Minogue v State of Victoria

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[2019] HCATrans 124

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M162 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

CRAIG WILLIAM JOHN MINOGUE

Plaintiff

and

STATE OF VICTORIA

Defendant

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 18 JUNE 2019, AT 10.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR C.J. HORAN, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR A.F. SOLOMON‑BRIDGE and MR R.A. MINSON for the plaintiff.  (instructed by Darebin Community Legal Centre)

MR P.J. HANKS, QC:   Your Honours, I appear with MR A.D. POUND and MS S. ZELEZNIKOW for the State of Victoria.  (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS J.E. DAVIDSON, for the Attorney‑General for New South Wales, who intervenes in the proceedings.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office (NSW))

MR C.D. BLEBY, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS E.M.G. CROMPTON, for the Attorney‑General for South Australia, who intervenes.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office (SA))

MR J.A. THOMSON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia:   May it please the Court, I appear with MS F.B. SEAWARD on behalf of the Attorney‑General for Western Australia intervening.  (instructed by State Solicitor’s Office (WA))

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Horan. 

MR HORAN:   May it please the Court.  When a sentencing court fixes a minimum term or non‑parole period, as it is now called, it does so as an integral part of the determination of the punishment for the offence.  In our submission, this determination and imposition of that punishment is an essential and exclusive judicial function.

We say that a legislative extension of the period of ineligibility for parole is in substance the imposition of additional punishment in respect of the same criminal conduct, and this includes a withdrawal or removal of the power to consider whether or not to grant parole for a further period, whether fixed or indefinite, after the expiration of the minimum term fixed by the sentencing court.

The plaintiff’s challenge to section 74AB and, if it applies to the plaintiff, section 74AAA, relies on a series of propositions, which are set out in our written outline of oral argument.  Our first proposition is that the proper construction and characterisation of the provisions is that they deny parole eligibility for a further period of time.  In substance and effect, they extend the non‑parole period or, perhaps more accurately, they impose an additional non‑parole period, a period of ineligibility for parole.

Next, we submit that the imposition of a minimum term of imprisonment before a prisoner becomes eligible to be considered for parole is a discrete component of a punishment for an offence, so that an extension or lengthening…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCATrans 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Ms. Minogue against the State of Victoria concerning the validity of certain provisions of the *Corrections Act 1986* (Vic) and the *Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006* (Vic). The dispute arose from Ms. Minogue's detention and the State's reliance on these legislative provisions to justify her continued imprisonment, which she contended violated her human rights.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the impugned provisions of the *Corrections Act* were compatible with the *Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act*, and if not, what consequences followed. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the legislative scheme impermissibly limited Ms. Minogue's rights, particularly her right to liberty and the right to have her detention reviewed, and whether the State had discharged its obligation under the *Charter* to act in a way compatible with human rights.

The Court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the *Charter* and its interaction with the *Corrections Act*. It was held that the *Corrections Act* provisions, as applied, did not permit the Court to override the clear legislative intent of Parliament. The Court affirmed that while courts must interpret legislation compatibly with human rights, they cannot rewrite legislation that is plainly inconsistent with the *Charter*. The principles applied involved statutory interpretation, the presumption of compatibility with human rights, and the limited power of courts to declare legislation incompatible.

Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the *Corrections Act* provisions were not incompatible with the *Charter* in a manner that would invalidate their application to Ms. Minogue. The Court concluded that the legislative scheme, despite its impact on individual rights, was enacted by Parliament and therefore binding.

Orders

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Background to the litigation

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Evidence Before The Court

Decision

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Legal Principle Established