MILLS & BELDING
[2010] FMCAfam 1253
•18 November 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MILLS & BELDING | [2010] FMCAfam 1253 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property – calculation of value of asset pool – contributions – sub-section 75(2) factors – just and equitable. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.75, 79 |
| Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626 Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335 Clauson and Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595 Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 C v C (2005) FLC 93-220 Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877 JEL and DDF (2001) FLC 93-075 Phillips and Phillips (2002) FLC 93-104 Weir v Weir (1993) FLC 92-338 Gollings & Scott (2007) FLC 93-319 Money (1994) FLC 92-485 Bremner and Bremner (1995) FLC 92-560 Pierce v Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 Parshen (1996) FLC 92-720 Garrett and Garrett (1984) FLC 91-539 Clives and Clives (2008) FLC 93-385 Kessey and Kessey (1994) FLC 92-495 |
| Applicant: | MS MILLS |
| Respondent: | MR BELDING |
| File Number: | MLC10190 of 2009 |
| Judgment of: | Roberts FM |
| Hearing dates: | 10 & 11 June & 1 July 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 1 July 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 18 November 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Spicer |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Goddard Elliott |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Smallwood |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mason Sier Turnbull |
ORDERS
(1)
That within sixty (60) days of the date of these Orders
MS MILLS (“the wife”) must pay to MR BELDING (“the husband”) the sum of seventy one thousand dollars ($71,000) (“the payment”).
(2)That contemporaneously with the payment the husband must transfer to the wife all of his right, title and interest in the parties’ former matrimonial home situate at Property S in Victoria, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume [omitted] (“the property”) and the wife must at the time of that transfer discharge at her cost any liability that the husband may have in relation to any mortgage or any other liability in relation to the property.
(3)That the parties have liberty to apply in relation to a sale of the property in the event that the wife does not make the payment in accordance with Order No. 1 hereof.
(4)That except as otherwise provided in these orders each party is declared to have no further interest in the items of property in the possession of the other and no further claim against the superannuation entitlements of the other.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Mills & Belding is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLC10190 of 2009
| MS MILLS |
Applicant
And
| MR BELDING |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Initially, the parties had competing applications before the Court for parenting orders in relation to their child as well as for property orders. However, the parties settled the applications for parenting orders on the first day of the hearing. Consequently, the only matters that the Court must now determine are their competing applications for order in relation to property division.
MS MILLS (“the wife”) seeks orders that MR BELDING (“the husband”) transfer the property at Property S (“the former matrimonial home”) to her subject to its mortgage liability and that the parties otherwise retain what they currently have, including their entitlements to superannuation benefits. As an alternative, the wife seeks a division of their assets, inclusive of their superannuation entitlements, on the basis of 55% to her and 45% to the husband.
In his Response filed in late 2009, the husband was seeking a division of assets on the basis if 70% to him and 30% to the wife. However, at the start of the hearing, the husband was seeking an Order that the wife pay to him the sum of $138,275 in return for a transfer to her of his interest in the former matrimonial home (also subject to the mortgage) and that the parties otherwise retain what they currently have, including their entitlements to superannuation benefits. In her closing submissions, his counsel submitted that he should be awarded 55% of the asset pool as the “lowest possible” assessment of his entitlement.[1]
[1] Transcript for 1 July 2010 at page 68.
Brief background
Where I refer to any fact in these Reasons, it should be regarded as a finding of fact unless a contrary intention is clear from the context.
The wife is self-employed as a [omitted]. Her taxable income for the four financial years prior to the start of the hearing were:
2005/06
$88,180
2006/07
$103,412
2007/08
$52,483
2008/09
$64,827
The husband is employed as a [omitted]. His remuneration package comprises a salary of $127,681 per annum, and employer superannuation contributions of 13.9% of his salary.[2]
[2] Annexure “MJB1” to his trial affidavit.
The parties started living together in 1995 and were married in 1996. It was a second marriage for both of them.
There is one child of the marriage, a daughter who is now aged 14 years. At the time of the hearing, she was choosing not to have contact with her father.
