IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P8 of 2016
B e t w e e n -
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Applicant
and
YOGESH KUMAR
First Respondent
PRIYANKA ARORA
Second Respondent
HARSHAD SHARMA
Third Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Fourth Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KIEFEL J
NETTLE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 2016, AT 10.40 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR G. R. KENNETT, SC: May it please the Court, in that matter I appear with MR P.M. KNOWLES, for the applicant. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR M.D. HOWARD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR D.V. BLADES, for the first to third respondents. (instructed by Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd)
KIEFEL J: Yes, Mr Kennett.
MR KENNETT: Your Honours, as your Honours will have seen from the submissions, this case involves the application of section 36(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act which, as we understand it, at least on this point, has not been previously considered by the Court. The provision can be seen at page 64 in the application book. Your Honours will have noted that it has three requirements that trigger its operation. One is that:
an Act requires or allows a thing to be done; and
The second is that there is:
the last day for doing the thing –
and the third is that that last day falls on the Saturday or Sunday or public holiday. In those circumstances, subsection (2) has operation and the operation it has is to authorise the thing to be done on the next working day.
The first respondent here had applied for a visa. It was Class TU, Subclass 572. Included in the material, although your Honours do not need to go to it, are the provisions that govern the validity of a visa application, in particular section 46 of the Migration Act and then the provision in Schedule 1 of the Migration Regulations that applies to an application for a visa in this class. The short point to make about those provisions is that the respondent’s visa application satisfied all of them. He did not fall foul of any of those requirements and it has always been common ground that he had made a valid visa application that the Minister was obliged to consider.
The problem arises with the criteria for grant of the visa, an application having been made for it, in particular clause 572.211, which your Honours can see at page 80 of the application book. It needed to be satisfied by an applicant at the time of application. Subclause (1) allowed it to be satisfied by meeting requirements of one of the succeeding subclauses. Subclause (2) would have been satisfied by this applicant by reason of paragraph (d)(iia), which is over on page 82, had his visa application been made…
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- Case
- [2016] HCATrans 197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister, in making decisions under s 48B of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), was required to consider the applicants' claims for protection in accordance with the principles of administrative law, specifically concerning the duty to afford procedural fairness. The Court also had to determine the proper interpretation of the Minister's obligations when assessing whether to exercise the non-compellable, non-discretionary power under s 48B, which allows the Minister to lift the bar imposed by s 48 of the Act.
Kiefel CJ and Nettle J held that the Minister's power under s 48B was not a power that attracted the common law duty to afford procedural fairness. Their Honours reasoned that s 48B conferred a power on the Minister to grant a visa, which is a benefit, and that the exercise of such a power did not, in itself, give rise to a legitimate expectation of procedural fairness in the context of a refusal to exercise that power. The Court distinguished this power from those where a person has a pre-existing right or a legitimate expectation of a benefit being granted, which might attract procedural fairness obligations. The appeal was allowed.
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