worth $250,000.00 and is subject to a mortgage in favour of (omitted) Bank standing currently at $279,614.94. Ms Mitchell also owns a car of modest value ($8,600.00); furniture and household effects ($2,000.00); and has limited superannuation ($19,403.12).
The applicant also has significant debts, not the least of which is her anticipated liability for legal fees arising from these proceedings. These debts far outweigh the applicant’s savings. In all these circumstances, it is Ms Mitchell’s position that she is to all intents and purposes, penniless.
Ms Mitchell is fifty-five years of age. She is employed as an (omitted) by (omitted). She has no formal qualifications. She works a basic thirty hour week, at $19.79 per hour. She receives penalty rates for overtime and public holidays.
A recent payslip indicates that she received a gross salary, for the six months ending 31 December 2013, of $25,980.17.[1] On any view, Ms Mitchell is to be considered to be a lowly paid worker.
[1] See applicant’s affidavit filed 18 February 2014 at annexure M
At present, Ms Mitchell’s major recurrent expense is her mortgage repayments to (omitted) Bank which total $362.00 per week or $18,824.00 per annum. The larger component of this sum is interest. A recent mortgage statement indicates that she had paid $7,487.24 in interest for the six months ending December 2013.[2]
[2] Ibid at annexure H
In all these circumstances, Ms Mitchell fears that she is “going backwards” financially given that she has a limited working lifespan before her and little likelihood of reducing her mortgage balance prior to her inevitable retirement from the workforce.
Ms Mitchell purchased the Property S property in July 1999 for $96,000.00 using the net proceeds of sale from her previous home ($20,000.00) and borrowing the balance from the (omitted) Bank. The property has appreciated in value but at the same time, the borrowings secured against it have also increased to their currently unsustainable level given the likely value of the property.
It is Ms Mitchell’s case that during the parties’ relationship she was prevailed upon by the respondent to extend the borrowings secured against the Property S property in order to purchase assets, mostly motor vehicles, which now remain in Mr Nevis’ control or possession. Now that the relationship between the parties has come to an end, this has created a situation which is greatly inequitable to her.
The applicant’s case is that the respondent has in his possession a number of motor vehicles and motor cycles and items relating to their use which are valued at $44,850.00 which sum is largely traceable in the increase of the mortgage on the Property S home for which Ms Mitchell remains legally liable.
More significantly in May of 2011, the parties purchased a house situated at Property M “the Property M property” for $205,000.00. This property was registered in Mr Nevis’ sole name – on Ms Mitchell’s case at Mr Nevis’ insistence. At the time of the property’s purchase, the parties had no significant savings and borrowed the entire purchase price and related expenses.
The relevant lender (omitted) Bank) was not prepared to lend against the security of the Property M property alone. In these circumstances, the sum of $167,000.00 was secured against the Property M property, with the remaining sum required to complete the purchase being advanced against the security of the Property S property, taking its mortgage to $280,000.00 where it has largely remained since.
The parties separated on 17 August 2012 in difficult circumstances and have remained on poor terms since. The applicant has returned to live in the Property S property, whilst the respondent has remained living in the Property M property.
Whilst the two properties remain individually owned, the respective loans to (omitted) Bank are jointly held. Accordingly, Ms Mitchell remains legally liable for the Property M mortgage, as well as the mortgage on Property S.
Those advising Ms Mitchell have not been able to obtain access to the Property M property in order to have it professionally valued. It is said because of Mr Nevis’s obstruction. In these circumstances, Ms Mitchell has relied upon the South Australian Government valuation for the property which currently stands at $189,000.00.
In addition, those advising Ms Mitchell have directed a number of subpoenae to financial institutions utilised by Mr Nevis, including (omitted) Bank. At present, the mortgage secured against the Property M property stands at $163,696.96.
A recent statement from (omitted) Bank indicates that Mr Nevis was required to pay an amount of $1,005.97 to maintain the mortgage on the Property M property. The applicant’s understanding is that Mr Nevis is currently maintaining this mortgage whilst she continues to maintain the mortgage on the Property S property.
Ms Mitchell fears that the current situation is both untenable and fundamentally unfair to her. It is her case that her various contributions made during the parties’ relationship were significantly greater than those of the respondent. Yet, at the end of the parties’ relationship, she is in debt whilst Mr Nevis retains whatever equity is available in the parties’ two real properties and several valuable motor cars.
In addition, there is a marked discrepancy currently in the parties’ superannuation holdings. The respondent has superannuation to the value of approximately $35,000.00, whilst the applicant has superannuation of around $19,500.00 as a consequence of a work history characterised by low wages and casual employment.
Ms Mitchell now wishes to terminate her financial relationship with Mr Nevis and protect herself from what is currently a joint liability to the (omitted) Bank. She fears that Mr Nevis may not behave responsibly in respect of this debt and may leave her liable for it. In addition, she wishes to claw back some of her equity in the Property M property and the various motor vehicles currently in Mr Nevis’ control.
It is her case that considerations of justice and equity dictate at least a 70/30 per cent division of the parties’ assets being made in her favour. This outcome is based on what she would assert are her superior contributions made during the parties’ relationship and because she faces a very uncertain financial future.
