Milne v Rally Australia Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Milne v Rally Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCA 1101

MILNE v RALLY AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED

NSD 914 of 2009

STONE J
29 SEPTEMBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 914 of 2009

BETWEEN:

MILNE
Applicant

AND:

RALLY AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 SEPTEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application as agreed or taxed, such costs to be payable forthwith.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 914 of 2009

BETWEEN:

KATIE MILNE
Applicant

AND:

RALLY AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

29 SEPTEMBER 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 24 August 2009 the applicant, Ms Katie Milne, filed an application under ss 67A and 475(1)(b) of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (the Act) seeking to restrain the respondent from carrying on a motor car rally in the Tweed and Kyogle Local Government areas. As the rally was to be held during the period from 3 to 6 September 2009 the application was attended with considerable urgency and came before me as duty judge at 2.15 pm on 27 August 2009.  At the conclusion of the hearing on 27 August I dismissed the application for interlocutory relief and undertook to provide written reasons and to make an order for costs at a later date.  These are my reasons.

  2. At the hearing the applicant sought leave to have Mr Alan Oshlack represent her.  Mr Oshlack is not a legal practitioner and has no right of appearance in this Court.  He may appear with the leave of the Court.  The applicant said she had not sought legal representation as Mr Oshlack has an intimate knowledge of the matter and would be the best person to represent her.  Ms Milne said that Mr Oshlack had represented her in the past and she had more confidence in him than any lawyer. 

  3. From my questioning of her I concluded that Ms Milne appeared to understand the disadvantages that might arise from her not having a legally qualified representative.It was, however, with considerable reservation as to Mr Oshlack’s ability to assist the Court that I gave him leave to appear on the interlocutory application.  On both sides the matter was urgent.  Given that the commencement of the rally was imminent, if injunctive relief was not to be futile the matter had to proceed immediately.  Furthermore the inevitable preparation for such an event, as to which the respondent submitted detailed evidence, made it vital that the respondent have certainty as soon as possible.  It was therefore not practical to adjourn the hearing to allow Ms Milne to obtain legal representation even had…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Milne v Rally Australia Pty Limited, the applicant, Ms Milne, sought an injunction to prevent the respondent from conducting a rally that she believed would harm the Tweed koala population and other wildlife in the area. The court had to decide whether Ms Milne's concerns were sufficient to warrant an injunction, considering the criteria for granting such relief, and whether her evidence, including expert opinions, was admissible. The court noted significant issues with the admissibility of Ms Milne's affidavit and the affidavits of her experts, finding them largely inadmissible due to their failure to meet the requirements of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Additionally, Ms Milne did not establish a prima facie case for a controlled action under the relevant legislation or demonstrate that the balance of convenience favoured her application. Consequently, the court found that Ms Milne was not entitled to the injunction she sought.

The legal issues before the court included the admissibility of expert opinion under s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the criteria for granting an injunction, and whether the applicant could show a prima facie case. The court examined the application of the law to the facts presented, focusing on the requirements for expert evidence, the necessity of showing a controlled action under the Act, and the balance of convenience. The court held that Ms Milne's evidence did not meet the necessary standards, and therefore, she failed to meet the criteria for an injunction. The court also considered the costs of the interlocutory application, ordering that Ms Milne pay the respondent's costs as agreed or taxed, payable forthwith.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application as agreed or taxed, such costs to be payable forthwith.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the involvement and commitment that Ms Milne has demonstrated are sufficient to give her standing to bring the application she was not able to meet the criteria for the grant of an injunction. For that purpose it would be necessary for her to show a prima facie case (in the sense explained in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 82 per Gummow and Hayne JJ, per Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at 68) that the proposed rally was a controlled action and that no approval had been obtained under Part 9 of the Act. It would also be necessary for her to show that the balance of convenience lay with the granting of the injunction and that she was in a position to give an undertaking as to damages that is not an empty undertaking; First Netcom Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 101 FCR 77 at 85.The applicant’s evidence In the course of the hearing it transpired that my reservations about Mr Oshlack’s capacity to represent Ms Milne were justified. The affidavits that had been filed on behalf of the applicant were largely inadmissible, a fact that would have been apparent even to an inexperienced lawyer. Ms Milne’s affidavit filed in support of the application contained expressions of opinion that could be admitted only as evidence of the deponent’s state of mind. Other parts of the affidavit were totally irrelevant and clearly inadmissible. In summary her affidavit established that:·the applicant was very concerned to save the Tweed koala population from what she perceived as threats to its continued existence;·she first became aware of the proposed rally in September 2008 and from that time took an active interest in it;·she became increasingly concerned about the impact that the rally might have on the world heritage value of the proposed site and on species such as the Albert lyrebird, the spotted tail quoll and certain endangered frogs;·she understood that there was widespread community opposition to the rally;·she consulted environmental experts who expressed concern about the impact that the rally would have on various vulnerable species including those mentioned above. In addition to her affidavit the applicant also relied on the following two affidavits: (1) the affidavit of Mark Stewart Graham affirmed on 24 August 2009 to which were annexed two reports dated 31 July 2009 and 15 August 2009; and (2) the affidavit of Stephen John Ambrose affirmed on 24 August 2009 to which was annexed a letter of advice addressed to Mr Oshlack and a “supplementary statement of evidence” dated 23 August 2009. The first difficulty facing the applicant in relation to her expert evidence was whether any part of it was admissible as expert opinion in accordance with s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Section 79 provides an exception to the opinion evidence rule in the case of evidence of an opinion that is “wholly or substantially” based on a person’s specialist knowledge that, in turn, is “based on the person’s training, study and experience”. All elements of s 79 must be satisfied. Accordingly it must be shown that the opinion is relevant; that the person expressing the opinion has specialised knowledge in the relevant field; that the person’s specialised knowledge is based on the person’s training, study or experience; and that the particular opinion is based (wholly or substantially) on the specialised knowledge; see Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [17] per Lindgren J.

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

Full text does not contain this section.