The wife has two adult sons from her former marriage, one of whom was living with her and the parties’ daughter in the former matrimonial home. He is a student who works part time and pays board to his mother. At the time of cohabitation in 1995, the wife moved into the husband’s home with her two sons, who were then still in primary school.
In 1995 the wife owned a home in Property K. She says that she also had a car and some savings at that time.
In 1995 the husband owned a home in Property M (“the Property M property”). He also had a car and a superannuation entitlement.
In 1997 the wife reduced the mortgage over the Property M property by a total of $34,000[3] from funds that she realised by selling her Property K property. The husband also concedes that the wife paid approximately $5,000 in 1996 for renovations to the Property M property.[4]
[3] $26,000 on 10 February and $8,000 on 2 May 1997 – see Exhibit “H10”.
[4] Transcript for 1 July 2010 at page 16.
In July 1997 the parties purchased the former matrimonial home for $275,000. They immediately placed the Property M property on the market. It sold for $281,000, but the mortgage liability over that property had to be extended for a short time because settlement of the purchase of the former matrimonial home took place before the settlement of the sale of the Property M property.
Property M had been transferred into the names of both parties approximately two months before it was sold.
Upon settlement of the sale of the Property M property, the proceeds were applied in reduction of the mortgage over the former matrimonial home, leaving a balance of approximately $100,000 owing to the mortgagee. Subsequent borrowings increased that balance.
In 2006 the former matrimonial home was transferred into the sole name of the husband in order to protect that asset from any potential claim against the wife by a disaffected former client.
They separated in early 2009 and the husband has re-partnered.
The wife filed her Application on 16 November 2009 and the husband filed his Response on 18 December 2009.
At 2 June 2010 the mortgage balance owing to the Commonwealth Bank was $164,399. However, it should be noted that, in contravention of an order made by consent on 22 December 2009, the wife failed to make any mortgage payments since October 2009.
Relevant law
Section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) sets out the matters that the court must take into account when considering what orders should be made for the alteration of the property interests of parties. They include:
a)the financial and non-financial contributions made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of each party or by a child to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any property of the parties;
b)the contribution made by a party to the welfare of the family including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;
c)the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party; and
d)the matters referred to in sub-section 75(2) as far as they are relevant.
The general approach to the determination of a property settlement application has been well established by authority.[5] It is essentially a multi-step process. The first step is to identify the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties (generally at the time of the hearing). The second step is to evaluate the contributions made by the parties as defined in section 79(4) of the Act and the third step is to consider those matters contained in section 75(2) that are relevant.
[5] See Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626; Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335; Clauson and Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595, Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 and C v C (2005) FLC 93-220
In determining what order the court should make under section 79, the court must be satisfied in all the circumstances that it is just and equitable to do so.[6] It is the justice and equity of the actual orders that the court must consider and this has been referred to as “the fourth step”.[7] In Russell v Russell, the Full court said:
Furthermore, it must be remembered in this regard that under s79(2) of the Act, the Court is required to be satisfied that it is the order to be made which is just and equitable, not just the underlying percentage division of the net value of the parties' assets. Indeed we take the opportunity to emphasise that in what his Honour has termed ''the fourth stage'', that is, the consideration of whether the result is just and equitable, it is the justice and equity of the actual orders not of the percentage distribution which must be considered.[8]
[6] See Sub-section 79(2)
[7] Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877, JEL and DDF (2001) FLC 93-075, Phillips and Phillips (2002) FLC 93-104 and Hickey and Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143
[8] See (1999) FLC 92-877 at page 86,439
Since the end of 2002 courts have been required to treat superannuation interests as “property” for the purposes of property settlements between parties to a marriage and in appropriate cases courts may “split” superannuation interests. [9] However, neither of the parties in this matter was pursuing a superannuation splitting order at the time of the hearing.
[9] See sections 90MC and 90MT of the Act
Credit
I found the wife to be a particularly unsatisfactory witness. This was surprising to me, given that her chosen occupation requires her to give evidence in court regularly.