In respect of superannuation, at least provisionally, Ms Mitchell proposes an equalisation of the parties’ respective holdings. This position is subject to how the parties’ non superannuation assets are ultimately divided.
How such an outcome is to be achieved is uncertain, given Mr Nevis has not cooperated with any process of rationalisation of the parties’ pressing debts and modest assets.
In these circumstances, counsel for Ms Mitchell concedes that the result of the current proceedings is likely to be problematic and may potentially consume in legal fees whatever assets can be salvaged for his client from what he would categorise as a financial catastrophe.
In a minute of the orders sought by her recently filed, Ms Mitchell proposes the following:
·Mr Nevis pay her the sum of $85,000.00;
·In order to achieve this outcome, the parties mutually refinance the current home loan accounts in respect of both the Property S and Property M properties, severing the joint loan liability;
·Ms Mitchell be declared the sole owner of the Property S property;
·If Mr Nevis is unable to raise the sum of $85,000.00, the Property M property be sold;
·There be a split in the sum of $7,962.10 in Ms Mitchell’s favour from Mr Nevis' (omitted) Superannuation;
·Mr Nevis return to Ms Mitchell the oven, stovetop and range hood which were purchased by her for installation in the Property M property.
What is Mr Nevis’ response to this proposal is unclear. His former solicitors filed a response to Ms Mitchell’s application on 29 August 2013. In this response, Mr Nevis proposed only that there be “a division of the assets of the relationship”.
The history of the proceedings to date
As previously indicated, the applicant commenced these proceedings on 15 July 2013. The application was personally served on Mr Nevis in Property M on 19 July 2013.[3] The proceedings were listed for their first return in the court’s sitting to Property M on 26 August 2013.
[3] See affidavit of service of Mr Nevis filed 22 July 2013
On this occasion the applicant was represented by her solicitor Mr Kyrimis, whilst Mr Mahony a (omitted) solicitor, appeared on Mr Nevis’ behalf. At that stage, Mr Nevis had not formally responded to Ms Mitchell’s application.
On 26 August 2013, the matter was referred to a conciliation conference which was scheduled to take place in (omitted) on 13 November 2013.
Orders were also made for the parties to exchange relevant financial documents and valuations in respect of items of property both real and personal. In the event of disagreement regarding the value of property, it was ordered that they should instruct a single and suitably qualified person to value any items of property in dispute between them.
In addition, each party was restrained and injunctions were made preventing them from dealing with both the Property M and Property S properties, particularly from increasing the level of debt secured against either such property.
The proceedings were then adjourned until 2 December 2013 in Property M following the scheduled date for conciliation. The conciliation conference did not proceed.
On the applicant’s case, this was because Mr Nevis had declined to take part in the process envisaged by the orders of 26 August 2013 and had resisted the process of obtaining valuations particularly in respect of the Property M property.
As a consequence, Mr Kyrimis wrote to the court on 6 November 2013 requesting the vacation of the conciliation conference. With his letter, he attached copies of correspondence forwarded by him to Mr Mahony regarding the matter. Ultimately, Mr Mahony wrote to Mr Kyrimis on 6 November 2013 indicating that he would no longer be acting for Mr Nevis.
On 15 November 2013, Mr Mahony’s office filed a notice of withdrawal as lawyer from the case. The notice indicated that the address last known by Mr Mahony for Mr Nevis, was a PO Box in (omitted). In all these circumstances, the conciliation conference did not go ahead.
On 27 November 2013, Mr Kyrimis on behalf of Ms Mitchell, filed an application in a case seeking the following orders:
·Ms Mitchell’s application be dealt with as an undefended matter;
·In the alternative, orders be made directing Mr Nevis to grant access to the Property M property for the purposes of a valuation and pay one half of the anticipated cost.
The application was supported by an affidavit deposed by Mr Kryimis. In this affidavit, Mr Kryimis deposed that Mr Nevis had failed to comply with the order for discovery made on 26 August 2013 and to cooperate with the process of obtaining a valuation of the Property M property.
The application was listed before the court on 2 December 2013, the same date to which the substantive proceedings had been earlier adjourned. The application in a case was served on Mr Nevis by pre-paid post to the postal address indicated on the notice of withdrawal of solicitor filed by Mr Mahony’s office.[4]
[4] See affidavit of Ms D filed 2 December 2013
Mr Nevis did not appear either in person or through a legal representative on 2 December 2013. I am satisfied that Mr Nevis had been informed of the adjourned date. He was present in court on 26 August 2013 when the case was adjourned to this date.
In addition, I am satisfied that he was informed of Ms Mitchell’s application through the mail. It is clearly the case that Mr Nevis knew of Ms Mitchell’s application to settle de facto property matters with him and he has done little to advance this application.
On 2 December 2013, at the instigation of Mr Kyrimis, I made the following orders:
Further consideration of the matter is fixed for an undefended hearing on 21 February 2014 at 10:00am NOTING three (3) hours has been set aside.
The respondent is restrained from further appearance of the matter without the leave of the court.
