Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jama

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jama [1999] FCA 1680

MIGRATION – whether persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group – clan fighting in Somalia – whether Tribunal directed attention to future situation in Somalia

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476(1)(c), 476(1)(e), 476(1)(g), 476(3)(e), 476(4)(a)

Abdalla v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 11, approved
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 87 FCR 280, approved
Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 AC 293, cited
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, discussed

Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 190 CLR 225, cited
Periannan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Wilcox J, 28 July 1987), cited

Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1077, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, cited
Western Television Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 12 FCR 414, cited
Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511, cited

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v KALTUN ISMAIL JAMA
N 755 OF 1999

BRANSON, SACKVILLE and KIEFEL JJ
SYDNEY
3 DECEMBER 1999

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 755 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Appellant

AND:

KALTUN ISMAIL JAMA
Respondent

JUDGES:

BRANSON, SACKVILLE and KIEFEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 DECEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 755 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Appellant

AND:

KALTUN ISMAIL JAMA
Respondent

JUDGES:

BRANSON, SACKVILLE and KIEFEL JJ

DATE:

3 DECEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BRANSON & SACKVILLE JJ:
INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant (“the Minister”) appeals from a judgment of a Judge of this Court which set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant to the respondent Kaltun Ismail Jama (“Ms Jama”) a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. For present purposes, Ms Jama is entitled to be granted a protection visa if the relevant decision-maker is satisfied that she is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to The Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees (together “the Refugees Convention”).

  3. Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention to Ms Jama if she is a person who:

    “… owing to a…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jama and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1680
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jama concerns a Somali national's application for a protection visa, which was denied by the Tribunal. Ms Jama's application was based on her fear of persecution if she returned to Somalia due to her membership in the Musa Arra sub-clan of the Habr Yunis sub-clan of the Isaaq clan. The Tribunal found Ms Jama to be a credible witness but concluded that there was no real chance she would be persecuted due to clan membership if she returned to Somalia. The trial judge found errors in the Tribunal's reasoning and decision, leading to the Minister's appeal to the Full Court.

The key legal issues in this case revolve around the interpretation of the Refugees Convention and the application of its provisions to Ms Jama's situation. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal correctly applied the law in determining whether Ms Jama had a well-founded fear of persecution if she returned to Somalia. The court had to consider if the Tribunal properly assessed the evidence and whether it had misapplied the law by drawing a distinction between traditional warfare and persecution for a Refugees Convention reason.

The Full Court, while acknowledging the Tribunal's diligent research, found that it had misapprehended the evidence or the subject for enquiry, or both. The court held that the Tribunal erred by not considering whether the clan-based conflict in Somalia had an objective in addition to the acquisition or control of territory, which might result in acts indirectly advancing those objectives by targeting non-combatant sub-clan members, including Ms Jama. This approach overlooked the possibility of both traditional and persecutory motives in the conflict. The court concluded that the Tribunal had addressed the wrong question and failed to consider whether there was a real chance Ms Jama would suffer persecution if returned to Somalia.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. This decision reinforces the understanding that clan-based conflicts can have both traditional and persecutory elements and that decision-makers must carefully consider all evidence to determine whether there is a real chance of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention to Ms Jama if she is a person who:“… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [herself] of the protection of that country ….”FACTS Ms Jama is a citizen of Somalia. She arrived in Australia on 24 February 1997 and lodged an application for a protection visa on 30 June 1997. The Tribunal found Ms Jama to be a credible witness and accepted her account of her circumstances. Relevantly, Ms Jama’s circumstances are that she is a member of the Musa Arra sub-clan of the Habr Yunis sub-clan of the Isaaq clan. In 1988, when Ms Jama was eleven years of age, her family fled from their home in the town of Hargeisa in north-west Somalia, seeking protection in a refugee camp in Ethiopia. The Tribunal was satisfied that Ms Jama has no right of return to Ethiopia. The Tribunal recorded that Ms Jama feared that she would be killed or raped if she returned to Somalia, in consequence of retaliation by the ruling sub-clan against her sub-clan. Since the Tribunal expressly accepted Ms Jama’s account, it must have accepted that she did have these fears. The Tribunal appears also to have been satisfied that Ms Jama feared that, as a young, single, unaccompanied woman without relatives in Somalia, she would be vulnerable to attack if she returned to Somalia because of the status of women in that country. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Isaaq clan, of which the Habr Yunis is a sub-clan, is “a particular social group” in Somalia within the meaning of the Refugees Convention, and that “young single Somali females without protection” are also such a social group. The Tribunal accepted the independent evidence available to it which revealed that Somalia is in a state of civil war with much of the conflict clan-based and involving shifting alliances. It identified the first question for its consideration as “whether there is a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for reasons of her clan membership should she return to Somalia.” The Tribunal observed that:‘A power imbalance between warring groups … does not of itself convert … warfare into “persecution” of the weaker and more vulnerable group unless the group is being systematically harassed for a Convention reason.’It reasoned:“Where an applicant’s claims concern clan warfare it will be necessary to consider whether the fighting is aimed at establishing or maintaining power or establishing control over land or resources, which would generally not be persecution, or whether it can properly be regarded as part of a course of systematic conduct or harassment for a Convention reason.There is no evidence before the Tribunal that supports the view that the Habr Yunis subclan [Musa] Arra is being persecuted for a Convention reason. According to the independent evidence the opposing clans are fighting over the control of North West Somalia.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

