Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) [2011] FCA 1467

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) [2011] FCA 1467
Appeal from: MZYLE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA  589
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v MZYLE and PETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
File number: VID 960 of 2011
Judge: NORTH J
Date of judgment: 19 December 2011
Date of hearing: 28 October 2011
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr S Donaghue
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Niall SC with Ms A Burt
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Victorian Legal Aid
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 960 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Appellant

AND:

MZYLE
First Respondent

PETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 960 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Appellant

AND:

MZYLE
First Respondent

PETER GACS IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

19 DECEMBER 2011

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Before the Court is an appeal by the appellant, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, from a declaration made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 15 August 2011.  The Federal Magistrates Court declared that the second respondent, a merits reviewer, made errors of law in recommending to the appellant that the first respondent is not a refugee within the definition in Art 1A of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).

  2. The first respondent is a national of Sri Lanka.  He arrived at Christmas Island on 7 February 2010.  An initial assessment of his refugee status made by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) was unfavourable to him.  He therefore applied for a merits review of the assessment.  On 2 December 2010, the second respondent produced written reasons for the recommendation to the appellant that the first respondent should not be recognised as a refugee.

  3. Section 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) prohibits the publication of a person’s name in certain proceedings involving refugee claims. The section does not apply to the present challenge to the refugee status assessment which is merely a recommendation to the appellant for the purpose of his considering whether to permit the first respondent to apply for a protection visa. The…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1467
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYLE (No 2) involved the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, who was appealing against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that had allowed an appeal against a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) regarding the applicant's refugee status. The applicant, MZYLE, had claimed asylum in Australia, and the RRT had assessed whether the applicant qualified as a refugee under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The appeal was before the Federal Court to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its review of the RRT's decision.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the Federal Circuit Court had correctly applied the law in reviewing the RRT's decision. Specifically, the court had to determine if the RRT had properly assessed the risk of persecution faced by the applicant upon returning to Sri Lanka. The court also needed to examine whether the RRT had correctly applied the principles of assessing risk as opposed to making a definitive finding on the future state of affairs.

The Federal Court found that the Federal Circuit Court had not adequately considered the principles of risk assessment as required by the jurisprudence. The court emphasised that the assessment of risk involved weighing the evidence and determining the likelihood of future persecution, rather than making a binary decision on the facts. The court noted that the RRT's decision had not sufficiently articulated the process of risk assessment, which was critical for the determination of refugee status. The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court should have identified and rectified these errors in the RRT's decision-making process.

In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the Federal Circuit Court had not properly exercised its jurisdiction to review the RRT's decision. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, reflecting the court's view that the appeal was not well-founded.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Judges of this Court are used to examining decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal on refugee claims. They follow a formula by which the relevant question which the member must address is set out at the commencement of the decision by reference to the extensive jurisprudence in Australia on the meaning of the definition of refugee in the Convention. This practice makes it clear that the member has articulated the purpose of the decision making process. Of course, the mere statement of the question does not always mean that the decision maker has addressed the right question, but it is a valuable pointer on judicial review to the likelihood that the member has done so. This practice is not reflected in the reviewer’s reasons in the present case. The reviewer set out the relevant law at the commencement of his reasons. This presumably was to indicate the purpose to which the reasons were directed. The relevant law was stated in three short paragraphs which, in substance, merely set out the text of Art 1(A) of the Convention. There is no reference in the reasons to the task on which the reviewer was embarked except this brief reference to the text of the Convention definition. Whilst the definition is the appropriate starting point, such a bare and limited reference to the applicable law gives no support to the view proposed by the appellant that the reviewer understood the totality of his function in relation to the question of the scrutiny by government authorities in Sri Lanka of returned asylum seekers.CONCLUSION In the result the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to this aspect of the reviewer’s reasons, the Federal Magistrate said: 45.… the law requires an assessment of the risk to the asylum seeker, not a positive finding as to what the future will in fact hold. …46.The law in this area does not require a decision-maker to “come down on one side or the other”. Rather the law requires the decision-maker to first make an assessment of the material and identify the facts and circumstances which they are persuaded to accept or reject and assess the weight to place on each item of evidence. Secondly, in cases involving asylum seekers, the legal test is not limited to whether or not they have proven a particular factual element (such as the application of physical force on a specific occasion), but ultimately requires an assessment of risk in determining whether or not the asylum seeker holds a well-founded fear of persecution. 47.To approach the task on the basis that a decision-maker has a responsibility to “come down on one side or the other” can only lead to real concern that rather than assessing and weighing the evidence in order to determine which facts and circumstances the decision-maker is persuaded of, (and the weight to be placed on the material in order to properly assess the risk) the decision maker felt forced to make a binary decision and effectively pick one version or the other, even though the decision maker may not be persuaded to the requisite standard that any particular given state of affairs actually exists: the very error committed by the trial judge in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 2 All ER 712; [1985] 1 WLR 948; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1. The assessment of risk is a different finding to a decision as to whether a particular factual element of a cause of action has been established.Consideration It was accepted by both the appellant and the first respondent that one function the reviewer had to perform was to assess the evidence produced, determine what evidence was relevant, and if that evidence was conflicting, to make findings of fact. The parties also accepted that the ultimate issue which the reviewer had to determine was whether the claimant fell within the definition of refugee in Art 1A of the Convention and they further agreed that this task required an assessment of whether, on the facts found, there was a real chance that the claimant would suffer persecution in the future as a young Tamil returning to Sri Lanka. Mr Niall SC, who appeared on behalf of the first respondent, drew attention to the fact that the ultimate question involved more than the resolution of contested fact. He referred to Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 281:The chance of persecution is not a fact to be inferred solely from facts that are found to have existed; the very uncertainty of what has happened in other cases is itself material to the assessment of the chance of persecution in the instant case. As a matter of ordinary experience, it is fallacious to assume that the weight accorded to information about past facts or the opinion formed about the probability of a fact having occurred is the sole determinant of the chance of something happening in the future; the possibility that a different weight should have been attributed to pieces of conflicting information or the possibility that the future will not conform to what has previously occurred affects the assessment of the chance of the occurrence of a future event.