The applicant file and serve any further affidavit material she proposes to rely on at the undefended hearing by no later than 24 January 2014.
A copy of the orders made today are to be served by the applicant’s solicitors on the respondent by pre-paid post at his last known address.
The costs of the application and the conciliation conference are reserved.
Again, proof of service of this order has been provided. It was forwarded again by post to Mr Nevis’ postal address.[5]
[5] See affidavit of Ms K filed 6 December 2013
Ms Mitchell’s application was called on for hearing around 10.30am on 21 February 2014. Mr Nevis was called and did not appear in answer to the call. In those circumstances, at the instigation of Mr Kyrimis, the matter proceeded and he made submissions on behalf of his client. This process took about an hour and during it Mr Nevis did not appear.
Ms Mitchell had recently filed an affidavit to which was attached a number of documents. In the main, these documents were subpoenaed bank records and evidence regarding the valuation of the various items of property affected by these proceedings.
The nature of an undefended hearing
It is a significant thing for proceedings to be determined in the absence of one of the parties. The court has an obligation to ensure that the parties to proceedings before it have an opportunity to participate in those proceedings.
Before a person can be adversely affected by judicial order, he or she must be afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard.[6] I am satisfied that Mr Nevis has been given an adequate opportunity to appear in these proceedings and put his position before the court.
[6] See Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1
Ms Mitchell is entitled to have her application for settlement of de facto property matters determined within a reasonable period of time pursuant to the applicable principles of law.
As such she needs neither Mr Nevis’ formal imprimatur nor his cooperation to have her application determined. Rather, there is an obligation on Mr Nevis’ part if he wishes to be involved in the proceedings for him to attend at court as required and pursue any application put by him or on his behalf with due diligence.
The Federal Circuit Court is a court of private law. It determines disputes between parties according to law. In this case, according to the provisions of Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 which relate to the division of property following the breakdown of a de facto relationship.
The court cannot compel a respondent to engage with litigation. It is however obliged to give a respondent the opportunity to put evidence before the court and if he or she wishes to do so, contest any evidence relied upon by the applicant.
However, a respondent whether by intransigence, disinterest or manipulation cannot succeed in denying an applicant a just resolution according to law, to his or her application by choosing not to take part in proceedings because they do not proceed in the manner of his or her preference.
Order 13.1A of the Federal Circuit Court Rules deals with the court’s authority to enter judgment against a respondent if that respondent defaults in complying with a court order or fails to prosecute any proceedings with due diligence.
Pursuant to Rule 13.03A(2), a respondent is in default if amongst other things, he or she has failed to:
·Comply with an order of the court in the proceedings;
·Produce a document as required; or
·Defend the proceedings with due diligence.
I am satisfied that Mr Nevis has not produced relevant financial documents to Ms Mitchell as ordered by the court, nor has he defended the proceedings with due diligence. In these circumstances, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 13.03B(2)(d) Ms Mitchell is entitled to judgment in default.
In addition, I am satisfied that Mr Nevis has been given adequate notice of these proceedings, particularly that they were listed for undefended hearing on 21 February 2014 and has not appeared in respect of them, nor given any explanation as to his conduct up to this point.
The applicant is not entitled as of right to the orders which she seeks. Rather, the onus remains on her to establish to the court that the orders which she seeks, are just and equitable according to law.
Essentially, Ms Mitchell must lead sufficient evidence to establish her case to the court and persuade it that the result she proposes is a just and equitable one. Otherwise the court should impose the result in the case it considers fair according to the law and the evidence available to it.
The court’s pre-eminent responsibility is to ensure a just result between the parties, notwithstanding the failure of Mr Nevis to participate properly in the proceedings. However, in the absence of satisfactory rebutting evidence, the applicant’s affidavit material is to be accepted by the court unless it appears inherently unreliable or otherwise unsatisfactory.
The formal affidavit material on which Ms Mitchell relies, is as follows:
i)An affidavit of Ms Mitchell filed 15 July 2013;
ii)Statement of her financial circumstances filed 15 July 2013;
iii)Further affidavit of Ms Mitchell filed 18 February 2014.
As the parties have never been married to one another, before the court can exercise its power to alter property rights between them, it must declare that a de facto relationship existed between them at a time after the commencement of the applicable (omitted) Bank legislation which is contained in Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975.
The power to make a declaration as to the existence or otherwise of a de facto relationship, arises pursuant to section 90RD(1) of the Act.
Pursuant to the section, if an application is made for the alteration of property interests [section 90SM] following the breakdown of a de facto relationship: “the court may, for the purpose of those proceedings … declare that a de facto relationship existed, or never existed [between the applicant for such a declaration and another specified person]”.
Ms Mitchell commenced these proceedings on 15 July 2013. It is her evidence that the parties were involved in a de facto relationship with one another from late July 1999 until final separation occurred on 17 August 2011. Mr Nevis has not disputed this evidence other than he asserts the parties commenced cohabitation in mid-1997 and the relationship between them lasted for approximately fifteen years.
In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act are engaged and the court has jurisdiction to alter proprietorial interests between the parties.
