Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Dhingra

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Dhingra [2000] FCA 406

MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether offence under s 83G of the Act as in force in January 1993 same as offence under current s 243 – relevance of difference between “stay permit” and “stay visa” – effect of renumbering – relevance of consequences for respondent of construction of section

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14, 29, 30, 189, 198, 237, 243, 284
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) s 40
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 8, 8A, 15AA
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth)
Migration (1993) Regulations reg 1.6, 3A
Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations reg 4
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.15A

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 cited
Azevedo v Secretary Department of Primary Industries and Energy (1992) 35 FCR 254 cited
Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 cited
Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 cited
Re Bolton; ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 cited

Chandler & Co v Collector of Customs (1907) 4 CLR 1719 considered
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 referred to

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
v SANJEEV DHINGRA

N 1198 of 1999

BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ
SYDNEY
5 APRIL 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1198 of 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

SANJEEV DHINGRA
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 APRIL 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1198 of 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

SANJEEV DHINGRA
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ

DATE:

5 APRIL 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURCHETT and BRANSON JJ

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal with leave from an interlocutory decision of a judge of the Court which resulted in an order that the respondent (“Mr Dhingra”) be released from immigration custody.  The learned primary judge made the order for release following the determination by him of the answers to three preliminary questions.  The questions, and the effect of his Honour’s answers, are as follows:

    Question 1:Is a person convicted of an offence under s 83G of the Migration Act 1958 as at January 1993, thereby convicted of an offence for the purpose of s 243(2) of the Act as at July 1999?

    Answer:No.

    Question 2:If the answer to question 1 is yes, is such a person thereby an unlawful non-citizen for the purpose of the Act?

    Answer:

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 406
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court is an appeal by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs against a decision that allowed the applicant, Sanjeev Kumar Dhingra, to remain in Australia. Dhingra, an Indian citizen, was initially granted a Spouse visa based on his marriage to an Australian citizen. However, he was convicted of a crime related to his visa application, leading to his imprisonment and subsequent detention by immigration authorities. The central legal issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of sections 83G and 243 of the relevant immigration legislation, particularly in relation to the liability for being an illegal entrant. The appellant argues that the elements of the offence under section 83G(1), as in force in January 1993, are identical to those under section 243(1) and contends that Dhingra became subject to civil liability under section 83G(2) upon committing the offence in January 1993, which was not extinguished by subsequent amendments to the Act.

The court examined the legislative framework, specifically section 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, which provides that a repeal of an Act should not affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired under the repealed Act, unless the contrary intention appears. The court found that section 83G(2) did not subject anyone to liability as an illegal entrant based on committing an offence under section 83G(1) but rather attached that liability to those convicted of such an offence. This distinction is crucial because a person may commit an offence without being convicted and vice versa. Consequently, the court held that Dhingra did not become an illegal entrant by virtue of committing the offence under section 83G(1).

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs. This ruling clarifies the legal interpretation of the relevant sections of the immigration legislation, ensuring that liability for being an illegal entrant is only incurred upon conviction, not merely by committing an offence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

In our view the appeal from his Honour should be dismissed for the reasons which are set out below.Factual Background The factual background to the hearing before the primary judge was set out in the following paragraphs of his Honour’s reasons for judgment.“The applicant is a citizen of India who first entered Australia on a visitor entry permit on 7 April 1989. He made a number of unsuccessful applications for Australian permanent residence. On 13 January 1993 the applicant married an Australian citizen. Soon after he returned to India where he lodged an application with the Australian High Commission in New Delhi (“the Commission”) to migrate to Australia on the basis of his marriage. On 13 October 1993 the Commission approved Mr Dhingra’s application and granted him a Class 100 Spouse visa. He returned to Australia on this visa on 20 October 1993, and on arrival was granted an entry permit to remain in Australia permanently.On 23 October 1996 the applicant was committed for trial at the District Court in Sydney on indictment that he:“between 13 January 1993 and 1 February 1993 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales applied for a stay permit on the basis of satisfying a criterion for the permit because of being married to another person namely Angeline Singh, whereas at the time of the application, the accused did not intend to live permanently with the other person in a genuine and continuing marital relationship.”The applicant was convicted on 31 March 1999, and was remanded in custody. On 7 May 1999, Judge Mahoney of the District Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen months imprisonment from 31 March 1999 and imposed a fine of $3000 though the terms of the sentence enabled the applicant to be released on 1 April 2000.The applicant appealed against the severity of the sentence. On 29 July 1999 bail was granted by a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the following terms:“The Court orders:That SANJEEV KUMAR DHINGRA be granted bail on the following conditions:1. A) The applicant is to be of good behaviour whilst on bail.B)His Honour directs that the applicant is not to be released except into the custody of an officer from the Dept of Immigration.C)The applicant is to prosecute his application for leave to appeal with due diligence.D)The applicant is to appear before the Court of Criminal Appeal on the date which is notified to his solicitor as the date of the hearing of his application for leave to appeal.E)Bail is to be automatically revoked in the event of any breach of any one of these conditions and the applicant may thereupon be arrested by any Police Officer.F) Bail may be entered into before any Justice of the Peace.”The appeal has yet to be heard. It appears to be common ground that when the applicant was granted bail, he was immediately detained by Departmental officers and placed in immigration detention as an unlawful non-citizen in purported reliance upon ss 189, 196 and 243(2) of the current Act. On 1 September 1999, a Departmental officer advised the applicant’s solicitor that he had received advice to the effect that the Minister was able to remove the applicant from Australia on the basis that the applicant is an unlawful non-citizen.”Legislative Framework

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant contends that the elements of the offence under s 83G(1) (as in force in January 1993) are identical to the elements of the offence under s 243(1). Further, and possibly in the alternative, the appellant contends that upon the respondent committing in January 1993 an offence against s 83G(1) of the Act, he became subject to the civil liability provided for by s 83G(2) of the Act (ie of becoming an illegal entrant) and the subsequent amendment of s 83G did not extinguish that liability. Reliance is placed on s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“the Acts Interpretation Act”).CONSIDERATION The issue for determination is one of statutory construction. Ultimately the search is for the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the words of the Act viewed as a whole and having regard to legitimate aids to construction (Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 per Mason and Wilson JJ at 319-321). Section 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act relevantly provides:“8 Where an Act repeals in whole or in part a former Act, then unless the contrary intention appears the repeal shall not:(a)[not here relevant]; or(b)[not here relevant]; or(c)affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any Act so repealed; or(d)affect any penalty forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any Act so repealed; or(e)affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege obligation liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;and any such investigation legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted continued or enforced, and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed.” Section 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act provides:“8AA reference in section … 8 to the repeal of an Act or a part of an Act includes a reference to:(a)a repeal effected by implication;(b)the abrogation or limitation of the effect of the Act or part; and(c)the exclusion of the application of the Act or part to any person, subject matter or circumstance.” It is not necessary in this case to determine the effect of s 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act (but see Azevedo v Secretary, Department of Primary Industries and Energy (1992) 35 FCR 284 at 301) or to give consideration to the general principles of the common law designed to avoid giving retrospective effect to statutory provisions (see Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 per Gibbs J at 20-23). In our view, it is plain that s 83G(2), as in force in January 1993, did not subject any person who committed an offence under s 83G(1) to liability as an illegal entrant. Rather it attached that liability to any person convicted of an offence under s 83G(1). The distinction is not one of mere semantics: a person may commit an offence without thereafter being convicted of that offence and a person may be wrongly convicted of an offence and either not appeal or not successfully appeal.