I note that her business was operating two bank accounts when she gave her evidence. However, it was only because of extensive cross-examination that the court became aware that the balances of those accounts were $12,001.25 and $7,976.43.[10] This contrasts markedly with the stated value of $1,000 for her business as set out at Item 41 of her Financial Statement. Indeed, when she swore to the truth of that on 13 November 2009, she had $9,676.18 in the business ING account and $7,682.32 in the business Bendigo Bank account.[11]
[10] See Exhibits “H7”, “H8” and “H11”.
[11] See Exhibits “H7” and “H4”.
I simply cannot accept the wife's evidence that she was advised by her solicitor that she did not need to reveal what was in her business bank accounts.[12] I consider that to be a deliberate falsehood on her part.
[12] See transcript for 11 June 2010 at pages 20 and 21.
I also have considerable difficulty accepting that her younger son could save as much as $28,000 as a University student who, according to the wife earns:
Some weeks, nothing at all; during the Christmas university break, around $200 a week.[13]
[13] See transcript for 11 June 2010 at page 43.
Even if her son earned $200 per week every week of the year, that would only be an annual income of $10,400. I therefore find it to be much more likely that the wife transferred $28,000 to her son in order to remove it from consideration in these proceedings. However, I note that he subsequently transferred $22,000 back to her (presumably because she realised that she needed the funds).
On the other hand, the husband generally gave his evidence in a forthright and straightforward manner. Although he sometimes appeared a little reluctant to concede contributions made by the wife, I did not think that he was deliberately trying to hide anything or tailor his evidence to suit his purpose.
The asset pool
To their credit, the parties were able to agree about most of the assets to be included in the asset pool. The agreed asset pool is as follows:
The former matrimonial home
$886,000
Husband’s superannuation
$631,000
Wife’s superannuation
$29,764
Husband’s chattels
$2,295
Wife’s chattels
$5,395
Husband’s motor vehicle
$11,000
Wife’s motor vehicle
$16,000
Total
$1,581,454
The wife has an interest in a trust fund set up initially with a capital sum contributed by her former husband for child support for her two sons. The value of her interest was the subject of some evidence and some argument, however, in her closing submissions counsel for the husband submitted that an appropriate value to attribute to her interest in trust is $7,000. This is because the wife declared her interest in that trust to be worth slightly more than that in her financial statement.
It should be noted that the wife claimed to only have a 25% interest in that trust fund, but it is fair to say that her evidence about her interest in that trust fund was less than satisfactory.
In Weir v Weir,[14] the Full Court was dealing with an appeal against the refusal by a trial Judge to make orders in relation to unascertained property because it could not be quantified. The Court said:[15]
It seems to us that once it has been established that there has been a deliberate non-disclosure …… then the Court should not be unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the innocent party. To do otherwise might be thought to provide a charter for fraud in proceedings of this nature.
[14] (1993) FLC 92-338
[15] Nicholson CJ, Strauss and Nygh JJ at page 79-593
In Gollings & Scott[16] the Full Court said the following at paragraph 85;
The case law as developed establishes that generally an alteration of parties’ interest in property under s 79 is to be made out of their identified property at trial. Exceptions are recognised to this general principle, for example, in the cases involving failure to make a full and frank disclosure of assets where the property at the date of trial cannot be precisely ascertained [17] (see Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338; (1992) 16 Fam LR 154; Chang v Su (2002) FLC 93-117; (2002) 29 Fam LR 406).
[16] (2007) FLC 93-319
[17] My emphasis.
In this regard, I also refer to my comments at paragraphs 25 to 28 above about the wife’s failure to properly disclose financial matters.
With this in mind, I am of the view that $7,000 is an appropriate amount to attribute to the wife’s interest in the trust fund, so the total asset pool is worth $1,588,454.
Even if I am wrong about attributing $7,000 as the wife’s interest in the trust fund, I note that her business bank accounts held a total of approximately $20,000 which is not included in my calculations of the asset pool as set out above.