His Honour held that whilst in the usual case that provision would only apply if there was no evidence to support some positive claim asserted by the applicant, here there was no question of disbelief of the applicant’s own factual claims and they led naturally to the conclusion that she had a well founded fear of persecution. His Honour went on:“A decision that she should not have refugee status based on considerations of her safety could, in those circumstances, only be rationally made if there was other evidence from which the decision-maker could reasonably be satisfied that there was no reasonable chance that the applicant would not be persecuted”. His Honour held there was no such evidence and that, relevantly, there was no evidence that, having regard to her particular circumstances, her membership of the Habr Yunis clan, she could safely return to Hargeisa, whatever the position of other refugees; and there was no evidence that she could safely go elsewhere in Somalia. His Honour recognised that he had applied, as appropriate, a shift in the evidential burden of proof. The second error identified by his Honour under the heading of “Available Protection”, was that the Tribunal had addressed the wrong question. This was held by his Honour to come within s 476(1)(c), which provides a ground for review where the decision is not one authorised by the Act. Alternatively, his Honour considered that the Tribunal had been guilty of a constructive failure to exercise its jurisdiction: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, 577. The correct questions identified by his Honour were whether this applicant could be safely repatriated to Somalia, not whether many refugees might now be; and whether (more widely), there was any reasonable chance that, as a Habr Yunis this applicant might be persecuted. His Honour added that the available material might, barely, maintain an inference that it was more probable than not that the applicant would not be persecuted, but it could not sustain an inference that there was no reasonable chance of such persecution and “whether actual conditions on the ground in and around Hargeisa would assure the applicant, beyond a reasonable chance to the contrary, of safety was simply not addressed by the evidence”. His Honour considered that that error may also be reviewable under s 476(1)(e) because there was an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. The Minister appeals from his Honour’s decision. The Appeal The Full Court in Abdi’s case held that the fact that civil war is taking place does not exclude the possibility that persecution, in its Convention sense, can also occur. Their Honours identified that (290): “The relevant question raised by the language of the definition requires a determination, on the evidence, of whether the harm or detriment is for a Convention reason. In the present case there appears to be a risk of serious harm in Somalia even to bystanders and those on the sidelines who are incidentally caught up in what might be called the “cross-fire”. This, however, is not sufficient. The evidence must go further and disclose a Convention connection between the persecution of the applicant or the clan to which he belongs and the risk of harm. This in turn calls for a consideration, so far as can be determined on the evidence, as to the purpose and nature of the war, the way it is conducted, and the objectives sought to be achieved by the war.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal also concluded that protection was available to the applicant from her clan or from the interim government in north-west Somalia. In that respect, it referred to the submission that she would have difficulty integrating in north-west Somalia because she had no immediate family and had not lived there for some time, but accepted the independent evidence that there was relative stability in Hargeisa and that there were policemen and an army maintaining law and order. The Tribunal accepted the independent evidence of the UNHCR’s analysis of the situation, that clan members could stay in safety in their own clan areas and that stability, as well as law and order, had returned to most of the territory. There was, it found, protection and systems in place for the applicant’s repatriation to her former home. The Trial Judge’s decision His Honour did not accept the Tribunal’s finding that there was “no evidence” to support the view that the applicant’s sub-clan was being persecuted for a Convention reason. In his Honour’s view the evidence to which the Tribunal had referred “was littered with examples of brutal clan-based conflict”. His Honour considered that the Tribunal’s reasoning drew a clear distinction between hardship suffered “by reason of” conflict motivated by control over resources or territorial dominance, which his Honour described as “traditional aims of warfare” on the one hand, and systematic harassment “by reason of” a