Pursuant to section 90SM, the court is authorised to make such order as it considers it appropriate in order to alter the interests of the parties to a de facto relationship.
The expression “property” is defined in section 4(1) in relation to the parties to a de facto relationship as meaning “… property to which those parties are, or that party is, as the case may be, entitled, whether in possession or reversion.” Accordingly, the definition of property is a wide one.
Pursuant to section 90SM(3), the court is actively prevented from making an order altering the interests in property of the parties to a de facto relationship unless it is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so in all the circumstances prevailing. This follows from the use of the prohibitory words “shall not” in the relevant section.
In all the circumstances of this case, the condition that it is just and equitable to make a property order is readily satisfied as it is clear that as a result of choices made by each of the parties, the de facto relationship between them has now come to an end.
In particular, it is necessary for the court to determine the parties’ jointly held liability to (omitted) Bank in respect of both the Property S and Property M properties. It would be fundamentally unfair to Ms Mitchell if this does not occur or is frustrated unduly.
That being so, it appears to me that the applicable legislation provides a pathway to be followed in order to arrive at an alteration of de facto property interests which is just and equitable and otherwise appropriate.
Firstly, I must ascertain what are the parties’ assets and liabilities as at the date of trial. In this case, this process is not without its difficulties given Mr Nevis’ lack of cooperation with the court’s processes.
On the one hand, the parties’ liabilities particularly to (omitted) Bank are readily ascertainable. On the other hand, difficulties arise because formal valuations have not been obtained in respect of the various motor vehicles currently standing in Mr Nevis’ possession nor are there any actual valuations in respect of either the Property S or Property M properties.
In these circumstances, Ms Mitchell proposes to rely on the Red Book valuations for the motor vehicles in question and on the South Australian Government valuation for the two real properties.
In all the circumstances of this case, I will accept these valuations as to do otherwise would further reduce the already modest asset pool with no guarantee that Mr Nevis would cooperate with any alternative process of valuation.
Secondly, the court must ascertain the contributions made by each party to the pool of assets as at the date of trial. Contributions fall into two broad categories.
The first kind is contributions to the property: financial contributions and non-financial contributions, made directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of a party to the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property [section 90SM(4)(a)].
The second kind is contributions to the welfare of the family: in the words of the section, “the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contributions made in the capacity of home maker or parent. [section 90SM(4)(c)]”
It is clear from the authorities that this second kind of contribution must be given appropriate weight and is not to be treated as a token matter or as a contribution which is inherently less valuable or important than a financial contribution to property.
Thirdly, the court must make some assessment of the parties’ prospective needs by reference to the factors set out in section 90SF(3) of the Family Law Act 1975.
Pursuant to section 90SF(3)(r), the Court is entitled to take into account “any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account”.
At the outset, I am at pains to point out to the parties that the task I must undertake is not a simple accounting or arithmetical task. In the jargon of the times, I cannot “crunch the numbers” to come up with a division of their property which is not open to challenge or incapable of different interpretation.
The evidence
The applicant was born on (omitted) 1959. The respondent was born on (omitted) 1959. Accordingly, both parties are in their mid-fifties. Both parties have adult children from previous relationships.
When the parties met, the applicant owned a house at (omitted). The respondent was living in a rented housing trust home. The applicant asserts that her health is good.
At the time, the applicant was employed as a part-time (omitted) by (omitted) and had been so since 1994. In addition, she worked four or five nights per week at a (omitted).
Mr Nevis was employed as an (omitted), but lost his job shortly after the parties became involved with one another. In these circumstances, Ms Mitchell lent Mr Nevis the sum of $6,000.00 to buy a (business omitted). He then (business omitted) and went into business as (business omitted).
In April of 1999, Ms Mitchell sold her home at (omitted), netting $20,000.00. She used this sum as the deposit for the purchase of the Property S property which she moved into in July of 1999.
The purchase price of the Property S property was $96,000.00, of which Ms Mitchell borrowed $76,000.00 from the (omitted) Bank. Mr Nevis moved into the house in mid-1999. He did not contribute any moneys directly towards the purchase of the property.
It is Ms Mitchell’s case that when the parties commenced their relationship, Mr Nevis had few items of property. She had the contents of her home and a motor vehicle.
It is her case that she, through the provision of the loan of $6,000.00 subsidised the respondent’s employment prospects. It is Ms Mitchell’s evidence that Mr Nevis’ (omitted) business was not particularly successful and was wound up in 2000.
Thereafter, Mr Nevis had employment with various employers as a (omitted) and (omitted). However, it is her case that Mr Nevis did not settle in any of these positions for any lengthy periods of time.
In contrast, it is her case that she worked consistently for (employer omitted), with her hours of work being extended so that she was able to give up the (employer omitted) position. In these circumstances, it is her case that she was reliable in her employment but Mr Nevis was not.
