IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M151 of 2016
B e t w e e n -
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Applicant
and
MOHINDER PAL SINGH
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 7 APRIL 2017, AT 10.42 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.T. JOHNSON, SC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.C. KNOWLES, for the applicant. (instructed by Clayton Utz Lawyers)
MR P.R.D. GRAY, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A. ALEKSOV, for Mr Singh. (instructed by Ravi James Lawyers)
NETTLE J: Mr Johnson.
MR JOHNSON: Yes, thank you, your Honours. Your Honours, the special leave question that we have formulated in the summary of argument attempts to distil the various circumstances of the case which we say give rise to this being an appropriate matter for special leave. What I was proposing to do, your Honours, was to adopt the following structure, if it suits your Honours.
Firstly, just to quickly run through that question; secondly, to refer to some concessions or statements of purpose that were made below which enlighten the discussion; thirdly, to refer to what we say is the general importance; fourthly, to quickly visit section 476 of the Migration Act and indicate to your Honours why we say that what the Full Court has done has gone beyond or it would require the Circuit Court to go beyond its authority under that provision.
NETTLE J: Mr Johnson, was section 476(2)(a) drawn to the attention of the Full Court of the Federal Court? I ask because I cannot see it referred to in the reasons for judgment.
MR JOHNSON: Your Honour, I am sure that it was. I think all of 476 was there. Section 476(2)(a) specifically refers to the inability of the Circuit Court to review a primary decision, and that was an idea that was at the very heart of the Full Court’s judgment in Prodduturi that the Full Court spent so much time looking at.
NETTLE J: Yes.
MR JOHNSON: So although they might not refer to the provision in specie, as it were, frankly one could not read Prodduturi without appreciating that there was a limitation upon the ‑ ‑ ‑
GORDON J: Is your complaint really that the Full Court of the Federal Court focused on a power to grant a remedy divorced from the jurisdiction in which that power might be granted or exercised?
MR JOHNSON: Yes, that is the territory that we are in, your Honour.
GORDON J: The “territory”, or is that it?
MR JOHNSON: That is the main point, your Honour. There are also some questions of hypotheticality involved.
GORDON J: I wonder about that. If you are right in your contention that they are focused on power…
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- Case
- [2017] HCATrans 79
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction under section 476 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) to grant the declaration sought by Mr. Singh. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Full Court had erred in finding that the Federal Circuit Court possessed such jurisdiction, contending that the relief sought was not connected to a "migration decision" as defined by section 476(2) and that the matter involved a hypothetical controversy rather than a present dispute. The applicant also raised concerns about the utility of any declaration granted by the Federal Circuit Court, given the potential for future decisions by a delegate to be the operative ones.
The applicant’s argument focused on the limitations imposed by section 476 of the *Migration Act*, particularly subsection (2), which restricts the types of decisions that can be reviewed. It was submitted that the Full Court had overlooked these limitations and had focused on the power to grant a remedy divorced from the relevant jurisdictional constraints. The applicant contended that the controversy was hypothetical because it concerned the potential impact of the Tribunal's decision on future visa applications under section 48 of the Act, rather than a present, concrete dispute. The applicant further argued that any declaration would be futile as it would not definitively resolve the validity of a future delegate's decision.
The respondent, Mr. Singh, argued that the Federal Circuit Court did have jurisdiction under section 476(1) because there was a sufficient nexus between the relief sought and the Tribunal's decision, even if the relief was declaratory. He contended that the Full Court's interpretation of section 476, as informed by High Court precedent such as *SZSSJ*, allowed for associated declaratory relief provided there was a sufficient connection to a decision affected by jurisdictional error. Mr. Singh submitted that the refusal of his visa application had present, adverse consequences under the Act, including the operation of section 48, and therefore the matter was not hypothetical but concerned a real controversy.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi