FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2017] FCA 1297
Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3343 File number: NSD 135 of 2017 Judge: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 9 November 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION — finding that review applicant had not been honest with Tribunal about times for sitting English competency test – Tribunal refused to grant applicant further time to sit test – whether review applicant denied procedural fairness in respect of dishonesty finding — whether common law rule of procedural fairness apply in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – unnecessary to decide question of construction — unnecessary for Tribunal to expressly foreshadow dishonesty finding in any construction Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 45, 65, 357A, 359A, 360, 363, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.15C, cl 885.213,
Cases cited: Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 8, (2010) 264 ALR 417
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2012) 202 FCR 387
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMOK (2009) 247 FCR 404
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3343
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 10 May 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 56 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr GT Johnson SC with Mr BD Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellants: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent appeared in person ORDERS
NSD 135 of 2017 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Appellant
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Appellant
AND: SULTAN SINGH
Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 December 2016 in proceedings SYG 2446/2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order that the application for judicial review commenced by Mr Sultan Singh on 1 September 2014 be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
The respondent, Mr Singh, is a citizen of India. On 15 June 2011, he lodged an application for a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) (Subclass 885) visa. The visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection because Mr Singh failed to show that he had competent English. Mr Singh applied for a review of the delegate’s decision before the then-named Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision after affording Mr Singh a number of opportunities to sit an English competency test and…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1297
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 December 2016 in proceedings SYG 2446/2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order that the application for judicial review commenced by Mr Sultan Singh on 1 September 2014 be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Mr Singh was given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond.
2. Whether the common law rule of procedural fairness applies in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. Whether it was necessary for the Tribunal to expressly foreshadow the dishonesty finding in any construction.
Held
1. The court concluded that Mr Singh was not given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond.
2. The court determined that the common law rule of procedural fairness applies in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. The court held that it was unnecessary to decide the question of construction regarding whether the Tribunal was required to expressly foreshadow the dishonesty finding in any construction.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is convenient to determine the issues arising on the appeal in the order urged by Counsel for the Minister. I will turn first to the question of whether Mr Singh was given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond. For that purpose, I will proceed on the assumption that the content of the obligation is the same as that which would exist had s 357A of the Act not been enacted. I accept the Minister’s submission that to the extent that s 357A of the Act imposes a substantive obligation to act in a manner that is “just and fair” the content of the obligation in the circumstances of the present case would rise no higher than the ordinarily implied obligation to afford procedural fairness to Mr Singh in the exercise of the Tribunal’s functions and powers.CONSIDERATION Some preliminary observations should be made about the consequences of the Tribunal’s finding that Mr Singh “was not being honest”. As the primary judge correctly held, the finding was critical to the outcome of the review. From the premise that Mr Singh had been dishonest, the Tribunal reasoned that Mr Singh had sought to delay the outcome of the review for as long as possible. Implicitly, the Tribunal held that Mr Singh’s stated purposes for seeking the earlier three adjournments, and then in requesting the fourth adjournment, had not been genuine. Its conclusion that Mr Singh had been provided with a “more than reasonable amount of time” to provide evidence of his English competency is to be read in the context of the dishonesty finding. Implicitly, the Tribunal rejected Mr Singh’s claim to have genuine medical reasons supporting the grant of a fourth adjournment. Although the Tribunal did not expressly make a finding that Mr Singh did not suffer from a stammer as he had claimed, the Tribunal’s finding that he had been afforded sufficient time is to be understood as giving little or no weight to the circumstance of the disability. As I have mentioned, Mr Singh appeared self-represented on the Minister’s appeal. For the most part, his submissions were directed at the merits of the Tribunal’s finding that he had acted dishonestly. He insisted that the testing authority had in fact given him information that was inconsistent with the information the authority had provided to the Tribunal and that there was no dishonesty on his part in the information he had imparted to the Tribunal (both personally and through his migration agent) about the available testing times. The submissions of Mr Singh fairly reflect the submissions he might have made in connection with his honesty had the Tribunal expressly invited him to do so. The submissions do not directly engage with the questions of law now arising on the appeal. It is sufficient to note that there were submissions Mr Singh could have made to the Tribunal concerning his honesty that, if accepted, were capable of affecting the outcome. The content of the obligation to afford a review applicant procedural fairness was identified in broad terms by the Full Court (Northrop, Miles and French JJ) in Alphaone. The Full Court said (at 591 — 592):Where the exercise of a statutory power attracts the requirement for procedural fairness, a person likely to be affected by the decision is entitled to put information and submissions to the decision-maker in support of an outcome that supports his or her interests. That entitlement extends to the right to rebut or qualify by further information, and comment by way of submission, upon adverse material from other sources which is put before the decision-maker. It also extends to require the decision-maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. Subject to these qualifications however, a decision-maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question.(Footnotes omitted, my emphasis)