It is also Ms Mitchell’s case that she paid all the necessary outgoings in respect of the Property S property and purchased the majority of food and groceries consumed by her and Mr Nevis. She also asserts that she did “virtually all of the cooking, cleaning and other domestic work.”[7]
[7] See Ms Mitchell’s affidavit filed 15 July 2013 at paragraph 29
Ms Mitchell concedes that Mr Nevis did work from time to time. However, it is the tenor of her evidence that he largely utilised his income for his own purposes, whilst her income was expended in joint family purposes. In addition, she asserts she supported Mr Nevis’ then twelve year old son, A, who lived with the parties from 2003 onwards.
In 2004, the loan secured against the Property S property was extended by a sum of between $50,000.00 to $60,000.00. The loan included Mr Nevis as a joint borrower but the property remained registered in Ms Mitchell’s sole name.
Some of the moneys so advanced were utilised to pay for renovations to the property but the majority was utilised to purchase a Honda motorcycle used by Mr Nevis and to pay off a debt related to another motor vehicle which he had.
In 2007 or 2008, a further $80,000.00 was borrowed, again secured against the Property S property. Again, much of this sum was utilised to purchase motor vehicles utilised by Mr Nevis, or to reduce debt in respect of other motor vehicles.
It is the effect of Ms Mitchell’s evidence that Mr Nevis has a fixation with motor vehicles and motor cycles and has largely utilised his income and any financial resources available to him, including the equity in the Property S property, to advance his interest in motoring. Ms Mitchell portrays herself as the financial victim of Mr Nevis’ fixation with motor vehicles.
In her affidavit material, Ms Mitchell summarises her position at the end of 2009, as follows:
“As a result, the debt on my house at Property S went up from the original $76,000.00 to around $210,000.00. Of this, around $40,000.00 represented the cost of improvements to the house – a new roof, reverse cycle air conditioning, spray pavers, new hot water service, rendering, carport and a new shed. The balance of the additional lending was mostly (business omitted), motor cars, motorcycles and paying off other loans for them.”
In his affidavit material, Mr Nevis refutes the assertion that he did not provide much help around the home. It is his case that Ms Mitchell insisted on doing all the cooking and cleaning because she was dismissive of his capabilities in this regard. He also asserts that she has over-stated the period during which A stayed with the parties.
In the period 2010 to 2011, the parties discussed buying a house in (omitted), where Mr Nevis’ parents lived and beginning a new life in the town. This led to the purchase of the Property M property in May of 2011. The purchase price was $205,000.00 plus stamp duty and purchase costs.
As previously indicated, the purchase of the Property M property was financed entirely by funds advanced by (omitted) Bank. As a consequence, the loan relating to the Property S property went to $280,000.00, with a separate loan secured against the Property M property of $167,000.00.
The parties moved to Property M in early 2012. Ms Mitchell asserts that she paid $3,500.00 to install solar panels on the property; installed bedroom wardrobes at a cost of $1,000.00; paid for bathroom tiles at a cost of $1,000.00; and paid $3,220.00 for an oven, stove top and range hood, which so far as she knows remain unpacked at the Property M property.
The parties separated in difficult circumstances in July of 2012. At this stage, Ms Mitchell returned to Adelaide. The Property S property was tenanted at the time but she has since resumed occupation of it and returned to her previous employment at (omitted).
Following separation, Ms Mitchell asserts that Mr Nevis withdrew a sum of $3,000.00, from the (omitted) Bank joint account which he has used for his own purposes. She also believes that Mr Nevis received a tax return of $15,500.00 after separation which he has also utilised for his own purposes without any reference to her.
At separation, Ms Mitchell was the registered owner of a Ford (model omitted) sedan. It is Ms Mitchell’s evidence that following separation, Mr Nevis (or some person acting in concert with him) forged her signature on a transfer document in respect of the vehicle, in order to sell it, retaining the proceeds of sale for his own benefit.
It is Ms Mitchell’s evidence, refuted by Mr Nevis, that the respondent was controlling of her and emotionally abusive. She asserts as follows:
“During the course of the relationship, the respondent was very controlling and had to have things his own way. He would become nasty and abusive (although not physically violent to me) if he didn’t.”[8]
[8] See applicant’s affidavit filed 15 July 2013 at paragraph 50
Clearly, this criticism of Mr Nevis’s behaviour is inchoate in nature. Ms Mitchell has other criticism of Mr Nevis in regards to his honesty and his level of fidelity during the parties’ relationship. For reasons which I will delineate in due course, I must be careful not to attribute fault for the failure of the parties’ relationship, particularly in the context of any assessment of their respective levels of contribution.
Ms Mitchell does provide specific evidence in respect of an incident which allegedly occurred in June of 2012 when the parties were driving to Property M and their vehicle broke down, causing Mr Nevis to lose his temper. Again Ms Mitchell does not allege that Mr Nevis assaulted her in any way, only that his behaviour was frightening and from her perspective, irrational.
It is, however, Mr Kyrimis’s submission that the court should consider making a further allowance in its overall assessment of the parties’ various contributions in his client’s favour, on the basis that the respondent’s conduct during the parties’ relationship rendered Ms Mitchell’s performance of her necessary obligations more onerous.
