Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUSU

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUSU [2016] FCAFC 50

Appeals from:

SZUSU v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2316

SZUYA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2315

File numbers: NSD 1101 of 2015
NSD 1102 of 2015
Judges: TRACEY, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 31 March 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeals from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal correctly understood “a right to enter and reside” for the purposes of s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – right extends to include a “liberty, permission or privilege lawfully given” – use of the expression “as a matter of practical reality” not determinative
Legislation:

Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2), 36(3)

Cases cited:

Controller of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (1997) 80 FCR 543

Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU (2013) 215 FCR 35

MZZXS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1384

NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161

SZTOG v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 180

SZTOX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 77

SZTQN v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 188

SZUDE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1202

V856/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 408

V872/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 122 FCR 57

Date of hearing: 4 March 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Appellants (NSD 1101 and 1102): Mr G Kennett SC and Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Appellants (NSD 1101 and 1102): DLA Piper
Counsel for the First Respondents (NSD 1101 and 1102): Mr JR Young
Solicitor for the First Respondent (NSD 1101): G & S Law Group
Solicitor for the First Respondent (NSD 1102): Shamser Thapa & Associates
Counsel for the Second Respondents (NSD 1101 and 1102): The second respondents filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1101 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

SZUSU

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

TRACEY, FLICK AND KATZMANN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

3.The orders made in the Federal Circuit Court on 26 August 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof the application in that court be dismissed with costs.

AND THE COURT:

4. Grants to the first respondent a costs certificate in respect to the appeal pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), in the form…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The two appeals, heard together, involve the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection challenging decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The case concerns the interpretation of section 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), specifically whether the Refugee Review Tribunal correctly applied the legal test regarding a non-citizen's right to enter and reside in a country other than Australia. The respondents, both Nepalese nationals, argued they had not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of a right to enter and reside in India, which led to the dismissal of their refugee claims by the Tribunal.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court judge correctly determined that the Tribunal had erred in its application of section 36(3). The primary concern was the Tribunal's use of the phrase "as a matter of practical reality" in describing the respondents' right to enter and reside in India. The court had to ascertain if this phrase led to a misinterpretation of the statutory requirement, potentially constituting a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the Federal Circuit Court judge had indeed erred in his interpretation of section 36(3). The Tribunal's use of the phrase "as a matter of practical reality" did not in itself lead to a misinterpretation of the statutory language. The court emphasised that the phrase was not determinative of the correct legal test and that the Tribunal had correctly understood the requirement of the statute, which encompasses a "liberty, permission or privilege lawfully given." Therefore, the Tribunal's decision was in line with the statutory provisions, and the Federal Circuit Court judge's finding of error was incorrect.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made in the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed the applications for judicial review. Additionally, the court ordered the first respondent to pay the appellant's costs and granted a costs certificate to the first respondent for the appeal, under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

3. The orders made in the Federal Circuit Court on 26 August 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof the application in that court be dismissed with costs.

AND THE COURT:

4. Grants to the first respondent a costs certificate in respect to the appeal pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), in the form annexed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Certificate under Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981

No: NSD1102/2015

Federal Court of Australia

District Registry: New South Wales

Division: General

On Appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

SZUYA

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES GRANTING CERTIFICATE: JUSTICE TRACEY, JUSTICE FLICK and JUSTICE KATZMANN

DATE OF CERTIFICATE: 31 March 2016

WHERE MADE: Sydney

IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 to the first respondent in respect of:

1. the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the appeal; and

2. any costs incurred by the appellant in relation to the appeal that have been, or are required to be, paid by the first respondent to the appellant in pursuance of an order of the Court.

Date: 31 March 2016

Background

Background to the litigation

The two appeals, which were heard together, are from orders of the same Federal Circuit Court (the FCC) judge in applications for judicial review of Tribunal decisions (heard consecutively), made by the same Tribunal member. They raise the same question. The question is whether the FCC erred in holding that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test under s 36(3). Background The first respondents in each appeal are both Nepalese nationals who claim to fear persecution in Nepal: SZUYA as a member of a particular social group by the Tribunal described as “victims of the rebel Maoists in Nepal”, and SZUSU by reason of his imputed political opinion as an opponent of the Maoists. In each case the Tribunal expressed doubts about the respondent’s credibility but considered it unnecessary to resolve those doubts because he had not taken all possible steps to avail himself of what the Tribunal found was his right to enter and reside in India. There is no dispute that it was open to the Tribunal to dispose of the applications in this way without first determining whether any of the criteria in s 36(2) had been satisfied: see SZUDE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1202 (McKerracher J). In the court below, the primary judge held that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error when it stated (at [47]) in SZUYA and [50] in SZUSU) that:Taking into account the terms of the Treaty itself, the information from Indian and Australian authorities about the administrative arrangements concerning entry to India by Nepalese nationals and the country information and other commentary on the ability of Nepalese citizens to enter and reside in India, the Tribunal is satisfied that that [sic], as a matter of practical reality, the applicant has a right to enter and reside in India.(Emphasis added.) The reference to the Treaty is a reference to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal, 31 July 1950, Kathmandu [1950] INTServ 12. The “information” consisted of information provided by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in a report dated 18 September 2013 and displayed on the website of the Indian Bureau of Immigration, which, according to the Tribunal’s reasons, is a publication of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India. Its URL indicates that it appears on the national portal of India. The reasons of the primary judge appear in the judgment in SZUYA. In SZUSU the primary judge merely adopted those reasons. The Tribunal’s reasons in the two cases, save for specific references to the first respondents’ claims, are relevantly identical. Consequently, for convenience, we will refer to passages in the Tribunal’s reasons by the paragraphs in the Tribunal’s reasons in SZUYA.The proper construction of s 36(3) Section 36(3) of the Act states that:Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non‑citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non‑citizen is a national.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established