Mitchell (a pseudonym) v Arnold (a pseudonym)
[2024] VCC 724
•27 May 2024
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE COMMON LAW DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
APPEALS AND POST SENTENCE APPLICATIONS LIST
| KENDRA MITCHELL (a pseudonym) | Appellant |
| v | |
| JEANIE ARNOLD (a pseudonym) | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE PILLAY | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 1 May 2024 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 27 May 2024 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Mitchell (a pseudonym) v Arnold (a pseudonym) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VCC 724 | |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
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Subject:Appeal against family violence intervention order
Catchwords: Legal, factual or discretionary error - Where appellant is self-represented litigant
Legislation Cited: Family Violence Protection Act 2008
Cases Cited:AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors [2023] VSC 13; Matsoukatidou v Yarra Ranges Council (2017) 51 VR 624; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; Byrne v Owners of Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan 55597 [2016] WASC 153; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504; WS v Gardin (2015) 48 WAR 494; De Winter v De Winter (1979) 23 ALR 211; Jan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1837; Hobson (a pseudonym) v Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety [2022] VSCA 101; Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Judgment: Appeal dismissed
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Ms K Mitchell (a pseudonym), in person | |
| For the Respondent | Ms S Dodds | Victoria Police |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1In this proceeding, Kendra Mitchell (a pseudonym) appeals against orders made in the Magistrates’ Court on 16 November 2021. Those orders were made pursuant to s74 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (“the Act”). Specifically, the appeal is brought pursuant to s119 of the Act.
Relevant Background
2The appeal centres around an unfortunate set of family circumstances. It is useful to give a very brief overview of those family circumstances as it gives context to the hearing before the learned Magistrate on 15 and 16 November 2021 and the subsequent decision.
3Briefly, Jeanie Arnold (a pseudonym) and Derek Arnold (a pseudonym) are married and have a son named Josh (a pseudonym). Kendra Mitchell and her husband have a daughter, Valerie (a pseudonym). Josh Arnold (a pseudonym) and Valerie became involved in an intimate relationship and had a daughter named Vanessa (a pseudonym), born in May 2014. Unfortunately Josh and Valerie became involved in drugs, and at various times Vanessa was taken from their care by the Department of Health and Human Services Child Protection Service and placed into the care of Jeanie Arnold and Derek Arnold her grandparents.
4In about 2019, various allegations were made by Kendra Mitchell that Josh Arnold had been sexually abusing his daughter Vanessa, and that Jeanie and Derek Arnold had been complicit in covering this up. Details of these allegations and how they were made do not need to be delved into for the purposes of this broad overview. Suffice to say there was considerable tension between Kendra Mitchell and Jeanie Arnold and Derek Arnold. This manifested in phone calls, text messages, and also various instances where both parties were present, either at the Arnold house or, specifically, one incident where it was alleged that Kendra Mitchell had attended at Vanessa’s kindergarten and retrieved her without proper permission from Jeanie and Derek Arnold.
5Once again, and only setting out matters in the broad to give context to the hearing, it appears that Victoria Police, on behalf of Jeanie Arnold and Vanessa Arnold, brought applications against Kendra Mitchell for intervention orders. At the same time, Kendra Mitchell brought an application for an intervention order against Derek Arnold. Both matters were listed before Magistrate Hayes on 15 and 16 November 2021. It appears that Kendra Mitchell consented to an intervention order being made against her in favour of Jeanie Arnold. Kendra Mitchell, however, contested whether an intervention order should be granted against her in favour of Vanessa. As to her application against Derek Arnold, this was contested by Derek Arnold.
Proceedings in the Magistrates Court
6For the purposes of the hearing, Kendra Mitchell had the benefit of counsel for the purposes of conducting cross-examination.[1]
[1]Court Book (“CB”) 25, Transcript (“T”) 7, Line (“L”) 30 – T8, L1-6
7The police appeared to prosecute the application for an IVO to protect both Jeanie Arnold and Vanessa. In Ms Mitchell’s application, counsel Mr Foley appeared to cross-examine Derek Arnold, and Mr Arnold had counsel, Mr Hardesty, to cross-examine Ms Mitchell. At the outset of the hearing there was a discussion between all parties as to how the matter would proceed, and essentially it was determined that the matters would be heard together.[2]
[2]CB 40, T12, L8-15
8On the first day, police called Jeanie Arnold, Derek Arnold, Ms Faulkner (a pseudonym) of Child Protection Services, and First Constable Vaughan (a pseudonym) the informant. It is relevant to note that transcript for the afternoon session on the first day was not able to be produced due to an audio-recording issue. On the second day, Kendra Mitchell was called, gave evidence, and was cross-examined, and Derek Arnold was called, gave evidence, and was cross-examined. A witness named Ms Simmons was called on behalf of Ms Mitchell, and gave evidence-in-chief and was cross-examined. The learned Magistrate then proceeded to deliver judgment with oral reasons. As a result, the learned Magistrate made orders by consent in favour of Jeanie Arnold and made a finding that orders ought be made in favour of Vanessa against Kendra Mitchell.
9As to Kendra Mitchell’s application against Derek Arnold, this was dismissed.
10Kendra Mitchell now appeals from the decision to grant an order in favour of Vanessa against her.
Relevant legal principles
11In the decision of the Honourable John Dixon J in AAA v County Court of Victoria & Ors (“AAA”), [3] John Dixon J considered the terminology associated with s119 and particularly the meaning of the term “rehearing by the County Court” which appears there. In that case, his Honour held that an appeal under s119 is a broad appeal by way of rehearing. The features of such a broad appeal are the following:
(a) that the appeal court will apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal to the facts as it finds them;[4]
(b) the powers of the appeal court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate the original decision-maker made some legal, factual, or discretionary error;[5]
(c) the appeal may be conducted by reference to the evidence given at the first instance, though with power to receive further evidence;[6]
(d) the Court is required to assess and evaluate the evidence for itself.[7]
[3][2023] VSC 13
[4](Ibid) at paragraph [50]
[5]Ibid
[6]Ibid
[7]Ibid
12However, his Honour noted that an appeal of this nature did not have an immutable set of characteristics or inflexible boundaries but, ultimately, would be informed by the legislation creating the appeal right, the jurisdiction, the composition and functions of the tribunal from whose decision the appeal lies, and the individual circumstances of the case at hand.[8]
[8]Ibid at paragraph [54]
13As to any evidence which may be permitted at the rehearing, his Honour considered that new evidence could be admitted.[9] He elaborated that the appellate court is not confined to the record of evidence led at the original hearing, and may hear new evidence presented on the appeal. It is then the appeal court’s function to apply the law at the time when the appeal is heard to consider all of the admitted evidence. He summarised this as being an appeal by way of rehearing based upon the evidence given in the court of first instance, supplemented by further evidence.[10]
[9]Ibid at paragraph [63]
[10]Ibid at paragraph [51(b)] relying on Matsoukatidou v Yarra Ranges Council (2017) 51 VR 624, 645 at [65]
14Broadly, the ratio of that case was that an appellant needs to demonstrate a legal, factual or discretionary error in the Magistrates’ Court’s decision to enliven the jurisdiction of this Court. Such error may be proved after an examination of the transcript in the Magistrates’ Court, to examine the conduct of the proceeding and any reasons for decision.
Errors of law, fact and discretion
15What constitutes an error in any particular case is wholly dependent on the evidence considered in the context of the objective findings of the primary judge.[11] With that said, established legal principles operate to guide the courts through an assessment of claimed errors. I turn now to briefly consider those.
[11] Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Legal error
16A legal error may arise in the way in which a court:
“undertakes its fact-finding, or … in the way in which it construes the statute which it is applying in a particular case, or in some other aspect of its reasoning”.[12]
[12] Byrne v Owners of Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan 55597 [2016] WASC 153 at [23]
17Appeals operate as a safeguard against these errors, to ensure that courts and tribunals operate within their jurisdiction.[13]
[13] Ibid
Factual error
18A factual error arises when a trial judge’s findings of fact are “glaringly improbable” and “inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence”.[14] A factual error does not arise simply because an appellate court considers that the probabilities of the case are against that finding of fact.[15]
[14] Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479
[15] Ibid
19The legal principles with respect to factual errors were summarised by Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ in Lee v Lee:[16]
“A court of appeal is bound to conduct a ‘real review’ of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge’s reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge’s findings unless they are ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling inferences’ is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, ‘in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge’.”
[16] (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55]
20Similarly, in Blunt v Blunt it was said:
“If it can be shown that the court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or omitted to take into account matters that are relevant, there would, in my opinion, be ground for an appeal.”[17]
[17] Blunt v Blunt [1943] AC 517 at 526
Discretionary error
21Where the evidence identifies an error by the trial judge in the exercise of their discretion, the appellate court may then exercise its own discretion on that point.
22The legal principles with respect to discretionary errors were identified by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King:[18]
“It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion to which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.”
