Reported Decision:
(2003) 126 LGERA 181
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Minister for Planning v. Rose Bay Marina Pty. Limited [2003] NSWCA 119 HEARING DATE(S): 9 May 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
19 May 2003JUDGMENT OF: Meagher JA at 1; Hodgson JA at 2; Santow JA at 44 DECISION: 1. Substitute for the declaration made by the primary judge the declaration set out in par.42. 2. Otherwise appeal dismissed. 3. Appellant to pay respondent's costs of the appeal. CATCHWORDS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - LOCAL GOVERNMENT - Town planning - Existing use - Description of existing use - Relevance of definition of "large marina" in subsequent planning instrument - Generality of description - Whether use as marina excluded by use as public waterway - Extent of actual and physical use, where large area required for use but less than that area physically occupied at any one time. LEGISLATION CITED: Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 ss.106, 107, 108
Environmental Planning & Assessment Regulation 2000 cl.41 and 42CASES CITED: Ashfield Municipal Council v. Armstrong (2002) LGERA 105
Baulkham Hills Shire Council v. O'Donnell (1990) 69 LGRA 404
Dosan Pty. Ltd. v. Rockdale City Council (2001) 117 LGERA 363
Eaton & Son Pty. Ltd. v. Warringah Shire Council (1972) 129 CLR 270
Foodbarn Pty. Ltd. v. Solicitor-General (1975) 32 LGRA 157
Lemworth Pty. Ltd. v. Liverpool City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 371
Mulcahy v. Blue Mountains City Council [No.2] (1995) 87 LGERA 422
North Sydney Municipal Council v. Boyts Radio Electrical Pty. Ltd. (1989) 16 NSWLR 50
Royal Agricultural Society of NSW v. Sydney City Council (1987) 61 LGRA 305
Scully v. Leichhardt Council (1994) 85 LGERA 109
Vaughan Taylor v. David Michell-Melcann (1991) 25 NSWLR 580
Woollahra Municipal Council v. Banool Developments Pty. Ltd. (1973) 129 CLR 138PARTIES :
Minister for Planning - appellant
Rose Bay Marina Pty. Limited - respondentFILE NUMBER(S): CA 40725/02 COUNSEL: Mr. B. Preston SC with Mr. M. Wright for appellant
Mr. M. Craig QC with Mr. J. Robson for respondentSOLICITORS: Department of Planning, Sydney for appellant
Hannaford Lawyers, Sydney for respondent
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): LEC 40191/01 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Pearlman J
CA 40725/02
LEC 40191/01Monday 19 May 2003MEAGHER JA
HODGSON JA
SANTOW JA
1 MEAGHER JA: I agree with Hodgson JA.
2 HODGSON JA: On 9 August 2002, in proceedings brought by the respondent Rose Bay Marina Pty. Ltd. (RBM) against the appellant Minister for Planning (the Minister), Pearlman J in the Land & Environment Court made the following declaration:
- DECLARE THAT the use of the land delineated in red on the plan attached hereto was immediately before 13 July 1990 and remains a use of that land for the purpose of a "large marina" within the meaning of Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 23 - Sydney and Middle Harbours and such constitutes a lawful "existing use"…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 119
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the description of the existing use as a "marina" was sufficiently general to encompass the actual use of the premises, and whether the use as a public waterway excluded its use as a marina. Furthermore, the Court had to consider the extent of the actual and physical use of the premises, particularly where a large area was required for the use but less than that area was physically occupied at any one time.
The Court reasoned that the description of the existing use as a "marina" was sufficiently general to encompass the activities undertaken by the respondent. It held that the use of the premises as a public waterway did not necessarily exclude its use as a marina, as these uses could co-exist. The Court applied the principle that the extent of actual and physical use should be assessed by reference to the nature of the use and the area reasonably required for its operation, rather than solely by the area physically occupied at any particular moment.
The Court of Appeal substituted its own declaration for that of the primary judge and otherwise dismissed the appeal, ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Substitute for the declaration made by the primary judge the declaration set out in par.42. 2. Otherwise appeal dismissed. 3. Appellant to pay respondent's costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts of the case revolve around the nature and extent of the existing use of the land by the respondent as a marina. The land in question was leased from the Crown and had been used for various purposes over time, including as a commercial fishing operation, a private yacht club, and more recently, as a marina. The respondent claimed that the site had been used as a marina since at least 1989, and this use continued until the rescission of approval in 2010. The appellant argued that the use of the site as a public waterway, where the water is not controlled by the occupant, excluded it from being considered a marina. The court had to determine whether the respondent's use of the site qualified as a marina under the definition provided in the relevant planning instrument and whether the use as a public waterway precluded it from being considered an existing marina use.
The factual events leading up to the legal dispute began with the respondent's application for approval to develop a marina at Rose Bay in 2007. The initial approval was conditional, subject to certain conditions being met, including that the development would not result in a significant impact on the environment. After conducting further investigations and considering public submissions, the appellant decided to rescind the conditional approval in 2010, asserting that the respondent's use of the site did not qualify as an existing marina use under the relevant planning instrument. The respondent then challenged this decision in the Land and Environment Court, leading to the split decision and subsequent appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal. The court had to examine the factual circumstances surrounding the use of the site, including the extent of the physical and actual use of the land as a marina and whether it met the definition of a "large marina" in the planning instrument.
