Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hidalgo

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hidalgo
[2005] FCA 437

MIGRATION – Subclass 835 (Remaining Relative) visa – “overseas near relative” – finding that applicant usually resident in Australia – whether residence in Australia precludes grant of visa

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 475A
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.15

Migration Amendment Regulations 1999 (No 13) SR No 259

Scargill v Minister for Immigration (2003) 129 FCR 259 discussed
Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Hughes (1998) 86 FCR 567 discussed
Gauthiez v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 53 FCR 512 cited
Cam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 14 cited
Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 cited
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 cited

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS v YANIRE PAMELA AHUMADA HIDALGO

No Q 207 of 2004

SPENDER J
15 APRIL 2005
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 207 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPLICANT

AND:

YANIRE PAMELA AHUMADA HIDALGO
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 APRIL 2005

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed with costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 207 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPLICANT

AND:

YANIRE PAMELA AHUMADA HIDALGO
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE:

15 APRIL 2005

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) from a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) given on 15 September 2004, whereby the Tribunal remitted the application made by the visa applicant for an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa to the Minister for reconsideration, with the direction that the visa applicant met the following criteria for a Subclass 835 (Remaining Relative) visa:

    • clause 835.211 of Schedule 2;
    • clause 835.212 of Schedule 2;
    • clause 835.213 of Schedule 2; and
    • clause 835.221 of Schedule 2.
  2. The Minister claims:

    (i)A declaration that the decision is void and of no force and effect.

    (ii)Certiorari removing the decision into the Federal Court of Australia to be quashed, or an order in the nature of certiorari quashing or setting aside the decision.

    (iii)Mandamus or an injunction compelling the Tribunal to consider and determine according to law the applicant’s application for review.

    (iv)Costs.

    (v)Such further or other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

  3. The contention by the Minister is that in making the finding that the applicant met the criteria for a Subclass 835 (Remaining Relative) visa

    ‘The Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, and/or identified a wrong issue, asked…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 437
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hidalgo involved the respondent, a Chilean national, who sought a Subclass 835 (Remaining Relative) visa. The Tribunal had to determine whether the respondent's status as "usually resident in Australia" precluded the grant of the visa. The respondent had arrived in Australia on a Subclass 686 (Tourist Long Stay) visa in 1988, departed in 1999, and re-entered on the same visa, which was set to expire in December 1999. She applied for a visa on the basis of being a remaining relative of her father, who was residing in Australia. The Tribunal found that the respondent had usually resided in Australia at the time of her visa application and during the period of the Tribunal's decision.

The legal issue the court had to decide was whether the respondent's status as "usually resident in Australia" precluded her from being granted a Subclass 835 visa. The court examined subregulation 1.15(1)(c)(i) of the Migration Regulations, which required the Tribunal to assess where the respondent usually resided and where her overseas near relatives resided. The Tribunal concluded that the concept of "usual residence" included both physical presence and an intention to treat a place as home for at least the time being, but not necessarily forever. The court referred to the High Court's decision in Koitaki and the Full Federal Court's decision in Scargill to support its findings on the concept of "usual residence."

The court reasoned that the respondent's physical presence in Australia and her intention to reside there, as evidenced by her application for a visa and her subsequent living arrangements, established that she was "usually resident" in Australia. The court held that this finding did not preclude her from being granted the visa, as the regulation did not require the respondent to prove the existence of an overseas near relative. The court dismissed the application with costs.

