Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Snyman

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Snyman [2016] FCA 242

Appeal from: Snyman & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2791
File number: NSD 1363 of 2015
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 11 March 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for business skills (residence) (class DF) subclass 892 visas – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether Tribunal considered relevant evidence – whether Tribunal erred by asking whether company operated “one main business” rather than “a main business” for the purposes of reg 1.11 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether Tribunal misconstrued reg 1.11(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 134(10), s 351

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.03, reg 1.11, reg 1.11(1)(a), reg 1.11(1)(d), reg 1.11(2), Sch 2 cl 892.211, cl 892.212, cl 892.212(a), cl 892.212(b), cl 892.212(c), cl 892.212(c)(ii), cl 892.213, cl 892.213(a), cl 892.213(b)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) Sch 1

Cases cited:

Nassif v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 448; [2003] FCA 481

Snyman & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2791

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235; [2013] FCAFC 71

Date of hearing: 11 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 114
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr PM Knowles
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Dobbie and Devine Immigration Lawyers
Table of Corrections
15 March 2016 In paragraph 113, the words “must fail” have been replaced with the words “should be allowed”.

ORDERS

NSD 1363 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

GERT CHRISTOFFEL SNYMAN

First Respondent

MARALANE MARIA SNYMAN

Second Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court be set aside and, in their place, the following orders made:

(a)the application be dismissed; and

(b)the applicants pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $6,825 (being the amount prescribed in Sch 1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)).

3.The first and second respondents pay the costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BARKER J:

  1. Mr Gert Christoffel Snyman and Mrs Maralane Maria Snyman, the first and second respondents, are husband and wife and citizens of South Africa who entered Australia on 19 October 2009, pursuant to Business Skills (Provisional) Subclass 163 visas granted on 3 February 2009. 

  2. Mr Snyman is one of two shareholders and owns 50% of the shares in Cutman Pty Ltd (ABN 76 140 284 859),…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 242
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Snyman, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had overturned a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in relation to a visa application. The applicants, Mr and Mrs Snyman, sought a subclass 892 visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the central issue before the court was whether the AAT had properly considered the evidence and interpreted the relevant provisions of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Specifically, the court examined whether the AAT had erred in asking whether the company operated “one main business” rather than “a main business” for the purposes of regulation 1.11 of the Migration Regulations.

The court found that the AAT had indeed erred in its interpretation and approach. The AAT had rejected the applicants’ submission that the various businesses operated by the company, Cutman, could be treated as one main business under regulation 1.11(2). Instead, the AAT had treated each business as separate and distinct, which led to the conclusion that the applicants did not meet the requirements of clause 892.212(a) of the Regulations. The court held that the AAT had misconstrued the relevant regulation by focusing on the number of ABNs and consolidated accounts rather than the substantive nature and operation of the businesses. Furthermore, the AAT had failed to consider the consolidated management and operation of the businesses as a single enterprise, which was a critical factor in determining whether they constituted one main business.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, reinstating the original decision of the AAT that the applicants’ visa application be dismissed. The court also ordered that the applicants pay the costs of the first respondent, while the first and second respondents were to bear the costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of correctly interpreting statutory provisions and ensuring that all relevant evidence is considered in migration cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court be set aside and, in their place, the following orders made:

(a) the application be dismissed; and

(b) the applicants pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $6,825 (being the amount prescribed in Sch 1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)).

3. The first and second respondents pay the costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Department now appeals to this Court from the Federal Circuit Court’s decision by way of a notice of appeal filed 9 November 2015. The grounds of appeal are set out below, but first the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision should be mentioned.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal held that Mr and Mrs Snyman only satisfied cl 892.212(a) of the Regulations, and so did not meet the requirements of cl 892.212 overall. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Snyman had a 50% ownership interest, as defined in reg 1.03 and s 134(10) of the Act, in Cutman. The Tribunal further accepted that the four businesses relied on for the purposes of the application were owned by Cutman and operated using the same ABN. It appeared to do this however, not on the basis that each was a business activity, as Mr and Mrs Snyman’s migration agent had submitted, but on the basis each was a separate, relevant business. It was also satisfied that each such business was a qualifying business as each was profit driven; provided goods and services; and was neither a passive nor speculative investment. In the Tribunal’s view, despite the delegate’s earlier apparent willingness to accept Cutman as “one main business” in his correspondence of 18 July 2014, that was before the Tribunal, the number of main businesses owned by Mr Snyman was still in issue as the Tribunal was conducting a hearing de novo. The Tribunal appeared to reject Mr and Mrs Snyman’s submission that the four businesses owned by Cutman from 7 December 2012 to 7 December 2013, being the 12 months immediately prior to the date of the application and so the relevant 12 month period for the purposes of cl 892.212(c)(ii), were separate activities comprising but the one business and so could be treated as “one main business” for the purposes of cl 892.212. In doing so, the Tribunal referred to the websites of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Business Register which provided that a company may own more than one business and more than one business may operate under the same ABN. The Tribunal considered the Department’s policy, that equated the identity of a main business to a single ABN, to be irrelevant. It considered that whether or not a business was a main business or a qualifying business was to be determined by applying the circumstances of Cutman to the definitions of “main business” and “qualifying business” in the Regulations. In doing so, it noted the “very different” and “individual” nature of the businesses that Mr and Mrs Snyman relied on. In circumstances where Cutman was the only company, the Tribunal considered the Department’s policy to accept interrelated companies as “one main business” to also be irrelevant. The Tribunal rejected Mr and Mrs Snyman’s submission that the reasoning of the Court in Nassif v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 448; [2003] FCA 481, in respect of the phrase “a business” in the definition of “ownership interest” in s 134(10) of the Act, supported the view that different ventures conducted under the same ABN could be used to satisfy cl 892.212. In circumstances where the Tribunal accepted that Mr Snyman had an ownership interest in each of the businesses, it considered the relevant question was how many of those businesses he could rely on to satisfy cl 891.212(c). It considered Nassif to be irrelevant in this regard.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, they contend that the primary judge’s summary of the Tribunal’s conclusion was accurate and not, as alleged, misstated. Even if the Minister’s submission in this regard were correct, they submit that this would not gainsay the primary judge’s substantive finding that the Tribunal erred by adopting an assumption that revealed a misconstruction of the applicable law. CONSIDERATION In most respects, at the hearing of the appeal, the issue in contention between the parties, as pursued by counsel for the parties, was whether the Tribunal had regarded relevant evidence and, having regard to the merits of the application, formed the conclusion that there were four individual businesses and not a single main business comprised of a number of separate activities or ventures. Counsel for Mr and Mrs Snyman, for example, commenced his oral submissions by drawing attention to the business activity statements (BAS) of Cutman and the fact that reporting was done on a consolidated basis for all business activities operated by the company, which were before the Tribunal. He made the point that there was no distinction, apart from having the same ABN, in respect of the reporting of profit and loss and the payment of GST. He emphasised that the financial statements of Cutman were provided to the delegate in the first instance and were before the Tribunal. Counsel sought to emphasise that the profit and loss statement was also prepared on a consolidated basis so that the profit from trading across various business activities was reported singularly and the expenditure was likewise set out in that manner. He further drew attention to the balance sheet of Cutman in which stock on hand was separated out within the current assets, and trade debtors were reported on together. He also noted that two cheque accounts were identified. In summary, he submitted that, by and large, the assets and liabilities of Cutman were identified on a consolidated basis for the company. So far as the management of Cutman was concerned, counsel drew attention to the fact that Mr Snyman and his son, Rudi Snyman, were jointly responsible for the strategic management of the various business activities operated by the company and that Mr Snyman had stated that he acted as the financial manager in relation to all business activities. In other words, the business of Cutman, counsel submitted, was centrally managed. The evidence did not disclose that there was a separate running of each business necessarily. Consequently, counsel for Mr and Mrs Snyman submitted that there was more before the Tribunal than merely the use by the different business enterprises of the single company ABN and consolidated accounts. Counsel thereby submitted that a very distinct submission was put to the Tribunal that there was a business enterprise that conducted a number of different business activities. When pressed, counsel submitted that the single undertaking of Cutman was one that engaged in multiple business activities for the generation of profit for its shareholders. Thus, it should have been regarded as one undertaking.