Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2017] FCA 1297

Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3343
File number: NSD 135 of 2017
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 9 November 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION — finding that review applicant had not been honest with Tribunal about times for sitting English competency test – Tribunal refused to grant applicant further time to sit test – whether review applicant denied procedural fairness in respect of dishonesty finding — whether common law rule of procedural fairness apply in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – unnecessary to decide question of construction — unnecessary for Tribunal to expressly foreshadow dishonesty finding in any construction
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 45, 65, 357A, 359A, 360, 363, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.15C, cl 885.213,

Cases cited:

Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 8, (2010) 264 ALR 417

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2012) 202 FCR 387

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMOK (2009) 247 FCR 404

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3343

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 10 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr GT Johnson SC with Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellants: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Respondent: The Respondent appeared in person

ORDERS

NSD 135 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Appellant

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Appellant

AND:

SULTAN SINGH

Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 December 2016 in proceedings SYG 2446/2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order that the application for judicial review commenced by Mr Sultan Singh on 1 September 2014 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. The respondent, Mr Singh, is a citizen of India.  On 15 June 2011, he lodged an application for a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) (Subclass 885) visa.  The visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection because Mr Singh failed to show that he had competent English.  Mr Singh applied for a review of the delegate’s decision before the then-named Migration Review Tribunal.  The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision after affording Mr Singh a number of opportunities to sit an English competency test and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh involved Mr Singh, who applied for a visa but did not provide evidence of his English competency. The delegate refused his visa application based on this lack of evidence. Mr Singh applied for review of the delegate’s decision, and the Tribunal granted him an extension to provide evidence of his English competency. However, Mr Singh did not provide the evidence, and the Tribunal found that he had been dishonest. The Tribunal refused to grant Mr Singh further time to sit the English competency test, and he sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had denied Mr Singh procedural fairness in respect of its finding that he had been dishonest. The court held that the common law rule of procedural fairness applied in respect of the review conducted under Part 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and that the Tribunal had not provided Mr Singh with adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond. The court found that the Tribunal should have expressly foreshadowed the dishonesty finding in any construction. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside and replaced with an order dismissing Mr Singh’s application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 December 2016 in proceedings SYG 2446/2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order that the application for judicial review commenced by Mr Sultan Singh on 1 September 2014 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The test specified in reg 1.15C(a)(i) of the Regulations is that conducted in accordance with the International English Language Testing System (IELTS).BACKGROUND The criteria prescribed in cl 885.21 (including as to English competency) are to be satisfied at the time of the visa application. In respect of reg 1.15C, however, the High Court has held that the IELTS test does not need to be conducted before the visa application is made, but can be undertaken during the decision-making process: Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 8; (2010) 264 ALR 417 at [24] – [27] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ). At the time of his visa application, Mr Singh did not provide evidence that he had achieved a competent score in an IELTS test within two years prior to his visa application being lodged. Although he provided the delegate with a notice confirming that he had been booked to undertake the test, he did not provide the test results to the delegate. The delegate refused Mr Singh’s visa application on that basis. Mr Singh’s application for review of the delegate’s decision was listed for hearing before the Tribunal on 14 April 2014. About a month prior, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Singh requesting that he provide evidence of his English competency. Nothing was provided in response to that request. At the hearing Mr Singh told the Tribunal that he had sat for an IELTS test two days prior and that the results of the test would be available on 28 April 2014. The Tribunal granted Mr Singh until 30 April 2014 to provide evidence of competent English. Argument on the appeal proceeded on the basis that in providing Mr Singh additional time, the Tribunal exercised its discretion, conferred by s 363(1)(b) of the Act, to “adjourn the review from time to time”. The adjournment granted on 14 April 2014 was the first of three such adjournments granted to Mr Singh pursuant to s 363(1)(b). Mr Singh’s migration agent wrote to the Tribunal member on 30 April 2014. His letter stated that Mr Singh suffered from hearing and stammering problems and that he had only just become aware that these problems were considered a “minor disability” by the authority responsible for administering the IELTS test. The agent said that special arrangements could be made for Mr Singh to undergo a test that accommodated his disabilities. The letter continued:We believe [Mr Singh] did not realize that he is eligible to sit for IELTS with special arrangements by [the testing authority] hence he continued to take test and could not score. We believe he deserves at least 1 chance at IELTS with special setting at [the testing authority]. The Tribunal responded by letter dated 30 April 2014 confirming that it had agreed to grant an extension of time until 13 June 2014. That letter stated that Mr Singh must book an IELTS test before that date, and that if no information was received by the Tribunal it would proceed to make its decision. This was the second adjournment granted by the Tribunal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether Mr Singh was given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond.
2. Whether the common law rule of procedural fairness applies in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. Whether it was necessary for the Tribunal to expressly foreshadow the dishonesty finding in any construction.

