Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nass

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NASS
[2003] FCA 477

MIGRATION – Appeal against magistrate’s decision to set aside decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – Whether Tribunal failed to approach its task in good faith – Alleged recklessness by Tribunal in evaluating evidence – Tribunal’s reasons misstated applicant’s evidence in numerous respects and used the problems suggested by the misstatements as a basis for disbelieving the applicant – Appeal dismissed.

SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361 applied

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS v NASS

N 63 of 2003

WILCOX J
20 MAY 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N63 of 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A FEDERAL MAGISTRATE

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

NASS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N63 of 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A FEDERAL MAGISTRATE

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

NASS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

20 MAY 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WILCOX J:

  1. This is an appeal by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) against a decision of a federal magistrate (Raphael FM) allowing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the respondent a protection visa.  The respondent filed a notice of contention by which he sought to sustain the magistrate’s decision upon an alternative ground that was not accepted by the magistrate.

  2. Pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the Chief Justice directed the appeal be heard by a single judge of the Court.

    Background

  3. The respondent, an Iranian citizen, arrived in Australia on 21 March 2000.  He sought a protection visa, claiming to be a refugee, within the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees), by reason of the fact that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of his religion.  Although he is the respondent to this appeal, it is convenient to refer to this person as “the applicant”, as did the Tribunal and Raphael FM.

  4. The applicant claimed he became a Christian, while still in Iran, and this led to his arrest on two occasions.  On those occasions, he said, he was interrogated and tortured; he regained his freedom only upon his family paying large bribes.

  5. The Tribunal accepted that, since…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 477
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nass involved an Iranian citizen who arrived in Australia on 21 March 2000 and sought a protection visa, claiming to be a refugee due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of his religion. The Refugee Review Tribunal found that the applicant's claims were not reliable and that he fabricated most aspects of his claims to create the profile of a refugee. The Tribunal held that s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 applied to the applicant, and his conduct in Australia must be disregarded in determining whether he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for Convention reasons. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had become a Christian while still in Iran. The Tribunal's decision was reviewed by a magistrate, who set aside the decision and found that the Tribunal failed to approach its task in good faith. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal failed to approach its task in good faith and whether the Tribunal was reckless in evaluating the evidence. The applicant's counsel argued that the Tribunal failed to make a bona fide attempt to exercise its power and that the Tribunal's actions amounted to a concerted, blatant, and dishonest attempt to find against the applicant on the basis of lack of credit. Alternatively, it was argued that the Tribunal had been so recklessly indifferent to the accuracy or otherwise of its statements that it cannot be said to have made a bona fide attempt to exercise its power. The magistrate accepted the alternative submission of recklessness and set aside the Tribunal's decision.

The Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal and held that the Tribunal did not fail to approach its task in good faith. The Court found that the Tribunal's reasons misstated the applicant's evidence in numerous respects, but this did not amount to a failure to approach its task in good faith. The Court held that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated that it had considered the applicant's evidence and had made findings based on that evidence. The Court also held that the Tribunal's misstatements of the evidence did not affect the outcome of the case because the Tribunal did not suggest that the incidents claimed by the applicant, if true, would not have amounted to persecution for a Convention reason. The Court found that the applicant's claim for a protection visa failed because he was disbelieved.

The final orders of the Court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

Pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the Chief Justice directed the appeal be heard by a single judge of the Court.Background The respondent, an Iranian citizen, arrived in Australia on 21 March 2000. He sought a protection visa, claiming to be a refugee, within the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees), by reason of the fact that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of his religion. Although he is the respondent to this appeal, it is convenient to refer to this person as “the applicant”, as did the Tribunal and Raphael FM. The applicant claimed he became a Christian, while still in Iran, and this led to his arrest on two occasions. On those occasions, he said, he was interrogated and tortured; he regained his freedom only upon his family paying large bribes. The Tribunal accepted that, since his arrival in Australia, the applicant had involved himself in Christian activities. However, the Tribunal said this was done only “to provide for himself the profile of, and the enhance his claims to be, a refugee”. Accordingly, the Tribunal held s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 applied to the applicant “and his conduct in Australia must be disregarded in determining whether he has a well founded fear of being persecuted for Convention reasons”. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had become a Christian while still in Iran. The member disbelieved the incidents of persecution claimed by the applicant, finding that “overall [his] evidence was not reliable”. The member expressed the view “that he fabricated most aspects of his claims in an attempt to create for himself the profile of a refugee”. The Tribunal did not suggest the incidents claimed by the applicant, if true, would not have amounted to persecution for a Convention reason; the applicant’s claim for a protection visa failed because he was disbelieved.The magistrate’s decision The hearing before the magistrate took place on 18 December 2002, before the decision of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 195 ALR 24. Consequently, counsel argued the application for judicial review by reference to the so-called “Hickman exceptions”. Counsel for the applicant (Mr L Karp) relied on the first exception in contending to the magistrate that the Tribunal failed to make a bona fide attempt to exercise its power. Mr Karp put this submission on alternative bases. First, he argued, the actions of the Tribunal, in its review of the evidence and its findings and conclusions, amounted to “a concerted, blatant and dishonest attempt to find against the applicant on the basis of lack of credit”. Alternatively, Mr Karp said: “the Tribunal has been so recklessly indifferent to the accuracy or otherwise of its statements that it cannot be said to have made a bona fide attempt to exercise its power”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J
The Tribunal did not suggest the incidents claimed by the applicant, if true, would not have amounted to persecution for a Convention reason; the applicant’s claim for a protection visa failed because he was disbelieved.The magistrate’s decision The hearing before the magistrate took place on 18 December 2002, before the decision of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 195 ALR 24. Consequently, counsel argued the application for judicial review by reference to the so-called “Hickman exceptions”. Counsel for the applicant (Mr L Karp) relied on the first exception in contending to the magistrate that the Tribunal failed to make a bona fide attempt to exercise its power. Mr Karp put this submission on alternative bases. First, he argued, the actions of the Tribunal, in its review of the evidence and its findings and conclusions, amounted to “a concerted, blatant and dishonest attempt to find against the applicant on the basis of lack of credit”. Alternatively, Mr Karp said: “the Tribunal has been so recklessly indifferent to the accuracy or otherwise of its statements that it cannot be said to have made a bona fide attempt to exercise its power”. Raphael FM did not accept the first submission, of deliberate dishonesty; but he upheld the alternative submission, recklessness. In doing so, he referred to a table provided to him by Mr Karp detailing fifteen alleged misstatements, by the Tribunal in its reasons, of the evidence. Counsel for the Minister (Mr J Smith) had responded to that table, conceding many of the misstatements claimed by Mr Karp. The magistrate set out the table in his reasons for judgment and added references to two additional statements of the evidence by the Tribunal that he had found for himself and thought to be dubious. The magistrate had a transcript of the evidence given by the applicant to the Tribunal. So he was able to determine whether the errors claimed by Mr Karp had occurred and their significance. The magistrate accepted the accuracy of Mr Karp’s table in relation to each of the errors claimed by him, although he thought three of them were insignificant, in the sense that they would not have affected the Tribunal member’s understanding of the case put to him by the applicant. However, the magistrate expressed concern that other errors might have affected the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility. In para 9 of his reasons for judgment Raphael FM said:“I have no evidence before me that the Tribunal had before it the transcript of the hearing or that it heard the tape. I would therefore propose to proceed on the basis put forward by the [Minister’s] counsel that the Tribunal began to deal with this matter some months after the hearing had taken place. I am guided, in my approach as to whether what occurred constitutes a failure to approach the Tribunal’s task in good faith, by the views of the Full Bench of the Federal Court in SBBS v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCAFC 361 and in particular [42 to 59].”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J