[18] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505
Complaints as to Conclusion
23Notwithstanding the statutory obligations placed upon appellate courts to scrutinise the evidence, inferences and conclusions before them, the general “tenor” of appellate court decisions on these issues is of a broad respect for the conclusions reached by trial judges.
24To establish that a conclusion of a trial judge was incorrect, it is necessary for an appellant to satisfy the appellate court that the trial judge reached the wrong conclusion by reason of an error of law, fact or discretion, supported by evidence.[19]
[19] Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504 at [22]
25In Gett v Tabet, Allsop P, Beazley and Basten JJA explained:
“Where no error can be identified and the conclusion of his Honour is not itself implausible, this court should properly give weight to the view formed by the trial judge, because to do so is to acknowledge the fact that in various respects, his Honour enjoyed a beneficial position in resolving conflicting evidence, drawing inferences and making the ultimate evaluative judgment.”[20]
[20] Ibid
26In circumstances where an error is identified, to succeed on appeal it must be established that the identified error puts the validity of the conclusion in doubt. If the error in question is inconsequential, the fact of the error is not of itself enough for an appeal to succeed.[21]
[21]WS v Gardin BC201502131 (2015) 48 WAR 494 at [138-139]; see also Jan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1837 at [48]
27The High Court in De Winter v De Winter clarified the circumstances in which such an error would affect the ultimate decision on appeal:
“There are many other authorities, from Young v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134 at 137 to Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627, that recognize that a mistake of fact is a ground for overruling a decision involving discretionary judgment. It may, in some cases, appear that the mistake of fact has not affected the final result, or that its effect has been negligible, or that in any case the conclusion reached was correct, notwithstanding the error. But it is not right to say, as the majority of the Full Court appear to have said in the present case, that a discretionary judgment which has proceeded upon a mistake of fact should be upheld simply because the order was well within the range of the discretion of the primary judge.
It is perfectly true that the opinion which a judge forms as to the credibility of a witness may be influenced by a variety of matters. A number of pieces of evidence may lead to the conclusion that the witness is generally unreliable, but one example of false testimony may be enough, and of course the demeanour of the witness alone may lead to that conclusion. But where a judge has reached such a conclusion for a variety of reasons, and it is demonstrated that some of those reasons are unsound, his decision will not necessarily be upheld because the other reasons would in themsleves [sic] have been sufficient to support it. The question is whether the invalid reason has influenced the ultimate conclusion, or whether the error was immaterial; if the error did affect the conclusion, the result may nevertheless be so plainly right that it can be allowed to stand, notwithstanding the unsoundness of some of its foundations.”[22]
(emphasis added).
[22] De Winter v De Winter (1979) 23 ALR 211 at 217-218
28Finally, where an appeal is brought on the basis that a trial judge ought to have attributed greater weight to certain evidence, or reached an alternative conclusion based on the evidence, it is necessary for the appellant to establish that the conclusion of the primary judge was not open on the material before them.[23]
[23]Hobson (a pseudonym) v Secretary to the Department of Justice and Community Safety [2022] VSCA 101 at [20-21]
29Having set out those principles, I now turn to the appeals pressed by Ms Mitchell.
Consideration
30By reason of the matters set out above, it is for the appellant, Ms Mitchell, to demonstrate legal, factual, or discretionary error in the decision of the learned Magistrate below. To this end, the appellant filed grounds of appeal and submissions in support. Due to the discursive nature in the way these grounds and submissions were set out, I first let the appellant address me uninterrupted orally on her submissions. When she had exhausted her oral submissions, I explained the law relating to the decision in AAA and described for her the various types of errors which need to be demonstrated in order for her to succeed.[24] I then took her to each of her grounds of appeal and the corresponding submission from the respondent. I asked Ms Mitchell to make submissions to me about each of the points which she had raised and the respondent’s countering submission. When she had completed that task, I then called on the respondent. The respondent’s submissions largely echoed the written submissions made. At the conclusion of that I stood the matter down for a brief period so that Ms Mitchell could contemplate any matters she wished to raise in reply. I then asked her to provide oral submissions in reply to those matters raised by the respondent.
[24]The decision itself had previously been forwarded to Ms Mitchell by orders of the Judicial Registrar well before the hearing came on.
31I now turn to deal with each of the alleged errors as particularised by Ms Mitchell.[25]
[25]CB 122, paragraph 1
Legal errors
32The first line reads:[26]
“The applicant Jeanie Arnold and her husband Derek Arnold lied, made false reports, and gave false and misleading information to police and the courts ...”
