Milovan Stankovic v Terry Grant Van Der Velde
[2014] HCASL 109
MILOVAN STANKOVIC
v
TERRY GRANT VAN DER VELDE & ORS
[2014] HCASL 109
S34/2014
On 12 May 2009, a sequestration order was made against the applicant's estate. At the time of the order, the applicant and his wife, the third respondent, jointly owned a property in New South Wales ("the Kellyville property"). The Kellyville property was subsequently sold by the third respondent and the first and second respondents, who were the trustees of the applicant's estate in bankruptcy.
The applicant sought declaratory relief on the ground that certain payments he received by way of compensation for personal injury were used to assist in the purchase of the Kellyville property. His contention was that, pursuant to s 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ("the Act"), that money was "protected money" which should be paid to the applicant.
On 14 December 2012, the Federal Court of Australia (Emmett J) held that 15.05 per cent of the net proceeds of sale of the Kellyville property could be attributed to the compensation money and ordered payment to the applicant in that proportion.
On 3 June 2013, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Edmonds, Jagot and Bromberg JJ) dismissed an appeal from the decision of Emmett J. The Full Court rejected certain contentions raised by the applicant as not open to challenge on appeal, including the validity of the trustees' appointments and the sequestration order. The Full Court held that the appeal assumed the correctness of the primary judge's determination to the extent that it proceeded on the basis that the sequestration order was valid and that the relevant property was lawfully held by the trustees.
The applicant requires an extension of time in which to bring his application for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Full Court. The applicant's draft notice of appeal makes unparticularised assertions of a failure to consider "relevant matters of law and fact". It does not identify any question as to the correctness of the Full Court's decision. An appeal to this Court would enjoy insufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave. The grant of an extension of time would therefore be futile. Special leave should be refused.
Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.
S.M. Kiefel
19 June 2014P.A. Keane
2
0
0