IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M112 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Plaintiff
and
ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA
Defendant
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 10 DECEMBER 2020, AT 9.46 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
KIEFEL CJ: In accordance with the current practice, I shall announce the appearances for counsel.
Appearing for the plaintiff is MR A.P. BERGER, QC.(instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Appearing for the defendant is MR R. MERKEL, QC with MR C.J. TRAN and MS E.S. JONES. (instructed by Doogue + George Lawyers)
Appearing for the Commonwealth as intervener is MR S.P. DONAGHUE, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia, with MR M.A. HOSKING. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Merkel.
MR MERKEL: If the Court pleases, do your Honours have the respondent’s outline of oral argument?
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, thank you.
MR MERKEL: I take it your Honours have had an opportunity to read it.
KIEFEL CJ: I think we can catch up, if we have not.
MR MERKEL: Yes, thank you, your Honour. Can we say, at the outset, that we would summarise the key propositions for which we are contending in our submissions as follows. Firstly, we would say that the decision of this Court in Lim is authority for the principles stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of our outline of oral argument…..The second submission is that the reasoning of Justice Gummow in Fardon – to which Justice Gummow and Justice Crennan adhered with Justice Hayne and agreeing in Thomas – establishes two propositions. The first is that the preventive detention jurisdiction considered in Fardon is not an exception to the Lim principle. Secondly, as a consequence, the jurisdiction in Fardon could not be validly conferred or invested as judicial power of the Commonwealth under Chapter III of the Constitution.
The third proposition is that it follows that the preventive detention jurisdiction in Division 105A of the Criminal Code purportedly invested in State and Territory courts under section 77(iii) of the Constitution is, firstly, penal or punitive in character and, secondly, has been invested contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution. The fourth submission is that the decision of this Court in Kable (No 2) should not be accepted as determining that preventive detention jurisdiction is able to be invested or conferred under section 77 of the Constitution as part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
Our submissions will cover four principle topics. The first is that we will address the Court’s decision in Lim and subsequent decisions that have applied Lim. Secondly, we will consider Justice Gummow’s judgments, particularly his Honour’s judgment in Fardon; thirdly, we will outline what we will contend is the punitive character of Division 105A of the Criminal Code; and,…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 218
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Federal Court possessed the inherent jurisdiction to grant a permanent stay of deportation proceedings, notwithstanding the absence of express statutory authorisation for such a power. This involved considering the scope of the Federal Court's judicial power and its ability to control the exercise of executive power in circumstances where it might otherwise lead to an abuse of process or a miscarriage of justice.
A majority of the High Court held that the Federal Court does not possess the inherent jurisdiction to grant a permanent stay of deportation proceedings. The Court reasoned that the power to grant a stay of deportation is a statutory power, and in the absence of such a statutory grant, the Federal Court cannot create such a power. The majority distinguished between the court's power to grant interlocutory stays to preserve the subject matter of litigation and a permanent stay that would permanently prevent the executive from exercising its statutory powers. The Court emphasised that the executive's power to deport is a significant public interest consideration and that judicial intervention must be grounded in clear statutory authority or established common law principles that do not extend to permanently enjoining the exercise of such powers.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court granting a permanent stay were set aside.
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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