FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kaur (No 2) [2015] FCA 748
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kaur (No 2) [2015] FCA 748 Appeal from: Mandeep Kaur & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1002 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v MANDEEP KAUR, JAGSIR SINGH DHALIWAL, PRABHJOT KAUR DHALIWAL and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number(s): VID 361 of 2014 Judge(s): YATES J Date of judgment: 24 July 2015 Catchwords: COSTS – whether costs certificate under s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) should be granted Legislation: Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) s 6 Cases cited: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 5 FCR 476
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 286 FLR 90
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kaur (2014) 227 FCR 548
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (No 3) [2010] FCAFC 102
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 9 February 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 12 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms M Sydzik Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the First to Third Respondents: Mr GM Hughan Solicitor for the First to Third Respondents: Clothier Anderson & Associates Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: The fourth respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 361 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: MANDEEP KAUR
First RespondentJAGSIR SINGH DHALIWAL
Second RespondentPRABHJOT KAUR DHALIWAL
Third RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 JULY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first to third respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
2.The first respondent be granted a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) (the Act) in respect of the appeal stating that in the Court’s opinion it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under the Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 361 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: MANDEEP KAUR
First RespondentJAGSIR SINGH DHALIWAL
Second RespondentPRABHJOT KAUR DHALIWAL
Third RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE:
24 JULY 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 17 December 2014, I allowed an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had set…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 748
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the appellant's argument that the costs respondents had not provided evidence of their financial positions and that there was no evidence that they would be disadvantaged in respect of future visa applications by an order for costs that is not supported by a costs certificate. The court found that it was unrealistic to expect Ms Kaur to undertake the burden of the appeal without legal representation, and that such representation was not only a benefit for Ms Kaur but also for the Court in having an argument presented in proper adversarial form. The court also noted that the resolution of the question involved had consequences beyond the immediate case and clarified how the source of funds criteria are to be applied in respect of applications for student visas.
The court granted the first respondent a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) in respect of the appeal, stating that in the Court’s opinion it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under the Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the appeal. The first to third respondents were ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first to third respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
2. The first respondent be granted a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) (the Act) in respect of the appeal stating that in the Court’s opinion it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under the Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In opposing the application, the appellant points to the fact that the costs respondents have placed no evidence before the Court of their financial positions. There is no evidence that they cannot meet a costs order and there is no evidence that they would be disadvantaged in respect of future visa applications by an order for costs that is not supported by a costs certificate. The appellant accepts that the decision in the appeal has implications for the administration of the student visa regulatory scheme and that the decision clarifies how decision-makers should interpret and apply the source of funds criteria. Nevertheless, the appellant points to the fact the appellate jurisdiction of the Court was exercised by a single Judge and not a Full Court.Consideration The burden of arguing the appeal for the costs respondents was undertaken by the first respondent, Ms Kaur. The second and third respondents are members of her family. Their visa applications were dependent on the success of Ms Kaur’s application. They played no active role in the appeal. I do not think that it would be an appropriate exercise of discretion to grant them separate costs certificates in respect of the appeal. I am persuaded, however, that it would be an appropriate exercise of discretion to grant Ms Kaur such a certificate. In my view, having regard to the question of law involved, it is unrealistic to expect that Ms Kaur could have undertaken the burden of the appeal without legal representation. Such representation was not only a benefit for Ms Kaur. It was also a benefit for the Court in having an argument presented in proper adversarial form. It is also significant that the resolution of the question involved has consequences beyond the immediate case and clarifies how, at least in one respect, the source of funds criteria are to be applied in respect of applications for student visas. It is true that the first respondent has not placed evidence before the Court of her financial circumstances. However, in the present case, I do not think that this is of countervailing significance in light of the other considerations to which I have referred. In any event, although the financial position of a respondent is a relevant consideration to be taken into account, I do not think that it is only in cases of financial hardship that the discretion can or should be exercised. It can be taken that a respondent to an appeal is an unwilling party. The question arising under s 6(1) is whether, in the circumstances contemplated by that provision, a burden should fall on the unsuccessful respondent in a given case without the measure of alleviation provided by a costs certificate. I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case are such that that measure of alleviation should be provided. In coming to that decision, I take into account that no disentitling circumstances reflecting adversely on Ms Kaur’s conduct of the litigation have been brought to my attention. Finally, I should record that I do not think that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court was exercised by a single Judge and not a Full Court is a matter of any significance in the present case. Disposition