Convention ground, and observed that the distinction was now well established in migration case law, referring to Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1077, and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 87 FCR 280. His Honour went on, however, to observe that though a distinction might be drawn between “traditional warfare” and “convention persecution”, the categories are not mutually exclusive, and the fact that the Somalian war was being conducted in order to obtain control over territory or resources does not preclude a finding that harm may have been concurrently caused for a Convention reason. There may be both traditional and persecutory motives. Wars that begin for traditional reasons may develop a persecutory element: Abdalla v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 11. His Honour concluded that the Tribunal’s characterisation of the Somali conflict as “traditional” (his Honour’s term) “effectively foreclosed the possibility that the conflict may have also generated ‘Convention persecution’”. The error was considered by his Honour to be one under s 476(1)(e) Migration Act, namely one which involved an incorrect application of the law to the facts. As to the question of availability of protection, his Honour referred at length to the evidence to which reference had been made by the Tribunal and then set out what it appeared to amount to. I do not propose to detail his Honour’s conclusions. Whilst acknowledging that the Tribunal appeared to have diligently researched conditions in Somaliland and Hargeisa, it nevertheless appeared to his Honour, that it had misapprehended either the evidence or the true subject for enquiry, or both.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour also held that the Tribunal had “addressed the wrong question”. He considered that the evidence before the Tribunal might have supported an inference that Ms Jama probably would not be persecuted by reason of her membership of the Habr Yunis clan. However, it could not sustain an inference that there was no reasonable chance of such persecution. Although it is not entirely clear, his Honour may have intended to hold that the Tribunal had failed to engage in the necessary consideration of future conditions in north-west Somalia and thus failed to consider whether there was a real chance that the appellant would suffer persecution in the future for a Refugees Convention reason, were she to be returned to Somalia.CONSIDERATION In our view, the learned trial Judge was right to conclude that the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that there was a dichotomy between fighting “aimed at establishing or maintaining power or establishing control over land or resources” (which his Honour referred to as “traditional warfare”) and persecution for a Refugees Convention reason. In other words, the Tribunal approached the question by regarding the two alternatives as mutually exclusive. A natural reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, set out in par 10 above, indicates that the Tribunal considered that it followed from the independent evidence that the opposing clans were fighting over the control of north-west Somalia, that there could be no persecution of members of the Habr Yunis sub-clan for a Refugees Convention reason. This interpretation is reinforced by the Tribunal’s reliance on a quotation from the UNHCR Handbook, par 164, suggesting that“[p]ersons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered [to be] refugees…”. The Tribunal did not ask whether the clan-based fighting, accepting that it related to control over north-west Somalia, had an objective additional to the acquisition or control of territory, or whether the objectives of the fighting might be indirectly advanced by acts likely to be destructive of the morale of members of Ms Jama’s sub-clan. This could be the case, for example, if acts were directed at non-combatant sub-clan members. In short, the Tribunal did not ask whether the clan-based conflict gave rise to a real chance that members of the sub-clan, including Ms Jama, would be singled out for persecutory treatment because of their clan membership. Full Courts of this Court in Abdalla v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 11, at 20, and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 87 FCR 280, at par 38, have held that no dichotomy of the kind referred to in par 17 above exists. Each of the decisions was published after the date of the Tribunal’s decision and so could not have been taken into account by the Tribunal. On 10 September 1999, the High Court granted special leave to appeal in Abdi, in part because the Full Court declined to follow the reasoning of the House of Lords in Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 AC 293. However, it was not contended that it would be appropriate for this Court to decline to follow the approach taken by the Full Court in Abdi.