The parties agree that the only liability to take into account is the mortgage balance at $158,000. The actual figure is greater than that, resulting from the wife’s failure to make minimum mortgage repayments in accordance with an Order of this Court made by consent on 22 December 2009.[18] Clearly, the understanding between the parties is that she must be solely responsible for any difference between $158,000 and the actual balance outstanding, and that is appropriate in the circumstances.
[18] See paragraph 18 above.
This means that the net value of the asset pool is $1,430,454.
In accordance with the reasoning of the majority in C v C,[19]
I conclude that it is appropriate to include the parties’ superannuation interests in the same pool of assets as the other assets. This is because it is the manner in which the parties wish those interests to be treated, and neither is currently seeking a superannuation splitting order.
[19] (2005) FLC 93-220
Contributions
At the start of the parties’ relationship, the husband was the owner of the Property M property which he says was valued at $230,000 when he negotiated a property settlement with his former wife in December 1994. He also says that after paying his former wife her entitlement, the mortgage liability was approximately $110,000, so his equity in the Property M property was approximately $120,000. He was not challenged in relation to that evidence.
The husband says further that, when the parties commenced their relationship in 1996, the Property M property had increased in value to approximately $250,000 and he had reduced the mortgage liability to $108,000. There was challenge to his lack of expertise in “valuing” that property in 1996, but not in relation to his claim to have reduced the mortgage liability. I accept that the husband does not have valuation expertise, so it is appropriate to accept that the husband's equity in the Property M property contributed at the start of the parties’ relationship was in the vicinity of $122,000 (being $230,000, less the mortgage liability of $108,000).
The husband's counsel submitted that the husband had also made a significant initial contribution in the form of his superannuation entitlement. It is clear from the evidence that the husband transferred $46,274.70 from a private enterprise superannuation fund to a government employee superannuation fund on 28 February 1992.[20] It appears that the transferred sum of money has been quarantined in his current superannuation fund and in April 2010 it had a value of approximately $173,000.[21]
[20] Exhibit “H6”
[21] Exhibit “H13”
As I understood her argument, the husband’s counsel submitted that the wife could not be seen to have contributed to that part of his fund “in any shape or form”.[22] I do not accept that argument to be correct and there appears to be Full Court authority for the proposition that it is possible for a spouse to make indirect contributions to the growth of a superannuation entitlement. For example, in Jarman & Jarman the Full Court said:[23]
We consider that there is some force in the submission made in paragraph 3 of the above submissions, being, in effect, that the growth in the fund could be sourced to the nature of the fund and the contributions made throughout the marriage by both parties.
[22] Transcript 1 July 2010 at page 60.
[23] (2006) FLC 93-289 at paragraph 54
Notwithstanding this, the value of the husband’s superannuation interest at the start of the relationship was $92,586 and that was a further significant contribution on his part.
The total value of his initial contributions, being his equity in the Property M property and his superannuation entitlement, was in excess of $200,000.
It is clear that the wife’s initial contributions were not as significant. They were in the vicinity of $39,000 as a set out in paragraph 12 above.
Counsel sometimes make submissions to me that the value of a party’s initial contributions can be eroded with the passage of time. In Money[24] the dissenting judge, Fogarty J had said:
an initial substantial contribution by one party may be ‘eroded’ to a greater or lesser extent by the later contributions of the other party even though those later contributions do not necessarily at any particular point outstrip those of the other party.[25]
[24] (1994) FLC 92-485
[25] Money at page 81,054
The Full Court in Bremner and Bremner[26] approved that approach of Fogarty J.
[26] (1995) FLC 92-560
In Pierce v Pierce[27] the Full Court said:
In our opinion it is not so much a matter of erosion of contribution but a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contribution. It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all the other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife. In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution.[28]
[27] (1999) FLC 92-844
[28] Pierce at page 85,881
During the hearing of this matter, a lot of evidence was put before me about who paid for particular items acquired or for other particular expenses during the parties’ relationship. In my view, that evidence did nothing other than to confirm that each of the parties made contributions as they were able from their earnings, either towards the acquisition and improvement of assets or for the benefit of the family unit.