There was no detail as to any of these allegations. Furthermore, they are clearly not legal errors but might be considered to be factual errors. However, it is relevant to note that both Jeanie Arnold and her husband Derek Arnold were called and cross-examined in the course of the hearing below. The learned Magistrate heard that evidence, and considered written material such as text messages before making a decision. She was entitled to form a view about the veracity of the evidence presented and she did so. The formulation of this ground cannot sustain the assertion that it was an error. I dismiss this ground.
[26]CB 122
33The opening line reads:[27]
“The Police applicant and prosecutor did not present courts with any evidence to Mrs. Arnold’s claims in application relating to domestic violence allegations towards my granddaughter ...”
It is sufficient to note that the learned Magistrate dealt with this allegation during the course of the trial. In fact, it was a specific submission made by Mr Foley at T76-77. The magistrate specifically dealt with this issue in the course of her reasons.[28] There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[27]CB 122-123
[28]CB 111, T82, L27 – T83
34The opening line reads:[29]
“Victoria Police officer Seniour [sic] constable Lucy Vaughan who applied for intervention orders on behalf of Mrs. Arnold called me prior to 15/16/November 2021 [sic] to tell me police were not going to pursue Mrs. Jeanie Arnold’s intervention orders due to lack of evidence. ...”
This seems to be an assertion that Ms Mitchell was caught by surprise by the police pursuing the matter. However, as pointed out by the respondent’s submission, and as is abundantly clear from the transcript, this matter was discussed, the potential for adjournment was considered and Ms Mitchell told the learned Magistrate that she wanted to proceed.[30] In those circumstances it was quite clear that Ms Mitchell made a decision to proceed despite there being the potential to adjourn the matter. That was her decision, and she cannot now resile from it. There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[29]CB123 paragraph 1
[30]CB 30, T2, L21 – T3, L17
35The opening line reads:
“The applicant Jeanie Arnold, Seniour constable Lucy Vaughan and child protection employee Sally Faulkner did not provide subpoenaed documents ...”[31]
It is apparent from a reading of the transcript that the issue of subpoenaed documents was raised. However, Ms Mitchell agreed to proceed without that material.[32] That was her decision, and she cannot now resile from it. There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[31]CB 123 paragraph 2
[32]CB 37, T9, L23-27
36The opening line reads:
“Police prosecutor on the 16/11 2023 November deceived and mislead the magistrate and court by manipulating information ...”[33]
No detail was provided as to this. It is a broad unsubstantiated, and grave allegation. Such an allegation without exacting proofs cannot be entertained. I also note she was re-examined on neuropsychologist report and had an opportunity to put forward any information she considered the police prosecutor omitted.[34] There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[33]CB 124 paragraph 2
[34]CB 82 T 53 L24 - CB 83 T 54 L1-23
37The opening line reads:
“In the matter heard on 15 September 2020, in recording transcripts, the Police prosecutor had stated the matter had been resolved ...”[35]
A reading of the transcript discloses no discussion about this matter. It was not a matter raised before the learned Magistrate, in cross-examination, or in submissions. It was not demonstrated in what way it could have affected the ultimate decision. There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[35]CB 123 paragraph 4 – CB 124
38The opening line reads: [36]
“The applicant Mrs. Jeanie Arnold’s husband Derek Arnold gave a false and misleading statement to police ...”
There are no details about this ground of appeal. Further, Mr Derek Arnold gave evidence and was cross-examined. The learned Magistrate subsequently assessed his evidence and reached a decision. The learned Magistrate was entitled to make such an assessment. There is no error demonstrated. I dismiss this ground.
[36]CB 124 paragraph 1
Alleged procedural errors
39The opening line reads:[37]
“The operation of the procedure in the matter was biased and discriminatory.”
A reading of the transcript and the reasons for decision indicates very clearly that the learned Magistrate afforded all parties an equal opportunity to be heard. Witnesses were called, gave evidence, and were cross-examined in the usual manner expected in court. Each party was allowed to make submissions, and did so. On questioning in this court, Ms Mitchell alleged that she was told that she could not speak, and therefore did not know that she could make objections at various points. A reading of the transcript makes it abundantly clear that the learned Magistrate asked her on numerous occasions about issues.[38] Ms Mitchell submitted that she was told by the magistrate that she was not allowed to speak. It is true that the magistrate did say to Ms Mitchell at CB 43, T15, L15, “Sorry, Ms Mitchell. Now’s not the time for you to speak.”[39] However, this was in the context of the police leading Jeanie Arnold’s evidence. A fair reading of this passage simply indicates that the learned Magistrate ensured that the examination-in-chief was not unfairly interrupted. The learned Magistrate further went on to indicate that it was not a blanket ban on Ms Mitchell intervening, but rather it was only at this time that she should not interrupt. There is no basis to this complaint. I dismiss this ground.
