Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION: Mirvac Projects Pty Ltd v Ku-Ring-Gai Council & Anor (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 672 PARTIES: APPLICANT
Mirvac Projects Pty LtdFIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
Ku-Ring-Gai Council
Michael William InglisFILE NUMBER(S): 10023 of 2007 CORAM: Jagot J KEY ISSUES: Appeal :- application to re-open - whether sufficient opportunity to be heard - whether reasons given without considering operation of a statutory provision - unavailability of trial judge - power to re-open - discretion LEGISLATION CITED: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Land and Environment Court Act 1979
State Environmental Planning Policy No 1 – Development StandardsCASES CITED: Autodesk Inc v Dyason (1993) 176 CLR 300;
Mirvac Projects Pty Ltd v Ku-Ring-Gai Council and Michael William Inglis [2007] NSWLEC 540;
Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSLWR 642DATES OF HEARING: 8/10/07
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
16 October 2007LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: APPLICANT
Mr T F Robertson SC with Mr J E Lazarus
SOLICITORS
Lindsay Taylor LawyersFIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
Mr P Marincowitz, solicitor
SOLICITORS
DLA Phillips Fox
Mr J J Garnsey QC with Mr Chris Norton
SOLICITORS
Woolf Associates
JUDGMENT:
THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALESJagot J
16 October 2007
10023 of 2007
MIRVAC PROJECTS PTY LTD
ApplicantKU-RING-GAI COUNCIL
First RespondentJUDGMENTMICHAEL WILLIAM INGLIS
Second Respondent
Jagot J:
1 By notice of motion filed on 24 September 2007 the applicant, Mirvac Projects Pty Ltd (Mirvac), sought orders that the matter be re-opened to enable it to put to the Court certain arguments or, alternatively, that the appeal be upheld in part.
2 Mirvac’s claims arise out of the reasons for decision of Talbot J in Mirvac Projects Pty Ltd v Ku-Ring-Gai Council and Michael William Inglis [2007] NSWLEC 540 published on 29 August 2007. It was common ground that Talbot J’s reasons for decision were delivered on or about the date of expiry of his commission as an Acting Judge. Talbot J is not available to deal with the notice of motion. Consequently, s 11(3A) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (the LEC Act) (enabling an Acting Judge to continue to deal with any matter they heard after the expiry of their commission) is immaterial.
3 In the reasons for decision, Talbot J directed the parties to “confer and agree on a form of orders reflecting the Court’s decision”, such orders to be filed with the Registrar for sealing within 14 days (at [70]). No agreement was reached in accordance with these directions. Instead, Mirvac claimed that the Court’s reasons for decision overlooked the operation of s 109B of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EPA Act). Mirvac said that, through no fault of its own, it was denied the opportunity to argue that this provision provided a complete answer to the problem that led Talbot J to decide to dismiss the appeal in part. Accordingly, Mirvac submitted that the interests of justice demanded the proceedings be re-opened…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWLEC 672
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine if the Council's refusal to amend the development consent was in accordance with the planning laws, and whether there were any procedural errors or errors of law in the decision-making process. A key aspect of the legal issue was whether the Council had the authority to modify the development consent without going through a fresh application process, and if the applicant had a legitimate expectation that the consent could be amended. The court had to balance the statutory provisions with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the Council's decision to refuse the modification of the development consent was lawful and that there were no procedural errors. The court held that the statutory framework did not provide the Council with the discretion to amend a development consent without a fresh application. Additionally, the court determined that the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation that the consent could be modified without initiating a new application process. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, the application to modify the development consent was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay its own costs of the proceedings, with specific provisions regarding the costs of a particular notice of motion.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) The applicant’s notice of motion filed 24 September 2007 is dismissed.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
(3) The application to modify development consent DA 1388/04 lodged on 24 November 2006 is refused.
(4) Each party is to pay its own costs of the proceedings save and except for costs of the notice of motion filed on 24 September 2007 (which may be argued).
(5) The exhibits are returned.