FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Dhingra [2000] FCA 406
MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether offence under s 83G of the Act as in force in January 1993 same as offence under current s 243 – relevance of difference between “stay permit” and “stay visa” – effect of renumbering – relevance of consequences for respondent of construction of section
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14, 29, 30, 189, 198, 237, 243, 284
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) s 40
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 8, 8A, 15AA
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth)
Migration (1993) Regulations reg 1.6, 3A
Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations reg 4
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.15ACooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 cited
Azevedo v Secretary Department of Primary Industries and Energy (1992) 35 FCR 254 cited
Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 cited
Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 cited
Re Bolton; ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 citedChandler & Co v Collector of Customs (1907) 4 CLR 1719 considered
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 referred toMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
v SANJEEV DHINGRAN 1198 of 1999
BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ
SYDNEY
5 APRIL 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1198 of 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
SANJEEV DHINGRA
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 APRIL 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1198 of 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
SANJEEV DHINGRA
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
BURCHETT, HILL and BRANSON JJ
DATE:
5 APRIL 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT and BRANSON JJ
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal with leave from an interlocutory decision of a judge of the Court which resulted in an order that the respondent (“Mr Dhingra”) be released from immigration custody. The learned primary judge made the order for release following the determination by him of the answers to three preliminary questions. The questions, and the effect of his Honour’s answers, are as follows:
Question 1:Is a person convicted of an offence under s 83G of the Migration Act 1958 as at January 1993, thereby convicted of an offence for the purpose of s 243(2) of the Act as at July 1999?
Answer:No.
Question 2:If the answer to question 1 is yes, is such a person thereby an unlawful non-citizen for the purpose of the Act?
Answer:
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Dhingra and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2000] FCA 406
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legislative framework, specifically section 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, which provides that a repeal of an Act should not affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired under the repealed Act, unless the contrary intention appears. The court found that section 83G(2) did not subject anyone to liability as an illegal entrant based on committing an offence under section 83G(1) but rather attached that liability to those convicted of such an offence. This distinction is crucial because a person may commit an offence without being convicted and vice versa. Consequently, the court held that Dhingra did not become an illegal entrant by virtue of committing the offence under section 83G(1).
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs. This ruling clarifies the legal interpretation of the relevant sections of the immigration legislation, ensuring that liability for being an illegal entrant is only incurred upon conviction, not merely by committing an offence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant contends that the elements of the offence under s 83G(1) (as in force in January 1993) are identical to the elements of the offence under s 243(1). Further, and possibly in the alternative, the appellant contends that upon the respondent committing in January 1993 an offence against s 83G(1) of the Act, he became subject to the civil liability provided for by s 83G(2) of the Act (ie of becoming an illegal entrant) and the subsequent amendment of s 83G did not extinguish that liability. Reliance is placed on s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“the Acts Interpretation Act”).CONSIDERATION The issue for determination is one of statutory construction. Ultimately the search is for the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the words of the Act viewed as a whole and having regard to legitimate aids to construction (Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 per Mason and Wilson JJ at 319-321). Section 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act relevantly provides:“8 Where an Act repeals in whole or in part a former Act, then unless the contrary intention appears the repeal shall not:(a)[not here relevant]; or(b)[not here relevant]; or(c)affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any Act so repealed; or(d)affect any penalty forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any Act so repealed; or(e)affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege obligation liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;and any such investigation legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted continued or enforced, and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed.” Section 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act provides:“8AA reference in section … 8 to the repeal of an Act or a part of an Act includes a reference to:(a)a repeal effected by implication;(b)the abrogation or limitation of the effect of the Act or part; and(c)the exclusion of the application of the Act or part to any person, subject matter or circumstance.” It is not necessary in this case to determine the effect of s 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act (but see Azevedo v Secretary, Department of Primary Industries and Energy (1992) 35 FCR 284 at 301) or to give consideration to the general principles of the common law designed to avoid giving retrospective effect to statutory provisions (see Mathieson v Burton (1971) 124 CLR 1 per Gibbs J at 20-23). In our view, it is plain that s 83G(2), as in force in January 1993, did not subject any person who committed an offence under s 83G(1) to liability as an illegal entrant. Rather it attached that liability to any person convicted of an offence under s 83G(1). The distinction is not one of mere semantics: a person may commit an offence without thereafter being convicted of that offence and a person may be wrongly convicted of an offence and either not appeal or not successfully appeal.