This was an issue considered by the Full Court of the Family Court in the case of Kennon & Kennon.[9] Mr Kyrimis submits that an adjustment of around ten per cent is an appropriate one to be made in his client’s favour because of the issues of control and coercive behaviour levelled by her against Mr Nevis which fail to be considered under the rubric provided by Kennon.
[9] Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757
As I indicated above, I must approach this issue with a significant degree of caution as it is one of the objectives of the applicable legislation that the attribution of fault should be removed as a factor in the determination of how the property of both married and de facto couples is to be divided other than in exceptional circumstances.
In this regard, it is appropriate to set out the relevant passages from the Full Court’s decision in Kennon:
“Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party’s contributions to the marriage, or, put the way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions within s.79. We prefer this approach to the concept of “negative contributions” which is sometimes referred to in this discussion.
In the above formulation, we have referred only to domestic violence, for the reasons which we indicated earlier, but its application is not limited to that.”
And further on:
“However, it is important to consider the “floodgates” argument. That is, these principles, which should only apply to exceptional cases, may become common coinage in property cases and be used inappropriately as tactical weapons or for personal attacks and so return this Court to fault and misconduct in property matters – a circumstance which proved so debilitating in the past. In addition, there is the risk of substantial additional time and cost.
However in our view, s 79 should encompass the exceptional cases which we described above. It would not be appropriate to exclude them as a matter of policy because of this risk. It is a matter of common sense for the lawyers involved and, where that may not be sufficient, it is a matter for a firm hand by the Court at an early stage when a case appears to raise those issues.
It is essential to bear in mind the relative narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party. It is not directed to conduct which does not have that effect and of necessity it does not encompass (as in Ferguson) conduct related to the breakdown of the marriage (basically because it would not have had a sufficient duration for this impact to be relevant to contributions).”[10]
[10] See Kennon & Kennon (supra) at 84,294-5
The use of the descriptor “exceptional” indicates that it is a “relatively narrow band of cases to which a Kennon-type adjustment would apply.”[11] In my view, Ms Mitchell has not provided cogent evidence that Mr Nevis’s alleged conduct had a discernible impact on how she went about her duties in the parties’ shared domestic circumstances.
[11] See Kucera & Kucera (2009) FMCAfam 1032 at paragraph 16
Mr Nevis may have behaved reprehensively from time to time. The parties’ relationship may also have been frequently unhappy and so unsatisfactory from both their perspectives. But this is not, in my view, sufficient to found the application of any Kennon-type adjustment, particularly given the generic and inchoate nature of the complaints made by Ms Mitchell.
Otherwise, as I understand her case, Ms Mitchell’s claim for a weighting of contributions in her favour rest on two major bases. Firstly, in a modest asset pool, she brought in significantly more capital in the form of the proceeds of sale of her (omitted) home at the outset of the parties’ relationship. This was the contribution from which all other capital acquisitions made during the parties’ subsequent relationship stemmed.
Secondly, during the parties’ relationship itself, her direct financial contributions and those relating to the performance by her of homemaking tasks were significantly greater than those of the respondent. In this context, it is necessary to set out what is the actual pool of property against which those contributions must be levied.
The first step – the pool of property
I find that the relevant pool of assets and liabilities to be as follows. For reasons already provided, I accept the valuations as calculated by Mr Kyrimis:
Assets $ Property M Property 250,000.00 Property M Property 189,000.00 Ford (model omitted) (h) 10,150.00 Ford (model omitted) (w) 8,600.00 Ford (model omitted) (h) 2,500.00 Honda (model omitted) (h) 20,700.00 Kawasaki (h) 4,000.00 Honda motorcycle (h) 4,000.00 Trailers for racing motorcycles (h) 2,000.00 Trailer for (omitted) (h) 1,500.00 (business omitted) (h) 5,000.00 Furniture, tools, contents (h) 5,000.00 Furniture, tools, contents (w) 2,000.00 Monies withdrawn from home loan (add back)(h) 3,000.00 Total 507,450.00 Liabilities Mortgage on Property S 279,614.94 Mortgage on Property M 163,696.36 Total Liabilities 443,311.30 Net Assets 64,138.70 Superannuation (omitted) Fund (w) 19,403.12 (omitted) Fund (h) 35,290.53 Total Superannuation 54,693.65
I have not included in this table Ms Mitchell’s anticipated legal expenses or her recently received accounts related to services provided to the Property S property as I do not consider it would be fair to Mr Nevis to do so.
In my view, the withdrawal of the sum of $3,000.00 from the mortgage account made by Mr Nevis should be regarded as a premature distribution of assets made in his favour. Accordingly, notions of justice and equity dictate that this sum should be notionally added back into the parties’ pool of assets and be credited to the respondent.
Ms Mitchell believes that Mr Nevis has recently purchased an interest in a (business omitted) with another person. I have accepted the value attributed to the (business omitted) by the applicant. The figures for furniture, tools and household effects are those provided by the parties in their respective financial statements.
In all the circumstances, I accept that the pool of assets as I have calculated it, must be regarded as somewhat rough and ready. However, in my view, Mr Nevis is not well placed to complain about the pool’s short comings given his lack of involvement with the proceedings. In my view, what is significant is that the pool is meagre and considerations of pragmatism dictate that the court should act to finalise the proprietorial interests between the parties.
