Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant M

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Applicant M [2002] FCAFC 253

MIGRATION – protection visa – whether conscientious objector in Afghanistan would have well-founded fear of persecution by reason of “political opinion”– whether “political opinion” of conscientious objection imputed – whether Afghan society perceived conscientious objectors as comprising a “particular social group”.

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 referred to
Mijoljevic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 834 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant Z [2001] FCA 1823 cited

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v
APPLICANT M

W 502 of 2001

WHITLAM, NORTH and STONE JJ
23 AUGUST 2002
SYDNEY (HEARD AT PERTH)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 502 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

APPLICANT M
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WHITLAM, NORTH and STONE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD AT PERTH)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal is allowed.

2.   The orders made by the primary judge on 5 October 2001 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that:

(a)the application be dismissed, and

(b)the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

3.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 502 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

APPLICANT M
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

WHITLAM, NORTH and STONE JJ

DATE:

23 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD AT PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. This is one of a series of cases under the Migration Act1958 (“the Act”) in which a judge of the Court held that able-bodied Afghan males were a “particular social group” for the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention.  A Full Court (Sackville, Kiefel and Hely JJ) allowed the appeal in one of these cases: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant Z [2001] FCA 1823. In that case Sackville J held that the judge erred in holding that the material before the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) obliged it to consider whether able-bodied Afghan men constituted a particular social group. Kiefel J held that able-bodied Afghan males did not constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugees Convention. Hely J agreed with Sackville J and with Kiefel J.

  2. In the present case counsel for the respondent concedes that the material before the Tribunal was insufficient to require it to consider whether able-bodied Afghan men constituted a particular social group of which his client was a member.  However, he seeks to sustain the primary judge’s order setting aside the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of the other grounds that…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant M, the applicant sought review of a decision made by the Tribunal regarding his claim for a protection visa. The Tribunal had determined that the applicant would not face a "real chance" of persecution if he were to return to Afghanistan, primarily due to the Taliban's recruitment practices targeting males for military service rather than political opposition. The primary judge reviewed this decision, finding that the Tribunal had erred in not considering whether the applicant would be singled out for persecution due to his political opinion as a conscientious objector and his membership in a social group of conscientious objectors to military service.

The legal issues in this case centred on whether the Tribunal properly assessed the applicant's claims regarding potential persecution due to imputed political opinion and membership in a particular social group. The primary judge held that the Tribunal's reasoning was flawed because it did not consider whether the applicant's conscientious objection to military service would lead to persecution on the basis of political opinion or his membership in a social group. This oversight was deemed a jurisdictional error under the Migration Act.

The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to consider these aspects of the applicant's claims constituted a jurisdictional error. The primary judge's decision to allow the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Tribunal was based on this finding of error. The appeal was allowed, the orders made by the primary judge were set aside, and the application was dismissed. Additionally, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders made by the primary judge on 5 October 2001 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that:

(a) the application be dismissed, and

(b) the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal did not find that the respondent’s departure to avoid the ad hoc conscription practices of the Taliban would lead them to consider he was politically opposed to them. It did find (at p 21) that he could return to Afghanistan and “not face a ‘real chance’ of persecution for a Convention reason”. The Tribunal accepted that the respondent might “face serious harm as a consequence of being recruited into the Taliban militia”, but it found that “although he may not be committed to the aims and objectives of the Taliban, the motivation of the Taliban in recruiting him would be solely because he is a male with the potential to fight and for no other reason.”The Decision of the Primary Judge The primary judge held at [34] that the Tribunal erred in law to the extent that it fell into jurisdictional error within the meaning of s 476(1)(b) of the Act. His Honour identified two such errors. First, he said at [22] that “the Tribunal confined its reasoning, on the question whether the respondent had suffered persecution by reason of political opinion, to the question whether he had spoken out against the Taliban”. His Honour held at [25] that the Tribunal accordingly failed to consider whether the respondent “would be singled out from other objectors to conscription on the basis that he was a conscientious objector and thus held a political opinion for which he would be persecuted”. Secondly, the primary judge held at [34] that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the respondent had a well-founded fear of persecution “by reason of his membership of a particular social group comprising those persons who held a conscientious objection to military service.”An Imputed Political Opinion as a Conscientious Objector? His Honour thought that the respondent had “put forward” to the Tribunal a claim that he would be at risk of persecution by reason of a political opinion attributed to him on the basis of his pacifist views. His Honour detected this claim as having been raised in two items of evidence before the Tribunal. The first was a statement of the respondent’s reasons for claiming to be a refugee in Part C of his protection visa application. This statement was dated 25 July 2000 and was prepared by John O’Kane, a migration agent in the firm of solicitors who acted for the respondent throughout the prosecution of his visa application. The second piece of evidence was something the respondent evidently said either in an interview with an officer from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“DIMA”) or at the hearing before the Tribunal. In the statement dated 25 July 2000 the respondent said:“I am 27 years old I was living with my family. I was living with my father and mother, with my three brothers and three sisters, and my wife and child. I was a sewing machinist and I was running a shop. My brother Mohammad Ismail was working as a driver. The rest of my brothers and my father were working on the farm.Why I left my country:The reason I left Afghanistan was that the Taliban forced us to go to the front line and fight against their enemies. Otherwise we have to pay 20,000,000 Afghani a month not to go and fight.When I was working in my shop the Taliban were coming to the shop and were giving us a very hard time about my beard and my long hair. They said my beard had to be very long and that I should not have long hair.One day they took my cousin, that was seven months ago and he was killed in the battle. Three months ago, before I left, they came to my house and they asked my father – you have to send your son to the fight and that is why my father decided that I have to leave Afghanistan. I was at home at the time, but when they came I was hiding inside. They spoke only to my father and he told them that I was not home.I do not agree that the Taliban should make young people go to the war zone and fight. I will never agree to kill anybody. If the Taliban caught me and wanted me to go and fight and I refused, they would either have taken us by force, put me in jail or killed me. It is my political opinion that the Taliban should not be able to take young men to the front if they do not want to fight, but they take them by force. Because of that opinion I would be in danger if I stayed in Afghanistan.My father found a smuggler, I don’t know how he found him. I had met this smuggler before this once … his name was Niamatullah. He took me somewhere in Afghanistan and introduced me to another smuggler. I went with that smuggler and then he introduced me to another smuggler.Finally we ended up in Bali – the smuggler told us it was Bali. I don’t know what countries we went through on the way or where we left Afghanistan.What I fear might happen if I go back to my country:If I went back to Afghanistan the Taliban would kill me.Who I think will harm or mistreat me if I go back:The Taliban are the ones who would kill me.Why I believe they will harm or mistreat me if I go back:First of all they would kill me because I escaped from Afghanistan, second of all because they asked us to go to the fight and I refused.They have come to my house asking about me and I felt my life was in danger if I stayed.Why I believe that the authorities in my country will not protect me if I go back:I only have my father and brothers – there are no authorities who can protect me from the Taliban.”(We have highlighted those parts of the answers in the statement that the primary judge apparently had in mind.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.