The final orders were that the application was dismissed with costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed with costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Tribunal had to consider the current reg 1.15 in the context of the facts in the present case which it found.Factual Background The respondent was born on 1 September 1975 and is a national of Chile. She arrived in Australia on a Subclass 686 (Tourist Long Stay) visa on 17 December 1988. She departed Australia on 14 June 1999 and re-entered on 17 June 1999. The Tourist Long Stay Visa was due to cease on 17 December 1999. She lodged her application for an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa on 14 December 1999. That application, which is the subject of these proceedings, was on the basis that the applicant is a remaining relative of and nominated by her father Mr Juan de Dios Ahumada Robles. The Tribunal noted:‘11.▪ Parents: Juan de Dios Ahumada, married, and Leonor Maria Ahumada (step mother), married, both residing in Australia. Adelina Argelia Hidalgo (mother), country of residence unknown, was added at a later date when requested by the Department;▪Siblings: Trinidad del Carmen Ahumada, born on 20 June 1976; Juan Faustino Ahumada, born on 14 October 1981, and Robert Johnathan Ahumada, born on 17 June 198. All residing in Australia;▪Relatives outside Australia: None. Adelina Argelia Hidalgo, mother, was added at a later date on request of the Department.’12.In a typed statement signed and dated 13 December 1999, the visa applicant claimed that she lived with her mother and grandmother Erlinda Adelina Aseares Nunez, after she was born and that her father had left when she was a few months old. She claimed that her mother later began a spousal relationship and that the grandmother had moved out. The visa applicant claimed that she was sexually abused by her step-father. She eventually moved out to live with her grandmother and her mother was pregnant at the time. The visa applicant claimed that she “cut contact with them and never saw them again”. She claimed that she lived with her grandmother until her grandmother died in August 1987, and then her grandmother’s friend took her in. She claimed that her grandmother had helped her to get in touch with her father who was in Australia, and that she spoke to him for the first time in 1994 and met him in 1995. The visa applicant claimed that she visited Australia in 1998, and that she learnt that her “mother was no longer living where she used to”.’ The Tribunal noted that the applicant had submitted with her visa application:‘▪Certified copy of letter from a Family Therapist of the Peace Centre. The Therapist claimed that she has seen the visa applicant on 3 occasions for counselling sessions regarding claims of sexual abuse as a minor. The Therapist noted that the visa applicant claimed her mother had remarried when she was 11 and her step-father abused her regularly until she moved out at age 15. The Therapist stated the opinion that “the relationship with her father step mother, step brother and sister appears to be having a healing effect on [the visa applicant’s] new found life;▪Copy and translation by the representative of a statutory declaration issued on 5 November 1999 from Sandra Onesima Aracena Marin, claiming that she knew the visa applicant’s family, but had not seen her mother again after the visa applicant’s grandmother passed away in August 1987. She claimed that she was aware that the visa applicant was under the care of Mrs Candelaria Tapia C after that;▪Copy and translation by the representative of a statutory declaration issued on 4 November 1999 from Candelaria Margarita Tapia Campillay, claiming that the visa applicant lived with her grandmother until 12 August 1987, when the grandmother passed away. She claimed that from that date, the visa applicant lived with her family and had refused to live with her own mother. She claimed that “after a while, we never heard from the mother again, just that she had moved to Argentina”;▪Copy and translation by the representative of a statutory declaration issued on 5 November 1999 from Lilian Elizabeth Cuevas Rocco, claiming that she was the visa applicant’s neighbour for many years and that she is aware of the family situation. She claimed that Candelaria Tapia Campillay’s declaration is true;▪Copy and translation by the representative of Erlinda Aedlina Aciares Nunez’s death certificate issued on 28 October 1999, stating date of death as 12 August 1987;▪Certified copies of her birth certificate issued on 9 February 1999 with translation by the representative, disclosing that her father’s name is Juan de Dios Ahumuda Robles and her mother’s name is Adelina Argelia Hidalgo Asiares;▪ Certified copies of relevant pages of her passport.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Notwithstanding that the amendments to reg 1.15 were said to be directed at matters of onus of proof, there is nothing in the way the new reg 1.15 is cast to require the applicant to prove the existence of an overseas near relative. The case is very similar in that respect to the factual situation in Scargill v Minister for Immigration (2003) 129 FCR 259 (“Scargill”) where the Full Court (Carr, RD Nicholson and Merkel JJ) said at par 18:‘It is surprising that no information was sought from the relevant UK authorities to ascertain whether the appellant’s father was still alive. The appellant and his mother simply assumed that to be the case, and the Tribunal has based its finding on that unsatisfactory evidence. Nevertheless, the finding that the father was still alive is a finding of fact for which there was some basis in the material before the Tribunal, and it is not a finding that is open to review. Moreover, the appellant has not challenged that finding.’ (Emphasis added) In this particular case, implicit in the finding of “two overseas near relatives” is a finding that “the applicant’s natural mother is still alive”. The crucial question in this case concerns the application of subregulation 1.15(1)(c)(i). The Tribunal said:‘To assess this criterion, the Tribunal must first make findings on where the visa applicant usually resided at the time of application and also where the visa applicant now usually resides at the time of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal must also determine where each overseas near relative of the visa applicant resided/resides at these relevant times.’ The Tribunal then said ‘The concept of “usual residence” was discussed by the Full Federal Court in Scargill. In that case, the Full Court followed the approach of the High Court in Koitaki [Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1941) 64 CLR 241]. The Full Court stated that the concept of “usual residence” has 2 elements: a physical presence; and an intention to treat a place as home for at least the time being but not necessarily forever.Scargill made it clear that where someone is “usually resident” is a question of fact and that it is open to a decision maker to find that a person who holds a temporary visa is “usually resident” in Australia. The Full Court stated the following at paragraph 27:‘In the present case, the appellant’s presence in Australia after he left the USA was lawful. He entered Australia on a temporary permit as a visitor, suggesting that at the time of his entry he may not have had a firm intention to reside in the future in Australia. However, after two and a half months, he made an application for a visa which assumes such an intention, and thereafter he lived in Australia with his mother. Had the Tribunal posed the question: ‘Where in that period was his place of abode, where was his home?’ the answer inevitably would have been ‘in Australia at his mother’s place’, and the material before the Tribunal indicated that his only intention was to remain living there.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER J