Miller v Byrne - [2016] WASC 236

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION: MILLER -v- BYRNE [2016] WASC 236

CORAM: ALLANSON J

HEARD: 25 JULY 2016

DELIVERED : 15 AUGUST 2016

FILE NO/S: SJA 1043 of 2016

BETWEEN: BRETT JAMES MILLER
Appellant
AND
RYAN JAMES BYRNE
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :CHIEF MAGISTRATE S A HEATH
File No  :PE 11089 of 2015, PE 12326 of 2015, PE 12328 of 2015, PE 17511 of 2015, PE 22893 of 2015, PE 22897 of 2015, PE 22898 of 2015, PE 22899 of 2015, PE 22900 of 2015, PE 22901 of 2015, PE 22902 of 2015, PE 37977 of 2015, PE 37983 of 2015, PE 37984 of 2015, PE 22895 of 2015, PE 12167 of 2016, PE 37980 of 2015

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Discount for plea of guilty under s 9AA Sentencing Act 2004 (WA) - Whether plea at earliest reasonable opportunity - Delay of plea while negotiating offences - Whether delay reasonable - Turns on own facts

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Whether appellate court should interfere in sentence of lower court - Section 14(2) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) - Miscarriage of justice - Failure to discount for plea of guilty - Fresh exercise of sentencing discretion - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 9AA

Result:

Leave to appeal on grounds 1, 2 and 3 granted
Appeal allowed
Sentence of the magistrate set aside
Substituted with a sentence of 78 weeks' imprisonment
Conditionally suspended for 12 months

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr S B Watters & Mr R Williamson
Respondent: Ms S E Wisbey

Solicitors:

Appellant: Williamson Criminal Lawyers
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Abeyakoon v Brown [2011] WASCA 63; (2011) 211 A Crim R 338
Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4
D v Lusted [2013] TASSC 31
Marshall v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 156
Rossi v State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 189
Tela v State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 103
Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170

ALLANSON J: Brett James Miller applies for leave to appeal against sentences of imprisonment imposed on him by a magistrate. Mr Miller was on bail for nearly a year between his arrest and when he pleaded to the charges. During that time he took steps to overcome his drug addiction. There are two matters central to the appeal: whether proper allowance was made for Mr Miller's early indication of his willingness to plead guilty; and whether his demonstrated rehabilitation while on bail should have resulted in a suspended sentence.
Alternatively, the appellant submitted that this court should resentence on the basis of error by the court below and, on the fresh exercise of the sentencing discretion, the court should suspend any sentence of imprisonment.

The offences and sentences

On 2 May 2016, Mr Miller was sentenced on his plea of guilty to 44 charges for offences he committed between November 2014 and May 2015. By his offending, Mr Miller had breached a community based order imposed in July 2014. He was sentenced also for that breach, and for the four offences for which it was imposed. It was not remarked on in the sentencing process, but many of the offences were committed after Mr Miller had been admitted to bail.
The learned magistrate imposed sentences of imprisonment for 17 of the offences, and modest fines for the others. The appeal challenges only the sentences of imprisonment.
Mr Miller was sentenced to imprisonment for two offences of possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property; five offences of stealing a motor vehicle; four offences of stealing; two offences of burglary in a place; one offence of burglary in a dwelling; one offence of breach of bail; one offence of dangerous driving to escape police; and one offence of supplying methamphetamine. The total imprisonment was 2 years, with eligibility for parole. The overall sentence was structured by imposing cumulative sentences for five offences, with the other sentences of imprisonment to be served concurrently.
Counsel for the respondent has very helpfully provided a table setting out each offence, the date of offence, the maximum penalty for that offence (including the summary conviction penalty), and the penalty imposed. I have included it as an annexure to these reasons.

Sentencing considerations

Mr Miller was 32 at the time of sentencing. His criminal record before November 2014 was not serious. He had not previously been imprisoned, or appeared before a superior court. He did, however, have a record of minor offending beginning in July 2003.
On 16 July 2014, Mr Miller was convicted of stealing, unlawful damage, fraud and possession of cannabis, and given a community based order for 9 months. He completed the community work requirement of the order, but failed to comply with supervision requirements. He did not complete a programme requirement. He failed to comply with instructions relating to urinalysis. He was then addicted to methamphetamine.
In August and September 2014, Mr Miller was convicted and fined for three offences committed before the community based order was made. In March and April 2015, he was convicted and fined for five offences under the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) and one offence of possessing drug paraphernalia, all apparently committed while subject to the community based order.
The offences for which he was sentenced on 2 May 2016 began in November 2014. Most of them were committed in March and April 2015. Mr Miller was arrested on more than one occasion. On 5 March 2015, he appeared in the Perth Magistrates Court and was granted bail. He offended again the following day. On 14 April 2015 he appeared in the Perth Magistrates Court and was remanded on bail to appear on 29 April. He did not appear.
Mr Miller was arrested again on 8 May 2015, after committing further offences. He was released to bail on 12 May 2015 on conditions including that he reside at a Fresh Start recovery centre. He transferred from there after four months to a Salvation Army centre, where he lived and undertook drug counselling. While on bail (and while on bail awaiting this appeal) Mr Miller was subjected to urinalysis, and returned no positive samples.
Mr Miller pleaded guilty to all charges on 1 April 2016. Some of the charges had been amended, regarding the value of the property stolen, to allow them to be dealt with summarily. A charge of aggravated reckless driving, which carries mandatory imprisonment, had been amended to aggravated dangerous driving, which does not.
At the time of sentencing, Mr Miller and his wife were awaiting the birth of their first child.
The learned magistrate referred to the fact that the offences occurred while Mr Miller was in the grip of a drug addiction, and also that he had done very well during the period he had been on bail. While acknowledging that Mr Miller had made considerable steps towards rehabilitation since his arrest, his Honour regarded the seriousness and volume of the offending as requiring a term of immediate imprisonment. His Honour considered but rejected a suspended term as appropriate to this offending.
His Honour referred to the question of totality with such a large number of offences. He made all but five of the 17 sentences of imprisonment concurrent, and imposed fines of $100 for most of the remaining matters, describing the fines as 'token fines representing the fact that you have been in prison' (ts 16).
The learned sentencing magistrate referred to the period Mr Miller was on bail 'while [the charges] went through the committal process before they were amended to be dealt with in this jurisdiction'. He referred to the plea of guilty, but did not state the fact or extent of any reduction in sentence for the plea.

The grounds of appeal

Mr Miller seeks leave to appeal on three grounds.

Ground 1

This ground contends that the sentence of immediate imprisonment was in all the circumstances manifestly excessive. The substance of the complaint is that the sentence of imprisonment was not suspended.
There are four 'particulars':
1.1the plea of guilty;
1.2the criminality involved;
1.3the appellant's antecedents; and
1.4sentences imposed in broadly comparable cases.
The pleas of guilty were entered on 1 April 2016; Mr Miller had been arrested in May 2015. Counsel submitted on the appeal, in written submissions, that the plea was at the earliest reasonable opportunity 'upon the appellant being able to seek rehabilitation; and upon the conclusion of negotiations with the State regarding the appellant's charges'. Counsel who appeared before the sentencing magistrate did not submit that the plea was at the first reasonable opportunity. His submissions on timing of the plea were unfortunately opaque. The plea had been entered before another magistrate, about a month earlier. The respondent provided transcript of the earlier hearing during the adjournment of the appeal.
There can be no doubt that his Honour was aware of the plea of guilty, but it is not apparent how he took it into account in imposing the sentence he did.
In relation to particular 1.2, while challenging the sentence of immediate imprisonment, the appellant does not challenge the correctness of any of the findings made about the nature and seriousness of the offending.
Particular 1.3 is the nub of the appellant's argument about why the sentence of imprisonment should have been suspended.
Counsel at sentencing pressed for a suspended sentence, describing the appellant as having completed 'drug court conditions' during his period on bail. Counsel submitted that there would be no community interest served in undoing the hard work of the previous 12 months. Mr Miller was now clean and sober, engaged in volunteer work, and expecting the birth of his first child. He had 'turned his life around' and was at low risk of re-offending.
The learned magistrate expressed his concern at the number of offences, most of them committed in breach of a community based order. He said, correctly, that the offending was serious, including burglaries and stealing of cars and other items of considerable value on a continuing basis. The offences included an offence of dangerous driving to escape pursuit, conduct his Honour described as of a type that requires a term of immediate imprisonment by way of general and specific deterrence. The spate of property offences continued unabated until Mr Miller's arrest.
The appellant does not point to any error in his Honour's statement of his antecedents.
In written submissions on particular 1.4, the appellant correctly stated the principles regarding the use of sentences imposed in broadly comparable cases. He referred to two cases:
1.D v Lusted [2013] TASSC 31 is similar in that the offender committed a large number of offences, primarily of dishonesty, over a very short period and received a term of immediate imprisonment. Otherwise it is scarcely comparable. The offender in that case was 18. At the time of the hearing before Wood J, on 12 June 2013, the offender had been in custody since 12 November 2012, four months of that on remand before sentence. Her Honour partially suspended the sentence from the date of her decision (a sentencing option not available in Western Australia) on condition that the offender commit no offences punishable by imprisonment for a period of 18 months.
2.Tela v State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 103, where a sentence of 2 years and 9 months immediate imprisonment imposed on an 18‑year‑old for two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of burglary, one count of driving recklessly to escape pursuit, one count of aggravated failure to stop, and one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The burglary and aggravated burglary were dealt with on indictment. The sole ground of appeal alleged breach of the totality principle. The Court of Appeal held that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and refused leave.
Neither of these cases can be regarded as truly comparable. And no attempt has been made to identify any principle reflected in them, by reference to which the sentence imposed on Mr Miller can be shown to be excessive.
In short, no express error has been identified in the way in which his Honour approached the question of suspension.
Error may be implied if the sentences imposed are unreasonable or unjust. Such error may be shown if it is demonstrated that failure to suspend the term of imprisonment was not a sentencing option that was reasonably open in the exercise of a sound discretionary judgment. Having regard to the factors to which his Honour referred, and the information before the sentencing court, immediate imprisonment was within the range of sentences reasonably open in the exercise of a sound discretionary judgment. Whether a different sentence should have been imposed, having regard to material before this court, will be considered in the discussion of ground 3.

Ground 2

The appellant contends that the total effective sentence he received infringed the first limb of the principle of totality. That principle requires a judicial officer sentencing an offender for multiple offences to ensure that the aggregation of the sentences imposed is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved in the offender's conduct, when viewed in their entirety, and in all the circumstances of the case, including those personal to the appellant. This may be done by reducing the length of individual sentences for some offences, or by a mixture of cumulative and concurrent sentences.
The effect to be given to the rehabilitation of the appellant while on bail is also central to this ground. The appellant submits that the total sentence of two years is too high, and fails adequately to have regard to his antecedents.
The appellant does not allege express error. The learned magistrate was required to sentence for many offences that were not part of one transaction, but were committed over several weeks. He specifically referred to considerations of totality 'in relation to such a large number of offences', and structured the sentence to give effect to what he regarded as the sentence appropriate to the overall offending. Although only the sentences of imprisonment are challenged in this appeal, this court should not overlook the way in which the sentencing judge dealt with whole of the offending conduct.
The respondent submits that the resulting sentence, imprisonment for two years and a total fine of $6,000 for the 32 offences dealt with by a fine, is well within the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion, and no error may be implied from the length and type of sentence imposed. Subject to my reasons regarding ground 3, I would accept that submission.

Ground 3

Section 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides:
(1)In this section ‑
fixed term has the meaning given in section 85(1);
head sentence, for an offence, means the sentence that a court would have imposed for the offence if ‑
(a)the offender had been found guilty after a plea of not guilty; and
(b)there were no mitigating factors;
victim has the meaning given in section 13.
(2)If a person pleads guilty to a charge for an offence, the court may reduce the head sentence for the offence in order to recognise the benefits to the State, and to any victim of or witness to the offence, resulting from the plea.
(3)The earlier in the proceedings the plea is made, the greater the reduction in the sentence may be.
(4)If the head sentence for an offence is or includes a fixed term, the court must not reduce the fixed term under subsection (2) ‑
(a)by more than 25%; or
(b)by 25%, unless the offender pleaded guilty, or indicated that he or she would plead guilty, at the first reasonable opportunity.
(5)If a court reduces the head sentence for an offence under subsection (2), the court must state that fact and the extent of the reduction in open court.
(6)This section does not prevent the court from reducing the head sentence for an offence because of any mitigating factor other than a plea of guilty.
The time at which the plea is made is directly relevant in both s (3) and s (4).
Mr Miller was entitled to a discount for his plea of guilty. The magistrate did not specify the extent of any discount, as required by s 9AA(5) of the Sentencing Act. In that, the magistrate erred. The result of the error is that it is not possible to be certain whether the sentencing magistrate allowed a reduction to each sentence for the plea, or to know the extent of any reduction allowed.
The appellant submits that, on error being shown, this court may now resentence, so that the sentencing discretion should be exercised afresh. That does not automatically follow. Section 14(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2014 (WA) applies to sentencing appeals: Abeyakoon v Brown [2011] WASCA 63; (2011) 211 A Crim R 338 [32]. In Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170 [31], Jenkins J said:
I have been unable to find any decision which directly construes s 14(2) in the context of a sentencing appeal. The governing criteria should be that contained in the Act itself; that is, whether the judge hearing the appeal considers that, despite the error in the court below, the appeal ought to be dismissed because no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. In the context of a sentencing appeal this will usually require the sentencing court to consider what the appropriate penalty would have been for the offence if no error had been made in exercising the sentencing discretion at first instance. If a lower sentence ought to have been imposed at first instance then the Appeal Court would not be able to exercise the discretion in s 14(2) to dismiss the appeal because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. If, on the other hand, despite the error made in the lower court, the same sentence ought to have been imposed then the discretion in s 14(2) would, in the usual case, be exercised.
I agree with her Honour. It is still necessary to consider whether a different sentence should have been imposed in the lower court.
The appellant submits that the sentence should have been subject to the 'full discount'. As I have remarked earlier, it was not submitted before the sentencing magistrate that the plea was at the first reasonable opportunity, and the material before the magistrate did not show that it was made at that time.
Counsel for the appellant also submitted that, on its proper reading, s 9AA(4) permits a court to reduce a fixed term by 25% even where the plea was not entered at the first reasonable opportunity: the question under the subsection is whether the offender pleaded guilty, not when. This, he submitted, followed from the use of the disjunctive 'or' between pars (a) and (b). The submission is not supported by the text of the section, which is directed not only to the fact of a plea but the time at which it is entered as a condition for the exercise of the power to grant a reduction of 25%. It is also inconsistent with authority: see Rossi v State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 189 [64] ‑ [67]; Marshall v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 156 [45]. The making or indicating of the plea at the first reasonable opportunity is a condition for the exercise of the power to grant the maximum reduction.
Whether the plea is at the first reasonable opportunity requires an objective assessment, having regard to all relevant circumstances in the particular case, as to whether it would have been reasonable for the accused to have pleaded guilty on an earlier occasion: see Rossi v State of Western Australia [53]. Negotiation between the defence and prosecuting authorities, particularly where it includes an indication that the offender will plead guilty, would be a relevant circumstance to be assessed by reference to when the plea was then made.

The material before the sentencing magistrate, and that initially put before this court, did not enable a finding about when Mr Miller first indicated he would plead guilty. Counsel then acting for Mr Miller referred to his negotiations with the State, but in very general terms. There was no adequate explanation of why the plea had not been entered until 12 months after the arrest. That remained the case when this matter first came before the court on appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal, there was even some uncertainty about when guilty pleas for all charges were first entered or indicated. Counsel for the appellant assumed that this had been at the first reasonable opportunity. When this was questioned, counsel referred to the annotation '(G)', which appeared on the prosecution notices attached to the original appeal notice. He did not know whether this indicated a plea. At the request of the appellant I adjourned to enable the appellant's legal representatives to make further inquiries and put the results before the court. The appellant also sought to put before the court, as annexures to an affidavit of Rhett Williamson, dated 27 July 2016, the email record which gives substance to the submission that the plea followed negotiation with the state, and which enables a proper appreciation of when the plea of guilty was first entered or indicated. I am satisfied that the evidence should be admitted under s 40(1)(e) of the Criminal Appeals Act. Neither party wished to make further submissions once that evidence was received.
In short, the appellant's inquiries with the magistrates court reveal that '(G)' merely indicates that the magistrate entered one result (whether adjournment, remand or penalty) for a group of charges rather than an individual result for each charge.
The additional information regarding negotiations is more significant. Mr Miller was arrested on 8 May 2015. On 13 May, his solicitor, Mr Williamson, sent an email to the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions stating that Mr Miller would enter a plea '[if] the State agree to amend the approximate value of the property to below $10,000'. That amendment would put the charge within the jurisdiction of a summary court: Code s 378 and s 426. The offer referred to two charges of burglary and stealing. Mr Williamson followed up the offer by email on 20 July 2015. He was advised that a State prosecutor had not yet been assigned to manage the matter.
On 20 July 2015, Mr Williamson proposed that his client would plead guilty to 35 summary charges if four charges were discontinued. He was advised that the police were completing a brief with another ten charges and 'once this has been served and you have reviewed it we can discuss the matter'.
On 10 November 2015, the DPP wrote to Mr Williamson. Mr Williamson replied on 19 November, offering a resolution. In effect, he proposed that Mr Miller would plead to burglary and stealing charges if the value was dropped under $10,000, stating that the value of the property was disputed. He similarly offered to plead to a charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) on an amendment to the charge regarding the weight of the drug, stating the weight was disputed. Mr Williamson continued:
We could pleas of guilty to all other charges on one concession, and that is that the summary charges of Fail to Stop, SMV, No MDL and Reckless Driving (pursuit) all from 19 April 2015 are discontinued. There is a paucity of evidence on this charge, no forensics and no one located in the vehicle.
In the circumstances, given the volume of charges, it would be best to resolve these matters as a whole which would save the court and all parties a significant cost.
Mr Williamson followed up on 13 January 2016, stating that he would adjourn a hearing that day 'in anticipation of your consideration and hopefully a resolution as proposed in the offer [of 19 November]'. The DPP replied on 4 February 2016, referring to matters including the fact that some charges were not within the authority of the DPP, but were dealt with by the police. The burglary and stealing to which Mr Miller had offered a plea in May 2015 were the only purely indictable charges. The DPP proposed another brief adjournment when the matter came before the court on 12 February 2016.
Mr Williamson responded on 16 February 2016, with an offer of resolution that applied to all charges. In support of the proposal, Mr Williamson urged that the resolution was in the public interest, referring in particular to Mr Miller's drug dependence at the time of the offending and his success in being able to overcome his addiction and turn his life around. Mr Miller continued to deny that he was the driver in the reckless driving charge, and insisted on the discontinuance of the driving charges because of the mandatory imprisonment.
On 23 March 2016, apparently following further discussions, Mr Williamson confirmed that Mr Miller would plead to a substituted charge of dangerous driving. Pleas to all charges were entered on 1 April 2016.
The lengthy delay between arrest and plea must be viewed in the light of these negotiations. The delay was not merely for some tactical advantage; and the offers to plead, although subject to conditions, were made early and offered the genuine benefit of disposing of the whole of the matters without trial. None of this was before the sentencing magistrate. On the very limited information he had, his Honour could not be expected to properly allow for the plea in determining sentence.
But after carefully considering the exchange between Mr Williamson and the prosecuting authorities, information not put before his Honour, I believe that a different sentence should have been imposed. There has not only been a failure to comply with s 9AA(5), but there has been a miscarriage of justice. The sentence should be altered to properly take into account the circumstances surrounding the plea and the court should, as required by s 9AA(5), state the extent of the reduction to any head term.
Section 9AA is difficult to apply in these circumstances, where a more global approach is not only practical, but the only practical way to determine a sentence.
Having regard to the matters set out in s 6 of the Sentencing Act, terms of imprisonment for some of the offences should be imposed. The sentences stated by the learned magistrate are, in my opinion, appropriate head sentences.
In many instances, the case was very strong. In some cases Mr Miller was caught in possession of property, or drugs and drug paraphernalia. In others, he was identifiable from CCTV footage. But that is not so for all of the charges. For example, the statement of material facts does not cast doubt on the assertion made on behalf of Mr Miller, in the course of plea negotiation, that there was a lack of evidence proving that he was the driver in the charge of dangerous driving to which he ultimately pleaded. Mathematical precision is impractical when speaking of months and weeks. But having regard to the early indication of plea, and the strength of the prosecution case, it would be appropriate to reduce each sentence of imprisonment by a factor of around 16% to 20%.
It is also necessary to consider whether the term of imprisonment should be served immediately. That requires the court to consider all relevant sentencing factors: Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4 [8] ‑ [10]. In deciding whether to suspend a sentence of imprisonment a court takes into account the public interest in the rehabilitation of the offender. This can involve a degree of speculation about whether a particular offender will have the necessary motivation and resources to comply with the conditions of such a sentence. The degree to which Mr Miller has got his life on course in the last 15 months helps in assessing the prospects of his rehabilitation. I am satisfied that a suspended sentence can, in the circumstances that are now known, meet the requirements of sentencing principles.
There is another factor to be taken into account in the overall structure of the sentence. Mr Miller has served 51 days in prison. A suspended sentence cannot be backdated, but must date from today. I will take the time served into account by further reducing the term of imprisonment for one of the sentences to allow for approximately seven weeks in custody.
The sentences on each of PE 22898/15, PE 22901/15, PE 22893/15, PE 22895/15, PE 22897/15, PE 22899/15, PE 37977/15, PE 37980/15, and PE22900/15 will be 21 weeks. The sentence on PE 37983/15 will be 14 weeks. The sentences on PE 11089/15, PE 12326/15, PE 12328/15, PE 17511/15, PE 22902/15, PE 37984/15 and PE 12167/16 will be 11 weeks. The structuring of the overall sentence to ensure an appropriate aggregate term will follow that adopted by the sentencing magistrate.
The head sentence will be on PE 22898/15, and sentences on the other two burglary charges (PE 22901/15 and PE 37983/15) will be cumulative, giving a total of 56 weeks. The terms of imprisonment on the two charges of stealing a motor vehicle, PE12328/15 and PE12167/16, should also be cumulative. The sentences for each of the other matters where imprisonment has been imposed will be concurrent. I have taken into account the way in which the learned magistrate dealt with the balance of the charges, by imposing fines.
The total is imprisonment for 78 weeks. That term will be suspended for 12 months, starting from today.
I have considered whether the suspension should be conditional. Despite Mr Miller's obvious progress, I am satisfied that a supervision condition should be imposed.

