Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ASE15

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ASE15 [2016] FCAFC 37

Appeal from: ASE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2581
File number: WAD 585 of 2015
Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND MORTIMER  JJ
Date of judgment: 11 March 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection (class XA) visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where respondents did not receive initial letter notifying of Minister’s decision to refuse visa – whether re-sent letter was second notification – whether time for merits review application ran from initial or re-sent letter – whether failure to explain time period for merits review when re-sending letter was procedurally fair – appeal allowed  
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 48A, s 48B, s 51A, s 66, s 66(1), s 412(1), s 476(1), s 494B(4), s 494C(4)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.16(3), reg 4.31(2)

Cases cited:

ASE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2581

H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 188 FCR 153; [2002] FCAFC 18

Date of hearing: 17 February 2016
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr RJS French
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Savu
Solicitor for the Respondents: Savu Esq

ORDERS

WAD 585 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

ASE15

First Respondent

ASF15

Second Respondent

ASH15 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, BARKER AND MORTIMER  JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that relevantly resulted in the following orders:

    (2)  A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Refugee Review Tribunal decision made on 2 April 2015 and that decision is quashed.

    (3)  A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review application of the first, second and fourth applicants of the decision of the delegate made on 14 January 2015 before it according to law.

    (4)  The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs fixed in the sum of $6825.

  2. The appeal initially concerned the first, second and third respondents (being the first, second and fourth applicants referred to in order (3)), but at the hearing of the appeal, at the instance of the Minister, the appeal was dismissed so far as it concerned the third respondent, with costs on that part of the appeal reserved.  As a result, the appeal ultimately only concerned the first and second respondents.

  3. The orders appealed from came about in the following circumstances.

  4. On 27 August 2013, the first respondent lodged an application…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v ASE15, the respondents were applicants for a protection (class XA) visa who had not received the initial letter notifying them of the Minister's decision to refuse their visa. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia had found that the re-sending of the notification letter constituted a second notification and that the time for a merits review application had run from the date of the re-sent letter. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection appealed this decision to the High Court of Australia. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the re-sent notification letter constituted a second notification under section 66 of the Act, and whether the failure to explain the time period for merits review when re-sending the letter was procedurally fair.

The court found that the re-sending of the notification letter did not constitute a second notification under section 66 of the Act, as the statutory notification regime explicitly excluded additional procedural fairness to an individual. The court also found that the failure to explain the time period for merits review when re-sending the letter did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness, as the original letter had already explained the timetable. The court held that the Minister's submission that any duty to appraise the respondents of the applicable timetable was achieved by re-sending the original letter was correct. The court also held that even if the Department breached any duty of procedural fairness, this could not have led to a jurisdictional error by the RRT.

The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was set aside. The High Court of Australia held that the re-sending of the notification letter did not constitute a second notification under section 66 of the Act, and that the failure to explain the time period for merits review when re-sending the letter did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness. The court's decision has important implications for the interpretation of the statutory notification regime and the scope of procedural fairness in migration cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows there is no need to consider the issue raised by ground 1, that is, whether or not more than one notification is possible under s 66 of the Act for the purposes of the Act.Did the Court below err in law by finding that the first and second respondents were denied procedural fairness such that the RRT’s decision dated 2 April 2015 involved jurisdictional error? The primary judge found, in the alternative, that procedural fairness was denied in the particular circumstances as they had developed following the dispatching by the Minister of the notification dated 14 January 2015, namely:(1)The first and second respondents had notified a change of address prior to expiry of the review period.(2)They had also engaged in a communication relating to the delegate’s decision within that period, in which the Department conveyed that it was forwarding the delegate’s decision again to them.(3)The Department in that communication did not identify any covering letter or explain the consequences of the time that was running in respect of the earlier date of the letter. Although the Minister in his initial written submissions on the appeal submitted that the statutory notification regime explicitly excluded additional procedural fairness to an individual, after further consideration, on the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the Minister did not press that submission and did not make a submission that s 51A of the Act had such effect in the circumstances of a case such as the present. Rather, on behalf of the Minister it was submitted that the Department put the first and second respondents on notice of the time period for lodging a review by virtue of the 14 January 2015 notification letter, a copy of which they received on 16 February 2015. The Minister submits the letter provided a clear and express explanation that time started to run on 14 January 2015. To the extent that the primary judge accepted that the re-sent letter contained the warning that the first and second respondents were taken to have received the letter seven working days after the date appearing on it (14 January 2015) and that an application for review of the decision must be made within 28 days after they had been taken to be notified of the decision, but found that it was inadequate, the Minister contends that no duty of procedural fairness, if one existed, was breached. In the alternative, the Minister submits that the scope of procedural fairness is confined to no more than what was actually done by the Department. Any duty to appraise the first and second respondents of the applicable timetable was achieved by re‑sending the original letter, which itself explained the timetable. Finally, the Minister submits that even if the Department breached any duty of procedural fairness, this could not have led to a jurisdictional error by the RRT (noting that no breach of procedural fairness by the RRT itself is alleged or apparent). It must be said that the first and second respondents did not engage with these submissions concerning procedural fairness.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established