Step two – assessment of contributions
After a relationship in excess of twelve years, there is a meagre amount of property available to the court to be distributed between the parties. In net terms, it is less than $65,000.00. In these circumstances, the sum of $20,000.00 which the applicant had at the commencement of the parties’ relationship, must be regarded as being highly significant.
This sum enabled the purchase of the Property S property which was the parties’ home during the greater portion of their relationship. This property has appreciated in value over time and this appreciation enabled the purchase of the Property M property and other chattels of significant value. Without this contribution, I accept that it is likely that there would be very little property available to be divided between the parties now.
In my view, notwithstanding the modest level of this contribution in 2014 dollar terms, it would result in a level of injustice to the applicant if significant weight was not given to her superior initial contribution of capital into their relationship.
In my view, the evidence is sufficient for me to conclude that there was such a discrepancy in the parties’ respective level of asset backing at the start of their relationship that this is a factor which must be given “special recognition”[12] in the applicant’s favour.
[12] See Pierce & Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844
The respondent asserts that the applicant has over-stated her home making role during the parties’ relationship. He says as follows:
“I deny the assertion that I did not help much around the house. I say that I tried many times to assist the applicant wife. When she was cooking I would ask if she needed any help and she would always say “no”. I was not allowed in the kitchen. I understand this is part of the applicant wife’s (country omitted) heritage. In addition, the applicant wife said I couldn’t clean properly so she did not allow me to.”[13]
[13] See respondent’s affidavit filed 29 August 2013 at paragraph 26
In my view, this statement has the flavour of a rationalisation on Mr Nevis’ part and also represents a tacit acknowledgement that Ms Mitchell did indeed perform the vast majority of household tasks and did so to a high degree of proficiency. Although the overall asset pool is small, I must be careful not to undervalue Ms Mitchell’s significant home making role.[14]
[14] See Ferraro & Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1 at 38
I accept Ms Mitchell’s evidence that she worked throughout the parties’ relationship and contributed the entirety of the wages received by her to joint family purposes. More significantly, I do not reject her untested assertion that Mr Nevis when in employment, utilised his income as he saw fit. Certainly, at the end of the parties’ relationship there is scant, if any, evidence of the parties working in concert to grow their combined wealth.
In all these circumstances, it is my finding that factors relevant to contribution greatly favour the applicant and it would constitute a marked injustice to her if this was not recognised by the court particularly given the small overall asset pool.
However, I acknowledge that in the circumstances of a case like the present, it is highly artificial to speak of contributions in percentage terms. What matters to the parties is what any orders means to each of them in dollar terms and in respect of which items of property each is able to retain.
The Full Court of the Family Court has recently pointed out that there is no requirement on a trial judge to allocate a specific percentage entitlement of property following the exercise under either section 79(4) or 90SM(4). Rather such allocations have been described as being a “sensible and valuable tool” but are not necessarily an objective in themselves.[15]
[15] See Kane & Kane [2013] FamCAFC 205 per Faulkes DCJ
As a consequence, in most cases there will come a point where it is necessary to make the leap from words to figures and so move from a qualitative evaluation of contributions to one which is quantitative in nature. [16]
[16] See Steinbrenner & Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193 at [234] per Coleman J
In this case given the small asset pool and the significance of the applicant’s contributions, I consider that the starting point for any consideration of contributions in percentage terms is one of 70/30 per cent in Ms Mitchell’s favour in respect of the non-superannuation assets.
In respect of the superannuation which is modest in amount and which apparently represents the life time efforts of both parties in the workforce to date, an equalisation of the superannuation appears to me to be appropriate given the length of the relationship between the parties.
Step 3 – the prospective needs of the parties – section 90SF(3)
In my assessment, both parties face a problematic financial future. They are both in their mid-fifties and so are each likely to have a decade in which to garner resources for retirement through on-going employment. At this stage both Ms Mitchell and Mr Nevis have modest amounts of superannuation which is likely to be inadequate to provide a comfortable retirement for either of them. Given this situation, a decade may not be a sufficient period to remedy this deficiency.
Ms Mitchell has secure employment, but it is modestly paid and likely to remain physically demanding. Although she describes her health in positive terms, how much longer she can remain in employment must be uncertain. She will also have a significant level of debt in respect of her home regardless of the outcome of these proceedings.
As Ms Mitchell, for understandable reasons, sees ownership of her home as the basis of her future financial security, she will be committed to paying of this debt as quickly as she can. This will be an enormous challenge for her. At present she has no financial buffer to protect herself from any future exigencies.
Mr Nevis appears to be more blasé about debt and financial matters generally. At present, the jointly held liability to (omitted) Bank leaves Ms Mitchell exposed to potential financial calamity. She has a negative equity in her most significant asset. Given the history of this asset, this is a most inequitable situation from her perspective.
Neither party can be described as significantly qualified or likely to be particularly attractive to potential employers in a contracting job market. Mr Nevis has experience in (omitted) and (omitted) and holds the necessary (qualifications omitted) in this regard. However, (omitted) positions cannot be regarded as being either secure or particularly well-paid.