Conclusion

Leave to appeal should be granted on all grounds, and the appeal allowed.
Mr Miller will be resentenced in accordance with these reasons.

Annexure A
Table of Offences and Penalties

Charge No	Offence	Date of Offence	Maximum Penalty		Sentence
1.	AR 10457/14	Breach of CRO or community order (s 131(1) Sentencing Act)	$1,000 fine		$100 fine
Original offences for which the appellant was placed on a 9 month CBO on 19 July 2014
2.	JO 1091/14	Stealing (value $969) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	6/11/13	$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years		$100 fine
3.	JO 1092/14	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	6/11/13	2 years' imp/$24K fine Indictable: 7 years		$100 fine
4.	JO 1093/14	Criminal damage (s 444(1)(b) Code)	24/11/13	3 years' imp/$36K fine Indictable: 10 years		$100 fine
5.	JO 1094/14	Possess a prohibited drug (Cannabis) (s 6(2)); 34(1) MDA)	4/02/14	2 years imp/$2K fine		$100 fine
New offences
6.	PE 115219/14	Stealing (less than $1,000) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	2/11/14		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
7.	PE 115220/14	Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property (s 428(1) Code)	21/11/14		2 years' imp/$24K fine	$100 fine
8.	PE 115221/14	Possess drug paraphernalia (s 7B MDA)	21/11/14		3 years' imp/ $36K fine	$100 fine
9.	PE 119493/14	Possess drug paraphernalia (s 7B MDA)	24/12/14		3 years' imp/ $36K	$100 fine
10.	PE 9321/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
11.	PE 9322/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
12.	PE 9323/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
13.	PE 9324/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
14.	PE 9325/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
15.	PE 9326/15	Gains benefit by fraud (s 409 Code)	20/01/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
16.	PE 11001/15	Stealing (value $798) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	26/01/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
17.	PE 11002/15	Stealing (Value $470) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	28/01/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
18.	PE 11089/15	Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property (s 428(1) Code)	6/02/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine	3 months' imp (conc)
19.	PE 12326/15	Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property (s 428(1) Code)	6/03/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine	3 months' imp (conc)
20.	PE 12327/15	Stealing (Stihl brick saw) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	6/03/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
21.	PE 12328/15	Steal motor vehicle (s 378; 426(3) Code)	6/03/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 7 years	3 months' imp (cum)
22.	PE 13686/15	Stealing (clothing from charity bin) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	14/03/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
23.	PE 13687/15	Possess a prohibited drug (Methylamphetamine) (s 6(2); 34(1) MDA)	14/03/15		2 years imp/ $2K fine	$100 fine
24.	PE 13688/15	Possess drug paraphernalia (s 7B MDA)	14/03/15		3 years' imp/ $36k fine	$100 fine
25.	PE 13689/15	No authority to drive disqualified/suspended (subsequent offence) (s 49(1)(a) and (3)(c) RTA)	14/03/15		18 months' imp/ $1,000-$4,000 fine	$1,500 fine
26.	PE 17511/15	Stealing (bicycle and helmet: $1,500 + $100) (s 378; 426(2) Code)	13/03/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	3 months' imp (conc)
27.	PE 17512/15	Stealing (value $469) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	6/04/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
28.	PE 17513/15	Stealing (value $29.95) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	6/04/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
29.	PE 17514/15	Possess drug paraphernalia (s 7B MDA)	6/04/15		3 years' imp/ $36k fine	$100 fine
30.	PE 22892/15	Failure to stop (s 53(2A) RTA)	19/04/15		1^ST offence: $1200 fine Subsequent: $2400 fine	$100 fine
31.	PE 22893/15	Steal motor vehicle (s 371A; 378 Code)	19/04/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
32.	PE 22894/15	No authority to drive disqualified/suspended (subsequent offence) (s 49(1)(a) and (3)(c) RTA)	19/04/15		18 months' imp/ $1,000-$4,000 fine	$1,500 fine and MDL disqualification for 9 months
33.	PE 22895/15	Dangerous driving to escape police (aggravated) (s 61 RTA)	19/04/15		3 years' imp/ $36K fine	6 months' imp and MDL disqualification for 2 years
34.	PE 22896/15	Stealing (car keys) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	27/04/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
35.	PE 22897/15	Steal motor vehicle (s 378 Code)	27/04/15		2 years/ $24k Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
36.	PE 22898/15	Burglary and commit offence in place (s 401(2)(c))	27/04/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 14 years	6 months' imp (head sentence)
37.	PE 22899/15	Steal motor vehicle (s 371A; 378 Code)	8/05/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
38.	PE 22900/15	Stealing (value $9999) (s 378; 426(2) Code)	25-27/04/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
39.	PE 22901/15	Burglary and commit offence in dwelling (s 401(1)(b)	25-27/04/15		3 years/ $36K Indictable: 18 years	6 months' imp (cum)
40.	PE 22902/15	Breach of bail (s 51(2) Bail Act)	29/04/15		3 years imp/ $10K fine	3 months' imp (conc)
41.	PE 37975/15	Stealing (value $679) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	20-22/04/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
42.	PE 37977/15	Stealing (bicycles, value $4,600 (s 378; 426(2) Code)	25-26/04/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
43.	PE 37980/15	Stealing (s 378)	28-29/03/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	6 months' imp (conc)
44.	PE 37983/15	Burglary and commit offence in place (s 401(2)(c))	28-29/03/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 14 years	6 months' imp (cum)
45.	PE 37984/15	Supply a prohibited drug (Methylamphetamine) (s 6(1)(c) MDA)	8/05/15		4 years' imp/ $5,000 fine Indictable: 25 years' imp/ $100 K fine	3 months' imp (conc)
46.	PE 51987/15	Stealing (bicycle) (s 378; 426(4) Code)	21/04/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
47.	PE 22972/15	Stealing (mobile phone, value $848 (s 378; 426(4) Code)	26/03/15		$6,000 fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
48.	PE 22973/15	Stealing 92 x mobile phones, value $1536) (s 378; 426(2) Code)	28/03/15		2 years' imp/ $24K fine Indictable: 7 years	$100 fine
Conviction does not appear on criminal record as at 2 June 2016
49.	PE 12167/16	Steal motor vehicle (s 371A; 378 Code)	8/05/15		2 years/ $24K Indictable: 7 years	3 months' imp (cum)
Total Effective Sentence: 2 years imprisonment