FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) [2011] FCA 1467
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) [2011] FCA 1467 Appeal from: MZYLE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 589 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v MZYLE and PETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER File number: VID 960 of 2011 Judge: NORTH J Date of judgment: 19 December 2011 Date of hearing: 28 October 2011 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr S Donaghue Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Niall SC with Ms A Burt Solicitor for the First Respondent: Victorian Legal Aid Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 960 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
AppellantAND: MZYLE
First RespondentPETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 960 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
AppellantAND: MZYLE
First RespondentPETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
19 DECEMBER 2011
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an appeal by the appellant, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, from a declaration made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 15 August 2011. The Federal Magistrates Court declared that the second respondent, a merits reviewer, made errors of law in recommending to the appellant that the first respondent is not a refugee within the definition in Art 1A of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).
The first respondent is a national of Sri Lanka. He arrived at Christmas Island on 7 February 2010. An initial assessment of his refugee status made by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) was unfavourable to him. He therefore applied for a merits review of the assessment. On 2 December 2010, the second respondent produced written reasons for the recommendation to the appellant that the first respondent should not be recognised as a refugee.
Section 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) prohibits the publication of a person’s name in certain proceedings involving refugee claims. The section does not apply to the present challenge to the refugee status assessment which is merely a recommendation to the appellant for the purpose of his considering whether to permit the first respondent to apply for a protection visa. The…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2011] FCA 1467
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the Federal Circuit Court had correctly applied the law in reviewing the RRT's decision. Specifically, the court had to determine if the RRT had properly assessed the risk of persecution faced by the applicant upon returning to Sri Lanka. The court also needed to examine whether the RRT had correctly applied the principles of assessing risk as opposed to making a definitive finding on the future state of affairs.
The Federal Court found that the Federal Circuit Court had not adequately considered the principles of risk assessment as required by the jurisprudence. The court emphasised that the assessment of risk involved weighing the evidence and determining the likelihood of future persecution, rather than making a binary decision on the facts. The court noted that the RRT's decision had not sufficiently articulated the process of risk assessment, which was critical for the determination of refugee status. The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court should have identified and rectified these errors in the RRT's decision-making process.
In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the Federal Circuit Court had not properly exercised its jurisdiction to review the RRT's decision. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, reflecting the court's view that the appeal was not well-founded.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to this aspect of the reviewer’s reasons, the Federal Magistrate said: 45.… the law requires an assessment of the risk to the asylum seeker, not a positive finding as to what the future will in fact hold. …46.The law in this area does not require a decision-maker to “come down on one side or the other”. Rather the law requires the decision-maker to first make an assessment of the material and identify the facts and circumstances which they are persuaded to accept or reject and assess the weight to place on each item of evidence. Secondly, in cases involving asylum seekers, the legal test is not limited to whether or not they have proven a particular factual element (such as the application of physical force on a specific occasion), but ultimately requires an assessment of risk in determining whether or not the asylum seeker holds a well-founded fear of persecution. 47.To approach the task on the basis that a decision-maker has a responsibility to “come down on one side or the other” can only lead to real concern that rather than assessing and weighing the evidence in order to determine which facts and circumstances the decision-maker is persuaded of, (and the weight to be placed on the material in order to properly assess the risk) the decision maker felt forced to make a binary decision and effectively pick one version or the other, even though the decision maker may not be persuaded to the requisite standard that any particular given state of affairs actually exists: the very error committed by the trial judge in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 2 All ER 712; [1985] 1 WLR 948; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1. The assessment of risk is a different finding to a decision as to whether a particular factual element of a cause of action has been established.Consideration It was accepted by both the appellant and the first respondent that one function the reviewer had to perform was to assess the evidence produced, determine what evidence was relevant, and if that evidence was conflicting, to make findings of fact. The parties also accepted that the ultimate issue which the reviewer had to determine was whether the claimant fell within the definition of refugee in Art 1A of the Convention and they further agreed that this task required an assessment of whether, on the facts found, there was a real chance that the claimant would suffer persecution in the future as a young Tamil returning to Sri Lanka. Mr Niall SC, who appeared on behalf of the first respondent, drew attention to the fact that the ultimate question involved more than the resolution of contested fact. He referred to Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 281:The chance of persecution is not a fact to be inferred solely from facts that are found to have existed; the very uncertainty of what has happened in other cases is itself material to the assessment of the chance of persecution in the instant case. As a matter of ordinary experience, it is fallacious to assume that the weight accorded to information about past facts or the opinion formed about the probability of a fact having occurred is the sole determinant of the chance of something happening in the future; the possibility that a different weight should have been attributed to pieces of conflicting information or the possibility that the future will not conform to what has previously occurred affects the assessment of the chance of the occurrence of a future event.