Ms Mitchell has recently worked in a (employer omitted) and as a (omitted). She is now a (occupation omitted) for the (employer omitted). It seems she has a good reputation with (employer omitted), by whom she has been employed for many years but such (omitted) positions are casual in nature.
In all these circumstances, I do not think that it can be said that the various section 90SF(3) factors favour one party significantly more than the other, apart from the fact that the current disposition of assets and liabilities renders Ms Mitchell’s financial position more precarious than that of Mr Nevis and by virtue of the current inequality in superannuation, she is marginally less well prepared for retirement than is Mr Nevis.
This latter factor – preparedness for retirement – is a factor which in my view, further justifies an equalisation being made in respect of the parties’ superannuation holdings as proposed by Mr Kyrimis on behalf of Ms Mitchell.
Conclusions
This is a perplexing case by virtue of Mr Nevis’ lack of engagement with it. It would be preferable if the parties could have embarked upon a joint process of rationalising their financial affairs.
Given the paucity of assets, I am gravely concerned that the monies expended by Ms Mitchell in getting the case to this point may be out of proportion to what she will ultimately recoup, particularly if enforcement proceedings become necessary.
However, the precarious nature of her financial position at present rendered proceedings inevitable. She is currently in a situation where she finds herself effectively insolvent – in the sense that her equity in her home is less than it is worth after she has owned it for a period in excess of thirteen years and she has few other assets to speak of.
In these circumstances, she was compelled to bring proceedings to end her financial relationship with Mr Nevis. In my view, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there should be a significant reapportionment between the parties of their current levels of debt and equity in their respective homes.
It is grossly unfair that Ms Mitchell has available to her no equity in the Property S home, whilst Mr Nevis has potential equity of around $25,000.00 in the Property M property. It also unfair that Mr Nevis has chattels to the value of around $54,000.00, whilst Ms Mitchell has only her motor vehicle and household contents.
These factors, when coupled with the significant length of the relationship between the parties; Ms Mitchell’s initial injection of capital at its outset; and her more substantial contributions during the relationship; dictate that there should be orders made adjusting the parties’ current proprietorial interests.
Seventy per cent of the parties’ current net assets ($64,138.70) is represented by the sum of $44,897.09. Ms Mitchell has in her possession assets in the form of her motor vehicle and household effects to the value of $10,860.00.
Accordingly, to achieve a 70/30 % division of the non-superannuation assets would require a transfer of funds from Mr Nevis to Ms Mitchell in an amount of $34,037.09. It could be achieved in theoretical terms by Mr Nevis selling for value the various motor cycles in his possession and the equipment related to them.
However, in my view given Ms Mitchell’s currently precarious financial position; the smallest of the asset pool; and her superior contributions; such an outcome would be a just and equitable one from her perspective.
In my assessment, a just and equitable outcome would see Ms Mitchell receiving the sum of $40,000.00 from Mr Nevis and otherwise retaining the Property S property and the debt secured against it, as well as her motor vehicle and household contents.
Such an outcome would enable Ms Mitchell to inject some equity into the Property S property to afford her some level of protection against unforeseen exigencies. It would also give her a greater probability of paying down the debt related to it prior to her retirement.
I will also make the order sought by Ms Mitchell regarding the return to her of the oven, stove top and range hood purchased by her for installation in the Property M property. I will direct that the husband deliver these items to the wife at her expense within sixty (60) days of the date of these orders.
I will also make orders dividing the parties’ current entitlements to superannuation evenly between them. Given the length of their relationship and equality of age, I consider this to represent a fair outcome.
The more difficult aspect of the case is how this outcome is to be achieved in practical terms given the significant probability that Mr Nevis will not cooperate with the orders made.
The other difficulty relates to (omitted) Bank and the fact that the parties are jointly indebted to the Bank in respect of the monies secured against both the Property S and Property M properties.
From Ms Mitchell’s perspective, it is imperative that this joint liability be severed and she be indemnified in respect of all current and any further liability arising in respect of the Property M property.
If Mr Nevis does not comply with the order to pay Ms Mitchell the sum of $40,000.00 within a time specified by the orders, it will be necessary for the Property M property to be sold.
Given the level of equity available in the property, it may also be necessary for Mr Nevis to sell some of his motor cycles to meet his obligation. I propose allowing him a period of 60 days to raise the sum in question.
If he neglects to take the necessary steps to satisfy the payment order, I will direct the Registrar of the Court at Adelaide to sign all necessary documents to place the Property M property on the market for a sale price of $189,000.00.
I will also allow Ms Mitchell to seek an enforcement warrant to effect the sale of any motor vehicle in Mr Nevis’ possession in order to make up any potential shortfall in respect of such payment order.
In order to safeguard Ms Mitchell’s position in the short term, an injunction will issue preventing Mr Nevis from selling or otherwise dealing with any motor vehicle currently in his possession.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixty-six (166) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown
Date: 3 March 2014
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
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Property Law
Legal Concepts
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Jurisdiction
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Remedies
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Injunction
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Costs
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Statutory Construction
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