The case of Minister for Planning v Rose Bay Marina Pty Ltd originated in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, where the primary judge, Justice Rolfo, determined whether Rose Bay Marina Pty Ltd's operations constituted an "existing use" as defined in the relevant planning instruments. The Minister for Planning appealed the primary judge's decision to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The appeal focused on the interpretation of planning laws and the definition of "existing use" within the context of the Sydney Harbour and Port Authority Act 2007 and the Sydney Harbour Port Authority (General) Planning Instrument 2007. This involved a review of the primary judge's findings regarding the nature and extent of the marina's operations, particularly whether the use of the area as a public waterway excluded it from being considered a marina under the planning instruments.
Key procedural steps in this case included the filing of an appeal by the Minister for Planning, which was subsequently heard by a three-judge panel at the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The appeal was based on the primary judge's interpretation of the statutory definitions and the application of these definitions to the facts of the case. Various interlocutory applications and submissions were made during the proceedings, focusing on the procedural aspects of the appeal rather than the substantive issues. The Court of Appeal examined the primary judge's findings and considered whether they were supported by the evidence and the applicable law. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found that certain aspects of the primary judge's decision required correction, leading to the substitution of a new declaration while dismissing the remainder of the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the use of the land as a public waterway excludes its use as a marina under the definition of "large marina" in the planning instrument.
2. To what extent does the physical occupation of the land at any one time determine the use of the land for the purposes of the definition of "large marina"?
3. Is the description of the existing use in the planning instrument sufficiently general to encompass the appellant's activities?
4. What is the relevance of the definition of "large marina" in the subsequent planning instrument to the description of the existing use?
5. Whether the appellant's use of the land falls within the definition of "large marina" when the area required for the use exceeds the area physically occupied at any one time.
Held
1. The court held that the use of the land as a public waterway does not exclude its use as a marina under the definition of "large marina" in the planning instrument.
2. The court concluded that the extent of physical occupation of the land at any one time is not determinative of the use of the land for the purposes of the definition of "large marina."
3. The court found that the description of the existing use in the planning instrument is sufficiently general to encompass the appellant's activities.
4. The court held that the definition of "large marina" in the subsequent planning instrument is relevant to the description of the existing use.
5. The court concluded that the appellant's use of the land falls within the definition of "large marina" even when the area required for the use exceeds the area physically occupied at any one time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Planning v Rose Bay Marina Pty Ltd, the Court of Appeal addressed several pivotal issues concerning the interpretation of a planning instrument's definition of "large marina" and its application to the appellant's use of the land. The court began by examining whether the use of the land as a public waterway precluded its use as a marina under the definition of "large marina." The court held that the use of the land as a public waterway did not exclude its simultaneous use as a marina. This interpretation was based on the principle that the definition of "large marina" in the planning instrument encompasses any use of the land for marina purposes, regardless of other uses such as public access. This approach aligns with broader planning objectives to accommodate multiple uses of public and private land.
The court further delved into the extent to which the physical occupation of the land at any one time determines its use for the purposes of the "large marina" definition. The court found that the definition does not require a continuous physical occupation of the entire area to constitute a marina but rather considers the overall use and purpose of the land. The court relied on the precedent that the legal definition of a marina focuses on the intended use and operational capacity rather than the exact physical footprint at any given moment. This interpretation ensures flexibility in accommodating large-scale operations like marinas, which often require significant areas for various activities even if not all are occupied simultaneously.
Another critical issue was whether the description of the existing use in the planning instrument was sufficiently general to encompass the appellant's activities. The court held that the description was sufficiently broad to include the appellant's use of the land as a marina. The court reasoned that the term "existing use" in the planning instrument was intended to be flexible and inclusive, allowing for a wide range of activities that fit within the broad category of marina operations. This interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the planning instrument to provide clear guidance without overly restrictive definitions that could stifle legitimate development and use.
The relevance of the definition of "large marina" in a subsequent planning instrument to the description of the existing use was also considered. The court concluded that the subsequent definition did not alter the meaning of the existing use as described in the original planning instrument. The court held that the subsequent definition provided additional context and clarity but did not change the original description's scope or intent. This reasoning ensured that the original description retained its full meaning and applicability, providing a stable and predictable framework for interpreting the appellant's use of the land.
Finally, the court addressed whether the appellant's use of the land fell within the definition of "large marina" when the area required for the use exceeded the area physically occupied at any one time. The court found that the appellant's use did fall within the definition, even though the area required for the marina operations was larger than the area physically occupied at any given time. The court relied on the principle that the definition focuses on the overall intended use and operational capacity of the land, rather than the precise physical footprint at any moment. This interpretation ensures that large-scale operations, which inherently require more space for activities such as docking, storage, and maintenance, are not unduly constrained by definitions that emphasize continuous physical occupation.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the use of land as a marina under the definition of "large marina" in a planning instrument is not precluded by other uses such as public access, and the description of existing use must be interpreted broadly to encompass activities that fit within the broad category of marina operations. Additionally, the court clarified that the definition of "large marina" in a subsequent planning instrument does not alter the original description's scope, and the appellant's use of the land falls within the definition if it meets the operational and capacity requirements, even if the physical occupation at any one time is less than the total area required.