[37]CB 124 paragraph 2
[38]CB 31, T3, L19; CB 34, T6, L14; CB 37, T9, L27
[39]CB 43, T15, L15
40The opening line reads:[40]
“The Magistrate dismissed my intervention orders against the applicant’s husband taken out several weeks prior to applicant’s application for IVO against myself.”
This is potentially a statement of fact. It was not raised in the Magistrates’ Court hearing below, and it is not said how it may affect the ultimate decision in this matter. I dismiss this ground.
[40]CB 124 paragraph 3
41The opening line reads:[41]
“Magistrate did not take into consideration my witness affidavit and dismissed my witness’s evidence in court.”
[41]CB 124 paragraph 4
A reading of the transcript and the decision makes it abundantly clear that all the witness evidence was heard and the learned Magistrate considered all evidence.[42] There is no merit in this ground, and I dismiss it.
[42]CB 101-108; CB 109-118; and specifically noting that Mr Foley conducted cross-examination CB 54-55, 91 and 99
42The opening line reads:[43]
“Magistrate did not take into consideration, allow me to speak or allow my barrister to cross examine applicant, her husband, police, or child protection employee.”
I have partially addressed this above. However, a fair reading of the transcript, though it is missing the afternoon session on 15 November 2021, makes it clear that the proceeding was conducted in accordance with the usual rules and procedures of court, where witnesses were called and then cross-examined. There is no merit in this ground, and I dismiss it.
[43]CB 124 paragraph 4
43The opening line reads:
“Mrs. Arnold lied in application to police I had gone to her home to kidnap my granddaughter and daycare centre. ...”[44]
The magistrate dealt with this allegation and considered it in the course of her reasons. There is no merit in this ground, and I dismiss it.
[44]CB 124 paragraph 5
New evidence
44Ms Mitchell sought to produce new evidence to support her appeal. I ruled that such evidence was filed well out of time in accordance with the court orders, and with no reason to support its late admission. In addition, Ms Mitchell did not even appear at the final directions hearing to press for that evidence to be presented. At that stage I ruled it out,[45] and the matter proceeded without that evidence.
[45]Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Inadequate representation
45This ground read:[46]
“Barrister did not cross examine witnesses. Magistrate would not let me defend myself.”
[46]CB 125 paragraph 2
This ground must be rejected. Counsel for Ms Mitchell announced his appearance to cross-examine and was permitted to do so. He did so across both applications. As to the assertion that Ms Mitchell was not allowed to defend herself, the learned Magistrate asked Ms Mitchell on numerous occasions, which I have referred to above, as to the conduct of proceedings, and so she was involved. Furthermore, Mr Foley made closing submissions on her behalf in respect of both applications. There is no foundation to this allegation, and I dismiss it.
Unreasonable verdict
46Grouping these matters together, this is a complaint about the decision rather than any legal, factual, or discretionary error. The learned Magistrate heard evidence over two days from numerous witnesses who were called, referred to documentary evidence, and were cross-examined. The learned Magistrate then heard closing submissions. The learned Magistrate provided reasons for decision which set out in detail some of the evidence she relied on to come to her findings. While the appellant might be displeased with the result, it cannot be said that the decision-making process or the decision-making itself was attended with any legal, factual, or discretionary error. There is no merit in this ground, and I dismiss it.
Miscarriage of justice
47It is unclear what this ground seeks to allege by way of any legal, factual, or discretionary error. I enquired of Ms Mitchell in oral submissions about this. Ultimately she seemed to complain most keenly about the lack of an interpreter for her witness, Ms Simmons. However, it is clear on the transcript that it was Ms Mitchell who agreed to proceed without an interpreter being present when Ms Simmons gave evidence.[47] I dismiss this ground.
[47]CB 58, T29, L20
48To the extent that I can ascertain it appears that the remainder of these grounds complain about the learned Magistrate’s ultimate decision or reiterate matters raised earlier in her submissions. I have addressed these matters above. The complaint about the decision is not to identify any legal, factual, or discretionary error. In that circumstance there is no merit in this ground and I will dismiss it.
Conclusion
49For the above reasons, I find that none of the alleged errors are made out, and the appeal must be dismissed.
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