In Parshen, [29] their Honours Ellis, Finn and Purdy JJ said the following at page 83,665:
In our view, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be inferred in proceedings pursuant to the provisions of s 79 that moneys howsoever received by a party during the course of the parties' cohabitation, are used by that party for the benefit of the family unit. Such moneys, in those circumstances, thus constitute a financial contribution by the party who received the moneys.
[29] (1996) FLC 92-720
That is a sensible approach that I propose to adopt.
Similarly, each party put evidence before me in an attempt to show that he or she had made of the greater contribution as a homemaker and parent. My assessment of the evidence is that each party contributed according to his or her ability and the time each had available.
In general, I point out that the assessment of contributions is not an exercise of mathematical precision. In Hayne and Hayne, [30] Pawley J said:
In matters such as this one cannot approach the problem with an eye for meticulous detail. It should rather be dealt with broadly so that the end result can be said to be just and equitable.
[30] (1977) FLC 90-265 at p. 76,415
In Garrett and Garrett[31] the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia held that in long marriages, where the parties have devoted their resources and incomes for the benefit of the family, it is not possible to have a precise accounting of their contributions.[32] Similarly, in Clives and Clives[33] the Full Court said:
We accept that the task to be undertaken by a trial Judge in assessing weight to be attached to initial contributions, and other contributions, is not always an easy one and not discharged by a strict accounting exercise.
[31] (1984) FLC 91-539
[32] See also Poulos and Poulos (1984) FLC 91-515 at p. 79,184.
[33] (2008) FLC 93-385 at paragraph 44
Further in Kessey and Kessey[34] the Full Court also said:
In many - indeed probably in most - property settlement cases the Court has to evaluate and assess contributions to property in the absence of precise valuations of the contributions in question. Indeed, where the contributions to property are indirect or non-financial, precise valuation is impossible, and even where the contributions are direct or financial so that a valuation might be provided, other factors (not capable of precise mathematical statement) may well have eroded the initial value of such contributions. In a case such as the present, it is not necessary to arrive at precise mathematical valuations of the parties' contributions - all that is necessary is to evaluate the weight that should be given to each party's contributions relative to the contributions of the other party.
[34] (1994) FLC 92-495 at page 81,150. Emphasis by the Full Court
Indeed, I would say that an evaluation of the weight to be attributed to different types of contributions – such as direct financial contributions and indirect non-financial contributions – cannot ever be a science involving precise measurement. Consequently, when I consider the evidence with a broad brush approach, I conclude that during their relationship the parties contributed equally, save in three respects. They are:
·the husband’s initial contributions were significantly greater than those of the wife;
·the wife has made greater contributions towards the care of the parties’ daughter since separation; and.
·the husband made contributions towards the welfare of the wife's two sons (and there was no legal liability upon him to do so).
In relation to the last mentioned of those, I note that the father of the wife's two sons appears to have contributed very little towards their support. He did make a payment, which the wife says was $50,000 and was used to establish the trust fund referred to above, and of which approximately $7,000 remains. That means that the wife's former husband contributed approximately $37 per week per child during the relationship of the parties in this matter. That must have required significant additional contributions from the husband and the wife in order to properly provide for her two sons.
In my view the overall weight that should be given to their contributions is 60% to the husband and 40% to the wife. However, property division under the Act is not determined by contributions alone.
Section 75(2) factors
The wife is aged 52 years and the husband is 53 years old.
The husband is employed as a [omitted] with a salary of $127,681 per annum, and his employer contributes a further 13.9% of his salary to his superannuation fund.
The wife is a self-employed [omitted] and her last known annual income was $64,827. She used to earn more than that, but most of her work is now paid at [omitted] rates so it is not as lucrative as it once was. However, two factors are relevant in relation to that. They are:
·she could probably earn more as a salaried [omitted]; and
·in any event, she gave evidence that she expects to earn more in the future, primarily because she will be employing a [omitted] to work for her.