Held
1. The court concluded that Mr Singh was not given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond.
2. The court determined that the common law rule of procedural fairness applies in respect of a review conducted under Pt 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. The court held that it was unnecessary to decide the question of construction regarding whether the Tribunal was required to expressly foreshadow the dishonesty finding in any construction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is convenient to determine the issues arising on the appeal in the order urged by Counsel for the Minister. I will turn first to the question of whether Mr Singh was given adequate notice of the dishonesty finding and a fair opportunity to respond. For that purpose, I will proceed on the assumption that the content of the obligation is the same as that which would exist had s 357A of the Act not been enacted. I accept the Minister’s submission that to the extent that s 357A of the Act imposes a substantive obligation to act in a manner that is “just and fair” the content of the obligation in the circumstances of the present case would rise no higher than the ordinarily implied obligation to afford procedural fairness to Mr Singh in the exercise of the Tribunal’s functions and powers.CONSIDERATION Some preliminary observations should be made about the consequences of the Tribunal’s finding that Mr Singh “was not being honest”. As the primary judge correctly held, the finding was critical to the outcome of the review. From the premise that Mr Singh had been dishonest, the Tribunal reasoned that Mr Singh had sought to delay the outcome of the review for as long as possible. Implicitly, the Tribunal held that Mr Singh’s stated purposes for seeking the earlier three adjournments, and then in requesting the fourth adjournment, had not been genuine. Its conclusion that Mr Singh had been provided with a “more than reasonable amount of time” to provide evidence of his English competency is to be read in the context of the dishonesty finding. Implicitly, the Tribunal rejected Mr Singh’s claim to have genuine medical reasons supporting the grant of a fourth adjournment. Although the Tribunal did not expressly make a finding that Mr Singh did not suffer from a stammer as he had claimed, the Tribunal’s finding that he had been afforded sufficient time is to be understood as giving little or no weight to the circumstance of the disability. As I have mentioned, Mr Singh appeared self-represented on the Minister’s appeal. For the most part, his submissions were directed at the merits of the Tribunal’s finding that he had acted dishonestly. He insisted that the testing authority had in fact given him information that was inconsistent with the information the authority had provided to the Tribunal and that there was no dishonesty on his part in the information he had imparted to the Tribunal (both personally and through his migration agent) about the available testing times. The submissions of Mr Singh fairly reflect the submissions he might have made in connection with his honesty had the Tribunal expressly invited him to do so. The submissions do not directly engage with the questions of law now arising on the appeal. It is sufficient to note that there were submissions Mr Singh could have made to the Tribunal concerning his honesty that, if accepted, were capable of affecting the outcome. The content of the obligation to afford a review applicant procedural fairness was identified in broad terms by the Full Court (Northrop, Miles and French JJ) in Alphaone. The Full Court said (at 591 — 592):Where the exercise of a statutory power attracts the requirement for procedural fairness, a person likely to be affected by the decision is entitled to put information and submissions to the decision-maker in support of an outcome that supports his or her interests. That entitlement extends to the right to rebut or qualify by further information, and comment by way of submission, upon adverse material from other sources which is put before the decision-maker. It also extends to require the decision-maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. Subject to these qualifications however, a decision-maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question.(Footnotes omitted, my emphasis)