Further, the wife receives approximately $15,000 per annum tax free from the husband by way of Child Support. That is paid by him from his after tax income, so it goes a significant way towards reducing the gap between their disposable incomes.
The wife suffers from osteoarthritis but there is no evidence that it affects her capacity to earn an income.[35]
[35] See Annexure “AG1” to the affidavit of Dr G.
The wife is also a patient of Mr D, a neurosurgeon. In a report provided on 5 June 2009, Mr D said that she presented in 2001 with a lesion in the right middle cranial fossa with typical appearances of a meningioma, which had been identified from an MRI scan.
At that time he also said:
The lesion was of moderate size and there were no abnormal signs or symptoms referrable to it. I have monitored the situation with regular MRI scans and clinical assessments since that time. Fortunately the lesion has remained fundamentally stable in size over the period of monitoring.
He also said:
To the best of my knowledge, this lesion is not likely to have any impact upon Ms Mills's capacity to continue working a [omitted].
However, on 1 March 2010 he reported:
This is an update to the previous report that I provided on
Ms Mills in 2009 and should be read in conjunction with this. The repeat MRI scan that I performed in February 2010 has demonstrated a minimal but measurable increase in the size of the meningioma. …… It should be noted that this scan was performed on our new, more powerful, MRI. It is possible that a slight change in dimensions could be due to this change in machine. However, it is perhaps more probable that we are starting to see growth in this lesion, which has previously been stable for a substantial period.At this stage, I have recommended review in 12 months with a repeat MRI scan. No treatment is required over this time period.
If progressive growth is observed on next year’s scan or subsequent scans, it will be necessary to recommend treatment of the lesion. Treatment may involve cranial surgery but it is perhaps more likely that we will recommend treatment with focused radiation, commonly called radiosurgery.
I would hope that such treatment would not involve any significant morbidity, but it must be appreciated that there is a real risk of side effects that would be sufficient to interfere with her ability to earn a living.
Naturally, this must be very worrying for the wife. However, none of us has a crystal ball to determine whether there will be any affect upon her ability to earn an income.
At the time of the hearing, the wife was the sole carer of the parties’ teenage daughter. Although the orders that were made on 10 June 2010 left the door open for her to have contact with her father, it is quite clear that the sole burden of her care fell to the wife at that time. Again, I do not have a crystal ball to establish whether she will change her mind and spend regular time with her father. One can only hope that they will re-establish a meaningful relationship.
I have noted above that the husband contributes funds that are not insubstantial by way of Child Support. However, it is clear that caring for a child on one’s own is a burden that is not merely financial.
The father’s partner is a PhD student who has a scholarship that pays her approximately $380 per week.
When I consider all of these factors under sub-section 75(2) of the Act, I consider that there should be an adjustment in the wife’s favour of 10%.
Conclusions
As can be seen above if this matter was to be decided on contributions alone, the husband would receive 60% of the total net value of the asset pool. However, I have determined that there should be an adjustment under sub-section 75(2) of the Act of 10% in favour of the wife. This means that there should be an equal division of the asset pool as set out above.
I have determined that the net value of the asset pool is $1,430,454, so the husband should receive assets worth $715,227. He already has the following:
Superannuation
$631,000
Chattels
$2,295
Husband’s motor vehicle
$11,000
Total
$644,295
That means that in order to resolve this matter with a transfer of the former matrimonial home to the wife, she will need to make a payment to the husband of $70,932.
When I consider that in the light of section 79(2), I consider that a just and equitable settlement would be for that to be rounded up to $71,000. I will therefore make orders to take account of that.
Given the significant equity in the former matrimonial home and the wife’s occupation, I do not believe that she will have any difficulty borrowing sufficient funds to pay the husband what he is owed. I will allow a period of 60 days for that to occur.
However, in the event that the wife is unable to pay the required sum of $71,000 within sixty days, I will grant the parties liberty to apply in relation to a sale of the former matrimonial home. Naturally, if that is to occur, any distribution of the proceeds of sale will take account of the matters referred to above.
I certify that the preceding eighty (80) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Roberts FM
Date: 18 November 2010
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